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Noncoherent Massive MIMO with Embedded One-Way Function Physical Layer Security

Yuma Katsuki, , Giuseppe Thadeu Freitas de Abreu, ,
Koji Ishibashi, , and Naoki Ishikawa
Yuma Katsuki and Naoki Ishikawa are with the Faculty of Engineering, Yokohama National University, 240-8501 Kanagawa, Japan (e-mail: [email protected]). Giuseppe Thadeu Freitas de Abreu is with the School of Computer Science and Engineering, Constructor University, 28759 Bremen, Germany (e-mail: [email protected]). Koji Ishibashi is with the Advanced Wireless and Communication Research Center, The University of Electro-Communications, 182-8585 Tokyo, Japan (e-mail: [email protected]). This work was supported in part by the Japan Science and Technology Agency, Strategic International Collaborative Research Program (JST SICORP), Japan, under Grant JPMJSC20C1. Part of this paper was presented at IEEE VTC2021-Fall [1].
Abstract

We propose a novel physical layer security scheme that exploits an optimization method as a one-way function. The proposed scheme builds on nonsquare differential multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), which is capable of noncoherent detection even in massive MIMO scenarios and thus resilient against risky pilot insertion and pilot contamination attacks. In contrast to conventional nonsquare differential MIMO schemes, which require space-time projection matrices designed via highly complex, discrete, and combinatorial optimization, the proposed scheme utilizes projection matrices constructed via low-complexity continuous optimization designed to maximize the coding gain of the system. Furthermore, using a secret key generated from the true randomness nature of the wireless channel as an initial value, the proposed continuous optimization-based projection matrix construction method becomes a one-way function, making the proposed scheme a physical layer secure differential MIMO system. An attack algorithm to challenge the proposed scheme is also devised, which demonstrates that the security level achieved improves as the number of transmit antennas increases, even in an environment where the eavesdropper can perfectly estimate channel coefficients and experience asymptotically large signal-to-noise ratios.

Index Terms:
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), physical layer security (PLS), differential space-time block codes, optimization, one-way function.
\TPshowboxesfalse{textblock*}

(45pt,10pt) Accepted for publication in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. This is the author’s version which has not been fully edited and content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2023.3277255

I Introduction

Physical layer security (PLS) is an increasingly important research topic in wireless communications towards the post-quantum era. Considering that radio waves can propagate over long distances, and the ever-increasing demand for wireless-enabled, data-hungry and sensitive applications, an enormous amount of confidential information is exposed over the air. The current approach to secure such information is fundamentally reliant on encryption methods introduced at higher layers, which however can be vulnerable to emerging (in particular quantum) technologies. The classic asymmetric Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA) encryption method [2], for instance, relies on the complexity of prime factorization, which is threatened by Shor’s algorithm [3] in case a large-scale fault-tolerant quantum computer is employed.

It is known that noise has a deleterious effect on the accuracy of quantum circuits [4], which opens a gap between the theoretical capabilities of Shor’s algorithm and its practical performance of when implemented in real-world quantum computers [5]. While this challenge can win traditional cryptography some time, it is expected that such engineering hurdles will be gradually overcome [6].

In light of the above, the main idea of PLS is to exploit physical features of wireless channels [7, 8, 9, 10, 11], to design quantum resilient, and eventually quantum-proof (a.k.a post-quantum) security solutions. To cite a few examples, in [7], the randomness of extracted channel state information (CSI) in massive MIMO systems is used to construct linear precoding matrices that provide post-quantum security via large-scale beamforming and large constellation sizes. Similarly, in [8], security is incorporated into STBC schemes by translating random received signal strength indicators into phase rotations of transmit symbols, while in [9], the reciprocal phase of the channel between Alice and Bob is used as a seed for the legitimate pair to select the modulation they employed. In turn, in the chaos-based approaches of [10] and [11], a secret key is projected onto a space-time codeword and onto a time-varying unitary matrix, respectively.

All of these schemes have two security-enhancing components incorporated, namely, the possibility of frequent updates of channel-based keys, and the one-way projection which makes it difficult for an eavesdropper to estimate the key from the original transmit signals. The major drawback of the approaches is, however, the underlying assumption of perfect CSI (PCSI) knowledge [12, 13] by Alice and Bob, which implies frequent exchanges of pilot signals that in turn can be exploited by eavesdroppers to obtain precise CSI [14, 15].

In contrast, differential space-time modulation [16] does not require CSI estimation, such that the integration of the latter with the aforementioned approaches can be leveraged to reduce the risk of eavesdropping attacks in one-way function-based security schemes. However, the seminal approach [16] requires an M×MM\times M square unitary matrix to modulate MM symbols transmitted by MM transmit antennas, which degrades the effective transmission rate by a factor of MM. Fortunately, extended differential space-time modulation schemes have recently emerged [17, 18, 19, 20], which rely on M×TM\times T nonsquare space-time projection matrices, with T<MT<M, to modulate MM symbols, such that higher transmission rates can be achieved, with particular relevance in massive MIMO scenarios. In particular, it is shown in [18] that the nonsquare counterpart of the diagonal unitary coding (DUC) [21] achieves competitive performance, although it requires the solution of a highly-complex discrete optimization problem to be implemented, especially as the number of transmit antennas increases.

Against this background, we conceive a low-complexity but optimal optimization method for nonsquare differential massive MIMO coding. Based on this method, we then propose a PLS scheme that utilizes the optimization method as a one-way function, thus enabling asymmetric MIMO-based encryption exploiting features of the wireless channel. The contributions of the article can be summarized as follows.

