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Securing OFDM-Based NOMA SWIPT Systems

Ahmed Badawy, and Ahmed El Shafie, A. Badawy is with with Politecnico di Torino, DET., Turin, Italy (e-mail: [email protected]).A. El Shafie is with Qualcomm Tech. Inc, San Diego, CA 92121 USA (e-mail: [email protected]).
Abstract

In this paper, we present a physical-layer security scheme that exploits artificial noise (AN) to secure the downlink legitimate communications and transfer energy to nodes operating under non-cooperative non-orthogonal multiple-access (NOMA) scenario. The nodes employ a joint time-switching and power-switching scheme to maximize the harvested energy. We provide necessary analysis and derivations for the optimization parameters and find the optimized transmission parameters that maximize the minimum secrecy rate among users while meeting constraints on minimum transferred energy and outage probabilities at the nodes through an exhaustive grid-based search. Our analysis and simulations prove the feasibility of securing the communication among NOMA nodes, while transferring energy and meeting outage probability constraints.

Index Terms:
NOMA, Physical-layer security, Energy Harvesting, SWIPT

I Introduction

In [1], the authors proposed cooperative non-orthogonal multiple-access (NOMA) scheme where only the near user is an energy harvesting (EH) node that relays information to the far user, however, the work does not take into account securing the communication between the multiple nodes. The work in [2] optimized energy efficiency in non-cooperative NOMA under power budget and data rate constraints without exploiting physical-layer security schemes [3]. Hybrid simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) schemes were proposed in [4] and [5] under the consideration of the harvested energy at the receiving node while securing the legitimate transmissions, however, both works do not take NOMA and/or multiple-access scenarios into consideration. Moreover, [6] investigated physical layer security in large scale NOMA networks, without considering EH at the nodes.

Contributions

In this paper, we consider a system operating under non-cooperative NOMA scenario which employs OFDM transmissions. Without knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ instantaneous channel state information (CSI) since the eavesdroppers are assumed to be passive, the base station (BS) aims at securing communication between itself and legitimate users with the help of artificial noise (AN). In addition, the scheme transfers energy to the legitimate users. We provide necessary analysis and derivations for the achievable secrecy rates, energy transfer rates and outage probability at the legitimate non-cooperative far NOMA users. Several design parameters play different roles in maximizing the secrecy rates while meeting constraints on minimum outage probability and maximum transferred energy, such as cyclic-prefix (CP) length, time-switching (TS) factor between energy transfer and data transmission, power-splitting factor (PS), power-allocation factor between data signal and AN signal, PS factor between NOMA users under a desired outage probability at the legitimate users, and a desired average energy transfer rate constraints to maximize the secrecy rate between BS and legitimate NOMA users. We find the optimized values for these parameters through an exhaustive grid-based search.

Notation

Lower and upper case bold letters denote vectors and matrices, respectively. ()(\cdot)^{\dagger}, ()(\cdot)^{*}, diag{}\text{diag}\{\cdot\}, Tr{}\text{Tr}\{\cdot\} and ||||F||\cdot||_{F} denote transpose, Hermitian, diagonal, trace and the Frobenius norm of a matrix, respectively. 𝐅\boldsymbol{\mathrm{F}} is the FFT matrix, 𝐅\boldsymbol{\mathrm{F^{*}}} is the IFFT matrix. 𝐈N\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N} is the identity matrix with dimension N×NN\times N. 𝟎N1×N2\boldsymbol{\mathrm{0}}_{N_{1}\times N_{2}} is the zero matrix with dimensions N1×N2N_{1}\times N_{2}. N1×N2\mathbb{R}^{N_{1}\times N_{2}} is the set of real numbers with dimensions N1×N2N_{1}\times N_{2} and N1×N2\mathbb{C}^{N_{1}\times N_{2}} is the set of complex numbers with dimensions N1×N2N_{1}\times N_{2}. 𝔼{.}\mathbb{E}\{.\} denotes the expectation. ρ¯=1ρ\bar{\rho}=1-\rho. []+=max{,0}[\cdot]^{+}=\max\{\cdot,0\}. 𝒞𝒩(,)\mathcal{CN}(\cdot,\star) is a Gaussian distribution with ‘\cdot’ mean and ‘\star’ variance.

II System Model

Refer to caption
Figure 1: Network Topology.

In our adopted system model, we assume a BS trying to secure communication between itself and multiple legitimate users in the presence of passive eavesdroppers (Eves), denoted as ee, as depicted in Fig. 1. To this end, the users are categorized into two groups according to the radius of the disc they are located in and the BS is assumed to lie in the center of the discs. Without loss of generality, we assume two discs only, inner Disc UU with radius rur_{u} and Disc GG with inner radius rg1r_{g_{1}} and outer radius rg2r_{g_{2}}. We assume that the spatial topology for both legitimate users and eavesdroppers is modeled according to Poisson point processes (PPP). The legitimate users are assumed to have reliable power supplies. It is also assumed that the legitimate users are EH nodes. Since the energy required for transmission is much higher than that required for processing of the received samples [7], to save energy at the near user, a non-cooperative NOMA transmission scheme is adopted between the BS and the legitimate users. The eavesdroppers are assumed to be located at least half wavelength apart from any legitimate user.

