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The bottleneck and ceiling effects in quantized tracking control of heterogeneous multi-agent systems under DoS attacks

Shuai Feng [email protected]    Maopeng Ran [email protected]    Baoyong Zhang [email protected]    Lihua Xie [email protected]    Shengyuan Xu [email protected] School of Automation, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China and the Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing 100094, China School of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 68000, Singapore
Abstract

In this paper, we investigate tracking control of heterogeneous multi-agent systems under Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks and state quantization. Dynamic quantized mechanisms are designed for inter-follower communication and leader-follower communication. Zooming-in and out factors, and data rates of both mechanisms for preventing quantizer saturation are provided. Our results show that by tuning the inter-follower quantized controller, one cannot improve the resilience beyond a level determined by the data rate of leader-follower quantized communication, i.e., the ceiling effect. Otherwise, overflow of followers’ state quantizer can occur. On the other hand, if one selects a “large” data rate for leader-follower quantized communication, then the inter-follower quantized communication determines the resilience, and further increasing the data rate for leader-follower quantized communication cannot improve the resilience, i.e., the bottleneck effect. Simulation examples are provided to justify the results of our paper.

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1 Introduction

Control of multi-agent systems has attracted substantial attention of researchers. An agent refers to a subsystem in a large-scale system consisting of multiple agents and can be a different subject depending on the context. For example, an agent is a drone in a UAV swarm or a car in a vehicle platoon [1]. Agents are spatially distributed and hence the realization of control significantly depends on the quality of information exchanged among the agents via wireless communication networks. However, the challenges of malicious cyber attacks on information also emerge [2].

The control problems under packet losses have been well studied, e.g. in [3] for stochastic packet losses, and the case of DoS attacks inducing malicious packet losses has been studied in [4, 5, 6]. This paper deals with DoS attacks. The communication failures induced by DoS can exhibit a temporal profile quite different from those caused by genuine packet losses due to network congestion; particularly packet dropouts resulting from malicious DoS need not follow a given class of probability distributions [7], and therefore the analysis techniques relying on probabilistic arguments may not be applicable.

Attention has been focused on centralized systems under DoS attacks for achieving stability[8, 9], attack detection and control [10] and state estimation[11]. In [12], the authors study a stabilization problem under energy-constrained PWM DoS signals, and propose time and event triggering strategies under partially known and unknown attack information, respectively. The paper [13] describes DoS attacks by a Markov modulated model, in which the control packets are jammed stochastically. In [14], the authors model the interplay between a DoS attacker and a defender as a two-player zero-sum game and compute the saddle-point equilibrium. Recently, multi-agent systems under DoS attacks have been increasingly investigated, e.g., consensus, state estimation and real-time attack detection [15, 16, 17]. In [18], the authors propose a novel data-driven based algorithm to estimate the unknown switching matrices of the exosystems, and realize output regulation under DoS for heterogeneous multi-agent systems.

For multi-agent systems, the amount of data can be large especially when the number of agents is large. Consequently, agents can be subject to bandwidth limitation, and hence signals are subject to coarse quantization [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. Dynamic quantization for centralized systems in the presence of DoS attacks has been recently studied in [8, 25], in which the quantization mechanisms have zooming-out and in capabilities for mitigating the influence of DoS-induced packet losses and achieving asymptotic stability, respectively. Dynamic quantization has also been established for consensus of multi-agent systems without packet losses[26], in which only the zooming-in capability is developed. Recently, the papers [27, 28, 29] study consensus problems under DoS attacks and dynamic quantization. In [27, 28], quantization mechanisms with zooming-in and out capabilities are developed for homogeneous agents. An approach for designing a tight zooming-out parameter is provided, but the condition for consensus is subject to an additional constraint of DoS frequency[28]. As will be shown later, the approach in our paper is free from the additional DoS-frequency constraint.

In practice, a variety of agents may need to cooperate to complete a complicated task, i.e., cooperation of heterogeneous multi-agent systems [30, 31]. Consequently, those results for the control of homogeneous agents may not hold. In [29], heterogeneous nonlinear multi-agent systems under DoS and quantization were studied, while the focus is on the common consensus problem instead of tracking control. In this paper, we are interested in output tracking control of heterogeneous multi-agent systems under quantized communication and DoS attacks, in which the quantizer has a finite quantization range. The quantized controllers to be designed should prevent quantizer saturation all the time. Unlike DoS-free scenarios, the tracking errors can diverge under DoS attacks, and consequently some measurements can overflow the range of the quantizer if the quantized controllers for DoS-free scenarios are implemented.

For quantized tracking control of multi-agent systems, one can classify the overall information flow into the part for leader-follower quantized communication and the part for inter-follower quantized communication. In [32, 27], the leader-follower communication and inter-follower communication adopt an identical quantization mechanism. However, this may not provide optimal performance in communication resource allocation and control. One may also lose the insights about the interactions between the leader-follower and inter-follower quantized communication. For example, in order to save communication resource, one can select a data rate for the leader-follower quantized communication as close as possible to the minimum data rate [33], under which the followers can still estimate the leader’s state asymptotically. As will be shown in this paper, such a data rate (of the leader-follower quantized communication) can influence the inter-follower quantized communication, i.e., the quantizer for quantizing followers’ state can have overflow problem. In this paper, resilience refers to a bound charactering the amount of DoS attacks under which multi-agent systems can achieve quantized tracking control. Under DoS attacks, it is interesting and also important to know whether the leader-follower quantized communication or the inter-follower quantized communication influences more on the resilience. From a practical viewpoint, this can actually lead us to the optimal strategies of limited bandwidth allocation for real applications.

The paper’s contributions are twofold: a) design heterogeneous dynamic quantized controllers for the tracking control of heterogeneous multi-agent systems, b) discover the interactions between the leader-follower quantized communication and inter-follower quantized communication, and the consequent influences on the resilience of tracking control against DoS attacks. We reveal that the leader-follower quantized communication can cause ceiling effect and the inter-follower communication can cause bottleneck effect. Specifically, for a given communication topology and a number of bits for the quantization of the leader’s state, by tuning the followers’ quantized controller, one cannot improve the resilience beyond a level determined by the data rate of leader-follower quantized communication, i.e., the ceiling effect. Otherwise, overflow problems for quantizing followers’ state can occur. For the bottleneck effect, if one selects a “large” data rate for leader-follower quantized communication, further enlarging it cannot improve the resilience. Then the inter-follower quantized communication is the bottleneck of the resilience, which depends on the choices of the zooming-in and out factors for followers’ state quantization. We emphasize that, by our quantized controller design, the tightness for zooming-in factor is the same for DoS-free case [26], and the zooming-out factor is tight, i.e., arbitrarily approaching the spectral radius of the leader’s dynamic matrix.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the framework consisting of the control objectives, the heterogeneous leader and followers, and the class of DoS attacks. Section 3 presents the design of quantized controllers. The results of the paper are presented in Section 4. Numerical examples are presented in Section 5, and finally Section 6 ends the paper with conclusions and future research.

Notation. We denote by \mathbb{R} the set of reals. Given bb\in\mathbb{R}, b\mathbb{R}_{\geq b} and >b\mathbb{R}_{>b} denote the sets of reals no smaller than bb and reals greater than bb, respectively; b\mathbb{R}_{\leq b} and <b\mathbb{R}_{<b} represent the sets of reals no larger than bb and reals smaller than bb, respectively; \mathbb{Z} denotes the set of integers. For any cc\in\mathbb{Z}, we denote c:={c,c+1,}\mathbb{Z}_{\geq c}:=\{c,c+1,\cdots\}. Let v\lfloor v\rfloor be the floor function such that v=max{o|ov}\lfloor v\rfloor=\max\{o\in\mathbb{Z}|o\leq v\}. Given a vector yy and a matrix Γ\Gamma, let y\|y\| and y\|y\|_{\infty} denote the 22- and \infty- norms of vector yy, respectively, and Γ\|\Gamma\| and Γ\|\Gamma\|_{\infty} represent the corresponding induced norms of matrix Γ\Gamma. Let ρ(Γ)\rho(\Gamma) denote the spectral radius of Γ\Gamma. Given an interval \mathcal{I}, |||\mathcal{I}| denotes its length. The Kronecker product is denoted by \otimes. We let “ \genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{1}{\hphantom{\,\cdot\,}}{\hphantom{\,\cdot\,}} \color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{1}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\,\cdot\,}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\,\cdot\,} ” represent element-wise division of vectors, e.g., [x1x2]T[y1y2]T=[x1/y1x2/y2]T\mathchoice{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{0}{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{0}{\phantom{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}}{\phantom{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{1}{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{1}{\phantom{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}}{\phantom{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{2}{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{2}{\phantom{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}}{\phantom{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{3}{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{3}{\phantom{[x_{1}\,\,x_{2}]^{T}}}{\phantom{[y_{1}\,\,y_{2}]^{T}}}$}}=[x_{1}/y_{1}\,\,x_{2}/y_{2}]^{T}. Let “\circ” denote the element-wise multiplication of two vectors, e.g., [a1a2]T[b1b2]T=[a1b1a2b2]T[a_{1}\,\,a_{2}]^{T}\circ[b_{1}\,\,b_{2}]^{T}=[a_{1}b_{1}\,\,a_{2}b_{2}]^{T}. In our paper, a switched system refers to a class of systems in the form: x(k+1)=Aix(k),i{1,2,,c},x(k+1)=A_{i}x(k),i\in\{1,2,\cdots,c\}, in which the value of ii depends on the switching rules.