  • We conceive a low-complexity but optimal construction method for the square-to-nonsquare projection matrix. The conventional DUC-aided nonsquare coding requires a high complexity discrete optimization for unitary matrices. The corresponding time complexity increases exponentially with the number of transmit antennas and transmission rate, resulting in a challenge in open-loop massive MIMO scenarios. We generalize the square-to-nonsquare projection to enable continuous optimization. Then, we derive an objective function that is low-complexity despite achieving equivalent performance to the conventional counterpart, and demonstrate that the proposed scheme is optimal in terms of the coding gain and bit error rate.

  • We propose a novel concept that utilizes an optimization method as a one-way function. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first attempt of that kind in the context of wireless PLS. We compare representative optimization methods in terms of time complexity and optimality, and identify a good optimization method that can reduce the optimization delay while maintaining a good performance. In terms of the information leakage and the secrecy rate, we show that the proposed scheme with a large number of transmit antennas is capable of achieving high security even under extreme conditions where the eavesdropper can estimate perfect channel coefficients and can ignore noise.

The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The system model assumed throughout the article is defined in Section II. The conventional nonsquare differential coding scheme is briefly reviewed in Section III. In Section IV, the new optimization method to design square-to-nonsquare projection matrices is proposed and shown to be both optimal and of low complexity. In Section V, the application of the new optimization method as PLS protocol is described, along with an attack algorithm to probe the efficacy of the proposed scheme. The security performance of the scheme is analyzed in Section VI, and finally, concluding remarks are offered in Section VII.

II System Model

We assume that a legitimate transmitter Alice, equipped with MM transmit antennas, communicates with a legitimate receiver Bob, equipped with NN receive antennas, in the presence of eavesdropper Eve, also equipped with NN receive antennas, but with unlimited computing capabilities, such that the received signal at Bob is given by

𝐘(i)=𝐇(i)𝐒(i)+𝐕(i)N×T,\mathbf{Y}(i)=\mathbf{H}(i)\mathbf{S}(i)+\mathbf{V}(i)\in\mathbb{C}^{N\times T}, (1)

where ii denotes a transmission index, 𝐇(i)N×M\mathbf{H}(i)\in\mathbb{C}^{N\times M} denotes the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) small-scale Rayleigh fading channel matrix such that hn,m𝒞𝒩(0,1)h_{n,m}\sim\mathcal{CN}(0,1), 𝐒(i)M×T\mathbf{S}(i)\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times T} denotes a space-time codeword, and 𝐕(i)N×T\mathbf{V}(i)\in\mathbb{C}^{N\times T} denotes the i.i.d complex additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) matrix such that vn,t𝒞𝒩(0,σv2)v_{n,t}\sim\mathcal{CN}(0,\sigma_{v}^{2}), with 1nN1\leq n\leq N, 1mM1\leq m\leq M, 1tT1\leq t\leq T and the per-symbol signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) given 1/σv21/\sigma_{v}^{2}.

Similarly, the received signal at Eve is given by

𝐘Eve(i)=𝐇Eve(i)𝐒(i)+𝐕Eve(i)N×T,\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i)=\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i)\mathbf{S}(i)+\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i)\in\mathbb{C}^{N\times T}, (2)

where 𝐇Eve(i)\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i) and 𝐕Eve(i)\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i) are analogous of their counterparts at Bob.

We remark that in the security performance evaluation, it will assume that Eve not only has perfect knowledge of 𝐇Eve(i)\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i) but also, in an ideal case, may be subject to an infinite SNR, i.e.i.e., 𝐕Eve(i)=𝟎\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i)=\mathbf{0}.

III Conventional Nonsquare Differential Coding

In this section, we briefly review conventional nonsquare-matrix-based differential space-time coding (N-DSTC) schemes111Notice that noncoherent massive MIMO schemes [22, 23] employ simple modulation techniques such as PAM and PSK, and thus differ from the N-DSTC scheme which uses a unitary matrix and its nonsquare projection., including specific construction methods for space-time codewords, encoding and decoding procedures. The design of the projection matrices 𝐄i\mathbf{E}_{i} is an integral part of the design of a given N-DSTC scheme, and can be considered a form of physical encryption applied over the space-time codewords. The design of these matrices will be revisited in detail later, and is at the core of our contribution.

III-A Space-Time Modulation: DUC and ADSM Methods

N-DSTC [18] was proposed as a method to circumvent the requirement for perfect CSI estimation of classic coherent systems and to increase the transmission rate of square-matrix based DSTC [16, 21, 24, 25], which become particularly challenging in high-speed mobile and massive MIMO scenarios.

In N-DSTC schemes, BB bits of information are mapped into a data matrix 𝐗(i)M×M\mathbf{X}(i)\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M} selected from a codebook of 2B2^{B} matrices. Among others, two space-time codebook construction methods are representative: a) the DUC method of [21], and b) the algebraic differential spatial modulation (ADSM) scheme of [24].

In the DUC method [21], the BB input bits are mapped into the integers b=0,1,,2B1b=0,1,\cdots,2^{B}-1, and the corresponding unitary matrix is generated by

𝐗(i)=diag[exp(j2πb2Bu1),,exp(j2πb2BuM)],\mathbf{X}(i)=\mathrm{diag}\bigg{[}\mathrm{exp}\Big{(}j\frac{2\pi b}{2^{B}}u_{1}\Big{)},\cdots,\mathrm{exp}\Big{(}j\frac{2\pi b}{2^{B}}u_{M}\Big{)}\bigg{]}, (3)

where jj denotes the elementary imaginary number.

In this scheme, diversity is maximized by ensuring that the MM factors umu_{m} are designed to maximize the diversity product

Pmax=minb{1,,2B1}|m=1Msin(πbum2B)|1M,P_{\mathrm{max}}=\min_{b\in\{1,\cdots,2^{B}-1\}}\bigg{|}\prod_{m=1}^{M}\mathrm{sin}\Big{(}\frac{\pi bu_{m}}{2^{B}}\Big{)}\bigg{|}^{\frac{1}{M}}\!\!\!\!\!, (4)

while satisfying the condition 0<u1uM2B/20<u_{1}\leq\cdots u_{M}\leq 2^{B}/2\in\mathbb{Z}.