It is assumed that communication is carried out under OFDM scenario. We consider an OFDM symbol with total duration time TT, which is composed of the CP time duration, denoted by TcpT_{\rm cp}, and the time duration of the useful data signal, denoted by TsT_{s}. To this end, T=Nt/fs=Ncp/fs+Ns/fsT=N_{t}/f_{s}=N_{\rm cp}/f_{s}+N_{s}/f_{s}, where Nt=Ncp+NsN_{t}=N_{\rm cp}+N_{s} is the total number of samples within one OFDM symbol, NcpN_{\rm cp} is the number of the samples within the CP, NsN_{s} is the number of samples of the transmitted data signal, and fsf_{s} is the sampling frequency. Under OFDM scheme, the available bandwidth is divided into NsN_{s} orthogonal sub-channels.

The wireless channels between BS and users are modeled as block-fading channels, which implies that the channel coefficients do not vary during the channel coherence time. The thermal noise at the receiving nodes is modeled as additive white Gaussian noise with zero mean and power σ2\sigma^{2}.

III Scheme Design and Analysis

The BS uses NsN_{s}-point inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) to convert the frequency-domain sub-channels into the time-domain. In addition, it appends a CP of length NcpN_{\rm cp} to the beginning of each OFDM symbol to prevent the inter-OFDM-symbol-interference across adjacent OFDM symbols. Along with the transmitted OFDM symbol, the BS transmits a time-domain AN signal by exploiting the temporal dimensions gained by the presence of the CP. As will be shown later, the AN is designed such that it is canceled out at the legitimate receivers prior to signal demodulation and retrieval of the transmitted data message. The BS splits its total available transmit power, PtP_{t}, between the data and AN signals. The power split factor is denoted by 0ρ10\leq\rho\leq 1. The allocated power to the data signal is ρPt\rho P_{t} and the allocated power to AN signal is ρ¯Pt\bar{\rho}P_{t}.

BS transmits signals to two NOMA users selected from Discs UU and GG, which are uiu_{i} and gig_{i}, respectively along with AN signal. Moving forward, we will drop the subscript for the users and use uu and gg to denote the users. The transmitted signal from BS is

𝐱=ρPt𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩+ρ¯Pt𝐊𝐰,\boldsymbol{\mathrm{x}}=\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{E_{\rm cp}F^{*}}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Sp}}+\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Kw}}, (1)

where 𝐱Nt×1\boldsymbol{\mathrm{x}}\in\mathbb{\mathbb{C}}^{N_{t}\times 1}, 𝐄𝐜𝐩Nt×Ns\boldsymbol{\mathrm{E_{\rm cp}}}\in\mathbb{\mathbb{R}}^{N_{t}\times N_{s}} is the CP insertion matrix, 𝐒\boldsymbol{\mathrm{S}} Ns×2~{}\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{s}\times 2} contains the messages to be sent to the two NOMA users, 𝐩=[θuθg]\boldsymbol{\mathrm{p}}=[\sqrt{\theta_{u}}\hskip 7.22743pt\sqrt{\theta_{g}}]^{\dagger} is the vector that contains the assigned power factors for Users uu and gg, respectively, 𝐊Nt×Ncp\boldsymbol{\mathrm{K}}\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{t}\times N_{\rm cp}} is the AN precoding matrix and 𝐰Ncp×1\boldsymbol{\mathrm{w}}\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{\rm cp}\times 1} is the AN vector.

The entire CP is used in analog domain to transfer energy to two NOMA Users, uu and gg. Prior to processing and in time domain the rest of the OFDM symbol is divided into two portions. During the first portion, which has a duration Tu=Nu/fsT_{u}=N_{u}/f_{s} and Tg=Ng/fsT_{g}=N_{g}/f_{s} at Users uu and gg, respectively, where NuN_{u} and NgN_{g} are the number of samples in the first portions at Users uu and gg, respectively, the users use PS scheme, where a fraction of the received samples power is used for EH. For the remaining portion of the OFDM symbol, no PS is used and, hence, the entire second portion is used for data processing.

The received signal at User uu is

yi={cuβuρPt[𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩]i+cuβuρ¯Pt[𝐇𝐭𝐊𝐰]i+nuifori=Ncp+1,,Nu+NcpcuρPt[𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩]i+ρ¯Ptcu[𝐇𝐭𝐊𝐰]i+nui,fori=Ncp+Nu+1,,Ns\displaystyle y_{i}=\begin{cases}c_{u}\sqrt{\beta_{u}\rho P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H_{{t}}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}Sp}}\right]_{i}+c_{u}\sqrt{\beta_{u}\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\rm{H_{t}Kw}}\right]_{i}\\ \quad+n_{u_{i}}\hskip 54.2025pt\text{for}\hskip 7.22743pti=N_{\rm cp}+1,\ldots,N_{u}+N_{\rm cp}\\ c_{u}\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H_{{t}}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}Sp}}\right]_{i}+\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}c_{u}\left[\boldsymbol{\rm{H_{t}Kw}}\right]_{i}\\ \quad+n_{u_{i}},\hskip 50.58878pt\text{for}\hskip 7.22743pti=N_{\rm cp}+N_{u}+1,\ldots,N_{s}\\ \end{cases} (2)

where βu\beta_{u} is the power split factor during TuT_{u}, cu=11+duαc_{u}=\frac{1}{\sqrt{1+d_{u}^{\alpha}}}, dud_{u} is the distance between BS and uu, α\alpha is the path loss exponent, 𝐇𝐭\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H_{t}}} is the Toeplitz channel matrix between BS and uu with the impulse response of the channel as its first column, and 𝕟u\mathbb{n}_{u} is noise at receiver uu. Ditto, the received signal at User gg is