2 Framework

Communication graph: We let graph 𝒢=(𝒩,)\mathcal{G}=(\mathcal{N},\mathcal{E}) denote the communication topology among the followers, where 𝒩={1,2,,N}\mathcal{N}=\{1,2,\cdots,N\} denotes the set of follower agents and 𝒩×𝒩\mathcal{E}\subseteq\mathcal{N}\times\mathcal{N} denotes the set of edges. Let 𝒩i\mathcal{N}_{i} denote the set of the neighbors of agent ii, where i=1,2,,Ni=1,2,\cdots,N. We assume that the graph 𝒢\mathcal{G} is undirected and connected. Let 𝒜𝒢=[aij]N×N\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{G}}=[a_{ij}]\in\mathbb{R}^{N\times N} denote the adjacency matrix of 𝒢\mathcal{G}, where aij>0a_{ij}>0 if and only if j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i} and aii=0a_{ii}=0. Define the Laplacian matrix G=[lij]N×N\mathcal{L}_{G}=[l_{ij}]\in\mathbb{R}^{N\times N}, in which lii=j=1Naijl_{ii}=\sum_{j=1}^{N}a_{ij} and lij=aijl_{ij}=-a_{ij} if iji\neq j. For the leader-follower communication, we assume that only a fraction of the followers can receive information from the leader. Let ai0a_{i0} represent the leader-follower interaction, i.e., if follower ii can directly receive the information from the leader, then ai0>0a_{i0}>0, and otherwise ai0=0a_{i0}=0. Moreover, we let the diagonal matrix be 𝒟=diag(a10,a20,,aN0)N×N\mathcal{D}=\text{diag}(a_{10},a_{20},\cdots,a_{N0})\in\mathbb{R}^{N\times N}. Let λ~i\tilde{\lambda}_{i} (i=1,2,,Ni=1,2,\cdots,N) denote the eigenvalues of G+𝒟\mathcal{L}_{G}+\mathcal{D}.

System description: The follower agents interacting over the network 𝒢\mathcal{G} are expressed as heterogeneous systems:

xi(k+1)\displaystyle x_{i}(k+1) =Aixi(k)+Biui(k)\displaystyle=A_{i}x_{i}(k)+B_{i}u_{i}(k) (1a)
yi(k)\displaystyle y_{i}(k) =Cixi(k)\displaystyle=C_{i}x_{i}(k) (1b)

where i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N}, xi(k)nix_{i}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}} denotes the state of agent ii, ui(k)wiu_{i}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{w_{i}} denotes its control input, yi(k)vy_{i}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{v} denotes its output, and Aini×niA_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}\times n_{i}}, Bini×wiB_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}\times w_{i}} and Civ×niC_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{v\times n_{i}}. The sampling time between kk and k+1k+1 is Δ\Delta. We assume that (Ai,Bi)(A_{i},B_{i}) is stabilizable and thus there exists a feedback gain Kiwi×niK_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{w_{i}\times n_{i}} such that ρ(Ai+BiKi)<1\rho(A_{i}+B_{i}K_{i})<1. We assume that an upper bound of the initial condition xi(0)x_{i}(0) is known, i.e., xi(0)Cx0>0\|x_{i}(0)\|_{\infty}\leq C_{x_{0}}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} (i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N}). Note that Cx0C_{x_{0}} can be arbitrarily large as long as it satisfies this bound. This is for preventing the overflow of state quantization for the initial condition. The dynamics of the leader can be described by

v(k+1)=Sv(k)\displaystyle v(k+1)=Sv(k) (2)

where v(k)nvv(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}} is the state and Snv×nvS\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}}. We assume that ρ(S)1\rho(S)\geq 1. Otherwise, as v(k)0v(k)\to 0 when kk\to\infty, one can simply realize the tracking control by locally stabilizing (1) under which yi(k)0y_{i}(k)\to 0. Similarly, we assume that an upper bound of the initial condition v(0)v(0) is known, i.e., v(0)Cv0>0\|v(0)\|_{\infty}\leq C_{v_{0}}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}.

We assume that xi(k)x_{i}(k) is available to the local controller of agent ii. We also assume that only some of the followers can receive information from the leader. Followers can exchange information with their neighbor followers. We assume that transmissions are acknowledgment based and free of delay. Note that in a quantized control problem without packet losses, acknowledgments are not necessary [33, 34]. When packet losses and quantization coexist, acknowledgments are needed to ensure the synchronization of the signals in the encoders and decoders [3, 35]. Due to the data rate limitation, all the information exchanged via communication is encoded by limited numbers of bits. This implies that the transmitted signals are subject to quantization effect. In this paper, we develop two quantization mechanisms: one for followers’ state quantization, and another for leader’s state quantization. The motivations of adopting heterogeneous quantizers will be presented later (see Remark 4.6).

Quantizer for followers’ state: Let χ\chi\in\mathbb{R} be a scalar before quantization and qRf()q_{R_{f}}(\cdot) be the quantization function for scalar input values as

qRf(χ)={0σ<χ<σ2ψσ(2ψ1)σχ<(2ψ+1)σ2Rfσχ(2Rf+1)σqRf(χ)χσ\displaystyle\!\!q_{R_{f}}(\chi)\!\!=\!\!\left\{\!\!\begin{array}[]{lll}0&-\sigma<\chi<\sigma&\\ 2\psi\sigma&(2\psi-1)\sigma\leq\chi\!<\!(2\psi+1)\sigma\\ 2R_{f}\sigma&\chi\geq(2R_{f}+1)\sigma&\\ -q_{R_{f}}(-\chi)&\chi\leq-\sigma&\end{array}\right. (7)

where Rf>0R_{f}\in\mathbb{Z}_{>0} is to be designed and ψ=1,2,,Rf\psi=1,2,\cdots,R_{f}, and σ>0\sigma\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}. If the quantizer is unsaturated such that |χ|(2Rf+1)σ|\chi|\leq(2R_{f}+1)\sigma, then the quantization error satisfies |χqRf(χ)|σ.|\chi-q_{R_{f}}(\chi)|\leq\sigma.

Quantizer for leader’s state: Let πl:=el/ωl\pi_{l}:=e_{l}/\omega_{l} be the ll-th signal in a vector before quantization and ql(πl)q_{\mathcal{R}_{l}}(\pi_{l}) represents the quantized signal of πl\pi_{l} encoded by l\mathcal{R}_{l} bits, where l=1,2,,vl=1,2,\cdots,v. The choices of l\mathcal{R}_{l}, ele_{l}\in\mathbb{R} and ωl>0\omega_{l}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} will be specified later. We implement a uniform quantizer such that

ql(πl):={2l1πl+0.52l1,if 1πl<110.52l1,if πl=1\displaystyle q_{\mathcal{R}_{l}}(\pi_{l}):=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}\frac{\lfloor 2^{\mathcal{R}_{l}-1}\pi_{l}\rfloor+0.5}{2^{\mathcal{R}_{l}-1}},&\quad\textrm{if }-1\leq\pi_{l}<1\\ 1-\frac{0.5}{2^{\mathcal{R}_{l}-1}},&\quad\textrm{if }\pi_{l}=1\end{array}\right. (10)

if l1\mathcal{R}_{l}\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1}, and ql(πl)=0q_{\mathcal{R}_{l}}(\pi_{l})=0 if l=0\mathcal{R}_{l}=0. Note that for any ωl>0\omega_{l}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} the following holds:

|elωlql(el/ωl)|ωl/2l,if|el|/ωl1\displaystyle\left|e_{l}-\omega_{l}q_{\mathcal{R}_{l}}\left(e_{l}/\omega_{l}\right)\right|\leq\omega_{l}/2^{\mathcal{R}_{l}},\quad\textrm{if}\,|e_{l}|/\omega_{l}\leq 1 (11)

for both cases [3].

2.1 Time-constrained DoS

We refer to DoS as the event under which all the encoded signals cannot be received by the decoders and it affects all the communication links simultaneously. We consider a general DoS model that describes the attacker’s action by the frequency of DoS attacks and their duration. Let {hq}q0\{h_{q}\}_{q\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}} with h0Δh_{0}\geq\Delta denote the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, that is, the time instants at which DoS exhibits a transition from zero (transmissions are possible) to one (transmissions are impossible). Hence, Hq:={hq}[hq,hq+τq[H_{q}:=\{h_{q}\}\cup[h_{q},h_{q}+\tau_{q}[ represents the qq-th DoS time-interval, of a length τq0\tau_{q}\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}, over which the network is in DoS status. If τq=0\tau_{q}=0, then HqH_{q} takes the form of a single pulse at hqh_{q}. Given τ,t0\tau,t\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} with tτt\geq\tau, let n(τ,t)n(\tau,t) denote the number of DoS off/on transitions over [τ,t][\tau,t], and let Ξ(τ,t):=q0Hq[τ,t]\Xi(\tau,t):=\bigcup_{q\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}}H_{q}\,\cap\,[\tau,t] be the subset of [τ,t][\tau,t] where the network is in DoS status.

Assumption 1 [4] (DoS frequency). There exist constants η0\eta\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} and τD>0\tau_{D}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} such that n(τ,t)η+tττDn(\tau,t)\,\leq\,\eta+\frac{t-\tau}{\tau_{D}} for all τ,tΔ\tau,t\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq\Delta} with tτt\geq\tau.  \blacksquare

Assumption 2 [4] (DoS duration). There exist constants κ0\kappa\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} and T>1T\in\mathbb{R}_{>1} such that |Ξ(τ,t)|κ+tτT|\Xi(\tau,t)|\,\leq\,\kappa+\frac{t-\tau}{T} for all τ,tΔ\tau,t\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq\Delta} with tτt\geq\tau.  \blacksquare

Remark 2.1.