Notice that the search space size of problem (4) can be calculated as (2B1+M1M){2^{B-1}+M-1\choose M}, such that for M=32,64,128,M=32,64,128, and 256256 transmit antennas, we have (3M1M){3M-1\choose M} candidates to map B=log2(M)+2B=\mathrm{log}_{2}(M)+2 bits, which corresponds to 2×1025,5×1051,4×10104,2\times 10^{25},5\times 10^{51},4\times 10^{104}, and 4×102104\times 10^{210} candidates, respectively, making problem (4) highly complex.

In turn, in the ADSM method [24], the BB input bits are partitioned into two sequences of length B1=log2(M)B_{1}=\log_{2}(M) and B2=log2(L)B_{2}=\log_{2}(L) bits, respectively, with the first B1B_{1} bits used to select a specific dispersion matrix (DM) out of a codebook of DM matrices 𝐀m\mathbf{A}_{m} given by

𝒜{𝐀1,,𝐀M}={𝐈M,𝐌,𝐌2,,𝐌M1},\mathcal{A}\triangleq\{\mathbf{A}_{1},\cdots,\mathbf{A}_{M}\}=\{\mathbf{I}_{M},\mathbf{M},\mathbf{M}^{2},\cdots,\mathbf{M}^{M-1}\}, (5)
𝐌[]M×M,\mathbf{M}\triangleq\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 54.44226pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M}, (6)

which implies that 𝒜\mathcal{A} is a set of unitary matrices.

At each ii-th transmission block, a given DM 𝐀m(i)\mathbf{A}_{m}(i) is selected to encode the first B1B_{1} bits, while the remaining B2B_{2} bits are mapped to a symbol s(i)𝒮s(i)\in\mathcal{S}, with 𝒮\mathcal{S} denoting the LL-PSK constellation, such that the following data matrix is generated

𝐗(i)=s(i)𝐀m(i).\mathbf{X}(i)=s(i)\mathbf{A}_{m}(i). (7)

III-B Nonsquare Differential Encoding

To elaborate, in the N-DSTC scheme, at the beginning of a transmission stream, the set of projection matrices {𝐄1,,𝐄M/T}\{\mathbf{E}_{1},\cdots,\mathbf{E}_{M/T}\} are transmitted. During this initial stage, the received symbol is expressed as

𝐘(i)=𝐇(i)𝐄i+𝐕(i),\mathbf{Y}(i)=\mathbf{H}(i)\mathbf{E}_{i}+\mathbf{V}(i), (8)

for 1iM/T1\leq i\leq M/T. Notice that this requires MM timeslots.

After the projection matrices are communicated to the receiver, and assuming a transmission frame of WW blocks, the subsequent data matrices 𝐗(i)\mathbf{X}(i) are differentially encoded as

𝐒(i)={𝐈Mif i=M/T,or𝐒(i1)𝐗(i)if i>M/T,\displaystyle\mathbf{S}(i)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}\mathbf{I}_{M}&\text{if }i=M/T,\text{or}\\ \mathbf{S}(i-1)\mathbf{X}(i)&\text{if }i>M/T,\end{array}\right. (11)

mapped onto M×TM\times T nonsquare matrices via multiplication with the projection matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}, and transmitted such that the corresponding received signal becomes

𝐘(i)=𝐇(i)𝐒(i)𝐄1+𝐕(i),\mathbf{Y}(i)=\mathbf{H}(i)\mathbf{S}(i)\mathbf{E}_{1}+\mathbf{V}(i), (12)

for M/T<iWM/T<i\leq W.

The ratio between the number of transmit antennas MM and the frame length WW, i.e.,ηM/Wi.e.,\eta\triangleq M/W, is referred to as the reference insertion ratio. For the sake of performance assessment, we will set η\eta to 5%, such that W=20MW=20M, but we remark that the performance of N-DSTC schemes remain robust in high-speed mobile scenarios [19] even with η=1%\eta=1\% and η=0.1%\eta=0.1\%, which yield frames of length W=100MW=100M and W=1000MW=1000M, respectively.

III-C Algebraic Construction of Nonsquare Projection Basis

The N-DSTC scheme relies on a basis of projection matrices 𝐄iM×T\mathbf{E}_{i}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times T}, constructed to satisfy the constraints [18]:

Power constraint:𝐄iF2=T,\text{Power constraint}:\;\|\mathbf{E}_{i}\|^{2}_{F}=T,\\ (13a)
Normality:𝐄iH𝐄i=𝐈T,\text{Normality}:\;\mathbf{E}^{H}_{i}\mathbf{E}_{i}=\mathbf{I}_{T},\\ (13b)
Orthogonality:𝐄iH𝐄i=𝟎T,\text{Orthogonality}:\;\mathbf{E}^{H}_{i}\mathbf{E}_{i^{\prime}}=\mathbf{0}_{T},\\ (13c)
Reconstructibility:i=1M/T𝐄i𝐄iH=𝐈M,\text{Reconstructibility}:\;\sum_{i=1}^{M/T}\mathbf{E}_{i}\mathbf{E}^{H}_{i}=\mathbf{I}_{M}, (13d)

for all 1iiM/T1\leq i\neq i^{\prime}\leq M/T.