zi={cgβgρPt[𝐆𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩]i+cgβgρ¯Pt[𝐆𝐭𝐊𝐰]i+ngifori=Ncp+1,,Ng+NcpcgρPt[𝐆𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩]i+cgρ¯Pt[𝐆𝐭𝐊𝐰]i+ngi,fori=Ncp+Ng+1,,Nsz_{i}=\begin{cases}c_{g}\sqrt{\beta_{g}\rho P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G_{{t}}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}Sp}}\right]_{i}+c_{g}\sqrt{\beta_{g}\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\rm{G_{t}Kw}}\right]_{i}\\ \quad+n_{g_{i}}\hskip 54.2025pt\text{for}\hskip 7.22743pti=N_{\rm cp}+1,\ldots,N_{g}+N_{\rm cp}\\ c_{g}\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G_{{t}}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}Sp}}\right]_{i}+c_{g}\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\rm{G_{t}Kw}}\right]_{i}\\ \quad+n_{g_{i}},\hskip 50.58878pt\text{for}\hskip 7.22743pti=N_{\rm cp}+N_{g}+1,\ldots,N_{s}\end{cases} (3)

where βg\beta_{g} is the power split factor during TgT_{g}, cg=11+dgαc_{g}=\frac{1}{\sqrt{1+d_{g}^{\alpha}}}, dgd_{g} is the distance between BS and gg, 𝐆𝐭\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G_{t}}} is the Toeplitz channel matrix between BS and gg and 𝕟g\mathbb{n}_{g} is the AWGN at receiver gg.

Before processing the symbols at the receiver side, equalization is needed to remove the impact of power split. The received samples up to sample Ncp+NuN_{\rm cp}+N_{u} are now

y~i\displaystyle\tilde{y}_{i} =yi/βu\displaystyle=y_{i}/\sqrt{\beta_{u}}
=cuρPt[𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩]i+cuρ¯Pt[𝐇𝐭𝐊𝐰]i\displaystyle=c_{u}\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H_{{t}}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}Sp}}\right]_{i}+c_{u}\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\left[\boldsymbol{\rm{H_{t}Kw}}\right]_{i}
+nui/βu.\displaystyle\quad\quad\quad\quad+n_{u_{i}}/\sqrt{\beta_{u}}. (4)

Hence, the received vector at User uu is 𝐲=[y~1,y~2,,y~Nu,yNu+Ncp+1,,yNs]\boldsymbol{\mathrm{y}}=[\tilde{y}_{1},\tilde{y}_{2},\ldots,\tilde{y}_{N_{u}},y_{N_{u}+N_{\rm cp}+1},\ldots,y_{N_{s}}]^{\dagger}. The CP is removed from the received signal at uu by multiplying by the CP removal matrix 𝚽Ns×Nt\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Phi}}\in\mathbb{\mathbb{R}}^{N_{s}\times N_{t}}. The outcome is then fed to the FFT block which yields

𝐅𝐲=cuρPt𝐅𝚽𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩\displaystyle\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Fy}}\!=\!c_{u}\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{F\Phi H_{t}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}Sp}} +cuρ¯Pt𝐅𝚽𝐇𝐭𝐊𝐰+𝔽𝐧𝐮,\displaystyle\!+\!c_{u}\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{F\Phi H_{t}Kw}}\!+\!\mathbb{F}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{n_{u}}}, (5)

where 𝐧𝐮Ns×1\boldsymbol{\mathrm{n_{u}}}\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{s}\times 1} is the AWGN vector after CP removal. We will denote part of the first term in the left hand side of (5) by 𝐇=𝐅𝚽𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H=F\Phi H_{t}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}}}. Note that 𝐇Ns×Ns\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H}}\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{s}\times N_{s}} is a diagonal matrix, whose diagonal elements are the frequency domain channel coefficients between the BS and uu. Similar steps are followed at gg, which yields

𝐅𝐳=cgρPt𝐆𝐒𝐩+cgρ¯Pt𝐅𝚽𝐆𝐭𝐊𝐰+𝔽𝐧𝐠,\displaystyle\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Fz}}=c_{g}\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{GSp}}+c_{g}\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{F\Phi G_{t}Kw}}+\mathbb{F}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{n_{g}}}, (6)

with 𝐆=𝐅𝚽𝐆𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G=F\Phi G_{t}E_{\rm cp}F^{*}}} and 𝐧𝐠Ns×1\boldsymbol{\mathrm{n_{g}}}\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{s}\times 1} is the AWGN vector after CP removal for User gg.

To remove the impact of AN at both legitimate users, the AN precoding matrix should satisfy

𝚽(𝐇𝐭+𝐆𝐭)𝐊=𝟎Ns×Ncp\displaystyle\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Phi\left(H_{t}+G_{t}\right)K}}=\boldsymbol{\mathrm{0}}_{N_{s}\times N_{\rm cp}} (7)

Since the rank of the matrix 𝚽(𝐇𝐭+𝐆𝐭)\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Phi\left(H_{t}+G_{t}\right)}} is NsN_{s} and its number of columns is NtN_{t}, (7) has a non-trivial solution and correspondingly 𝚽(𝐇𝐭+𝐆𝐭)\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Phi\left(H_{t}+G_{t}\right)}} has a non-trivial null space.