In Assumption 1, τD\tau_{D} can be considered as the average dwell-time between consecutive DoS off/on transitions, while η\eta is the chattering bound. Assumption 2 expresses a similar requirement with respect to the duration of DoS. It expresses the property that, on the average, the total duration over which communication is interrupted does not exceed a certain fraction of time, as specified by 1/T1/T. The constant κ\kappa plays the role of a regularization term. It is needed because during a DoS interval, one has |Ξ(hq,hq+τq)|=τq>τq/T|\Xi(h_{q},h_{q}+\tau_{q})|=\tau_{q}>\tau_{q}/T. Thus κ\kappa serves to make Assumption 2 consistent. Conditions τD>0\tau_{D}>0 and T>1T>1 imply that DoS cannot occur at an infinitely fast rate or be always active.  \blacksquare

Control objectives: We seek to design a distributed controller ui(k)u_{i}(k) such that the quantizers in (7) and (10) do not saturate under DoS attacks; the outputs of the followers can track the state of the leader: limkyi(k)=v(k).\lim_{k\to\infty}y_{i}(k)=v(k).

Refer to caption
Figure 1: Control structure over the network. Agent i𝒩0i\in\mathcal{N}_{0} is a direct follower of the leader. Agent j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i} is a neighbor of agent ii. ll is the index for agent l𝒩jl\in\mathcal{N}_{j}. ACK denotes acknowledgments.

3 Controller design

The following lemma is necessary to relax the constraints of dwell time of switched systems and obtain a tight data rate (see Remarks 4.4 and 4.6).

Lemma 3.2.

[33] There exist (bounded) matrices E(k)nv×nvE(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}} and Tnv×nvT\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}}, and a transformation v¯(k)=E(k)Tv(k)\bar{v}(k)=E(k)Tv(k), possibly time-varying, transforming (2) into

v¯(k+1)=S¯v¯(k),S¯=diag(S¯1,,S¯p)nv×nv\displaystyle\!\!\!\bar{v}(k+1)=\bar{S}\bar{v}(k),\,\bar{S}=\text{diag}\left(\bar{S}_{1},\cdots,\bar{S}_{p}\right)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}} (12)

where p1p\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1} denotes the number of sub-matrices in S¯\bar{S}. Let r=1,2,,pr=1,2,\cdots,p, then one has

S¯r=[λr1λr11λr]nr×nr\displaystyle\bar{S}_{r}=\left[\begin{array}[]{cccc}\lambda_{r}&1&&\\ &\lambda_{r}&1&\\ &&\ddots&1\\ &&&\lambda_{r}\end{array}\right]\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{r}\times n_{r}} (17)

corresponding to the real eigenvalue λr\lambda_{r}\in\mathbb{R} of SS, and

S¯r=[ζrI2r1(ϕ)ζrI2r1(ϕ)r1(ϕ)ζrI2]2nr×2nr\displaystyle\bar{S}_{r}=\left[\!\!\begin{array}[]{llll}\zeta_{r}I_{2}&r^{-1}(\phi)&&\\ &\zeta_{r}I_{2}&r^{-1}(\phi)&\\ &&\ddots&r^{-1}(\phi)\\ &&&\zeta_{r}I_{2}\end{array}\!\!\right]\in\mathbb{R}^{2n_{r}\times 2n_{r}} (22)

corresponding to the complex eigenvalues λr=ζr(cosϕ±isinϕ)\lambda_{r}=\zeta_{r}(\cos\phi\pm i\sin\phi) with ζr0\zeta_{r}\geq 0 and

r(ϕ)=[cosϕsinϕsinϕcosϕ],I2=[1001]. \displaystyle r(\phi)=\left[\begin{array}[]{rr}\cos\phi&\sin\phi\\ -\sin\phi&\cos\phi\end{array}\right],\,\,I_{2}=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}1&0\\ 0&1\end{array}\right].\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\,\,\,\,\text{~{}{\tiny$\blacksquare$}} (27)

If SS has only real eigenvalues, the time-varying part in the transformation v¯(k)=E(k)Tv(k)\bar{v}(k)=E(k)Tv(k) is not needed, i.e., v¯(k)=Tv(k)\bar{v}(k)=Tv(k). Then, one only has the Jordan blocks in (17).

Assumption 3   For i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N}, we assume that there exists (Fi,Vi)(F_{i},V_{i}) satisfying FiS=AiFi+BiViF_{i}S=A_{i}F_{i}+B_{i}V_{i} and Iv=CiFi,I_{v}=C_{i}F_{i}, where IvI_{v} is the identity matrix of dimension nv×nvn_{v}\times n_{v}, and Viwi×nvV_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{w_{i}\times n_{v}} and Fini×nvF_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{i}\times n_{v}}.  \blacksquare

Assumption 3 is a typical assumption for cooperative control of heterogeneous multi-agent systems [30]. We refer the readers to [36] for more details.

Controller design: As shown in Figure 1, for follower agent i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N}, we propose the local control input

ui(k)=Kixi(k)+(ViKiFi)zi(k)\displaystyle u_{i}(k)=K_{i}x_{i}(k)+(V_{i}-K_{i}F_{i})z_{i}(k) (28)

in which

zi(k):=T1E1(k)z¯i(k)nv.\displaystyle z_{i}(k):=T^{-1}E^{-1}(k)\bar{z}_{i}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}}. (29)

The dynamics of z¯i(k)\bar{z}_{i}(k) in (29) follows

z¯i(k+1)=\displaystyle\bar{z}_{i}(k+1)=
{S¯z¯i(k)+K¯j=1Naij(z^j(k)z^i(k))+K¯ai0(v^(k)z^i(k)),ifkHqS¯z¯i(k),ifkHq\displaystyle\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}\bar{S}\bar{z}_{i}(k)+\bar{K}\sum_{j=1}^{N}a_{ij}(\hat{z}_{j}(k)-\hat{z}_{i}(k))\\ \quad\quad\quad+\,\bar{K}a_{i0}(\hat{v}(k)-\hat{z}_{i}(k)),&\text{if}\,k\notin H_{q}\\ \bar{S}\bar{z}_{i}(k),&\text{if}\,k\in H_{q}\end{array}\right. (33)

where z^j(k)nv\hat{z}_{j}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}} and v^(k)nv\hat{v}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}} are the estimates of z¯j(k)\bar{z}_{j}(k) and v¯(k)\bar{v}(k), respectively, and K¯nv×nv\bar{K}\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}} is a design parameter to be given later. The computation of z^j(k)\hat{z}_{j}(k) in (3) follows

z^j(k)={S¯z^j(k1)+θk1Q(z¯j(k)S¯z^j(k1)θk1)if kHq S¯z^j(k1)if kHq\displaystyle\hat{z}_{j}(k)\!\!=\!\!\left\{\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}\bar{S}\hat{z}_{j}(k-1)\!+\!\theta_{k-1}Q\left(\!\frac{\bar{z}_{j}(k)-\bar{S}\hat{z}_{j}(k-1)}{\theta_{k-1}}\!\right)&\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$ }\\ \bar{S}\hat{z}_{j}(k-1)&\text{if $k\in H_{q}$}\end{array}\right. (36)

where j{i}𝒩ij\in\{i\}\bigcup\mathcal{N}_{i} and Q()=[qRf()qRf()]TQ(\cdot)=[q_{R_{f}}(\cdot)\cdots q_{R_{f}}(\cdot)]^{T} is the vector version of (7). The scaling parameter θk\theta_{k} updates as

θk={γ1θk1,if kHqγ2θk1,if kHq \displaystyle\theta_{k}=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}\gamma_{1}\theta_{k-1},&\quad\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$}\\ \gamma_{2}\theta_{k-1},&\quad\text{if $k\in H_{q}$ }\end{array}\right. (39)

where γ1<1\gamma_{1}<1 and γ2>1\gamma_{2}>1 are zooming in and out parameters, respectively. We assume that the algorithms in (36) and (39) are embedded in the encoders and decoders of i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N} with identical initial conditions. Under DoS attacks, the variables in Q()Q(\cdot) may diverge. Therefore, the quantizers must zoom out by using γ2\gamma_{2} and increase their ranges so that the states can be measured properly. If the transmissions succeed, the quantizers zoom in and θk>0\theta_{k}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} decreases by using γ1\gamma_{1}. By adjusting the scaling parameter θk\theta_{k} in Q()Q(\cdot) dynamically, the state will be kept within the limited quantization range without saturation and can converge asymptotically. The ranges of γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}, and θ0\theta_{0} will be specified later. Note that γ1,γ2\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2} and θ0\theta_{0} in our paper are homogeneous among the followers. It is interesting to design distributed scaling parameters, e.g., γ1i\gamma_{1}^{i} and γ2i\gamma_{2}^{i}. In this situation, the new scaling parameter θk\theta_{k} in (39) will be a vector, and zooming-in and out factors composed by γ1i\gamma_{1}^{i} and γ2i\gamma_{2}^{i} will be matrices. This case will be left for future research.