A strategy to obtain the projection matrix basis is to partition a unitary matrix 𝐔MM×M\mathbf{U}_{M}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M}, such that 𝐄i\mathbf{E}_{i} is given by the (i1)T(i-1)T-th to the iTiT-th columns of 𝐔M\mathbf{U}_{M}, that is

𝐔M=[].\mathbf{U}_{M}=\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 46.09921pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]. (14)

In turn, in [18] it was proposed to construct the unitary matrix 𝐔M\mathbf{U}_{M} for a system with MM transmit antennas, and given a number NbN_{b} of nonzero components in each column, as follows

𝐔Mbdiag[𝐖,,𝐖]M/NbrepetitionM×M,\mathbf{U}_{M}\triangleq\mathrm{bdiag}\underbrace{[\mathbf{W},\cdots,\mathbf{W}]}_{M/N_{b}~{}\text{repetition}}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M}, (15)

with 𝐖\mathbf{W} denoting the discrete Fourier transform matrix

𝐖=1Nb[1111ωωNb11ω2ω2(Nb1)1ωNb1ω(Nb1)(Nb1)]Nb×Nb,\mathbf{W}=\frac{1}{\sqrt{N_{b}}}\!\left[\begin{array}[]{cccc}1&1&\cdots&1\\ 1&\omega&\cdots&\omega^{N_{b}-1}\\ 1&\omega^{2}&\cdots&\omega^{2(N_{b}-1)}\\ \vdots&\vdots&\ddots&\vdots\\ 1&\omega^{N_{b}-1}&\cdots&\omega^{(N_{b}-1)(N_{b}-1)}\end{array}\right]\!\in\mathbb{C}^{N_{b}\times N_{b}}, (16)

where ωexp(2πj/Nb)\omega\triangleq\mathrm{exp}(-2\pi j/N_{b}).

Notice that 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} becomes more sparse as Nb1N_{b}\to 1, and denser as NbMN_{b}\to M. Also, since M/NbM/N_{b} has to be an integer, we shall set Nb=1,21,22,,2log2(M)=MN_{b}=1,2^{1},2^{2},\cdots,2^{\mathrm{log_{2}}(M)}=M in this paper.

III-D Noncoherent ML Detection

In light of the design described above, a simple (if suboptimal) noncoherent N-DSTC receiver is [18]

𝐗^(i)=argmin𝐗𝐘(i)𝐘^(i1)𝐗𝐄1F2,\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i)=\mathop{\rm arg~{}min}\limits_{\mathbf{X}}||\mathbf{Y}(i)-\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i-1)\mathbf{X}\mathbf{E}_{1}||^{2}_{F}, (17)

where the key component 𝐘^(i)\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i) is defined by

𝐘^(i)={k=1M/T𝐘(k)𝐄kHfor i=M/T,𝐘(i)𝐄(1α)+𝐘^(i1)𝐗^(i)𝐄(α)for i>M/T,\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i)=\left\{\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}\sum_{k=1}^{M/T}\mathbf{Y}(k)\mathbf{E}^{H}_{k}&\text{for }i=M/T,\\[4.30554pt] \mathbf{Y}(i)\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)}+\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i-1)\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i)\mathbf{E}^{(\alpha)}&\text{for }i>M/T,\end{array}\right. (18)

while the constant matrices 𝐄(α)\mathbf{E}^{(\alpha)} and 𝐄(1α)\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)} are defined as

𝐄(α)α(i)𝐄1𝐄1H+k=2M/T𝐄k𝐄kH,\displaystyle\mathbf{E}^{(\alpha)}\triangleq\alpha(i)\mathbf{E}_{1}\mathbf{E}_{1}^{H}+\sum_{k=2}^{M/T}\mathbf{E}_{k}\mathbf{E}_{k}^{H}, (19a)
𝐄(1α)(1α(i))𝐄1H.\displaystyle\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)}\triangleq(1-\alpha(i))\mathbf{E}_{1}^{H}. (19b)

In equations (19a) and (19b), α(i)\alpha(i) is a forgetting factor that determines the ratio of 𝐘(i)\mathbf{Y}(i) and 𝐘^(i1)\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i-1) added together, which can be updated via the closed-form expression [19]

α(i)=min(max(αv(i),0.01),0.99),\alpha(i)=\min(\max(\alpha_{v}(i),0.01),0.99), (20)

where

αv(i)NTσv2𝐃(i)F2,\alpha_{v}(i)\triangleq\frac{N\cdot T\cdot\sigma_{v}^{2}}{||\mathbf{D}(i)||^{2}_{F}}, (21)

with the adaptive forgetting factor αv(i)\alpha_{v}(i) changed depending on the SNR and the difference between 𝐇(i)\mathbf{H}(i) and 𝐇(i1)\mathbf{H}(i-1) [19], and 𝐃(i)𝐘(i)𝐘^(i1)𝐗^(i)𝐄1\mathbf{D}(i)\triangleq\mathbf{Y}(i)-\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i-1)\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i)\mathbf{E}_{1}.

IV Proposed Nonsquare Coding

Despite various interesting features, there are a few aspects of the conventional N-DSTC schemes that can be improved. One of such aspects is that the projection matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} is not designed specifically for the mapping approach utilized, e.g.e.g. DUC or ADSM, and another is the fact that constructing the matrices 𝐄2,,𝐄M/T\mathbf{E}_{2},\cdots,\mathbf{E}_{M/T} satisfying the constraints (13a) to (13d) can become cumbersome in massive MIMO settings.

In this section, we therefore improve upon the conventional N-DSTC schemes in two ways. Firstly, an optimal method to construct 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} in which its nonzero elements are generalized to complex numbers is proposed. The minimum conditions to achieve the performance upper bound are also described. Secondly, a novel N-DSTC scheme that relies only on 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} is designed, which eliminates the need of constructing the matrices 𝐄2,,𝐄M/T\mathbf{E}_{2},\cdots,\mathbf{E}_{M/T}, reducing the overall complexity of the scheme.

