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Date of publication xxxx 00, 0000, date of current version xxxx 00, 0000. 10.1109/TQE.2020.DOI

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This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62101197, in part by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant 2021M691148.

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Corresponding author: Xueming Tang (email: [email protected]).

Quantum-inspired Hash Function Based on Parity-dependent Quantum Walks with Memory (August 2023)

QING ZHOU1    XUEMING TANG1    SONGFENG LU1    and HAO YANG1 Hubei Key Laboratory of Distributed System Security, Hubei Engineering Research Center on Big Data Security, School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, 430074, China
Abstract

In this paper, we develop a generic controlled alternate quantum walk model (called CQWM-P) by combining parity-dependent quantum walks with distinct arbitrary memory lengths and then construct a quantum-inspired hash function (called QHFM-P) based on this model. Numerical simulation shows that QHFM-P has near-ideal statistical performance and is on a par with the state-of-the-art hash functions based on discrete quantum walks in terms of sensitivity of hash value to message, diffusion and confusion properties, uniform distribution property, and collision resistance property. Stability test illustrates that the statistical properties of the proposed hash function are robust with respect to the coin parameters, and theoretical analysis indicates that QHFM-P has the same computational complexity as that of its peers.

Index Terms:
Controlled alternate quantum walks, quantum-inspired hash function, quantum walks with memory, statistical properties, stability analysis
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I Introduction

Cryptographic hash function acts as a key component of identification, message authentication, digital signatures, and pseudorandom number generation. From a security perspective, cryptographic hash functions can be divided into two broad categories: provably secure hash functions based on hard mathematical problems and dedicated hash functions based on ad-hoc constructions, especially iterative constructions of one-way compression functions. The former only satisfy computational security and are inefficient to be used in practice; the latter are efficiently computable, but the security of which is not built on a firm foundation.

To develop a secure and efficient hash function, more and more researchers have shown interests in hash functions based on quantum computing [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12], especially on discrete quantum walks [1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] (hereafter, simply DQW-based hash functions). The security of this kind of hash functions is based on quantum mechanics; more precisely, it is ensured by the theoretically infinite possibilities of the initial state and the irreversibility of modulo operation [7]. The output results of DQW-based hash functions are more attainable by classical simulation of the quantum walk process, where the final amplitudes can be calculated with linear overhead with respect to the number of steps. For this reason, a DQW-based hash function can be considered as a “quantum inspired” algorithm, where everything is calculated classically using some desired properties of a quantum system and its dynamics. In what follows, hash schemes constructed by simulating discrete quantum walks and then calculating hash values from the resulting probability distributions are called DQW-based hash functions or quantum inspired hash functions interchangeably.

Quantum inspired hash functions was first explored by Li et al. in [12], and further intensively discussed by Cao et al. in [10], Yang et al. in [5, 6, 7, 8, 11], and zhou et al. in [1]. Until Zhou et al.’s scheme (called QHFM) [1], all quantum inspired hash functions simply use quantum walks with different coin parameters, where only the coin operator is controlled by the message bit. QHFM is based on quantum walks with memory, where an additional changeable transform—the direction-determine operator is also controlled by the message bit. More recently, Hou et al. [2] has proposed a hash function QHFL based on lively quantum walks, where the shift operator contains a liveliness parameter, whose value (one out of two) is determined by the message bit. The good statistical performance of QHFM and QHFL suggests that combining quantum walks differing in component operators other than coin transform is a promising way to construct good hash functions.

Quantum walks with memory (QWM) [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] are types of modified quantum walks where the next direction of the walking particle is governed by the direction-determine operator, which specifies how the latest path together with the coin state affects the movement direction of the particle; different QWM models have different direction-determine operators. Unlike usual quantum walks without memory [23] or lively quantum walks [2], where the changeable operator (the coin or shift operator) can be characterized by a single parameter, the direction-determine operator of QWM is highly flexible. It is influenced by two factors: the memory length and the movement rule, the latter can be an arbitrary relation between the movement direction and the recorded shifts of the walker, which cannot simply be dictated by a few parameters. Hence, QWM have great potential to be used to construct various quantum-inspired hash functions.

Here, we present an alternative QWM-based hash function QHFM-P, which is inspired by quantum walks with memory provided by parity of memory [15]. The proposed hash function is on a par with the state-of-the-art DQW-based hash functions in terms of sensitivity of hash value to message, diffusion and confusion properties, uniform distribution property, collision resistance property, and computational complexity. Furthermore, it can preserve near-ideal statistical performance when changing the values of its coin parameters, indicating that QHFM-P has nice stability with respect to different coin angles.

II Controlled quantum walk with memory depending on the parity of memory

One-dimensional quantum walks with mm-step memory depending on the parity of memory (QWM-P), or parity-dependent quantum walks with mm-step memory on the line [15], is a quantum system living in a Hilbert space pdmd2d1c\mathcal{H}_{p}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{m}}\otimes\cdots\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{2}}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{1}}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{c} spanned by orthogonal basis states {|x,dm,,d2,d1,c|dm,,d1,c2;x}\{\Ket{x,d_{m},\dots,d_{2},d_{1},c}|d_{m},\dots,d_{1},c\in\mathbb{Z}_{2};x\in\mathbb{Z}\}, where cc is the coin state, djd_{j} (0 stands for left and 1 stands for right) records the shift of the walker jj steps before (d1d_{1} is the direction of the most recent step, and dmd_{m} is the earliest direction that is memorized), and xx is the current position of the walker. If the walker moves on a cycle with nn nodes, then xnx\in\mathbb{Z}_{n}. The one-step evolution of QWM-P may be decomposed into three parts: the first is a 2×22\times 2 coin operator CC on subspace c\mathcal{H}_{c}, here CC is parameterized by an angle θ\theta, i.e.,