Note that due to the equalization step applied in (4), the noise variance for the first NuN_{u} and NgN_{g} samples increases. The average noise variance across all samples for Users uu and gg can be given by

σa,u2=σ2(NsNu+NuβuNs),\displaystyle\sigma_{a,u}^{2}=\sigma^{2}\left(\frac{N_{s}-N_{u}+\frac{N_{u}}{\beta_{u}}}{N_{s}}\right), (8)
σa,g2=σ2(NsNg+NgβgNs).\displaystyle\sigma_{a,g}^{2}=\sigma^{2}\left(\frac{N_{s}-N_{g}+\frac{N_{g}}{\beta_{g}}}{N_{s}}\right). (9)

III-A Secrecy Rates

Both uu and gg are not impacted by AN signals by design. Under NOMA scheme, uu decodes and removes the message sent to User gg. The achievable rate at uu is

Ru=1Ntlog2det(𝐈Ns+ρθuPtNt𝐇𝐇(𝐅𝚲𝐮𝐅)𝟏),\displaystyle R_{u}=\frac{1}{N_{t}}{\log_{2}\det{\left(\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+{\frac{\rho\theta_{u}P_{t}}{N_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{HH^{*}\left(F\Lambda_{u}F^{*}\right)^{-1}}}}\right)}}, (10)

where 𝚲u=σ2cu2diag{1/βu,1/βu,,1/βuNu,1,1,,1}Ns×Ns\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Lambda}}_{u}=\frac{\sigma^{2}}{c_{u}^{2}}\text{diag}\{\underbrace{{1}/{\beta_{u}},{1}/{\beta_{u}},\ldots,{1}/{\beta_{u}}}_{N_{u}},1,1,\ldots,1\}\in\mathbb{R}^{N_{s}\times N_{s}}. Under NOMA, User gg treats the signal assigned to User uu as noise and does not remove it from its received signal. Hence, the achievable rate at gg is

Rg=1Ntlog2det(𝐈Ns+ρθgPtNt𝐆𝐆(𝐅𝚲𝐠𝐅)𝟏),\displaystyle R_{g}=\frac{1}{N_{t}}{\log_{2}\det{\left(\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+{\frac{\rho\theta_{g}P_{t}}{N_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{GG^{*}\left(F\Lambda_{g}F^{*}\right)^{-1}}}}\right)}}, (11)

where 𝚲gNs×Ns\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Lambda}}_{g}\in\mathbb{R}^{N_{s}\times N_{s}} is given by 𝚲g=(σ2cg2𝐈Ns+ρθuPt𝐆𝐆Nt)diag{1/βg,,1/βgNg,1,,1}.\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\Lambda}}_{g}\!=\!\left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{c_{g}^{2}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}\!+\!\frac{\rho\theta_{u}P_{t}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G}}^{*}}{N_{t}}\right)\text{diag}\{\!\underbrace{{1}/{\beta_{g}},\cdots,{1}/{\beta_{g}}}_{N_{g}},1,\cdots,1\!\}.

There are few cases for the the achievable rate at Eve. First if Eve is interested in decoding either of the messages sent to uu or gg. In this case, Eve considers the signal that she is not interested in as noise. If Eve is interested in decoding uu’s message only, Eve’s achievable rate in this case is given by

RE,u=1Ntlog2det(𝐈Ns+ρθuPtNt𝐕𝐕(ρ¯PtNcp𝐃𝐃+σ2ce2𝐈Ns+ρθgPt𝐕𝐕Nt)1),\begin{split}&R_{E,u}=\frac{1}{N_{t}}\log_{2}\det\bigg{(}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+\\ &\frac{\rho\theta_{u}P_{t}}{N_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{VV^{*}}}\left(\frac{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}{N_{\rm cp}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{DD^{*}}}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{c_{e}^{2}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+\frac{\rho\theta_{g}P_{t}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{VV^{*}}}}{N_{t}}\right)^{-1}\bigg{)},\end{split} (12)

where 𝐕\boldsymbol{\mathrm{V}} is a diagonal matrix with the frequency domain channel coefficients between BS and Eve as its diagonal and 𝐃=𝐅𝚽𝐕𝐭𝐊\boldsymbol{\mathrm{D=F\Phi V_{t}K}}, with 𝐕𝐭\boldsymbol{\mathrm{V_{t}}} being the Toeplitz channel matrix between BS and Eve. Note that the term ρ¯PtNcp𝐃𝐃\frac{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}{N_{\rm cp}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{DD^{*}}}, which is the AN covariance matrix, represents the impact of AN at Eve. If Eve is interested in decoding gg’s message only, Eve’s achievable rate in this case is given by

RE,g=1Ntlog2det(𝐈Ns+ρθgPtNt𝐕𝐕(ρ¯PtNcp𝐃𝐃+σ2ce2𝐈Ns+ρθuPt𝐕𝐕Nt)1).\begin{split}&R_{E,g}=\frac{1}{N_{t}}\log_{2}\det\bigg{(}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+\\ &\frac{\rho\theta_{g}P_{t}}{N_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{VV^{*}}}\left(\frac{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}{N_{\rm cp}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{DD^{*}}}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{c_{e}^{2}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+\frac{\rho\theta_{u}P_{t}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{VV^{*}}}}{N_{t}}\right)^{-1}\bigg{)}.\end{split} (13)

If Eve is interested in decoding both signals and employs a joint-typicality receiver, the secrecy rate can be given by

RE=1Ntlog2det(𝐈Ns+ρPtNt𝐕𝐕(ρ¯PtNcp𝐃𝐃+σ2ce2𝐈𝑵𝒔)1).\begin{split}R_{E}=&\frac{1}{N_{t}}\log_{2}\det\bigg{(}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{s}}+\\ &\frac{\rho P_{t}}{N_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{VV^{*}}}\left(\frac{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}{N_{\rm cp}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{DD^{*}}}+\frac{\sigma^{2}}{c_{e}^{2}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}_{N_{s}}}\right)^{-1}\bigg{)}.\end{split} (14)

The secure transmission rate between BS and uu and gg following the previous cases can now be given by

Rs,u[RuRE,u]+,\displaystyle R_{s,u}\leq[R_{u}-R_{E,u}]^{+}, (15)
Rs,g[RgRE,g]+.\displaystyle R_{s,g}\leq[R_{g}-R_{E,g}]^{+}. (16)

The sum secrecy rate is upper-bounded by [8]

Rs,u+Rs,g[Ru+RgRE]+.\displaystyle R_{s,u}+R_{s,g}\leq\left[R_{u}+R_{g}-R_{E}\right]^{+}. (17)

The rate pair (Rs,u,Rs,gR_{s,u},~{}R_{s,g}) should satisfy (15), (16) and (17).