The update of v^(k)\hat{v}(k) in (3) is given by

v^(k)={S¯(v^(k1)ω(k1)Qv(S¯v^(k1)v¯(k)S¯ω(k1))),kHqS¯v^(k1),kHq\displaystyle\!\!\!\hat{v}(k)\!\!=\!\!\left\{\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}\bar{S}\Big{(}\hat{v}(k-1)\\ \,\,-\left.\omega(k-1)\circ Q_{v}\left(\mathchoice{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{0}{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{0}{\phantom{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}}{\phantom{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{1}{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{1}{\phantom{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}}{\phantom{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{2}{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{2}{\phantom{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}}{\phantom{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{3}{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{3}{\phantom{\bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1)-\bar{v}(k)}}{\phantom{\bar{S}\omega(k-1)}}$}}\right)\!\right),&k\notin\!H_{q}\\ \bar{S}\hat{v}(k-1),&k\in\!H_{q}\\ \end{array}\right. (51)

in which Qv()Q_{v}(\cdot) is the vector form of (10), ω(k)nv\omega(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}} is a scaling vector for quantizing v¯(k)\bar{v}(k), “\circ” is the element-wise multiplication and “ \genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{1}{\hphantom{\,\,\cdot\,\,}}{\hphantom{\cdot}} \color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{1}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\,\,\cdot\,\,}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\cdot} ” is the element-wise division. The computation of ω(k)\omega(k) in (51) is given as follows:

{ω(k)={S~Hω(k1),kHqS~ω(k1),kHqH=diag(2R1I1,2R2I2,,2RpIp)nv×nv\displaystyle\!\!\!\!\!\left\{\!\!\begin{array}[]{l}\omega(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}\tilde{S}H\omega(k-1),&k\notin H_{q}\\ \tilde{S}\omega(k-1),&k\in H_{q}\end{array}\right.\\ H\!=\!\text{diag}(2^{-R_{1}}I_{1},2^{-R_{2}}I_{2},\cdots,2^{-R_{p}}I_{p})\!\in\!\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}}\end{array}\right. (56)

where the block diagonal matrix S~=diag(S~1,,S~p)nv×nv\tilde{S}=\text{diag}(\tilde{S}_{1},\cdots,\tilde{S}_{p})\in\mathbb{R}^{n_{v}\times n_{v}}. If rr corresponds to a real eigenvalue λr\lambda_{r}\in\mathbb{R}, then S~r=S¯r\tilde{S}_{r}=\bar{S}_{r} in (17). Otherwise, S~r\tilde{S}_{r} takes

S~r=[ζrI2OζrI2OζrI2]2nr×2nr,O=[1111].\displaystyle\tilde{S}_{r}\!\!=\!\!\left[\begin{array}[]{cccc}\zeta_{r}I_{2}&O&&\\ &\zeta_{r}I_{2}&O&\\ &&\ddots\\ &&&\zeta_{r}I_{2}\end{array}\right]\!\!\in\!\mathbb{R}^{2n_{r}\times 2n_{r}},O\!=\!\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}1&1\\ 1&1\end{array}\right]\!\!. (63)

Similar to [8], the parameter RrR_{r} (r=1,,pr=1,\cdots,p) in HH is the number of bits for the quantization process corresponding to S¯r\bar{S}_{r}. If RrR_{r} is determined, then l\mathcal{R}_{l} in (10) is determined as well. At last, we assume that the initial conditions in the encoding and decoding systems are identical and satisfy

v^l(0)=0,ωl(0)>|v¯l(0)|,l=1,2,,v\displaystyle\hat{v}_{l}(0)=0,\,\,\omega_{l}(0)>|\bar{v}_{l}(0)|,\,\,l={1,2,\cdots,v} (64)

where v^l(k)\hat{v}_{l}(k)\in\mathbb{R} and ωl(k)\omega_{l}(k)\in\mathbb{R} denote the ll-th element in vectors v^(k)=[v^1(k)v^l(k)v^v(k)]T\hat{v}(k)=[\hat{v}_{1}(k)\cdots\hat{v}_{l}(k)\cdots\hat{v}_{v}(k)]^{T} and ω(k)=[ω1(k)ωl(k)ωv(k)]T\omega(k)=[\omega_{1}(k)\cdots\omega_{l}(k)\cdots\omega_{v}(k)]^{T}, respectively.

4 Stability analysis

Define vectors z¯(k):=[z¯1T(k)z¯NT(k)]T\bar{z}(k):=[\bar{z}_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots\bar{z}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}, z^(k):=[z^1T(k)z^NT(k)]T\hat{z}(k):=[\hat{z}_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots\hat{z}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T} and δ(k):=z¯(k)𝟏Nv¯(k)\delta(k):=\bar{z}(k)-\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\bar{v}(k). Define errors ez(k):=z¯(k)z^(k)e_{z}(k):=\bar{z}(k)-\hat{z}(k) (of estimating z¯(k)\bar{z}(k)) and ev(k):=v^(k)v¯(k)e_{v}(k):=\hat{v}(k)-\bar{v}(k) (of estimating v¯(k)\bar{v}(k)). Define matrices G:=S¯N(G+𝒟)K¯,S¯N:=INS¯,W:=𝒟K¯,P:=(G+𝒟)K¯G:=\bar{S}_{N}-(\mathcal{L}_{G}+\mathcal{D})\otimes\bar{K},\bar{S}_{N}:=I_{N}\otimes\bar{S},W:=\mathcal{D}\otimes\bar{K},P:=(\mathcal{L}_{G}+\mathcal{D})\otimes\bar{K} and Z:=S¯N+(G+𝒟)K¯.Z:=\bar{S}_{N}+(\mathcal{L}_{G}+\mathcal{D})\otimes\bar{K}. We define α(k):=δ(k)/θk\alpha(k):=\delta(k)/\theta_{k}, ξz(k):=ez(k)/θk\xi_{z}(k):=e_{z}(k)/\theta_{k} and ξv(k):=ev(k)/θk\xi_{v}(k):=e_{v}(k)/\theta_{k}. Accordingly, we obtain the dynamics of α(k)\alpha(k) and ξz(k)\xi_{z}(k) in four cases as follows. The dynamics of ξv(k)\xi_{v}(k) will be analyzed later.

Case I: k+1Hqk+1\notin H_{q} and kHqk\notin H_{q}

α(k+1)=Gγ1α(k)+Pγ1ξz(k)Wγ1(𝟏Nξv(k))\displaystyle\!\!\!\!\alpha(k+1)=\frac{G}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k)+\frac{P}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{z}(k)-\frac{W}{\gamma_{1}}(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(k)) (65a)
ξz(k+1)=Zγ1ξz(k)Pγ1α(k)Wγ1(𝟏Nξv(k))\displaystyle\!\!\!\!\xi_{z}(k+1)=\frac{Z}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{z}(k)-\frac{P}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k)-\frac{W}{\gamma_{1}}(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(k))
1γ1Q(Zξz(k)Pα(k)W(𝟏Nξv(k)))\displaystyle\quad-\frac{1}{\gamma_{1}}Q\left(Z\xi_{z}(k)-P\alpha(k)-W(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(k))\right) (65b)

Case II: k+1Hqk+1\notin H_{q} and kHqk\in H_{q}

α(k+1)=S¯Nγ1α(k)\displaystyle\alpha(k+1)=\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k) (66a)
ξz(k+1)=S¯Nγ1ξz(k)1γ1Q(S¯Nξz(k))\displaystyle\xi_{z}(k+1)=\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{z}(k)-\frac{1}{\gamma_{1}}Q\left(\bar{S}_{N}\xi_{z}(k)\right) (66b)

Case III: k+1Hqk+1\in H_{q} and kHqk\notin H_{q}

α(k+1)=Gγ2α(k)+Pγ2ξz(k)Wγ2(𝟏Nξv(k))\displaystyle\!\!\!\!\alpha(k+1)=\frac{G}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k)+\frac{P}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{z}(k)-\frac{W}{\gamma_{2}}(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(k)) (67a)
ξz(k+1)=Zγ2ξz(k)Pγ2α(k)Wγ2(𝟏Nξv(k))\displaystyle\!\!\!\!\xi_{z}(k+1)=\frac{Z}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{z}(k)-\frac{P}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k)-\frac{W}{\gamma_{2}}(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(k)) (67b)

Case IV: k+1Hqk+1\in H_{q} and kHqk\in H_{q}

α(k+1)=S¯Nγ2α(k)\displaystyle\alpha(k+1)=\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k) (68a)
ξz(k+1)=S¯Nγ2ξz(k).\displaystyle\xi_{z}(k+1)=\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{z}(k). (68b)

The next proposition specifies the ranges of γ1\gamma_{1}, γ2\gamma_{2} and the value of (2Rf+1)σ(2R_{f}+1)\sigma preventing the saturation of (7). Its proof with C1C_{1} and C2C_{2} is provided in the Appendix.

Proposition 4.3.

Suppose there exists a Ev>0E_{v}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} such that ξv(k)Ev\|\xi_{v}(k)\|_{\infty}\leq E_{v}. Choose the zooming-in factor by ρ(G)<γ1<1\rho(G)<\gamma_{1}<1, the zooming-out factor by γ2>ρ(S)\gamma_{2}>\rho(S) and θ0Cx0γ1/σ\theta_{0}\geq C_{x_{0}}\gamma_{1}/\sigma. Under DoS attacks in Assumptions 1 and 2, the quantizer (7) is free of saturation if

(2Rf+1)σ\displaystyle\!\!\!(2R_{f}+1)\sigma
C2S¯N(ZNvσγ1+PC1+WNvEv). \displaystyle\!\!\!\geq C_{2}\|\bar{S}_{N}\|\left(\!\!\|Z\|\sqrt{Nv}\frac{\sigma}{\gamma_{1}}\!\!+\!\!\|P\|C_{1}\!\!+\!\!\|W\|\sqrt{Nv}E_{v}\!\!\right).\quad\,\,\text{~{}{\tiny$\blacksquare$}}
Remark 4.4.