C=(cosθsinθsinθcosθ);C=\begin{pmatrix}\text{cos}\theta&\text{sin}\theta\\ \text{sin}\theta&-\text{cos}\theta\end{pmatrix}; (1)

the second is the direction-determine transform DD on dmd2d1c\mathcal{H}_{d_{m}}\otimes\cdots\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{2}}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{1}}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{c}, whose action can be written as

D^:|dm,dm1,,d2,d1,c|dm1,dm2,,d1,c1ifeven(dm,,d1),c,\begin{split}\hat{D}:&\Ket{d_{m},d_{m-1},\dots,d_{2},d_{1},c}\rightarrow\\ &\Ket{d_{m-1},d_{m-2},\dots,d_{1},c\oplus 1\oplus ifeven(d_{m},\dots,d_{1}),c},\end{split} (2)

where ifeven(dm,,d1)ifeven(d_{m},\dots,d_{1}) equals 1 (respectively, 0) if the number of zeros in the memorized directions dm,,d1d_{m},\dots,d_{1} is even (respectively, odd); and the third is the shift operator SS on pd1\mathcal{H}_{p}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{1}}, whose action can be expressed as

S:|x,d1|x+2d11,d1.S:\Ket{x,d_{1}}\rightarrow\Ket{x+2d_{1}-1,d_{1}}. (3)

If the walker moves on a cycle with nn nodes, then the shift operator becomes |x,d1|x+2d11(modn),d1\Ket{x,d_{1}}\rightarrow\Ket{x+2d_{1}-1(\bmod n),d_{1}}.

A controlled one-dimensional quantum walks with memory depending on the parity of memory (CQWM-P) can be obtained by alternately applying QWM-P with different memory lengths (as well as different coin parameters). More precisely, CQWM-P evolves according to a tt-bit binary string msg=(m1,m2,,mt){0,1}tmsg=(m_{1},m_{2},\dots,m_{t})\in\{0,1\}^{t}: at the jjth time step, if mj=0m_{j}=0 (j{1,2,,tj\in\{1,2,\dots,t), then the walker performs QWM-P with s0s_{0} step memory (denoted by QWs0s_{0}M-P) and with coin parameter θ0\theta_{0}; if mj=1m_{j}=1, then the walker performs QWM-P with s1s_{1} (s1s0s_{1}\neq s_{0}) step memory (denoted by QWs1s_{1}M-P) and with coin parameter θ1\theta_{1}.

To enable QWs0s_{0}M-P and QWs1s_{1}M-P to be performed alternately, |s0s1||s_{0}-s_{1}| redundant qubits can be added to the walk process with less memory length, so that two walks live in the same Hilbert space. For instance, if 0<s0<s10<s_{0}<s_{1}, then s1s0s_{1}-s_{0} redundant qubits are added to QWMs0s_{0}P. In this case, the basis states of QWMs0s_{0}P becomes {|x,ds1,,d2,d1,c|ds1,,d1,d2;x}\{\Ket{x,d_{s_{1}},\dots,d_{2},d_{1},c}|d_{s_{1}},\dots,d_{1},d\in\mathbb{Z}_{2};x\in\mathbb{Z}\}, wherein the first s1s0s_{1}-s_{0} qubits are invariant under the transforms of QWMs0s_{0}P, and the DD transform becomes

D:|ds1,,ds0+1,ds0,ds01,,d2,d1,c|ds1,,ds0+1,ds01,,d1,c1ifeven(ds0,,d1),c.\begin{split}D:\Ket{d_{s_{1}},\dots,d_{s_{0}+1},d_{s_{0}},d_{s_{0}-1},\dots,d_{2},d_{1},c}\rightarrow\\ \Ket{d_{s_{1}},\!\dots\!,d_{s_{0}\!+\!1},d_{s_{0}\!-\!1},\!\dots\!,d_{1},c\!\oplus\!1\!\oplus\!ifeven(d_{s_{0}},\dots,d_{1}),c}.\end{split} (4)

In this work ,we focus on CQWM-P with one- and two-step memory, whose evolution operator controlled by msgmsg is the product of tt unitary transforms

Umsg=U(mt)U(mt1)U(m2)U(m1),U_{msg}=U^{(m_{t})}U^{(m_{t-1})}\cdots U^{(m_{2})}U^{(m_{1})}, (5)

where U(mj)U^{(m_{j})} is the one-step transform defined as

U(mj)=S(InD(mj))(I4nC(mj)).U^{(m_{j})}=S\cdot\left(I_{n}\otimes D^{(m_{j})}\right)\cdot\left(I_{4n}\otimes C^{(m_{j})}\right). (6)

In Eq. (6), C(0)C^{(0)} and C(1)C^{(1)} are coin operators parameterized by θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1}, respectively; I4nI_{4n} and InI_{n} are 4n×4n4n\times 4n and n×nn\times n identity operators, respectively; SS is the conditional shift operator controlled by the next direction d1d_{1}, such a direction is determined by an 8×88\times 8 unitary operator D(mj)D^{(m_{j})}. If mj=0m_{j}=0, then D(mj)D^{(m_{j})} is the direction-determine transform of QW1M-P, i.e., D^(0):|d1,c|c1d1,c\hat{D}^{(0)}:\Ket{d_{1},c}\rightarrow\Ket{c\oplus 1\oplus d_{1},c}; and if mj=1m_{j}=1, then D(mj)D^{(m_{j})} is the direction-determine transform of QW2M-P, i.e., D(1):|d2,d1,c|d1,c(d1d2),cD^{(1)}:\Ket{d_{2},d_{1},c}\rightarrow\Ket{d_{1},c\oplus(d_{1}\oplus d_{2}),c}. By appending a redundant qubit d2d_{2} to the state of QW1M-P and letting D(0):|d2,d1,c|d2,c1d1,cD^{(0)}:\Ket{d_{2},d_{1},c}\rightarrow\Ket{d_{2},c\oplus 1\oplus d_{1},c} determines the next direction if the controlling bit equals 0, the walk process can switch freely between QW1M-P and QW2M-P.