III-B Outage Probability

The outage probability for uu, Po,uP_{o,u}, comprises the probability that uu cannot detect the signal sent to gg and the probability that uu can detect the message sent to gg but cannot detect the message sent to itself. This is given as

Po,u=\displaystyle\small P_{o,u}= Pr{cu2𝐇F2<ϑ{g,u}}\displaystyle\Pr\left\{c_{u}^{2}||\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H}}||_{F}^{2}<\vartheta_{\{g,u\}}\right\}
+Pr{cu2𝐇F2>ϑ{g,u},ϑ{g,u}<ϑ{u,u}},\displaystyle+\Pr\left\{c_{u}^{2}||\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H}}||_{F}^{2}>\vartheta_{\{g,u\}},\vartheta_{\{g,u\}}<\vartheta_{\{u,u\}}\right\}, (18)

where ϑ{g,u}=δ1σa,u2ρPt(θgθuδ1)\vartheta_{\{g,u\}}=\frac{\delta_{1}\sigma_{a,u}^{2}}{\rho P_{t}\left(\theta_{g}-\theta_{u}\delta_{1}\right)}, ϑ{u,u}=δ2σa,u2ρθuPt\vartheta_{\{u,u\}}=\frac{\delta_{2}\sigma_{a,u}^{2}}{\rho\theta_{u}P_{t}}, with δ1\delta_{1} satisfies θgδ1θu>0\theta_{g}-\delta_{1}\theta_{u}>0 [9] and δ2=2(2δ3)1\delta_{2}=2^{(2\delta_{3})}-1, where δ3\delta_{3} is the desired rate at which uu can detect the message sent to itself. Hence, with the help of the results provided in [1] under the assumption that the spatial topology for the users is modeled through PPP, the approximate outage probability at User uu per sub-channel can be given by

Po,u{π2Ll=1L1cos2(2l12Lπ)×(1exp(nlϑ{g,u}))×(1+cos(2l12Lπ)),forϑ{g,u}ϑ{u,u}1forϑ{g,u}<ϑ{u,u}\small P_{o,u}\approx\begin{cases}\begin{split}&\frac{\pi}{2L}\sum_{l=1}^{L}\sqrt{1-\cos^{2}{\left(\frac{2l-1}{2L}\pi\right)}}\times\\ &\left(1-\exp\left(-n_{l}\vartheta_{\{g,u\}}\right)\right)\times\left(1+\cos{\left(\frac{2l-1}{2L}\pi\right)}\right),\\ &\hskip 124.30447pt\text{for}\quad\vartheta_{\{g,u\}}\geq\vartheta_{\{u,u\}}\end{split}\\ 1\hskip 119.24506pt\text{for}\quad\vartheta_{\{g,u\}}<\vartheta_{\{u,u\}}\end{cases} (19)

where nl=1+(ru2(1+cos(2l12Lπ)))αn_{l}=1+\left(\frac{r_{u}}{2}\left(1+\cos{\left(\frac{2l-1}{2L}\pi\right)}\right)\right)^{\alpha}, and LL is a design parameter used for complexity-accuracy tradeoff. The outage probability for gg, denoted by Po,gP_{o,g}, can be given by

Po,g=Pr{cg2𝐆F2<ϑ{g,g}},\displaystyle P_{o,g}=\Pr\left\{c_{g}^{2}||\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G}}||_{F}^{2}<\vartheta_{\{g,g\}}\right\}, (20)

where ϑ{g,g}=δ1σa,g2ρPt(θgθuδ1)\vartheta_{\{g,g\}}=\frac{\delta_{1}\sigma_{a,g}^{2}}{\rho P_{t}\left(\theta_{g}-\theta_{u}\delta_{1}\right)}. We extend the derivation provided in [1] for cooperative NOMA to our non-cooperative NOMA model and, hence, the approximate outage probability for User gg per sub-channel can be given by

Po,gπM(rg2+rg1)m=1M1cos2(2m12Mπ)nm×(1exp((1+nmα)ϑ{g,g}))\begin{split}P_{o,g}&\approx\frac{\pi}{M\left(r_{g_{2}}+r_{g_{1}}\right)}\sum_{m=1}^{M}\sqrt{1-\cos^{2}{\left(\frac{2m-1}{2M}\pi\right)}}\\ &n_{m}\times\left(1-\exp\left(-\left(1+n_{m}^{\alpha}\right)\vartheta_{\{g,g\}}\right)\right)\\ \end{split} (21)

where nm=Δrg2(1+cos(2m12Mπ))+rg1n_{m}=\frac{\Delta_{r_{g}}}{2}\left(1+\cos{\left(\frac{2m-1}{2M}\pi\right)}\right)+r_{g_{1}}, Δrg=rg2rg1\Delta_{r_{g}}=r_{g_{2}}-r_{g_{1}} and MM is a design parameter used for complexity-accuracy tradeoff.

