Sending-or-not-sending twin-filed quantum key distribution with discrete phase modulation
Abstract
We study the sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol with discrete phase modulation of coherent states. We first make the security of the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation. We then present analytic formulas for key rate calculation. We take numerical simulations for the key rate through discrete phase modulation of both the original SNS protocol and the SNS protocol with two way classical communications of active-odd-parity pairing (AOPP). Our numerical simulation results show that only with phase values, the key rates of the SNS protocol can exceed the linear bound, and with phase values, the key rates are very close to the results of the SNS protocol with continuously modulated phase-randomization.
I Introduction
The theories and experiments of quantum key distribution (QKD) Bennett and Brassard (1984); Ekert (1991); Pirandola et al. (2019); Xu et al. (2019); Gisin et al. (2002); Gisin and Thew (2007); Scarani et al. (2009); Shor and Preskill (2000); Koashi (2009); Hwang (2003); Wang (2005); Lo et al. (2005); Wang et al. (2019a); Kraus et al. (2005); Yin et al. (2016); Liao et al. (2017); Boaron et al. (2018); Chen et al. (2020); Yin et al. (2020) have been widely studied since the first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennet and Brassard in 1984 Bennett and Brassard (1984). The secure key rate and the distance are central issues in practical application of QKD. In particular, the decoy-state method Hwang (2003); Wang (2005); Lo et al. (2005) improves the relationship between key rate and channel transmittance from square scale, , to linear scale, . Recently, the idea of twin-field QKD (TFQKD) Lucamarini et al. (2018) and its variants Wang et al. (2018); Tamaki et al. (2018); Cui et al. (2019); Curty et al. (2019); Ma et al. (2018); Lin and Lütkenhaus (2018); Yu et al. (2019); Maeda et al. (2019); Lu et al. (2019); Jiang et al. (2019); Xu et al. (2020); Grasselli et al. (2019); Wang and Lo (2019); Hu et al. (2019); Zhang et al. (2019); Zhou et al. (2019) have further improved the key rate to the scale of square root of channel transmittance, , which can break linear bound Takeoka et al. (2014); Pirandola et al. (2017) of QKD. So far, the TFQKD has been demonstrated by a number of experiments Minder et al. (2019); Liu et al. (2019); Wang et al. (2019b); Zhong et al. (2019); Chen et al. (2020).
Among all the variants of TFQKD, the sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol Wang et al. (2018) together with its modified protocols Hu et al. (2019); Xu et al. (2020); Jiang et al. (2020) have attracted many attentions due to its large noise tolerance and high key rate. Moreover, the SNS protocol has a unique advantage that the traditional decoy-state method directly applies, which makes the finite-key analysis very efficient. The SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in proof-of-principle in Ref. Minder et al. (2019), and realized in real optical fiber with the finite-key effects taken into consideration Chen et al. (2020); Liu et al. (2019). Notably, the SNS protocol has been experimentally demonstrated over 509 km optical fiber Chen et al. (2020) which is the longest secure distance of QKD in optical fiber.
In practice, we need the decoy-state method Hwang (2003); Wang (2005); Lo et al. (2005) to assure the security of those protocols with imperfect sources. In the traditional decoy-state method, phase randomization is requested so that the source state can be regarded as the classical mixture of different photon-number states. However, the perfect phase randomization by continuous modulation is technically not likely. In a real experiment, the phases of WCS sources are discretely modulated to where and is always an even number. The major difference between the discrete modulation and continuous modulation is that the actual states of the latter case are Fock states while that of the former case is not.