III Hash Function Using Quantum Walks with One- and Two-step Memory on Cycles

The proposed hash function is constructed by numerically simulating CQWM-P with one- and two-step memory on cycles under the control of the input message, and then calculating the hash value from the resulting probability distribution of this walk.

Specifically, our hashing algorithm is parameterized by three positive integers {n,m,l|nmod2=1,10l2m}\{n,m,l|n\bmod 2=1,10^{l}\gg 2^{m}\} and three angles {θ0,θ1,α|θ0,θ1,α(0,π/2)}\{\theta_{0},\theta_{1},\alpha|\theta_{0},\theta_{1},\alpha\in(0,\pi/2)\}, where nn specifies the total number of nodes in the cycle that the walker moves along, mm is the number of hash bits that are contributed by each node, ll is the number of digits in the probability value (associated with each node) that are used to calculate the hash result, θ0\theta_{0} (respectively, θ1\theta_{1}) is the coin parameter of QW1M-P (respectively, QW2M-P), and α\alpha is the parameter of the initial state of the walker. Given the input message msgmsg, the m×nm\times n-bit hash value H(msg)H(msg) is calculated as follows.

  1. 1)

    Initialize the walker in the state |ψ0=cosα|0,1,0,0+sinα|0,1,0,1\Ket{\psi_{0}}\!=\!\text{cos}\alpha\Ket{0,\!1,\!0,\!0}+\text{sin}\alpha\Ket{0,1,0,1};

  2. 2)

    Apply UmsgU_{msg} to |ψ0\Ket{\psi_{0}} and generate the resulting probability distribution prob=(p0,p1,,pn1)prob=(p_{0},p_{1},\dots,p_{n-1}), where pxp_{x} is the probability that the walker locates at node xx when the walk is finished.

  3. 3)

    The hash value of msgmsg is a sequence of nn blocks H(msg)=B0B1Bn1H(msg)=B_{0}\lVert B_{1}\lVert\dots\lVert B_{n-1}, where each block BxB_{x} is the mm-bit binary representation of px10lmod2m\lfloor p_{x}\cdot 10^{l}\rfloor\bmod 2^{m} (\lfloor\cdot\rfloor denotes the floor of a number), and BxBx+1B_{x}\lVert B_{x+1} denotes the concatenation of BxB_{x} and Bx+1B_{x+1}.

IV Statistical Performance Analysis

The proposed scheme is a kind of dedicated hash function, the security of which is hard to prove, and it is commonly evaluated by means of statistical analysis. To facilitate comparison and discussion, we consider two typical instances QHFM-P-264 and QHFM-P-296 of the proposed scheme, where QHFM-P-LL produces LL-bit hash values and will be compared with the existing DQW-based hash functions with LL-bit output length. The values of m,l,θ0,θ1m,l,\theta_{0},\theta_{1}, and α\alpha for the two instances are the same, which are taken to be 8,8,π/4,π/38,8,\pi/4,\pi/3, and π/4\pi/4, respectively; the only distinction between QHFM-P-296 and QHFM-P-264 lies in the value of nn, which are taken to be 37 for the 296-bit output length and 33 for the 26-bit output length.

Our statistical tests considers four kinds of properties: sensitivity of hash value to message, diffusion and confusion properties, uniform distribution property, and collision resistance property, the latter three are assessed by analyzing the same collection of hash values, whose input messages come from the public arXiv dataset (see https://www.kaggle.com/Cornell-University/arxiv).

IV-A Sensitivity of Hash Value to Message

Let msg0msg_{0} be an original message and msgimsg_{i} (i{1,2,3}i\in\{1,2,3\}) the slightly modified result of msg0msg_{0}, the sensitivity of hash value to message is assessed by comparing the hash value H(msgi)H(msg_{i}) of msgimsg_{i} with the hash result H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) of msg0msg_{0}. Specifically, the original and modified messages are obtained under the following four conditions.

  • \bullet

    Condition 0: Randomly select a record from the dataset, take the texts of the abstract field within this record as msg0msg_{0};

  • \bullet

    Condition 1: Invert a bit of msg0msg_{0} at a random position and then get the modified message msg1msg_{1};

  • \bullet

    Condition 2: Insert a random bit into msg0msg_{0} at a random position and then obtain msg2msg_{2};

  • \bullet

    Condition 3: Delete a bit from msg0msg_{0} at a random position and then obtain msg3msg_{3}.

Corresponding to the above conditions, we list, as an example, four hash values in hexadecimal format produced by QWM-P-296 as follows.

  • \bullet

    H(msg0)=H(msg_{0})=“D8 CD B4 F1 A9 A8 E4 F8 60 F7 6F 74 B8 A7 C9 60 E8 7F 53 7F 10 F9 B0 1D 9D D6 37 A5 F1 8E F3 D5 71 5A 28 7B B1”;

  • \bullet

    H(msg1)=H(msg_{1})=“EB C6 F0 5F 74 5B B2 14 72 5F B7 29 CF 7F C6 96 E8 8B 87 8C 9A E9 50 51 8A D5 5D 62 0E ED F8 7B CE 15 D1 7F A7”;

  • \bullet

    H(msg2)=H(msg_{2})=“90 7E 3E 3F 8A D5 D5 6B 70 41 BD F9 37 B2 55 22 2B F1 76 C0 D3 09 E4 6C B5 88 CA C8 07 6D 7B 3F 22 6A 28 BF 21”;

  • \bullet

    H(msg3)=H(msg_{3})=“65 19 6A A5 EE AC 65 A9 52 FA E5 30 B7 22 56 67 51 F2 8F 8E CD B0 6E 6F 04 25 9F 2B 8D E0 97 CE 49 82 66 7A A8”.