Notice that these two improvements make room for the contribution introduced thereafter, by enabling the construction of 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} to be revisited in the context of one-way function designs for asymmetric PLS systems.

IV-A Projection Matrix Design via Continuous Optimization

For starters, let us analyze the performance of N-DSTC when 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} satisfies only the transmit power constraint of equation (13a), and identify the minimum condition under which the maximum performance is achieved. To that end, first consider the simplest when (Nb,T)=(M,1)(N_{b},T)=(M,1). In this case, 𝐄1M×1\mathbf{E}_{1}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1} is a vector, which for the sake of clarity is denoted 𝐞1M×1\mathbf{e}_{1}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1}. When 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} satisfies the power constraint and the power is equally distributed among transmit antennas, 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} can be expressed as

𝐞1=[e1e2eM]T/MM×1,\mathbf{e}_{1}=[e_{1}\ e_{2}\ \cdots\ e_{M}]^{T}/\sqrt{M}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1}, (22)

where each em=ejθme_{m}=e^{j\theta_{m}}, with 1mM1\leq m\leq M and 0θm<2π0\leq\theta_{m}<2\pi, lies on the unit-radius circle on the complex plane.

A good performance metric to evaluate the projection vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} is the coding gain defined as the minimum, among all pairs, Euclidean distance between projected data matrices 𝐗p𝐞1\mathbf{X}_{p}\mathbf{e}_{1} and 𝐗q𝐞1\mathbf{X}_{q}\mathbf{e}_{1}, that is [26]

g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) min𝐗p𝐗q𝒳((𝐗p𝐞1𝐗q𝐞1)H(𝐗p𝐞1𝐗q𝐞1))1N\displaystyle\triangleq\min_{\mathbf{X}_{p}\neq\mathbf{X}_{q}\in\mathcal{X}}\left((\mathbf{X}_{p}\mathbf{e}_{1}-\mathbf{X}_{q}\mathbf{e}_{1})^{H}(\mathbf{X}_{p}\mathbf{e}_{1}-\mathbf{X}_{q}\mathbf{e}_{1})\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=min𝐗p𝐗q𝒳(𝐞1H(𝐗p𝐗q)H(𝐗p𝐗q)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle=\min_{\mathbf{X}_{p}\neq\mathbf{X}_{q}\in\mathcal{X}}\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(\mathbf{X}_{p}-\mathbf{X}_{q})^{H}(\mathbf{X}_{p}-\mathbf{X}_{q})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}} (23)

where 𝒳{𝐗1,,𝐗2B}M×M\mathcal{X}\triangleq\{\mathbf{X}_{1},\cdots,\mathbf{X}_{2^{B}}\}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M} is the codebook of all 2B{2^{B}} possible data matrices 𝐗\mathbf{X}.

The above implies that the optimal projection vector 𝐞𝟏\mathbf{\mathbf{e}_{1}} is the solution of the problem

maximize𝐞𝟏M×1\displaystyle\mathop{\rm maximize}\limits_{\mathbf{\mathbf{e}_{1}}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1}} g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) (24)
s.t. |em|2=1,m=1,2,,M,\displaystyle|e_{m}|^{2}=1,\forall\;m=1,2,\cdots,M,

which is highly complex, as it requires the evaluation of the Euclidean distances of all pairs of M×MM\times M matrices in the set 𝒳\mathcal{X}, of cardinality 2B2^{B}, at the cost of 𝒪(M3)\mathcal{O}(M^{3}) per pair.

Thanks to the fact that DUC codewords are diagonal and already optimized via discrete combinatorial optimization [21], the coding gain defined in equation (23) does not depend on 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} in the particular case of DUC mapping. More generally, and in the case of ADSM, however, the coding gain of equation (23) varies with 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}, requiring a solution of the highly complex problem (24). In order to avoid the associated complexity, we first show in Appendix A, that equation (23) can be simplified to

g(𝐞1)=min(g1(𝐞1),g2(𝐞1)),g(\mathbf{e}_{1})=\min(g_{1}(\mathbf{e}_{1}),g_{2}(\mathbf{e}_{1})), (25)

with the functions g1(𝐞1)g_{1}(\mathbf{e}_{1}) and g2(𝐞1)g_{2}(\mathbf{e}_{1}) respectively given by

g1(𝐞1)=mins1,s2𝒮|s1s2|2N,g_{1}(\mathbf{e}_{1})=\min_{s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}}\left|s_{1}-s_{2}\right|^{\frac{2}{N}}, (26)
g2(𝐞1)=minn{1,,M/2}s𝒮(2(1{s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1}))1N.g_{2}(\mathbf{e}_{1})=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min\limits_{\begin{subarray}{c}n\in\{1,\cdots,M/2\}\\ s\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(2\,(1-\Re\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\})\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}\!\!\!\!. (27)

Thanks to equation (25), problem (24) can be significantly simplified as follows.