To close the gap between the theory and experiment, we study the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation of WCS sources. Although the effects of discrete-phase-randomization have been studied for the protocols such as the traditional decoy-state BB84 Hwang (2003); Wang (2005); Lo et al. (2005) in Ref. Cao et al. (2015), the MDIQKD Braunstein and Pirandola (2012); Lo et al. (2012); Wang (2013); Tamaki et al. (2012); Xu et al. (2013); Curty et al. (2014); Xu et al. (2014); Zhou et al. (2016) in Ref. Cao (2020), the non-post selection protocol Curty et al. (2019); Cui et al. (2019) of TFQKD in Ref. Lorenzo et al. (2020), no investigation has been done on the SNS protocol. Here we study this based on the structure of the SNS protocol. We prove it’s security and present the formulas for key rate calculation. Unlike other protocols with discrete-phase-randomized WCS sources Cao et al. (2015); Cao (2020); Lorenzo et al. (2020); Zhang et al. (2020); Primaatmaja et al. (2019). We then present analytical formulas of the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate and the lower bound of the yield of untagged bits while the prior arte works have to solve linear programming problems. Our numerical simulation results show that only with 6 phase values, the key rates of the SNS protocol can exceed the PLOB bound, the linear bound of the key rate established by Pirandola, Laurenza, Ottaviani, and Banchi Pirandola et al. (2017). With 12 phase slices, the key rates are very close to the SNS protocol with continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources. Since the property of no bit-flip error in the untagged bits in SNS protocl still holds with discrete phase modulation, we can directly apply the active-odd-parity pairing (AOPP) method proposed in our previous work Xu et al. (2020) to improve the key rate. The numerical results show that the advantage of the AOPP method still holds.
The article is arranged as follows. We first introduce how to perform the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation of WCS sources. Based on the equivalent entanglement protocol of the SNS protocol, we show how to get the formula of the phase-flip error rate. We then show how to apply the decoy-state method to obtain the upper bound of the phase-flip error rate and the lower bound of the yield of untagged bits. Using these bounds, we present numerical results for both the original SNS protocol and the SNA protocol with AOPP method. The article is ended with the concluding remarks.
II The SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation of weak coherent state sources
II.1 The protocol
The implementation process of the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation WCS sources is similar to that of the original SNS protocol Wang et al. (2018). Here we first introduce the 4-intensity protocol as follows. Obviously, the special case that the intensity of signal state equals to that of one of the decoy state in the 4-intensity makes the 3-intensity protocol.
For each time window, Alice (Bob) randomly decides it is a decoy window or a signal window. If it is a decoy window, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses to prepare a pulse of state , or (, or ), where are randomly chosen from and is assumed to be an even number. If it is a signal window, Alice (Bob) randomly chooses to prepare a vacuum pulse or a pulse of state with probabilities and respectively, where is randomly chosen from . If Alice (Bob) decides to send out a vacuum pulse, that is to say sending nothing or not sending, Alice (Bob) takes the corresponding classical bit value as . If Alice (Bob) decides to send out a pulse of state , Alice (Bob) takes the corresponding classical bit value as .
Then Alice and Bob send their pulses to Charlie, Charlie is assumed to perform interferometric measurements on the received pulses. If only one of the two detectors clicks, Charlie would announce this pulse pair causes a click and whether the left detector or right detector clicks. Alice and Bob take it as a one-detector heralded event.
After Alice and Bob repeat the above process for many times, they acquire a series of data which are used to perform the data post-processing.
The first step of data post-processing is sifting. Alice and Bob first announce the types of each time window they have decided. For a window that both Alice and Bob have decided a signal window, it is a window. The corresponding bits of the one-detector heralded event of the windows, which are also called as the sifted key, are used to extract the final key. Except for the windows, Alice and Bob announce the intensities and phases they have chosen in each window. For a window that both Alice and Bob have decided a decoy window, and the intensity of the pulse is and their phases satisfy
(1) |
where is a positive number close to 0, it is an window. Here in our calculation we shall simply set
(2) |
for the post selection condition of windows above. The data of windows are used to estimate the phase-flip error rate of untagged bits. The data of other windows are used for decoy-state analysis.