The plots of H(msg0)H(msg_{0}), H(msg1)H(msg_{1}), H(msg2)H(msg_{2}), and H(msg3)H(msg_{3}) in binary format are shown in Fig. IV-A, where each asterisk (*) in the jjth subgraph (j>0j>0) marks a different bit between H(msgj)H(msg_{j}) and H(msg0)H(msg_{0}). It indicates that a slight modification in the input message can lead to a significant change in the hash result, and the positions of changed bits are evenly distributed over the entire interval [1,296] of position numbers. A similar result can be obtained using QHFM-P with other output lengths, thus the output result of the proposed hash scheme is highly sensitive to its input message. \Figure[ht](topskip=0pt, botskip=0pt, midskip=0pt)fig1.epsPlots of the hash values produced by QHFM-P-296 under the four conditions, where Cj\text{C}j stands for Condition jj (j=0,1,2,3j=0,1,2,3).

IV-B Diffusion and Confusion Properties

To test the diffusion and confusion properties of the proposed hash function, the statistical experiment getting msg0msg_{0} and msg1msg_{1} are independently repeated NN times, then the hash values of those NN pairs of messages are analyzed. Let BiB_{i} (i{1,,N}i\in\{1,\dots,N\}) be the Hamming distance between H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) and H(msg1)H(msg_{1}) obtained in the iith experiment, the diffusion and confusion properties are assessed based on the following four indicators:

  1. 1)

    mean changed bit number B¯=i=1NBi/N\overline{B}=\begin{matrix}\sum_{i=1}^{N}B_{i}/N\end{matrix};

  2. 2)

    mean changed probability P=B¯/(n×m)×100%P=\overline{B}/(n\times m)\times 100\%;

  3. 3)

    standard deviation of the changed bit number ΔB=i=1N(BiB¯)2/(N1)\Delta B=\\ \sqrt{\begin{matrix}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\left(B_{i}-\overline{B}\,\right)^{2}\end{matrix}\big{/}(N-1)};

  4. 4)

    standard deviation of the changed probability ΔP=i=1N[Bi/(n×m)P]2/(N1)×100%\Delta P=\\ \sqrt{\begin{matrix}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\left[B_{i}/(n\times m)-P\right]^{2}\end{matrix}\big{/}(N-1)}\times 100\%.

The ideal value of PP is 50%50\%, and smaller ΔB\Delta B and ΔP\Delta P are more desirable. Following Ref. [1], we take N=10000N=10000 and use IDC=(ΔP+|P50%|)/2×100%I_{\text{DC}}=(\Delta P+|P-50\%|)/2\times 100\% as a composite indicator for the diffusion and confusion properties. The test results of the diffusion and confusion properties for the proposed hash functions are presented in Table I. For comparison, the reported results for the existing DQW-based hash schemes with 296- or 264-bit output length are also listed in Table I, where Yang21-296 is the second instance (with p=2/np=2/n) in Ref. [5].

TABLE I: Test Results of the Diffusion and Confusion Properties
Hash Instances or Schemes B¯\overline{B} P(%)P(\%) ΔB\Delta B ΔP(%)\Delta P(\%) IDC(%)I_{\text{DC}}(\%)
QHFM-P-296 147.9320 49.9770 8.5517 2.8891 1.4560
QHFM-P-264 132.1286 50.0487 8.1938 3.1037 1.5762
QHFL-296 [2] 148.1900 50.0600 8.5500 2.8900 1.4750
QHFL-264 [2] 132.0300 50.0100 8.1100 3.0700 1.5400
QHFM-296 [1] 147.9101 49.9696 8.5997 2.9053 1.4679
QHFM-264 [1] 131.8667 49.9495 8.1378 3.0825 1.5665
Yang21-296 [5] 147.8640 49.9541 8.6141 2.9102 1.4781
Yang19-264 [6] 131.6803 49.8789 8.8877 3.3666 1.7439
Yang18-264 [7] 132.1108 50.0420 8.0405 3.0457 1.5439

It can be seen that the test results for QHFM-P are very close to those for its peers, thus the diffusion and confusion properties of the proposed scheme are on a par with those of existing schemes with output length 296 or 264.

IV-C Uniform Distribution Analysis

The uniform distribution property of the proposed hash function is assessed by analyzing the NN pairs of hash values used in the diffusion and confusion test in a different way. Let TjT_{j} (j{1,2,,n×m}j\in\{1,2,\dots,n\times m\}) be the number of experiments in which the jjth bit of H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) is different from the jjth bit of H(msg1)H(msg_{1}), then the uniform distribution analysis considers the following two indicators:

  1. 1)

    mean number of experiments with flipped hash bit over n×mn\times m bit-positions T¯=j=1n×mTj/(n×m)\overline{T}=\begin{matrix}\sum_{j=1}^{n\times m}T_{j}/(n\times m)\end{matrix};

  2. 2)

    standard deviation of the number of experiments with flipped bit ΔT=j=1n×m(TjT¯)2/(n×m1)\Delta T=\sqrt{\begin{matrix}\sum_{j=1}^{n\times m}(T_{j}-\overline{T})^{2}\end{matrix}\big{/}(n\times m\!-\!1)}.

The ideal value of T¯\overline{T} is N/2N/2, and smaller ΔT\Delta T suggests better uniform distribution property. As shown in Table II, the values of T¯\overline{T} and ΔT\Delta T for the two instances of QHFM-P are close to the corresponding values for the recent DQW-based hash functions111The values of T¯\overline{T} and ΔT\Delta T for QHFL are both not available, so we only compare QHFM with the remaining four recent schemes. with the same output length. Since the reported value of N×PN\times P (which is equivalent to T¯\overline{T} theoretically, see [1]) for Yang21-296 is 4995.41, the value of |T¯5000||\overline{T}-5000| for Yang21-296 may be considered between (or close to) 1.90 and 4.59, so the T¯\overline{T} value of QHFM-P-296 is on the same level as that of Yang21-296.