III-C Harvested Energy

The energy harvested at both users comprises of two portions. The first portion is from the CP signal, which is

𝝊u=cu𝐀𝐜𝐩𝐇𝐭(ρPt𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩+ρ¯Pt𝐊𝐰),\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\upsilon}}_{u}=c_{u}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{\rm cp}H_{t}}}\left(\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{E_{\rm cp}F^{*}}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Sp}}+\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Kw}}\right), (22)

for User uu and defined similarly for User gg as

𝝊g=cg𝐀𝐜𝐩𝐆𝐭(ρPt𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐅𝐒𝐩+ρ¯Pt𝐊𝐰),\boldsymbol{\mathrm{\upsilon}}_{g}=c_{g}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{\rm cp}G_{t}}}\left(\sqrt{\rho P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{E_{\rm cp}F^{*}}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Sp}}+\sqrt{\bar{\rho}P_{t}}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{Kw}}\right), (23)

where 𝐀𝐜𝐩=[𝐈Ncp𝟎Ncp×Ns]Ncp×N\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{\rm cp}}}=\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{\rm cp}}\quad\boldsymbol{\mathrm{0}}_{N_{\rm cp}\times N_{s}}\right]\in\mathbb{R}^{N_{\rm cp}\times N} is the CP extraction matrix. The harvested energy during CP is then

E1,u\displaystyle\small E_{1,u} =\displaystyle=
ηPtTcpcu2Tr{𝐀𝐜𝐩𝐇𝐭(ρ𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐄𝐜𝐩Nt+ρ¯𝐊𝐊Ncp)𝐇𝐭𝐀𝐜𝐩},\displaystyle\eta P_{t}T_{\rm cp}c_{u}^{2}\text{Tr}\bigg{\{}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{\rm cp}H_{t}}}\bigg{(}\frac{\rho\boldsymbol{\mathrm{E_{\rm cp}E_{\rm cp}^{*}}}}{N_{t}}+\frac{\bar{\rho}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{KK^{*}}}}{N_{\rm cp}}\bigg{)}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{H_{t}^{*}A^{*}_{\rm cp}}}\bigg{\}}, (24)
E1,g\displaystyle\small E_{1,g} =\displaystyle=
ηPtTcpcg2Tr{𝐀𝐜𝐩𝐆𝐭(ρ𝐄𝐜𝐩𝐄𝐜𝐩Nt+ρ¯𝐊𝐊Ncp)𝐆𝐭𝐀𝐜𝐩},\displaystyle\eta P_{t}T_{\rm cp}c_{g}^{2}\text{Tr}\left\{\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{\rm cp}G_{t}}}\left(\frac{\rho\boldsymbol{\mathrm{E_{\rm cp}E_{\rm cp}^{*}}}}{N_{t}}+\frac{\bar{\rho}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{KK^{*}}}}{N_{\rm cp}}\right)\boldsymbol{\mathrm{G_{t}^{*}A^{*}_{\rm cp}}}\right\}, (25)

where 0η10\leq\eta\leq 1 is the efficiency factor of the RF energy conversion process at the energy harvester circuit. The second portion of the energy is harvested from NuN_{u} and NgN_{g} samples after CP and can be given by

E2,u=ηcu2ρβu¯PtNuTsNtTr{𝐀𝐍𝐮𝚽𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩(𝐀𝐍𝐮𝚽𝐇𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩)}\small E_{2,u}=\frac{\eta c_{u}^{2}\rho\bar{\beta_{u}}P_{t}N_{u}T_{s}}{N_{t}}\text{Tr}\bigg{\{}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{N_{u}}\Phi H_{t}E_{\rm cp}}}\left(\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{N_{u}}\Phi H_{t}E_{\rm cp}}}\right)^{*}\bigg{\}} (26)
E2,g=ηcg2ρβg¯PtNgTsNtTr{𝐀𝐍𝐠𝚽𝐆𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩(𝐀𝐍𝐠𝚽𝐆𝐭𝐄𝐜𝐩)}\small E_{2,g}=\frac{\eta c_{g}^{2}\rho\bar{\beta_{g}}P_{t}N_{g}T_{s}}{N_{t}}\text{Tr}\bigg{\{}\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{N_{g}}\Phi G_{t}E_{\rm cp}}}\left(\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{N_{g}}\Phi G_{t}E_{\rm cp}}}\right)^{*}\bigg{\}} (27)

where 𝐀𝐍𝐮=[𝐈Nu𝟎Nu×(NsNu)]Nu×Ns\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{N_{u}}}}=\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{u}}\quad\boldsymbol{\mathrm{0}}_{N_{u}\times(N_{s}-N_{u})}\right]\in\mathbb{R}^{N_{u}\times N_{s}} is the NuN_{u} samples extraction matrix and 𝐀𝐍𝐠=[𝐈Ng𝟎Ng×(NsNg)]Ng×Ns\boldsymbol{\mathrm{A_{N_{g}}}}=\left[\boldsymbol{\mathrm{I}}_{N_{g}}\quad\boldsymbol{\mathrm{0}}_{N_{g}\times(N_{s}-N_{g})}\right]\in\mathbb{R}^{N_{g}\times N_{s}} is the NgN_{g} samples extraction matrix. The total energy at uu and gg can be given by

Eu=E1,u+E2,u,Eg=E1,g+E2,g.\displaystyle E_{u}=E_{1,u}+E_{2,u},\ E_{g}=E_{1,g}+E_{2,g}. (28)