As the phases of WCS pulses in the windows are never announced in the public channel, the density matrix of those WCS pulses is
(3) |
For convenience, we define the approximated -photon state in the following form Cao et al. (2015):
(4) |
and . It is easy to see that is a classical mixture of different . Explicitly, we have
(5) |
where
(6) |
For the pulse pairs in windows, if the phases of the pulse pair satisfy where is a constant integer, the density matrix of those pulse pairs is
(7) |
where the subscript and indicate Alice and Bob respectively. After a simple calculation, one can find that is actually the classical mixture of the state ,
(8) |
where
(9) |
and the probability to obtain the state is
(10) |
II.2 The security analysis
Follow the security proof in Ref. Wang et al. (2018), let’s first consider the equivalent entanglement protocol of the SNS protocol.
In the entanglement protocol, for each time window, Alice and Bob pre-share the entanglement state
(11) |
where and are local states that only exist in Alice’s and Bob’s labs and and are real states that are sent to Charlie. According to the measurement results announced by Charlie, Alice and Bob can get a series of almost perfect entanglement state by applying entanglement purification to the local states. Two parameters are needed in the entanglement purification: the first is the bit-flip error rate in the basis, , and the second is the bit-flip error rate in the basis, , which is also the phase-flip error rate in the basis. Here the basis means , and the basis means . Finally, by measuring the local states in the basis, Alice and Bob can get secure final keys.
As Alice and Bob only concern about the secure final keys, they needn’t have to measure their local states after Charlie announces his measurement results, but they can just measure their local states before they send the real states to Charlie. If Alice and Bob each measures their local qubits in the basis, it is equivalent to that Alice and Bob randomly send the pulse of state or to Charlie. If Alice and Bob each measures their local qubits in the basis, it is equivalent to that Alice and Bob randomly send the pulse of state or to Charlie. As shown in Ref. Wang et al. (2018), a phase error happens if Alice and Bob send to Charlie and Charlie announces the right detector clicks or Alice and Bob send to Charlie and Charlie announces the left detector clicks.
Denote as the probability that Charlie announces the right detectors clicks while Alice and Bob send to Charlie. Denote as the probability that Charlie announces the left detectors clicks while Alice and Bob send to Charlie. Denote as the yield of . We can calculate the phase-flip error rate by
(12) |
According to the above discussion and the tagged-model, we can define the untagged bits in the real protocol as the bits in the windows that Alice decides not to send and Bob actually sends a pulse of state while Bob decides to send a WCS pulse with intensity , or Bob decides not to send and Alice actually sends a pulse of state while Alice decides to send a WCS pulse with intensity . Finally, we can get the secure final key rate by
(13) |
where is the Shannon entropy, is the yield of the events in the windows, is error correction efficiency factor, and is the bit error rate of the sifted keys.
II.3 The decoy-state method
To clearly show how to apply the decoy-state method to this protocol, we denote Alice’s sources , , and by , , and respectively, and we also denote Bob’s sources , , and by , , and . We denote the source of pulse pairs by , where . And for simplicity, we omit the subscripts. For example, source represents that Alice uses the source and Bob uses the source . Without phase post-selection, the density matrices of sources have similar form with Eq. (4). Specifically, we have
(14) |
where
(15) |
and is defined in Eq. (6). Here is the density matrix of sources and , and is the density matrix of sources and .
Denote the yield of sources by . Denote the yield of states and by and . In the original SNS protocol Wang et al. (2018), as the continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources are used, we have
(16) |
but this equality no longer holds in this protocol. Consider the properties of trace distance Cao et al. (2015), we have
(17) |
where
(18) |
is the fidelity of states and .
Denote the yield of states and by and respectively. And we have . We can get the lower bound of by either analytical formula or the linear programming.
Combining the equations
(19) |
where
(20) |
we have
(21) |
where
(22) |
It is easy to check that if the following condition holds
(23) |
which can be easily examined given values of and . And in our numerical simulation, we found Eq. (23) always holds. With
(24) |
where
(25) |
We have
(26) |
The remaining task is to estimate the upper bound of phase-flip error rate, , which is equivalent to estimate the upper bounds of and .