TABLE I: Examples of angle vectors of the optimal bases
Projection Vector Associated Optimal Angle Vector
𝐞1(M,M)\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,M) [θ1θ2θM\theta_{1}~{}\theta_{2}~{}\cdots~{}\theta_{M}] [rad]
𝐞1(2,2)\mathbf{e}_{1}(2,2) [0 0.785]
𝐞1(4,4)\mathbf{e}_{1}(4,4) [0 5.035 5.497 1.108]
𝐞1(8,8)\mathbf{e}_{1}(8,8) [0 0.930 0.022 0.243 4.180 1.367 0.376 2.481]
𝐞1(16,16)\mathbf{e}_{1}(16,16) [0 2.863 0.526 1.600 0.540 4.089 2.253 1.462 4.388 0.516 0.094 0.784 3.643 4.704 5.234 3.842]
𝐞1(32,32)\mathbf{e}_{1}(32,32)
[0 1.797 3.056 4.042 0.800 2.662 3.432 1.046 5.030 1.771 0.664 2.501 0.211 0.220 4.908 2.929
0.570 5.512 5.216 0.041 2.159 0.818 2.738 0.301 0.999 6.158 0.972 2.938 3.659 3.194 3.054 1.186]
𝐞1(64,64)\mathbf{e}_{1}(64,64)
[0 2.558 1.212 2.052 0.222 4.775 0.340 1.963 4.732 1.887 3.042 2.838 5.219 2.947 2.479 2.616
0.886 0.388 5.818 1.125 2.561 2.520 4.397 0.534 2.633 4.189 4.222 5.149 4.431 2.878 5.046 1.110
0.428 1.453 4.907 4.505 3.310 5.717 0.370 2.818 1.351 2.558 2.651 5.939 1.137 3.975 2.368 1.186
4.512 2.558 3.013 5.677 2.558 0.134 6.088 0.383 0.628 4.088 1.178 5.574 2.614 0.453 0.180 5.205]

First, notice that g1(𝐞1)g_{1}(\mathbf{e}_{1}) is not actually a function of 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} and therefore is irrelevant to the maximization of coding gain via selection of the projection vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} as per equation (24). In turn, maximizing g2(𝐞1)g_{2}(\mathbf{e}_{1}) directly is challenging, because the term {s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1}\Re\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\} rotates both with nn and ss, such that a given LL-PSK symbol ss that minimizes {s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1}\Re\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\} for a given value of nn, maximizes the same term for another value of nn corresponding to a rotation of π/2\pi/2 radians, and vice-versa.

In light of the above, and noticing that the term {s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1}\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\} is a complex number of radius |𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1||\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}|, it follows that a robust strategy to maximize g2(𝐞1)g_{2}(\mathbf{e}_{1}) for all values of nn and ss is to minimize the average amplitude of the term 𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1} over nn, such that the following alternative problem may be proposed as a relaxation of problem (24)

minimize𝐞𝟏M×1\displaystyle\mathop{\rm minimize}\limits_{\mathbf{\mathbf{e}_{1}}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1}} f(𝐞1)\displaystyle f(\mathbf{e}_{1}) (28)
s.t. |em|2=1,m={1,,M},\displaystyle|e_{m}|^{2}=1,\;\forall\;m=\{1,\cdots,M\},

where the objective function f(𝐞1)f(\mathbf{e}_{1}) is defined as

f(𝐞1)n=1M/2|𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1|.f(\mathbf{e}_{1})\triangleq\sum_{n=1}^{M/2}|\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}|. (29)

Unlike the original problem (24), which is highly complex and dependent on a combinatorially large number of evaluation of a cost function of cubic complexity order 𝒪(M3)\mathcal{O}(M^{3}), the latter problem (28) is, although not convex, a continuous manifold optimization problem, based on an objective of complexity order 𝒪(M2)\mathcal{O}(M^{2}), which can be solved efficiently. In fact, in some cases, solutions of problem (28) can be obtained in closed form, as is the case for (M,L)=(2,4)(M,L)=(2,4). Specifically, in this case we can set 𝐞1=[ejθ1ejθ2]T/2\mathbf{e}_{1}=\left[e^{j\theta_{1}}~{}e^{j\theta_{2}}\right]^{T}/\sqrt{2}, without loss of generality, and search for the pair (θ1,θ2)(\theta_{1},\theta_{2}) that minimize f(𝐞1)f(\mathbf{e}_{1}), which leads to the solution (θ1,θ2)=(0,π/4)(\theta_{1},\theta_{2})=(0,\pi/4). This solution yields the optimum projection vector 𝐞1=[1ejπ4]T/22×1\mathbf{e}_{1}=[1~{}e^{j\frac{\pi}{4}}]^{T}/\sqrt{2}\in\mathbb{C}^{2\times 1}, which in fact results in f(𝐞1)=0f(\mathbf{e}_{1})=0.

In the more general case, the optimization problem (28) can be solved via any number of publicly available standard optimization methods such as COBYLA, SLSQP [27], BFGS, L-BFGS, and Powell [28]. The performance of these methods will be compared in Subsection IV-C, and examples of angle vectors resulting in optimal 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} designs for various values of MM are given in Table I.

IV-B Extension to Sparse Projection Vectors and Matrices

Notice that the projection vector design of Subsection IV-A generally yields fully dense solutions (i.e.,|𝐞1|0=Mi.e.,|\mathbf{e}_{1}|_{0}=M). Allowing for sparsity in the projection may be desired, especially in large scale MIMO systems, as it enables a reduction of the number of RF chains required to implement the scheme. In addition, it is also know that the coding gain of ADSM-based schemes increases with sparsity [24] in the projection. These facts motivate us to seek a sparse alternative to the design described in Subsection IV-A.

On the other hand, recall that the utilization of a projection vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}, as opposed to a projection matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}, represents already a significant compression of transmission instances to T=1T=1. With the additional insertion of sparsity into 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}, the total number of degrees of freedom of the system is further reduced, which therefore motivates us also to extend the design of Subsection IV-A to the case when T>1T>1.