Lemma 3.2 is necessary to obtain “tight” γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}. Otherwise, the matrices on the diagonals of S¯N\bar{S}_{N} and G¯\bar{G} (in (Appendix–Proof of Proposition 4.3)) shall be SS and Sλ~iK¯S-\tilde{\lambda}_{i}\bar{K}, respectively, which are not necessarily upper-triangular. Then, the stabilization of the switched system regulated by S¯N\bar{S}_{N} and G¯\bar{G} can be subject to dwell time constraints. Consequently, γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} can be much more conservative in order to compensate the state “jumps” of the switched system as in [27]. Alternatively, if one seeks to obtain a less conservative zooming-out parameter, DoS frequency (regulating the switching frequency) should be upper bounded in order to ensure that the quantizer is not saturated and consensus is achieved [28].  \blacksquare

In Proposition 4.3, by properly selecting γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}, we have provided the value of (2Rf+1)σ(2R_{f}+1)\sigma for the unsaturation of quantizer (7), by supposing ξv(k)\xi_{v}(k) upper bounded. In the following proposition, we provide the conditions to ensure an upper bounded ξv(k)\xi_{v}(k), namely a finite EvE_{v}.

Proposition 4.5.

Supposing that γ2\gamma_{2} is selected as in Proposition 4.3, we have the following results:

  • a)

    The quantizer for the leader’s state in (10) is free of overflow for all kk.

  • b)

    If γ1\gamma_{1} satisfying Proposition 4.3 is given, then RrR_{r} needs to satisfy 2Rr>ζr/γ12^{R_{r}}>\zeta_{r}/\gamma_{1} so that EvE_{v} is finite.

  • c)

    If Rr>log2ζrR_{r}>\log_{2}\zeta_{r} is pre-given, then EvE_{v} is finite if γ1\gamma_{1} satisfies max{ρ(G¯),ζr/2Rr}<γ1<1\max\{\rho(\bar{G}),\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}}\}<\gamma_{1}<1 with G¯\bar{G} in (Appendix–Proof of Proposition 4.3).

Proof. Let evl(k)e_{vl}(k) denote the ll-th element of vector ev(k)e_{v}(k). To prove a), we will show |evl(k)|ωl(k)|e_{vl}(k)|\leq\omega_{l}(k), which implies quantizer unsaturation in view of (10). If k=1Hqk=1\notin H_{q}, then by (51) one has

ev(1)=S¯(ev(0)ω(0)Qv(ev(0)ω(0))).\displaystyle e_{v}(1)=\bar{S}\left(e_{v}(0)-\omega(0)\circ Q_{v}\left(\mathchoice{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{0}{\hphantom{e_{v}(0)}}{\hphantom{\omega(0)}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{0}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}e_{v}(0)}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\omega(0)}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{1}{\hphantom{e_{v}(0)}}{\hphantom{\omega(0)}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{1}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}e_{v}(0)}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\omega(0)}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{2}{\hphantom{e_{v}(0)}}{\hphantom{\omega(0)}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{2}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}e_{v}(0)}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\omega(0)}$}}{\ooalign{$\genfrac{}{}{1.8pt}{3}{\hphantom{e_{v}(0)}}{\hphantom{\omega(0)}}$\cr$\color[rgb]{1,1,1}\genfrac{}{}{0.6pt}{3}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}e_{v}(0)}{\color[rgb]{0,0,0}\omega(0)}$}}\right)\right). (77)

Note that |evl(0)|ωl(0)|e_{vl}(0)|\leq\omega_{l}(0) implied by (64). Then according to (11), element-wise inequality of (77) yields

|evl(1)||S¯l|Hω(0)S~lHω(0)=ωl(1)\displaystyle|e_{vl}(1)|\leq|\bar{S}_{l}|H\omega(0)\leq\tilde{S}_{l}H\omega(0)=\omega_{l}(1) (78)

in which |S¯l||\bar{S}_{l}| is the ll-th row of |S¯||\bar{S}|, and S~l\tilde{S}_{l} is the ll-th row of S~\tilde{S}. Here, |S¯||\bar{S}| is a matrix in which the elements are the absolute values of the corresponding elements in S¯\bar{S}. If k=1Hqk=1\in H_{q}, we have ev(1)=S¯ev(0)e_{v}(1)=\bar{S}e_{v}(0) by (51). Following a similar element-wise analysis as in (78), one has

|evl(1)||S¯l|[|ev1(0)||evv(0)|]TS~lω(0)=ωl(1).\displaystyle\!\!\!\!|e_{vl}(1)|\!\leq\!|\bar{S}_{l}|[|e_{v1}(0)|\cdots|e_{vv}(0)|]^{T}\!\leq\!\tilde{S}_{l}\omega(0)\!=\!\omega_{l}(1). (79)

By the above analysis, we have shown that if overflow does not occur at k=0k=0, then no matter k=1k=1 is corrupted by DoS or not, overflow cannot occur. By induction, one can confirm that overflow does not occur for all kk.

To prove b) and c), we first analyze the dynamics of

ξvl(k)=evl(k)ωl(k)ωl(k)θ(k)\displaystyle\xi_{vl}(k)=\frac{e_{vl}(k)}{\omega_{l}(k)}\frac{\omega_{l}(k)}{\theta(k)}\vspace{-2mm} (80)

where ξvl(k)\xi_{vl}(k) is the ll-th element in ξv(k)\xi_{v}(k). We have shown that |evl(k)|/ωl(k)1|e_{vl}(k)|/\omega_{l}(k)\leq 1 in a). In order to ensure ξvl(k)\xi_{vl}(k) is bounded, one needs to ensure that wl(k)/θ(k)w_{l}(k)/\theta(k) is upper bounded, namely bounded w(k)/θ(k)w(k)/\theta(k) in vector form. Let ω¯(k):=ω(k)/θk\bar{\omega}(k):=\omega(k)/\theta_{k}. In the absence of DoS, by (39) and (56), one has

ω¯(k+1)=S~Hγ1ω¯(k).\displaystyle\bar{\omega}(k+1)=\frac{\tilde{S}H}{\gamma_{1}}\bar{\omega}(k). (81)

It is clear that if b) or c) holds, then ρ(S~H/γ1)<1\rho(\tilde{S}H/\gamma_{1})<1. In the presence of DoS, we have

ω¯(k+1)=S~γ2ω¯(k)\displaystyle\bar{\omega}(k+1)=\frac{\tilde{S}}{\gamma_{2}}\bar{\omega}(k) (82)

where ρ(S~/γ2)<1\rho(\tilde{S}/\gamma_{2})<1 since γ2>ρ(S¯)=ρ(S~)\gamma_{2}>\rho(\bar{S})=\rho(\tilde{S}) in Proposition 4.3. Because S~H\tilde{S}H and S~\tilde{S} are upper-triangular matrices, by the stabilization of switched systems, one can confirm that ω¯(k)\bar{\omega}(k) is bounded, and hence there exists a positive and finite EvE_{v} such that ξv(k)Ev\|\xi_{v}(k)\|_{\infty}\leq E_{v} in view of (80).  \blacksquare

Remark 4.6.

Proposition 4.5 shows that due to the design of ω(k)\omega(k) and S~\tilde{S} therein, the quantizer (10) is free of overflow for any RrR_{r}. However, an inappropriate RrR_{r} can induce saturation problems to the quantizer (7). For instance, arbitrarily approaching the minimum data rate for RrR_{r} is not enough. Even if some followers can estimate v¯(k)\bar{v}(k) under the minimum RrR_{r} and quantizer (10) is not saturated, the quantizer (7) may have overflow problem. Specifically, suppose that RrR_{r} is sufficiently close to the minimum data rate log2ζr\log_{2}\zeta_{r}. Under such a RrR_{r}, the quantization error of leader’s state eve_{v} converges to zero in the absence of DoS attacks. However, such a RrR_{r} does not necessarily satisfy Rr>log2(ζr/γ1)R_{r}>\log_{2}(\zeta_{r}/\gamma_{1}) in Proposition 2 b). The violation of Proposition 2 b) can make the dynamics of (81) unstable and consequently EvE_{v} infinitely large. By Proposition 4.5, if EvE_{v} is unbounded, any finite-range quantizer (7) for followers’ state has the overflow problem. To solve the problem, there are two options. The first option is selecting a larger RrR_{r}, i.e., satisfying b) in Proposition 4.5 for a given γ1\gamma_{1}. As a second option, if one would like to get close to the minimum RrR_{r} [33], then a γ1\gamma_{1} sufficiently close to 1 is needed as indicated in c). As will be shown in Theorem 4.7, when RrR_{r} approaches the minimum data rate, one gets a poor resilience.

We emphasize that if one adopts an identical quantization mechanism for the leader’s and followers’ state as in [27] (as in (7), (36) and (39)), it is difficult to make RrR_{r} tight, and the gap between RrR_{r} and the minimum data rate is invisible. If one adopts an identical quantization mechanism for the leader’s and followers’ state as in (10), (51), (56), then designing the scaling parameter to ensure the followers’ state satisfying |el/ωl||e_{l}/\omega_{l}| in (11) is one of the major challenges, which will be left for future research.  \blacksquare

As a special case, if the dimension of the S¯r\bar{S}_{r} corresponding to the spectral radius is 1, the result in Proposition 4.5 b) can be relaxed to 2Rrζr/γ12^{R_{r}}\geq\zeta_{r}/\gamma_{1}. Note that if the dimension of the S¯r\bar{S}_{r} corresponding to the spectral radius is larger than 1, such a relaxation can make (81) unstable. Similarly, if the dimension of the S¯r\bar{S}_{r} corresponding to the spectral radius is 1, one can let γ2=ρ(S~)\gamma_{2}=\rho(\tilde{S}).