Denote as the probability that Charlie announces the right detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out the pulse pairs in the window and their phases satisfy . Denote as the probability that Charlie announces the left detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out the pulse pairs in the window and their phases satisfy . Given the discussion above, we know that the pulse pairs in the window whose phases satisfy are the classical mixture of the state . Thus by denoting as the probability that Charlie announces the right detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out the pulse pairs of state , we have
(28) |
Denote and as the probability that Charlie announces the right detector clicks and left detector clicks while Alice and Bob send out a vacuum pulse pair. Consider the properties of trace distance, we have
(29) |
where
(30) |
and
(31) |
With similar method, we have
(33) |
where
(34) |
and has already been shown in Eq. (31). Finally, we have
(35) |
With all those formulas, we can now calculate the secure final key rate according to the observed values in the experiment.
We have obtained explicit formulas above for key rate calculation. In our calculation below, we shall use our analytical formulas above. Definitely, the key rate here can be also calculated through linear programming. It is
(36) |
and so on. After we get the lower bound of through linear programming, the remaining process is the same to the above method.
II.4 4-intensity protocol and 3-intensity protocol
The 3-intensity protocol is simply a special case of our 4-intensity above by setting .
III The numerical simulation
In this part, we shall show some numerical simulation results.
We use the linear model to simulate the observed values Yu et al. (2019); Jiang et al. (2019). The distance between Alice and Charlie and the distance between Bob and Charlie is assumed to be the same. The properties of the two detectors of Charlie are assumed to be the same. The lowest intensities of the sources in the decoy window are set as and , and the remaining parameters including and are optimized to obtained the highest key rates. The ‘Distance’ shown in the figures of this part means the length of fiber between Alice and Bob. And the experiment parameters used in our numerical simulation are listed in Table. 1.
Figure 1 is the key rate of the SNS protocol with different number of phase values. The cyan curve is the PLOB bound which is established by established by Pirandola, Laurenza, Ottaviani, and Banchi to measure the linear upper bound of the key rate of QKD Pirandola et al. (2017). The key rates are almost coincide for the cases . Thus the curves for are not listed in this figure. Figure 1 shows that only with phase values, the key rate of the SNS protocol can exceed the PLOB bound, and with phase values , the key rates is very close to the SNS protocol with continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources.

Figure 2 is the key rate of the SNS protocol with AOPP Xu et al. (2020) and different number of phase values, while Figure 3 is the comparison of the key rates of the original SNS protocol and the AOPP method. The AOPP method is an error rejection process through two way classical communication, which is only related to the sifted keys. As the property of no bit-flip error in the untagged bits holds in the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulaion of WCS sources, we can directly apply the formulas got in our previous work Xu et al. (2020) to calculate the key rate after AOPP. Figure 3 shows that key rates of the SNS protocol with AOPP exceed those of the original SNS protocol by about in all distances. While the distance between Alice and Bob is less than 150 km, the key rates of the AOPP method with 6 phase values are even higher than those of the original SNS protocol with 10 phase values.


Figure 4 is the comparison of the key rates of the 4-intensity protocol and the 3-intensity protocol. In the 4-intensity protocol introduced in Sec. II.1, dosen’t have to be equal to . By adding a constraint that , we get the 3-intensity protocol Yu et al. (2019), which is a more convenient protocol in the experiments. Figure 4 shows that while the number of phase values is large, which is closer to the case of continuously modulated protocol, the key rates of the 3-intensity protocol is almost the same as those of the 4-intensity protocol. As the number of phase values decreases, the key rate gap between the two protocols gradually increases.

IV Conclusion
In summary, we have studied the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation. Starting from the security proof, we obtain analytical formulas of the phase-flip error rate when the discrete phase modulation. With our derivations, we also get the lower bound of the yield of untagged bits. Our numerical results show that only with phase values, the key rates of the SNS protocol can exceed the PLOB bound, and with phase values, the key rates are very close to the SNS protocol with continuously modulated phase-randomized WCS sources. The AOPP method proposed in Ref. Xu et al. (2020) can be directly applied here, and the numerical results show that the advantage of the AOPP method still holds in the SNS protocol with discrete phase modulation of WCS sources.
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