TABLE II: Test Results of the Uniform Distribution Property
Hash Instances or Schemes T¯\overline{T} |T¯5000|\left|\overline{T}-5000\right| ΔT\Delta T
QHFM-P-296 4997.70 2.30 51.9772
QHFM-P-264 5004.87 4.87 49.8667
QHFM-296 [1] 4996.96 3.04 48.4334
QHFM-264 [1] 4994.95 5.05 48.9253
Yang21-296 [5] 4998.10 1.90 N/A
Yang19-264 [6] 4996.60 3.40 N/A
Yang18-264 [7] 5003.90 3.90 N/A

To provide an intuitive description, we plot the number of experiments with flipped hash bit on every bit position of QHFM-P-296 in Fig. 1, where the number of experiments with flipped hash bit on every bit-position is very close to N/2N/2, suggesting that the proposed scheme has good uniform distribution property.

Refer to caption
Figure 1: Histogram of the 195-bit hash space, where N=10000N=10000.

IV-D Collision Resistance

The collision resistance test is carried out by counting the number of experiments in which the hash values of the original and modified messages collide at a certain number of bytes, and then comparing the counting result with its theoretical value.

For ease of exposition, we use {msg0(i),msg1(i)}\left\{msg_{0}^{(i)},msg_{1}^{(i)}\right\} to denote the original and modified messages obtained under Condition 0 and Condition 1 in the iith experiment, {H(msg0(i)),H(msg1(i))}\left\{H(msg_{0}^{(i)}),H(msg_{1}^{(i)})\right\} to denote the hash values of {msg0(i),msg1(i)}\left\{msg_{0}^{(i)},msg_{1}^{(i)}\right\}, and g=(n×m)/8g=\lceil(n\times m)/8\rceil to denote the number of bytes that a hash result produced by the proposed hash function can be divided into222If n×mn\times m is not divisible by 8, then add a prefix of (8n×m)mod8(8-n\times m)\bmod 8 zeros to the hash value.. The collision resistance test counts the numbers {WNe(ω)|ω=0,1,,g}\{W_{N}^{e}(\omega)|\omega=0,1,\dots,g\} of experiments in which H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) and H(msg1)H(msg_{1}) have ω\omega identical bytes (ω\omega is also called the number of hits). For instance, if the first, third, and fourth bytes of H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) are respectively the same as the first, third, and fourth bytes of H(msg1)H(msg_{1}) in the 25th experiment , then {H(msg0(25)),H(msg1(25))}\left\{H(msg_{0}^{(25)}),H(msg_{1}^{(25)})\right\} makes an incremental contribution of 1 to WNe(3)W_{N}^{e}(3).

The theoretical value of WNt(ω)W_{N}^{t}(\omega) is calculated using the binomial distribution formula

WNt(ω)=int[N×Pt(ω)]=int[N×g!ω!(gω)!(128)ω(1128)gω],\begin{split}W_{N}^{t}(\omega)&=\text{int}\left[N\times P^{t}(\omega)\right]\\ &=\text{int}\left[N\times\frac{g!}{\omega!(g-\omega)!}\left(\frac{1}{2^{8}}\right)^{\omega}\left(1\!-\!\frac{1}{2^{8}}\right)^{g-\omega}\right],\end{split} (7)

where int[]\text{int}\left[\cdot\right] denotes rounding a real number to its nearest integer, and Pt(ω)P^{t}(\omega) is the theoretical probability that ω\omega hits occur in {H(msg0),H(msg1)}\{H(msg_{0}),H(msg_{1})\}. Substituting g=296/8=37g=\lceil 296/8\rceil=37 and N=10000 into Eq. (7), one can get {WNt(ω)|ω=0,1,2,3}={8652,1255,89,4}\{W_{N}^{t}(\omega)|\omega=0,1,2,3\}=\{8652,1255,89,4\} for hash functions with 296-bit output length. Similarly, the values of WNt(ω)W_{N}^{t}(\omega) with ω=0,1,2,3\omega=0,1,2,3 for 264-bit hash functions are 8788, 1137, 71, and 3, respectively. For both 296- and 264-bit hash functions, the value of WNt(ω)W_{N}^{t}(\omega) with ω4\omega\geq 4 is 0.

Let Pe(ω)=WNe(ω)/NP^{e}(\omega)=W_{N}^{e}(\omega)/N be the experimental probability that H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) and H(msg1)H(msg_{1}) have ω\omega identical bytes, the collision resistance property of the proposed hash function can be assessed by the Kullback-Leibler divergence (referred to as KL divergence for short) of PeP^{e} from PtP^{t}

DKL(PePt)=ω=0gPe(ω)log2(Pe(ω)Pt(ω))D_{KL}\left(P^{e}\lVert P^{t}\right)=\sum_{\omega=0}^{g}P^{e}(\omega)\text{log}_{2}\left(\frac{P^{e}(\omega)}{P^{t}(\omega)}\right) (8)

The smaller the value of DKL(PePt)D_{KL}\left(P^{e}\lVert P^{t}\right) is, the closer PeP^{e} is to PtP^{t}. Note that there exist some values of ω\omega such that Pe(ω)=0P^{e}(\omega)=0 and Pt(ω)0P^{t}(\omega)\neq 0, hence we cannot use DKL(PtPe)D_{KL}\left(P^{t}\lVert P^{e}\right) to indicate the distance between PeP^{e} and PtP^{t}.