III-D Optimization Problem

We optimize the minimum average secrecy rate of Users uu and gg according to

maxβu,βg,ρ,θu,θg,Nu,Ng,Ncp:min{𝔼{Rs,u},𝔼{Rs,g}},s.t.𝔼{Eu}μu,𝔼{Eg}μg,Po,uϵu,Po,gϵg,0βu,βg,ρ,θu,θg1,Nu,Ng{0,1,2,,Ns},τNcp/fsNs/fs,\begin{split}\max_{\beta_{u},\beta_{g},\rho,\theta_{u},\theta_{g},N_{u},N_{g},N_{\rm cp}}:\min\left\{\mathbb{E}\left\{R_{s,u}\right\},\mathbb{E}\left\{R_{s,g}\right\}\right\},\\ \text{s.t.}\quad\mathbb{E}\left\{E_{u}\right\}\geq\mu_{u},\quad\mathbb{E}\left\{E_{g}\right\}\geq\mu_{g},\\ P_{o,u}\leq\epsilon_{u},\quad P_{o,g}\leq\epsilon_{g},\\ 0\leq\beta_{u},\beta_{g},\rho,\theta_{u},\theta_{g}\leq 1,\\ N_{u},N_{g}\in\left\{0,1,2,\ldots,N_{s}\right\},\\ \tau\leq N_{\rm cp}/f_{s}\leq N_{s}/f_{s},\end{split} (29)

where μu0\mu_{u}\geq 0 and μg\mu_{g}\geq are the desired average energy harvested rates at Users uu and gg, respectively, 0δu10\leq\delta_{u}\leq 1 and 0δg10\leq\delta_{g}\leq 1 are the desired outage probability at Users uu and gg, respectively, and τ=max{τu,τg}\tau=\max\{\tau_{u},\tau_{g}\} with τu\tau_{u}, τg\tau_{g} are the delay spreads between BS and Users uu and gg, respectively.

Some Remarks on Eqn. (29): There are some tradeoffs in (29) as follows

  • As NuN_{u} and NgN_{g} increase, the harvested energy at Users uu and gg increase. However, as can be seen from Eqns. (8) and (9), σa,u2,σa,g2σ2\sigma_{a,u}^{2},\sigma_{a,g}^{2}\geq\sigma^{2}, i.e., the average noise variance increases as NuN_{u} and NgN_{g} increase, which implies lower SNR at users. Each user can adjust its split samples, i.e., NuN_{u} or NgN_{g}, based on its needs. Similar remarks can be stated for βu\beta_{u} and βg\beta_{g}.

  • As ρ\rho increases, SNR at the users increases. However, this means that less power is dedicated to AN which will also increase the SNR at the eavesdropper and, hence, reduce the secrecy rate.

  • The NOMA power split factor should satisfy θu<θg\theta_{u}<\theta_{g} and θu+θg=1\theta_{u}+\theta_{g}=1 while as θu\theta_{u} increases, the SNR and hence the rate at User uu increases, however, the SINR and hence the rate at User gg decreases as can be seen from Eqns. (10) and (11).

Due to the non-convexity of the objective function and the constraints, the optimization problem in (29) is not convex and hence it can solved offline using Matlab’s fmincon function or multi-dimensional grid-based search over the optimization variables and then the feasible set optimal values get communicated to both NOMA Users uu and gg before operation. The optimization problem is solved through an exhaustive grid-based search at the BS, which is also known as brute force solution111The associated complexity can be reduced by using alternative computationally-efficient methods such as the interior-point methods [10, Chapter 11] which are used by the fmincon function in Matlab. Devising a more efficient method to solve the non-convex optimization problem in (29) is out of the scope of this paper. We shall investigate that in our future work.. Under the transmission parameters such as NtN_{t} and NcpN_{cp}, the BS calculates Rs,uR_{s,u}, Rs,gR_{s,g} ,Po,uP_{o,u}, Po,gP_{o,g}, for all feasible sets of the optimization parameters. The BS then selects the values that maximize the minimum secrecy rates between itself and uu and gg, while meeting constraints on EuE_{u}, EgE_{g}, Po,uP_{o,u} and Po,gP_{o,g}. The calculated optimal values should remain the same as long as the system’s average parameters including required 𝔼{Eu}\mathbb{E}\left\{E_{u}\right\}, 𝔼{Eg}\mathbb{E}\left\{E_{g}\right\}, 𝔼{Po,u}\mathbb{E}\{P_{o,u}\}, 𝔼{Po,g}\mathbb{E}\{P_{o,g}\} and average channel gains remain the same. The optimization problem does not require knowledge of eavesdroppers’ instantaneous CSI. Only statistics are required to be estimated.

IV Simulation Results

We conduct our OFDM-based NOMA SWIPT system simulation using Rayleigh fading channel realizations that follow 𝒞𝒩(0,1)\mathcal{CN}(0,1). Independent channel realizations are generated for each user and for the eavesdropper. The rest of the simulation parameters are σ2=1\sigma^{2}=1 Watt, Nt=64N_{t}=64, Ncp=16N_{\rm cp}=16, fs=2f_{s}=2 MHz, ru=8r_{u}=8 meters, rg1=10r_{g_{1}}=10 meters, rg2=14r_{g_{2}}=14 meters, du=4d_{u}=4 meters, dg=12d_{g}=12 meters, de=10d_{e}=10 meters, η=0.75\eta=0.75, and α=2\alpha=2. The calculated ranges for SNR at gg and uu across all variations of NgN_{g}, βg\beta_{g}, θg\theta_{g}, θu\theta_{u}, ρ\rho are [0:13]\in[0:13] dB and [27:45]\in[27:45] dB, respectively. Due to limited available space, we present more results for gg since it is the far user operating under non-cooperative NOMA. Moreover, we simulate for fixed Nu=16N_{u}=16 and βu=0.5\beta_{u}=0.5, however, similar conclusions for varying these two parameters are analogous to varying NgN_{g} and βg\beta_{g}. The optimized values are estimated through an exhaustive grid-based search operation at the BS. We present these values at the end of the section. In the following figures, we show the impact of varying the optimization parameters on the performance of the system.