Note that Proposition 4.5 cannot imply tracking control under DoS. The following main result characterizes the system’s resilience of tracking control under DoS attacks.

Theorem 4.7.

Suppose that γ1\gamma_{1} and RrR_{r} satisfy b) or c) in Proposition 2, and γ2\gamma_{2} satisfies Proposition 1. Then, one can achieve the tracking control if DoS attacks satisfy

1T+ΔτD\displaystyle\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}} <1log2γ2log2γ2log2γ1\displaystyle<1-\frac{\log_{2}\gamma_{2}}{\log_{2}\gamma_{2}-\log_{2}\gamma_{1}}
<1log2γ2log2γ2log2ζr2Rr.\displaystyle<1-\frac{\log_{2}\gamma_{2}}{\log_{2}\gamma_{2}-\log_{2}\frac{\zeta_{r}}{2^{R_{r}}}}.\vspace{-2mm} (83)

Proof. For achieving tracking control, it is necessary that δ(k)0\delta(k)\to 0 as kk\to\infty. This can be obtained by θk0\theta_{k}\to 0 in view of δ(k)=θkα(k)\delta(k)=\theta_{k}\alpha(k), in which one can confirm that α(k)\|\alpha(k)\| is upper bounded by following a similar analysis in the proof of Proposition 4.3. If DoS attacks satisfy the first inequality in (4.7), then one has θk0\theta_{k}\to 0 [27]. By Proposition 4.5, one can infer that (Rr,γ1)(R_{r},\gamma_{1}) satisfies γ1>ζr/2Rr\gamma_{1}>\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}}. Thus, one can obtain the second inequality in (4.7).

Now we show y(k)v(k)y(k)\to v(k). Let A:=diag(A1,,AN)A:=\text{diag}(A_{1},\cdots,A_{N}), and B,K,FB,K,F and VV take the similar form being block diagonal matrices. Let E¯(k):=INE(k)\bar{E}(k):=I_{N}\otimes E(k) and T¯:=INT\bar{T}:=I_{N}\otimes T. Then, in view of Assumption 3 and p(k):=x(k)Fv(k)p(k):=x(k)-Fv(k), one has p(k+1)=(A+BK)p(k)+B(KFV)(𝟏Nv(k)z(k))=(A+BK)p(k)+B(KFU)T¯1E¯1(k)(𝟏Nv¯(k)z¯(k))p(k+1)=(A+BK)\,p(k)+B(KF-V)(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes v(k)-z(k))=(A+BK)\,p(k)\,\,\,+B(KF-U)\bar{T}^{-1}\bar{E}^{-1}(k)(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\bar{v}(k)-\bar{z}(k)), in which we have shown that z¯(k)𝟏Nv¯(k)=δ(k)0\bar{z}(k)-\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\bar{v}(k)=\delta(k)\to 0. Since ρ(A+BK)<1\rho(A+BK)<1 and T¯1E¯1(k)\|\bar{T}^{-1}\bar{E}^{-1}(k)\| bounded, one can verify that p(k)0p(k)\to 0 as kk\to\infty, and hence Cp(k)=Cx(k)CFv(k)=y(k)v(k)0Cp(k)=Cx(k)-CFv(k)=y(k)-v(k)\to 0.  \blacksquare

Remark 4.8.

a) By (4.7), it is clear that the resilience depends on the leader-follower communication and inter-follower communication. Small γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}, and a large RrR_{r} can improve the system’s resilience against DoS. Without affecting the main idea of the paper, we let γ2\gamma_{2} infinitely approach ρ(S)\rho(S). This is a significant improvement compared with [27, 28].

b) If one selects a sufficiently large RrR_{r} for leader-follower quantized communication, e.g., ζr/2Rr<ρ(G)<γ1\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}}<\rho(G)<\gamma_{1}, then the quantized communication among the followers is the bottleneck of resilience. In other words, large γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} lead to poor resilience no matter how large is RrR_{r}. Mathematically, this can be confirmed by (4.7). We provide an intuitive explanation. Suppose that one chooses a RrR_{r} large enough such that the second inequity in (4.7) is infinitely close to 11. This implies that leader’s state has almost no quantization effects, and the leader’s direct neighbors can obtain the leader’s state by only one successful transmission. Subsequently, communication between the leader and its direct followers is not necessary since the followers can perfectly estimate v(k)v(k) locally. The rest to be done is that the followers who have v(k)v(k) should “deliver” v(k)v(k) to the other followers via the follower-follower communication. Then, it is intuitive to see that, now the ability of cooperative control among followers under DoS becomes the bottleneck, i.e., γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}.

c) The quantized communication between the leader and followers is the “ceiling” of resilience if one selects a small RrR_{r}, e.g., ζr/2Rr\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}} is close to 1. In this case, tuning the followers’ parameters cannot help much because γ1\gamma_{1} is lower bounded by ζr/2Rr\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}} for preventing quantizer overflow in view of c) in Proposition 2. In oder to prevent further resilience degradation induced by the quantized communication among followers (the first inequality in (4.7)), one needs to make γ1ζr/2Rr\gamma_{1}\to\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}} from the right. Then, one can verify that the right hand-side of the first inequality in (4.7) approaches that of the second inequality (the “ceiling”). One can still try to improve γ1<ζr/2Rr\gamma_{1}<\zeta_{r}/2^{R_{r}} such that the first inequality goes beyond the “ceiling” determined by RrR_{r}. However, this can cause quantizer overflow problem to (7) due to unbounded EvE_{v} (see the bottom plot in Fig. 3), which violates the first control objective.

d) Following a)-c), if one has selected a γ2\gamma_{2} close to ρ(S)\rho(S), a small γ1\gamma_{1} close to ρ(G)\rho(G) and a Rr>log2ζr/γ1R_{r}>\log_{2}\zeta_{r}/\gamma_{1}, then there is not much room for improving the resilience by quantized controller design. This is because SS (determining γ2\gamma_{2}) can depend on the inherent properties of the leader, and GG (determining γ1\gamma_{1}) depends on SS and communication topology. They together determine the bottleneck. One can attempt to find a K¯\bar{K} minimizing ρ(G)\rho(G), but this is out of the scope of our paper.  \blacksquare

By the proof of Theorem 4.7, the dynamics of p(k)p(k) determines the convergence rate of y(k)v(k)y(k)-v(k). It is straightforward that z¯(k)𝟏Nv¯(k)=δ(k)=θkα(k)θkC\|\bar{z}(k)-\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\bar{v}(k)\|=\|\delta(k)\|=\|\theta_{k}\alpha(k)\|\leq\theta_{k}C influences the convergence speed, where C>0C>0 denotes an upper bound of α(k)\|\alpha(k)\|. Now, one can see that the convergence speed mainly depends on θk\theta_{k}. In view of (39), a small γ1\gamma_{1} satisfying max{ρ(S¯λ~iK¯)}i𝒩<γ1<1\max\{\rho(\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{i}\bar{K})\}_{i\in\mathcal{N}}<\gamma_{1}<1 and a small γ2>ρ(S)\gamma_{2}>\rho(S), and less times of kHqk\in H_{q} can lead to a “fast” convergence of θk\theta_{k}, which essentially depends on the dynamics of SS, the eigenvalues of +𝒟\mathcal{L+D} and the number of packet losses induced by DoS attacks. Fast converge rate also requires more data rate. This can be confirmed by Proposition 4.3 and Proposition 4.5 b). Otherwise, quantizer overflow can occur. To maximize the convergence speed, in general, one should improve the communication topology, select a K¯\bar{K} minimizing max{ρ(S¯λ~iK¯)}i𝒩\max\{\rho(\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{i}\bar{K})\}_{i\in\mathcal{N}}, a γ1\gamma_{1} sufficiently close to max{ρ(S¯λ~iK¯)}i𝒩\max\{\rho(\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{i}\bar{K})\}_{i\in\mathcal{N}}, and a large RrR_{r} satisfying Proposition 4.5.

One can almost recover the number of quantization levels for homogeneous multi-agent systems by making the heterogeneous quantization mechanisms in this paper homogeneous by letting Ev=σ/γ1E_{v}=\sigma/\gamma_{1}. By “almost”, we mean that the values can be different due to parameter selections and dwell time constraints in [27]. Meanwhile, the inequalities in (4.7) characterizing the resilience recover to that in [27].

If the communication network is free of DoS attacks but subject to quantization, the zooming-out process is not needed and the problem recovers to the classic quantized leader-follower consensus. Note that if one applies heterogeneous quantization mechanisms as proposed in this paper, one still needs b) or c) in Proposition 4.5 to hold. Otherwise, follower’s quantizer can have overflow problem. Our result can also recover to that of quantization-free network under DoS attacks, namely choosing γ1=max{ρ(S¯λ~iK¯)}i𝒩\gamma_{1}=\max\{\rho(\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{i}\bar{K})\}_{i\in\mathcal{N}} and γ2=ρ(S)\gamma_{2}=\rho(S). However, such γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} can lead to infinite quantization levels due to infinite α(k)\alpha(k) and EvE_{v} caused by ρ(S¯N/γ2)=ρ(G/γ1)=1\rho(\bar{S}_{N}/\gamma_{2})=\rho(G/\gamma_{1})=1 (see the Appendix and (82), respectively). This is consistent with quantized consensus for homogeneous multi-agent systems under DoS attacks.