In addition to the KL divergence, the mean of the absolute difference per byte between H(msg0)H(msg_{0}) and H(msg1)H(msg_{1}) over NN independent experiment can also be used to assess the collision resistance property. Let t(ej)(i)t(e_{j})^{(i)} and t(ej)(i)t(e^{\prime}_{j})^{(i)} be the decimal value of the jjth byte of H(msg0(i))H(msg_{0}^{(i)}) and H(msg1(i))H(msg_{1}^{(i)}), respectively; the mean of the absolute difference per byte is given by

d¯bytee=1Ni=1Nj=1g1g|t(ej)(i)t(ej)(i)|,\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}=\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}\sum_{j=1}^{g}\frac{1}{g}\left\lvert t(e_{j})^{(i)}-t(e^{\prime}_{j})^{(i)}\right\rvert, (9)

and the theoretical value of d¯bytee\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e} is d¯bytet=85.33\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}=85.33 [5].

The test results of the collision resistance property for the proposed hash function are shown in Table III, where WNe(4+)W_{N}^{e}(4+) denotes the number of experiments in which at least 4 hits occur in {H(msg0),H(msg1)}\{H(msg_{0}),H(msg_{1})\}. The values of DKL(PePt)D_{KL}(P^{e}\|P^{t}) and |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}-\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}\right\rvert for the two instances of QHFM-P is smaller than or close to those for the existing hash instances with the same output length excepting QHFL, meaning that the collision resistance property of QHFM-P is better than or on a par with that of its peers excepting QHFL. For QHFL-296, the experimental value of DKL(PePt)D_{KL}(P^{e}\|P^{t}) is slightly smaller than that for QHFM-P-296, while the value of |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}-\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}\right\rvert is greater than that for QHFM-P-296; in similar, the value of |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}-\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}\right\rvert for QHFL-264 is smaller than that for QHFM-P-264, while the value of DKL(PePt)D_{KL}(P^{e}\|P^{t}) for QHFL-264 is slightly greater than that for QHFM-P-264. Taking into account the fluctuation of the experimental results, the collision resistance property of QHFM-P can be regarded as being on the same level as that of QHFL.

TABLE III: Test Results of The Collision Resistance property
Hash Instances or Schemes {WNe(ω)|ω=0,1,2,3,4+}\{W_{N}^{\,e}(\omega)|\omega=0,1,2,3,4+\} DKL(PePt)D_{KL}\left(P^{e}\lVert P^{t}\right) d¯bytee\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e} |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}^{\,e}_{byte}-\overline{d}^{\,t}_{byte}\right\rvert
QHFM-P-296 8637,1260,100,3,0\quad 8637,1260,100,3,0 0.0001461 85.30 0.03
QHFM-P-264 8794,1143,61,2,0\quad 8794,1143,61,2,0 0.0001513 85.40 0.07
QHFL-296[2] 8637,1278,81,4,0\quad 8637,1278,81,4,0 0.0000998 N/A 0.15
QHFL-264[2] 8784,1133,82,1,0\quad 8784,1133,82,1,0 0.0002427 N/A 0.02
QHFM-296[1] 8605,1312,81,2,0\quad 8605,1312,81,2,0 0.0003610 85.36 0.03
QHFM-264[1] 8762,1159,74,5,0\quad 8762,1159,74,5,0 0.0001457 85.27 0.06
Yang21-296 [5] 8321,1547,110,22,0\quad 8321,1547,110,22,0 0.0086163 85.22 0.11
Yang19-264 [6] 9019,923,52,2,4\quad 9019,923,52,2,4 0.0056472 89.76 4.43
Yang18-264 [7] 8904,1026,68,2,0\quad 8904,1026,68,2,0 0.0009686 83.64 1.69

V Stability with respect to coin parameters

Recall from section III that the proposed hash function is parameterized by three integers and three angles, among which the two coin angles are crucial components of the underlying controlled alternate quantum walks and may affect the four statistical properties considered in section IV.

To explore how robust the hashing properties of QHFM-P are with respect to different coin angles, we uniformly divide (0,π/2)(0,\pi/2) into c=30c=30 subintervals, take the endpoints (except 0 and π/2\pi/2) of those subintervals as the candidate values of each coin parameter, and then conduct N=2048N=2048 experiments for each pair of values. During the experiments for each angle pair, primary indicators of each type of statistical property are calculated. Specifically, we take PP together with ΔP\Delta P, T¯\overline{T} together with ΔT\Delta T, and DKL(PePt)D_{KL}(P^{e}\|P^{t}) together with |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}-\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}\right\rvert to be the primary indicators of the diffusion and confusion properties, the uniform distribution property, and the collision resistance property, respectively. Following Ref. [2], we take the mean Jensen-Shannon divergence [24] (over NN random experiments) between the resulting probability distributions corresponding to the original and modified messages to be the quantitative indicator of the sensitivity of hash value to message. Suppose, in an experiment, the probability distribution produced by the underlying controlled alternate quantum walks controlled by msgjmsg_{j} (j=0,1,2,3j=0,1,2,3) is PjP_{j}, the Jensen-Shannon divergence (referred to as JS divergence for short) between P0P_{0} and P1P_{1} is

DJS(P0,P1)=DKL(P0M)2+DKL(P1M)2,D_{JS}(P_{0},P_{1})=\frac{D_{KL}(P_{0}\|M)}{2}+\frac{D_{KL}(P_{1}\|M)}{2}, (10)

where M=(P0+P1)/2M=(P_{0}+P_{1})/2, and DKL(P0M)D_{KL}(P_{0}\|M) is the KL divergence of P0P_{0} from MM (see Eq. (8)).

The results of the stability test for the four kinds of properties of QHFM-P-296 are illustrated in Figs. 2 to 5, where D¯JS(P0,Pj)\overline{D}_{JS}(P_{0},P_{j}) (j=1,2,3j=1,2,3) in Fig. 2 denotes the average value of DJS(P0,Pj)D_{JS}(P_{0},P_{j}) over NN experiments. One may notice that the shape of Fig. 3(a) is identical to that of Fig. 4(a), this is because T¯\overline{T} is directly proportional to PP when the NN pairs of original and modified messages used in the diffusion and confusion test are re-used in the uniform distribution test.