These two modifications are the objectives of this subsection. For the sake of clarity, we shall hereafter denote the original projection vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} of Subsection IV-A by 𝐞1(M,M)\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,M), so as to explicitly indicate that it is designed for MM transmit antennas, with MM nonzero entries. Accordingly, a sparse projection vector with |𝐞1|0=NbM|\mathbf{e}_{1}|_{0}=N_{b}\leq M shall be denoted by 𝐞1(M,Nb)M×1\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b})\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1}, which can be constructed as follows

𝐞1(M,Nb)=𝐞1(M2,Nb)[10]M×1.\displaystyle\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b})=\mathbf{e}_{1}\left(\frac{M}{2},N_{b}\right)\otimes\begin{bmatrix}1\\ 0\end{bmatrix}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1}. (30)

For example, if we consider the case with M=4M=4 and Nb=2N_{b}=2, the corresponding extended basis is given by

𝐞1(4,2)=𝐞1(2,2)[10]=12[1ejπ4][10]=12[10ejπ40].\mathbf{e}_{1}(4,2)\!\,=\!\,\mathbf{e}_{1}(2,2)\otimes\!\begin{bmatrix}1\\ 0\end{bmatrix}\!\!=\!\!\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\!\begin{bmatrix}1\\ e^{j\frac{\pi}{4}}\end{bmatrix}\!\otimes\!\begin{bmatrix}1\\ 0\end{bmatrix}\!\!=\!\!\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\!\begin{bmatrix}1\\ 0\\ e^{j\frac{\pi}{4}}\\ 0\end{bmatrix}\!\!. (31)

The sparse projection vector described by equation (30) is shown in Appendix B to retain the same coding gain as that maximized under the solution of problem (28), and therefore can be said to be the optimal sparse solutions of the latter.

Finally, a projection vector 𝐞1(M,Nb)\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}) can be extended into a projection matrix denoted by 𝐄1(M,Nb,T)M×T\mathbf{E}_{1}(M,N_{b},T)\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times T}, which can be constructed as

(32)

where 𝐏\mathbf{P} is a permutation matrix defined as

𝐏[].\mathbf{P}\triangleq\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 54.44226pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]. (39)

Notice that left-multiplication of the matrix 𝐏n\mathbf{P}^{n} onto a vector 𝐯\mathbf{v} yields the nn-rotation of the elements of 𝐯\mathbf{v} in the downward direction.

For example, if 𝐯=[1234]T\mathbf{v}=[1~{}2~{}3~{}4]^{T}, then 𝐏𝐯=[4123]T\mathbf{P}\mathbf{v}=[4~{}1~{}2~{}3]^{T}, 𝐏2𝐯=[3412]T\mathbf{P}^{2}\mathbf{v}=[3~{}4~{}1~{}2]^{T}, and so on. It follows that the projection matrix designed via equation (32) consists of column-wise rotations of the design of equation (30). For example, with M=4,Nb=2M=4,N_{b}=2, and T=2T=2 we obtain

𝐄1(4,2,2)=[]=12[1001ejπ400ejπ4]\displaystyle\mathbf{E}_{1}(4,2,2)=\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 72.15007pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}1&0\\ 0&1\\ e^{j\frac{\pi}{4}}&0\\ 0&e^{j\frac{\pi}{4}}\end{array}\right]

IV-C Numerical Evaluation of Otimization Methods

As mentioned above, the design of dense projection vectors based on the solution of problem (28) can be accomplished by standard optimization methods such as COBYLA, SLSQP, BFGS, L-BFGS, and Powell [27, 28]. In this subsection we offer a numerical comparison of the performance of these methods.

Refer to caption
Figure 1: Histogram of coding gains g(𝐞1)g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) as given by equation (23), achieved by projection vectors obtained by solving problem (28) via various optimization packages, with M=64M=64 and N=2N=2.

We start with Fig. 1, which shows histograms of the coding gains g(𝐞1)g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) obtained from equation (23) with dense projection vectors 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} obtained by solving problem (28) via various optimization methods, for systems with M=64M=64 transmit and N=2N=2 receive antennas. It is found that all methods yield gains g(𝐞1)>1.26g(\mathbf{e}_{1})>1.26, with the BFGS method proving most effective in achieving the highest gains, g(𝐞1)1.41g(\mathbf{e}_{1})\approx 1.41, with the highest probabilities, followed closely by the SLSQP method.

Refer to caption
Figure 2: Convergence time of solutions of problem (28) obtained via various optimization packages with the same initial value, as a function of system dimension M=264M=2\to 64.

Next, we compare the convergence time of each of the latter optimization methods as a function of the system size. The results are shown in Fig. 2 and indicate that all methods are relatively fast, with the solutions for systems with M=64M=64 antennas obtained in around 10 seconds with the slowest approach (Powell method), and in less than 1 second with the fastest (COBYLA method). Considering both sets of results, we hereafter adopt the SLSQP method as it is found to be both fast and effective in achieving a high coding gain with a high probability.

Refer to caption
Figure 3: Starting and converging points of problem (28) with M=2M=2.

Finally, Fig. 3 shows the initial and converged points of the optimization problem (28) solved by SLSQP method, with M=2M=2. It can be seen that the objective function has many local minima, such that the final convergence point is highly distinct. Some initial points converge to the nearest minima, some do not, which makes it difficult for eavesdroppers to estimate the initial value from the converged value, even if M=2M=2.

V N-DSTC with Embedded One-way like function Physical Layer Security

The proposed N-DSTC scheme described above also has the feature that the projection matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} is obtained from the expansion via equations (30) and (32), of the solution problem (28) which, due to its manifold nature and the non-convexity of its objective, is not unique but rather dependent both on the method employed and on the initial value of the iterations towards a stable point, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 3.

This feature is similar to the notion of one-way function222A one-way function is defined as a function whose output is easy to compute for all inputs, but whose inverse is hard. However, no one has yet been able to answer whether there exists a one-way function in the sense of cryptographic theory. [29] widely used in cryptographic algorithms, and therefore can be exploited to embed physical layer security into the proposed N-DSTC scheme333This requires that the space-time modulation scheme generates symmetric symbols, such as in the ADSM approach introduced in Section III-A., as described below.