5 Simulation

In this section, we present two examples. Example 1 is mainly for the verification of the ceiling and bottleneck effects, and Example 2 is the application of our control scheme to the tracking control of mobile robots.

Example 1: We consider a multi-agent system with one leader and four followers. The dynamics of the leader and followers is regulated by S=[1.1052  0.1105;0  1.1052]S=[1.1052\,\,0.1105;0\,\,1.1052], and Ai=[0  1;0  0]A_{i}=[0\,\,1;0\,\,0], Bi=[1.10520.8895;0  1.1052]B_{i}=[1.1052\,\,-0.8895;0\,\,1.1052] and Ci=[1  0.5;0  1]C_{i}=[1\,\,0.5;0\,\,1], respectively. The interaction between the leader and followers is represented by 𝒟=diag(1,0,1,0)\mathcal{D}=\text{diag}(1,0,1,0). The Laplacian matrix of the graph for inter-followers’ communication follows that in [28]. The feedback gain in (28) is selected as K¯i=0.1I2\bar{K}_{i}=-0.1I_{2} and the design parameter in (3) is selected as K=0.4683I2K=0.4683I_{2}. The transmission interval between kk and k+1k+1 is Δ=0.1\Delta=0.1s.

One can obtain ρ(G)=0.9161\rho(G)=0.9161 and ρ(S)=1.1052\rho(S)=1.1052. Then we select γ1=0.92\gamma_{1}=0.92 and γ2=1.10521\gamma_{2}=1.10521 following Proposition 4.3. We select R1=1R_{1}=1 according to Proposition 4.5. By Proposition 4.3, we obtain (2Rf+1)σ>7.36381014(2R_{f}+1)\sigma>7.3638\cdot 10^{14}, which can be encoded by 50 bits. The theoretical sufficient bound of DoS attacks computed by Theorem 4.7 is 0.45460.4546. We consider a sustained DoS attack with variable period and duty cycle, generated randomly. Over a simulation horizon of 2020s, the DoS signal yields |Ξ(0,20)|=5.7|\Xi(0,20)|=5.7s and n(0,20)=42n(0,20)=42. This corresponds to values (averaged over 2020s) of τD0.4762\tau_{D}\approx 0.4762 and 1/T0.28501/T\approx 0.2850, and hence Δ/τD0.15\Delta/\tau_{D}\approx 0.15 and Δ/τD+1/T0.495\Delta/\tau_{D}+1/T\approx 0.495. Since our result regarding tolerable DoS attacks is a sufficient condition, one can see from the first plot in Figure 2 that the tracking control is achieved. We mention that the variables to be quantized in Q()Q(\cdot) in the simulation are between 7.65-7.65 and 9.29.2 (5 bits per state), which is much smaller than the theoretical result, i.e., 9.27.363810149.2\ll 7.3638\cdot 10^{14}. The theoretical result is conservative since we have selected γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} very close to their lower bounds and this can lead to large C1C_{1}, C2C_{2} and EvE_{v}.

Now we show the bottleneck effect. We select γ1=0.97\gamma_{1}=0.97 and let γ2\gamma_{2} be the same. According to Proposition 4.5 b), one sees that R1=1R_{1}=1 still satisfies the inequalities. However, for the same DoS pattern studied above, one can see from the second plot in Figure 2 that the tracking error diverges. Note that the value of R1R_{1} does not change and hence the “ceiling” does not change (the second inequality in (4.7)). However, the first inequality in (4.7) becomes smaller under a smaller γ1\gamma_{1}, which is actually the bottleneck of resilience causing state divergence. In this example, one still needs 50 bits for encoding a state because one selects a tight γ2\gamma_{2} for the pair (ρ(S)/γ2,ρ(G)/γ1)(\rho(S)/\gamma_{2},\rho(G)/\gamma_{1}), and ρ(S)/γ2\rho(S)/\gamma_{2} determines the lower rate for iteration during the computation of C1C_{1}, C2C_{2} and EvE_{v}. In the simulation, we actually have 8Q()8-8\leq\|Q(\cdot)\|_{\infty}\leq 8 (5 bits per state), though the tracking control fails due to the bottleneck effect.

In the following, we show the ceiling effect caused by R1R_{1}. In the simulation example above, we have shown that R1=1R_{1}=1 is already sufficiently large, i.e., ζ1/2R1<ρ(G)\zeta_{1}/2^{R_{1}}<\rho(G). Thus, we verify the ceiling effect by an academic value R1=0.2R_{1}=0.2. According to Proposition 4.5 c), one can choose γ1=0.97\gamma_{1}=0.97. Similarly, we let γ2=1.10521\gamma_{2}=1.10521. Under this setting, we can see from the first plot of Figure 3 that tracking is achieved. Note that both R1R_{1} and γ1\gamma_{1} now are smaller than the values in the previous examples, and hence the sufficient bound of tolerable DoS attacks is smaller. To recover the resilience to that in previous examples, we enlarge γ1\gamma_{1} for mitigating the bottleneck, i.e., γ1=0.93\gamma_{1}=0.93 and R1=0.2R_{1}=0.2. However, as we presented in Proposition 4.5 and (4.7), only improving the bottleneck (beyond the “ceiling”) can cause overflow problems of follower’s quantizers. This is shown in the second plot in Figure 3, which implies that the variables to be quantized by Q()Q(\cdot) diverge. This implies that when R1R_{1} is fixed and small, R1R_{1} will determine the upper bound of resilience. One cannot further improve the resilience by violating the ceiling effect. Otherwise, the quantizer (7) will have saturation problems.

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Figure 2: Top: Time response of tracking errors (γ1=0.92\gamma_{1}=0.92); Bottom: Time response of tracking errors (γ1=0.97\gamma_{1}=0.97) and the legend follows that in the top plot.

Example 2: In this example, we apply our control scheme to the tracking control of mobile robots under quantization and DoS attacks. The dynamics of four follower mobile robots is taken from [37] as x˙i1(t)=xi2(t),x˙i2(t)=cixi2(t)+ui(t),\dot{x}_{i1}(t)=x_{i2}(t),\,\,\dot{x}_{i2}(t)=-c_{i}x_{i2}(t)+u_{i}(t), in which xi1(t)x_{i1}(t) and xi2(t)x_{i2}(t) denote the position and velocity, respectively, with i=1,2,3,4i=1,2,3,4, and ci=0.2c_{i}=0.2 is the friction parameter. The virtual leader is an autonomous system with dynamics v˙(t)=[0  1;0  0]v(t)\dot{v}(t)=[0\,\,1;0\,\,0]v(t) and the elements in v(t)=[v1(t)v2(t)]Tv(t)=[v_{1}(t)\,\,v_{2}(t)]^{T} denote the position and velocity. Let yi(t)=[xi1(t)xi2(t)]Ty_{i}(t)=[x_{i1}(t)\,\,x_{i2}(t)]^{T} for i=1,2,3,4i=1,2,3,4. It is simple to obtain the system matrices for sampled-data dynamics with sampling interval Δ=0.1\Delta=0.1s: Ai=[1.0000  0.0990;0  0.9802]A_{i}=[1.0000\,\,0.0990;0\,\,0.9802], Bi=[0.004967;0.09901]B_{i}=[0.004967;0.09901] for followers i=1,2,3,4i=1,2,3,4 and S=[1  0.1;0  1]S=[1\,\,0.1;0\,\,1] for the leader. The communication topology is illustrated in the top picture in Figure 4. We select Ki=[77.262413.5990]K_{i}=[-77.2624\,\,-13.5990] and K¯=0.42I2\bar{K}=0.42I_{2}. One can verify that ρ(G)=0.9493\rho(G)=0.9493 and ρ(S)=1\rho(S)=1. Then we select γ1=0.95\gamma_{1}=0.95, γ2=1.01\gamma_{2}=1.01 and R1=1R_{1}=1 by Proposition 4.3. By Theorem 4.7, if 1/T+Δ/τD<0.83751/T+\Delta/\tau_{D}<0.8375, tracking control can be achieved. Similarly to Example 1, DoS attacks are generated randomly with |Ξ(0.50)|=29.6|\Xi(0.50)|=29.6s and n(0,50)=122n(0,50)=122 as shown in the middle picture in Figure 4, which yield 1/T+Δ/τD0.8361/T+\Delta/\tau_{D}\approx 0.836. It satisfies the bound of tolerable DoS attacks, i.e, 0.836<0.83750.836<0.8375. The time response of tracking errors are provided in the middle picture of Figure 4, which presents the success of tracking control under DoS by yiv0\|y_{i}-v\|\to 0.

We compare the performance of tracking control in the presence and absence of quantization. To make the comparison clear, DoS attacks are not considered. Moreover, we assume that the virtual leader increases its speed by 1m/s at 2525s and the followers should track the new speed as well as the position. As shown in the last plot in Figure 4, the tracking errors converge to 0 in [0,25][0,25]s and (20,50](20,50]s with and without quantization. In particular, by the simulation curves in (25,50](25,50]s, the convergence speed under quantization is close to the one without quantization. To further improve their convergence speeds, one needs to improve the communication topology, e.g., by unitizing the one in Example 1 and obtaining ρnew(G)=0.8304\rho_{\text{new}}(G)=0.8304. By the new ρnew(G)\rho_{\text{new}}(G), it is straightforward that the convergence speed without quantization is faster and the one under quantization is also faster since one can select a smaller γ1\gamma_{1}.