It can be seen from Fig. 2(a) that the average JS divergences between P0P_{0} and P1P_{1} for different values of coin parameters fall within a narrow range, indicating that the value of D¯JS(P0,P1)\overline{D}_{JS}(P_{0},P_{1}) is quite stable with respect to θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1}. Similarly, the maximum and minimum values of D¯JS(P0,P2)\overline{D}_{JS}(P_{0},P_{2}) (or D¯JS(P0,P3)\overline{D}_{JS}(P_{0},P_{3})) are very close to each other, suggesting that the sensitivity of hash value to message of the proposed hash function is stable with respect to the coin parameters. In Fig. 3, the mean changed probability PP fluctuates around 50%50\%; meanwhile, the value of the standard deviation ΔP\Delta P is small and does not vary significantly for different values of θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1}. Hence, the diffusion and confusion properties of QHFM-P is robust with regard to different coin angles. Likewise, the experimental values of T¯\overline{T} for different coin angles are close to the theoretical value N/2N/2, and the results of ΔT\Delta T, DKL(PePt)D_{KL}(P^{e}\|P^{t}), and |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}-\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}\right\rvert displayed in Figs. 4 and 5 are relatively small, which suggests that the uniform distribution property and the collision resistance property of the proposed hash function are also stable with respect to coin parameters.

Refer to caption
Figure 2: Mean JS divergences between P0P_{0} and PjP_{j} (j=1,2,3j=1,2,3) for θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1} in [π/60,29π/60][\pi/60,29\pi/60].
Refer to caption
Figure 3: PP and ΔP\Delta P for θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1} in [π/60,29π/60][\pi/60,29\pi/60].
Refer to caption
Figure 4: T¯\overline{T} and ΔT\Delta T for θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1} in [π/60,29π/60][\pi/60,29\pi/60].
Refer to caption
Figure 5: DKL(PePt)D_{KL}(P^{e}\|P^{t}) and |d¯byteed¯bytet|\left\lvert\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,e}-\overline{d}_{byte}^{\,t}\right\rvert for θ0\theta_{0} and θ1\theta_{1} in [π/60,29π/60][\pi/60,29\pi/60].

VI Time and Space Complexity

Similar to existing DQW-based hash schemes, the proposed hash algorithm can be efficiently computed using classical computer. Thus, it is more appropriate to consider QHFM-P as a classical algorithm and to concentrate on classical complexity.

By rewriting the 4-term basis state |x,d2,d1,c\Ket{x,d_{2},d_{1},c} of QWHF-P in pd2d1c\mathcal{H}_{p}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{2}}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{d_{1}}\otimes\mathcal{H}_{c} as a 2-term basis state |x,j=|x,22d2+21d1+20c\Ket{x,j}=\Ket{x,2^{2}d_{2}+2^{1}d_{1}+2^{0}c} in p8\mathcal{H}_{p}\otimes\mathcal{H}^{8}, where 8\mathcal{H}^{8} is the 8-dimensional Hilbert space, the quantum state of the walker performing parity-dependent quantum walks with one- and two-step memory on a cycle of length nn after tt time steps can be expressed as

|ψt=x=0n1j=07Atx,j|x,j.\Ket{\psi_{t}}=\sum_{x=0}^{n-1}\sum_{j=0}^{7}A_{t}^{x,j}\Ket{x,j}. (11)

The results of sequentially performing the coin operator, the direction-determine transform, and the shift operator of QW2M-P on the computational states |x,j\Ket{x,j} are tabularized in Table 4. For ease of notation, we denote C(1)C^{(1)} by (a1b1c1d1)\bigl{(}\begin{smallmatrix}a_{1}&b_{1}\\ c_{1}&d_{1}\end{smallmatrix}\bigr{)} and write (x±1)modn(x\pm 1)\bmod n shortly as x±1x\pm 1. In the first three columns of Table IV, the second terms jj of the basis states and the transformed results are written in binary format, for the binary representation j2j1j0j_{2}j_{1}j_{0} of jj indicates the values of d2d_{2}, d1d_{1}, and cc in a natural way.