Fig. 2 presents the simulated average secrecy rates. Fig. 3 presents the simulated outage probabilities. Fig. 4 presents the simulated harvested energy. In Figs. 2 to 4, we have (a) average parameter for uu versus ρ\rho for different θg\theta_{g} values (b) average parameter for gg versus ρ\rho for different θg\theta_{g} values, Ng=24N_{g}=24 and βg=0.5\beta_{g}=0.5 (c) average parameter for gg versus βg\beta_{g} for different ρ\rho values, Ng=24N_{g}=24 and θg=0.75\theta_{g}=0.75 and (d) average parameter for gg versus NgN_{g} for different ρ\rho values, θg=0.75\theta_{g}=0.75 and βg=0.5\beta_{g}=0.5. Note that changing θg\theta_{g} changes θu\theta_{u} since θu=1θg\theta_{u}=1-\theta_{g}.

As shown in Fig. 2 (a) as ρ\rho increases or θg\theta_{g} decreases, the SNR at uu increases and hence 𝔼{Rs,u}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,u}\} increases. However since gg considers uu’s signal as noise, as ρ\rho increases, the noise variance increases and hence 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\} decreases as shown in Fig. 2 (b). Unlike uu as θg\theta_{g} increases, the desired signal power at gg increases, which improves SNR and consequently 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\}. As shown in Fig. 2 (c) as βg\beta_{g} increases, higher power factor is allocated for signal decoding rather than energy harvesting, which improves SNR as follows from the definition of Λg\Lambda_{g} and, hence, improves 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\}. NgN_{g} does not have much impact on 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\}. Note that the upper bound (UB) in (17) is satisfied.

Refer to caption
Figure 2: Average secrecy rates: (a) 𝔼{Rs,u}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,u}\} and UBs, (b) 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\} vs. ρ\rho, (c) 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\} vs. βg\beta_{g} and (d) 𝔼{Rs,g}\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\} vs. NgN_{g}.

One key finding in Fig. 3 (a) is that very low values of θu\theta_{u}, for example 0.050.05, i.e., when θg=0.95\theta_{g}=0.95, might lead to Po,u=1P_{o,u}=1. To achieve a desired ϵu104\epsilon_{u}\leq 10^{-4}, ρ\rho can be [0.05:0.95]\in[0.05:0.95] and θg[0.55:0.9]\theta_{g}\in[0.55:0.9]. As can be inferred from Fig. 3 (b) to (d) to achieve a desired ϵg104\epsilon_{g}\leq 10^{-4}, ρ\rho can be [0.2:0.95]\in[0.2:0.95], θg[0.55:0.9]\theta_{g}\in[0.55:0.9], βg[0.05:0.95]\beta_{g}\in[0.05:0.95], and Ng[12:Ns]N_{g}\in[12:N_{s}].

As expected, the harvested energy at uu is much higher than that at the far User gg. To achieve a desired μu10\mu_{u}\geq 10 joules, ρ\rho should be [0.5:0.95]\in[0.5:0.95] as shown in Fig. 4 (a). Note that since the energy is harvested at uu before cancelling User gg’s signal, changing θg\theta_{g} does not have an impact on 𝔼{Eu}\mathbb{E}\{E_{u}\}. As can be seen in Fig. 4 (b) to (d), to achieve μg1\mu_{g}\geq 1 joule, ρ\rho should be [0.65:0.95]\in[0.65:0.95], βg\beta_{g} should be [0.55:0.95]\in[0.55:0.95] and NgN_{g} should be [16:Ns]\in[16:N_{s}]. NgN_{g} has the most impact on the harvested energy at gg.

Refer to caption
Figure 3: Outage probabilities: (a) Po,uP_{o,u} vs. ρ\rho, (b) Po,gP_{o,g} vs. ρ\rho, (c) Po,gP_{o,g} vs. βg\beta_{g} and (d) Po,gP_{o,g} vs. NgN_{g}.

Following the exhaustive grid-based search operation, the optimal results under our simulation parameters are ρ=0.75\rho=0.75, θg=0.75\theta_{g}=0.75, βg=0.85\beta_{g}=0.85 and Ng=32N_{g}=32. The reader can infer these values from and the explanatory plots in Figs. 2 to 4. The achieved maximized 𝔼{Rs,u}=4\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,u}\}=4 bits/sec/Hz and 𝔼{Rs,g}=0.7\mathbb{E}\{R_{s,g}\}=0.7 bits/sec/Hz while meeting the constraints on Po,u104P_{o,u}\leq 10^{-4}, Po,g104P_{o,g}\leq 10^{-4}, 𝔼{Eu}10\mathbb{E}\{E_{u}\}\geq 10 joules and 𝔼{Eg}1\mathbb{E}\{E_{g}\}\geq 1 joule.

Refer to caption
Figure 4: Average harvested energy: (a) 𝔼{Eu}\mathbb{E}\{E_{u}\} vs. ρ\rho, (b) 𝔼{Eg}\mathbb{E}\{E_{g}\} vs. ρ\rho, (c) 𝔼{Eg}\mathbb{E}\{E_{g}\} vs. βg\beta_{g} and (d) 𝔼{Eg}\mathbb{E}\{E_{g}\} vs. NgN_{g}.

V Conclusion

We presented an AN aided physical-layer security scheme for energy harvesting nodes operating under OFDM-based non-cooperative NOMA scheme. We showed that, with optimal choice of design parameters, it is possible to secure the considered system while transferring energy to multiple nodes under minimum outage probability constraints at legitimate users.

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