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Figure 3: Top: Time response of tracking errors; Bottom: The output of Q()Q(\cdot).
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Figure 4: Top: Communication topology with agent 0 being the leader and agents 1-4 being the followers; Middle: Time response of tracking errors under DoS; Bottom: Time response of tracking errors without and under quantization with y:=[y1Ty2Ty3Ty4T]Ty:=[y_{1}^{T}\,\,y_{2}^{T}\,\,y_{3}^{T}\,\,y_{4}^{T}]^{T}.

6 Conclusions and future research

This paper studied tracking control of heterogeneous multi-agent systems under DoS attacks and state quantization. We have designed heterogeneous quantization mechanisms for the leader’s and followers’ state. With the dynamical quantized controllers with zooming-in and out capabilities, and proper data rate, we have shown that the quantizers are free of saturation under DoS attacks. Our results revealed the bottleneck effect of resilience: if one selects a “large” data rate for leader-follower quantized communication, further enlarging it cannot improve the resilience. Then, the inter-follower quantized communication determines the resilience. We also presented the ceiling effect of resilience: by tuning the quantized controllers of followers, one can at most improve the resilience to the level determined by the data rate of leader-follower quantized communication. Otherwise, overflow of followers’ state quantizer can occur.

For the directions of future research, it is interesting to consider the presence of noise. Then the dynamics of the tracking error is expected to be practically stable[32]. One can also design distributed scaling parameters such that each follower agent can have individual zooming-in and out factors. Moreover, it is useful to design controllers that can tolerate communication delays [38], uncertainties [39] and accelerate consensus speed [40].

Appendix–Proof of Proposition 4.3

By Cases I–IV in Section 4, the evolution of α\alpha along with the sequence of successful steps {sr}{k}\{s_{r}\}\subseteq\{k\} follows: α(sr)=(S¯Nγ2)mr1Gγ1α(sr1)+(S¯Nγ2)mr1(Pγ1ξz(sr1)Wγ1(𝟏Nξv(sr1)))\alpha(s_{r})=(\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}})^{m_{r-1}}\frac{G}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(s_{r-1})+(\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\!)^{m_{r-1}}(\frac{P}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{z}(s_{r-1})-\frac{W}{\gamma_{1}}(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(s_{r-1}))), where mr10m_{r-1}\geq 0 denote the number of unsuccessful transmission between sr1s_{r-1} and srs_{r}. There exists a unitary matrix UU such that UT(G+𝒟)UU^{T}(\mathcal{L}_{G}+\mathcal{D})U is an upper-triangular matrix whose diagonals are λ~i\tilde{\lambda}_{i}. Then it is simple to obtain that

G¯:=(UIv)TG(UIv)=\displaystyle\bar{G}:=(U\otimes I_{v})^{T}G(U\otimes I_{v})=
[S¯λ~1K¯S¯λ~NK¯].\displaystyle\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{1}\bar{K}&\,\,\,\,\,\,\,*&*\\ &\ddots&*\\ &&\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{N}\bar{K}\end{array}\right]. (87)

Recall that S¯\bar{S} is an upper-triangular matrix, then we assume that there exists an upper-triangular K¯\bar{K} such that S¯λ~iK¯\bar{S}-\tilde{\lambda}_{i}\bar{K} is Schur stable for i=1,,Ni=1,\cdots,N.

Define vectors α¯(k):=(UIv)Tα(k)\bar{\alpha}(k):=(U\otimes I_{v})^{T}\alpha(k), ξ¯z(k):=(UIv)TPγ1ξz(k)\bar{\xi}_{z}(k):=(U\otimes I_{v})^{T}\frac{P}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{z}(k) and ξ¯v(k):=(UIv)TWγ1(𝟏Nξv(k))\bar{\xi}_{v}(k):=(U\otimes I_{v})^{T}\frac{W}{\gamma_{1}}(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(k)). Then, one has α¯(sr)=(S¯Nγ2)mr1G¯γ1α¯(sr1)+(S¯Nγ2)mr1(ξ¯z(sr1)ξ¯v(sr1))\bar{\alpha}(s_{r})=(\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}})^{m_{r-1}}\frac{\bar{G}}{\gamma_{1}}\bar{\alpha}(s_{r-1})\,\,+(\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}})^{m_{r-1}}(\bar{\xi}_{z}(s_{r-1})-\bar{\xi}_{v}(s_{r-1})), which is obtained by the fact that (UIv)T(U\otimes I_{v})^{T} and S¯Nmr1\bar{S}_{N}^{m_{r}-1} are commuting matrices. Let s1s_{-1} denote the step k=0k=0. Then we have α(s1)=α(0)2NnvCx0θ0\|\alpha(s_{-1})\|=\|\alpha(0)\|\leq 2\sqrt{Nn_{v}}\frac{C_{x_{0}}}{\theta_{0}}, ξ¯z(sr)PNnvσγ1\|\bar{\xi}_{z}(s_{r})\|\leq\|P\|\sqrt{Nn_{v}}\frac{\sigma}{\gamma_{1}} and ξ¯v(sr)WNnvEvγ1\|\bar{\xi}_{v}(s_{r})\|\leq\|W\|\sqrt{Nn_{v}}\frac{E_{v}}{\gamma_{1}}, and ρ(G¯/γ1)<1\rho(\bar{G}/\gamma_{1})<1 and ρ(S¯N/γ2)<1\rho(\bar{S}_{N}/\gamma_{2})<1 by the selections of γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}. By the stabilization of switched systems, there exists a positive real C1C_{1} such that α¯(sr)C1\|\bar{\alpha}(s_{r})\|\leq C_{1}. In particular, S¯N\bar{S}_{N} and G¯\bar{G} are upper-triangular, which implies there are no dwell-time constraints.

To analyze the overflow problem, i.e., the lower bound of (2Rf+1)σ(2R_{f}+1)\sigma, one needs to investigate z¯(k)S¯Nz^(k1)θk1\|\frac{\bar{z}(k)-\bar{S}_{N}\hat{z}(k-1)}{\theta_{k-1}}\|_{\infty} by (36). At sr+1s_{r}+1, one has (z¯(sr+1)S¯Nz^(sr))/θsr=Zξz(sr)Pα(sr)W(𝟏Nξv(sr))Zξz(sr)Pα(sr)W(𝟏Nξv(sr))(2Rf+1)σ\left\|(\bar{z}(s_{r}+1)-\bar{S}_{N}\hat{z}(s_{r}))/\theta_{s_{r}}\right\|_{\infty}=\|Z\xi_{z}(s_{r})-P\alpha(s_{r})-W(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(s_{r}))\|_{\infty}\leq\|Z\xi_{z}(s_{r})-P\alpha(s_{r})-W(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(s_{r}))\|\leq(2R_{f}+1)\sigma which implies unsaturation of follows’ quantizer qRf()q_{R_{f}}(\cdot). For the step of sr+2s_{r}+2, if sr+1s_{r}+1 is a successful transmission step, one can follow the similar analysis presented in the step of sr+1s_{r}+1 and shows quantizer unsaturation. If sr+1s_{r}+1 is not a successful transmission step, then one has z¯(sr+2)S¯Nz^(sr+1)θsr+1=S¯Nξz(sr+1)(2Rf+1)σ\left\|\frac{\bar{z}(s_{r}+2)-\bar{S}_{N}\hat{z}(s_{r}+1)}{\theta_{s_{r}+1}}\right\|_{\infty}=\|\bar{S}_{N}\xi_{z}(s_{r}+1)\|_{\infty}\leq(2R_{f}+1)\sigma, in which we have used ξz(sr+1)Zξz(sr)Pα(sr)W(𝟏Nξv(sr))\|\xi_{z}(s_{r}+1)\|_{\infty}\leq\|Z\xi_{z}(s_{r})-P\alpha(s_{r})-W(\mathbf{1}_{N}\otimes\xi_{v}(s_{r}))\|_{\infty}. By induction, if the transmissions at sr+m1s_{r}+m-1 are all failed, then for sr+ms_{r}+m (m2m\geq 2), one has z¯(sr+m)S¯Nz^(sr+m1)θsr+m1=S¯Nξz(sr+m1)=S¯N(S¯Nγ2)m2ξz(sr+1)(2Rf+1)σ\left\|\frac{\bar{z}(s_{r}+m)-\bar{S}_{N}\hat{z}(s_{r}+m-1)}{\theta_{s_{r}+m-1}}\right\|_{\infty}=\|\bar{S}_{N}\xi_{z}(s_{r}+m-1)\|_{\infty}=\|\bar{S}_{N}\left(\frac{\bar{S}_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m-2}\xi_{z}(s_{r}+1)\|_{\infty}\leq(2R_{f}+1)\sigma, in which ρ(S¯N/γ2)<1\rho(\bar{S}_{N}/\gamma_{2})<1 such that (S¯N/γ2)kC2>0\|(\bar{S}_{N}/\gamma_{2})^{k}\|\leq C_{2}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}. By the above analysis, one can see that the quantizer qRf()q_{R_{f}}(\cdot) does not saturate at srs_{r}, sr+1s_{r}+1 and sr+ms_{r}+m (m2m\geq 2), which implies quantizer unsaturation at all kk.  \blacksquare

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