TABLE IV: Actions of the coin, the direction-determine, and the complete one-step transforms of QW2M-P
|x,j\Ket{x,j} I4nC(1)|x,jI_{4n}\otimes C^{(1)}\Ket{x,j} (InD(1))(I4nC(1))|x,j(I_{n}\otimes D^{(1)})(I_{4n}\otimes C^{(1)})\Ket{x,j} S(InD(1))(I4nC(1))|x,jS(I_{n}\otimes D^{(1)})(I_{4n}\otimes C^{(1)})\Ket{x,j}
|x,000\Ket{x,000} a1|x,000+c1|x,001a_{1}\Ket{x,000}+c_{1}\Ket{x,001} a1|x,000+c1|x,011a_{1}\Ket{x,000}+c_{1}\Ket{x,011} a1|x1,0+c1|x+1,3a_{1}\Ket{x-1,0}+c_{1}\Ket{x+1,3}
|x,001\Ket{x,001} b1|x,000+d1|x,001b_{1}\Ket{x,000}+d_{1}\Ket{x,001} b1|x,000+d1|x,011b_{1}\Ket{x,000}+d_{1}\Ket{x,011} b1|x1,0+d1|x+1,3b_{1}\Ket{x-1,0}+d_{1}\Ket{x+1,3}
|x,010\Ket{x,010} a1|x,010+c1|x,011a_{1}\Ket{x,010}+c_{1}\Ket{x,011} a1|x,110+c1|x,101a_{1}\Ket{x,110}+c_{1}\Ket{x,101} a1|x+1,6+c1|x1,5a_{1}\Ket{x+1,6}+c_{1}\Ket{x-1,5}
|x,011\Ket{x,011} b1|x,010+d1|x,011b_{1}\Ket{x,010}+d_{1}\Ket{x,011} b1|x,110+d1|x,101b_{1}\Ket{x,110}+d_{1}\Ket{x,101} b1|x+1,6+d1|x1,5b_{1}\Ket{x+1,6}+d_{1}\Ket{x-1,5}
|x,100\Ket{x,100} a1|x,100+c1|x,101a_{1}\Ket{x,100}+c_{1}\Ket{x,101} a1|x,010+c1|x,001a_{1}\Ket{x,010}+c_{1}\Ket{x,001} a1|x+1,2+c1|x1,1a_{1}\Ket{x+1,2}+c_{1}\Ket{x-1,1}
|x,101\Ket{x,101} b1|x,100+d1|x,101b_{1}\Ket{x,100}+d_{1}\Ket{x,101} b1|x,010+d1|x,001b_{1}\Ket{x,010}+d_{1}\Ket{x,001} b1|x+1,2+d1|x1,1b_{1}\Ket{x+1,2}+d_{1}\Ket{x-1,1}
|x,110\Ket{x,110} a1|x,110+c1|x,111a_{1}\Ket{x,110}+c_{1}\Ket{x,111} a1|x,100+c1|x,111a_{1}\Ket{x,100}+c_{1}\Ket{x,111} a1|x1,4+c1|x+1,7a_{1}\Ket{x-1,4}+c_{1}\Ket{x+1,7}
|x,111\Ket{x,111} b1|x,110+d1|x,111b_{1}\Ket{x,110}+d_{1}\Ket{x,111} b1|x,100+d1|x,111b_{1}\Ket{x,100}+d_{1}\Ket{x,111} b1|x1,4+d1|x+1,7b_{1}\Ket{x-1,4}+d_{1}\Ket{x+1,7}

Combining Eq. (11) with the first and last columns of Table IV, one can obtain the relation between {At+1x,j|xn,j8}\{A_{t+1}^{x,j}|x\in\mathbb{Z}_{n},j\in\mathbb{Z}_{8}\} and {Atx,j|xn,j8}\{A_{t}^{x,j}|x\in\mathbb{Z}_{n},j\in\mathbb{Z}_{8}\} (hereafter, simply {At+1x,j}\{A_{t+1}^{x,j}\} and {Atx,j}\{A_{t}^{x,j}\}, respectively) after one step of QW2M-P as follows:

At+1x,0=a1Atx+1,0+b1Atx+1,1,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,0}=a_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,0}+b_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,1},
At+1x,1=c1Atx+1,4+d1Atx+1,5,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,1}=c_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,4}+d_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,5},
At+1x,2=a1Atx1,4+b1Atx1,5,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,2}=a_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,4}+b_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,5},
At+1x,3=c1Atx1,0+d1Atx1,1,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,3}=c_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,0}+d_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,1},
At+1x,4=a1Atx+1,6+b1Atx+1,7,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,4}=a_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,6}+b_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,7},
At+1x,5=c1Atx+1,2+d1Atx+1,3,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,5}=c_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,2}+d_{1}A_{t}^{x+1,3},
At+1x,6=a1Atx1,2+b1Atx1,3,\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,6}=a_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,2}+b_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,3}, (12)
At+1x,7=c1Atx1,6+d1Atx1,7.\displaystyle A_{t+1}^{x,7}=c_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,6}+d_{1}A_{t}^{x-1,7}.

Relation (12) shows that the eight amplitudes of being at position xx at time t+1t+1 can be calculated from the amplitudes of being at positions x±1x\pm 1 at time tt using 16 multiplications and 8 additions, meaning that the 8n8n amplitudes of being at nn locations can be calculated using O(n)O(n) basic arithmetic operations. Similarly, one can obtain the relation between {At+1x,j}\{A_{t+1}^{x,j}\} and {Atx,j}\{A_{t}^{x,j}\} for QW1M-P, where the amplitudes can also be updated using O(n)O(n) basic operations at each time step.

If one wants to obtain an LL-bit hash value (LL is a multiple of mm) of an MM-bit message, then the walker moves MM steps on a cycle with L/m=O(L)L/m=O(L) nodes, here mm is constant with respect to MM. The assignment of the initial amplitudes {A0x,j}\{A_{0}^{x,j}\} can be carried out with O(L)O(L) time and O(L)O(L) memory space, the values of {AMx,j}\{A_{M}^{x,j}\} can be calculated from {A0x,j}\{A_{0}^{x,j}\} using O(ML)O(ML) basic operations with O(L)O(L) space, and the hash value can be computed from {AMx,j}\{A_{M}^{x,j}\} using O(L)O(L) multiplications and O(L)O(L) modulo operations with O(L)O(L) space. As a result, the time and space complexity of QHFM-LL are O(ML)O(ML) and O(L)O(L), respectively, which are the same as those of the state-of-the-art hash functions [1, 2, 5, 6, 7] based on discrete quantum walks.

VII Conclusion

In this article, a new QWM-based hash function QHFM-P is proposed and analyzed. Similar to the existing QWM-based hash function [1], the proposed scheme is also constructed by using quantum walks with one- and two-step memory; the major distinction lies in that the underlying walks with two-step memory of QHFM and QHFM-P are different extensions of Mc Gettrick’s QW1M model [13]. The proposed hash function has the same time and space complexity as those of QHFM, and it also has near-ideal statistical properties. It is noteworthy that the four kinds of statistical properties of QHFM-P are quite stable with respect to the coin angles, which suggests the robustness of the hashing properties of the proposed scheme.

In the future, we will try to identify the region of stability in the plane of coin and other parameters, examine the stability with respect to various direction-determine transforms, and establish the conditions for constructing good QWM-based hash functions.

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