V-A Proposed PLS-protected N-DSTC Scheme

Straightforwardly, the proposed N-DSTC scheme can be summarized as follows:

  1. 1.

    Assuming that the transmitter Alice and the receiver Bob share a secret key444For a full physical-layer implementation, zz can be assumed to be extracted from the channel between Alice and Bob [8]., zz\in\mathbb{Z}, the pair locally generates an identical pseudo-random initial vector 𝐞1(0)M×1\mathbf{e}_{1}^{(0)}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times 1} based on the seed zz.

  2. 2.

    Starting from 𝐞1(0)\mathbf{e}_{1}^{(0)}, Alice and Bob locally solve problem (28) using the same optimization method and parameters (e.g.e.g. number of iterations, step sizes, etc.) which may also be pseudo-randomly determined by the shared seed zz, thus obtaining solution vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} common to the pair.

  3. 3.

    Using the common vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}, Alice and Bob locally produce 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} via equations (30) and (32).

  4. 4.

    During the first TT instances Alice transmits a random unitary matrix 𝐔M=[𝐔1,,𝐔M/T]M×M\mathbf{U}_{M}=[\mathbf{U}_{1},\cdots,\mathbf{U}_{M/T}]\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M}, subsequently transmitting its payload data matrices 𝐗(i)\mathbf{X}(i), differently encoded and encrypted by 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}, yielding at Bob the received symbol blocks

    𝐘(i)={𝐇(i)𝐔i+𝐕(i)for 1iM/T,𝐇(i)𝐗(i1)𝐗(i)𝐒(i)𝐄1+𝐕(i)for i>M/T,\mathbf{Y}(i)\!=\!\begin{cases}\mathbf{H}(i)\mathbf{U}_{i}+\mathbf{V}(i)&\!\!\text{for }1\!\leq\!i\!\leq\!M/T,\\ \mathbf{H}(i)\underbrace{\mathbf{X}(i\!-\!1)\mathbf{X}(i)}_{\triangleq\mathbf{S}(i)}\mathbf{E}_{1}\!+\!\!\mathbf{V}(i)&\!\!\text{for }i>M/T,\\[-12.91663pt] \end{cases} (46)

    where 𝐒(i)\mathbf{S}(i) are the differentially-encoded symbol blocks equivalent to those constructed via equation (11) in conventional schemes, and 𝐗(M/T)𝐈M\mathbf{X}(M/T)\triangleq\mathbf{I}_{M}.

  5. 5.

    Bob differentially decodes and decrypts the messages from Alice by computing

    𝐗^(i)=argmin𝐗𝐘(i)𝐘^(i1)𝐗𝐄1F2,\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i)=\mathop{\rm arg~{}min}\limits_{\mathbf{X}}||\mathbf{Y}(i)-\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i-1)\,\mathbf{X}\,\mathbf{E}_{1}||^{2}_{F}, (47)

    with 𝐘^(i)\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i) defined as

    𝐘^(i){k=1M/T𝐘(k)𝐔kHfor i=M/T,𝐘(i)𝐄(1α)+𝐘^(i1)𝐗^(i)𝐄(α)for i>M/T,\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i)\!\triangleq\!\begin{cases}\sum\limits_{k=1}^{M/T}\!\mathbf{Y}(k)\mathbf{U}^{H}_{k}&\!\!\!\text{for }i\!=\!M/T,\\ \mathbf{Y}(i)\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)}\!+\!\!\hat{\mathbf{Y}}(i\!-\!1)\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i)\mathbf{E}^{(\alpha)}&\!\!\!\text{for }i\!>\!M/T,\end{cases} (48)

    the constant matrices 𝐄(α)\mathbf{E}^{(\alpha)} and 𝐄(1α)\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)} defined as

    𝐄(α)𝐈M𝐄1𝐄(1α),\displaystyle\mathbf{E}^{(\alpha)}\triangleq\mathbf{I}_{M}-\mathbf{E}_{1}\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)}, (49a)
    𝐄(1α)(1α(i))𝐄1H,\displaystyle\mathbf{E}^{(1-\alpha)}\triangleq(1-\alpha(i))\mathbf{E}_{1}^{H}, (49b)

    and α(i)\alpha(i) as given in equation (20).

  6. 6.

    Restart the procedure from step 1) periodically.

Notice that unlike conventional schemes reviewed in Subsection III-C, the proposed scheme does not rely on an entire set of compression matrices 𝐄1,𝐄2,,𝐄M/T\mathbf{E}_{1},\mathbf{E}_{2},\cdots,\mathbf{E}_{M/T}, but rather on a single projection/encryption matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}. This feature not only simplifies the ML detection process, as can be inferred by direct comparison of equations (19) and (49), but also is crucial for security, since 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} is uniquely determined by 𝐄2,,𝐄M/T\mathbf{E}_{2},\cdots,\mathbf{E}_{M/T}.

Furthermore, also unlike conventional schemes, the secret projection/encrypting matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} is never exposed to Eve, nor is it related to the unitary matrix transmitted during the initialization phase of the differentially encoding procedure, in contrast to conventional schemes, e.g.e.g. as in equation (14).

In light of the features highlighted above, in order to decrypt the secret messages exchanged between Alice and Bob, an eventual eavesdropper Eve must extract 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} directly from its own received signals, subject to a distinct channel. In the next subsections, we formulate the best attack Eve can inflict onto the proposed scheme and subsequently analyze the secrecy rate of the method.

V-B Eavesdropping Attack Conditions and Strategy

In order to assess the secrecy performance of the N-DSTC scheme with embedded one-way function physical layer security under the most strenuous conditions, an idealized scenario highly beneficial to Eve is considered, namely:

  • Perfect CSI: the channel matrix 𝐇Eve\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}} from Alice to Eve is assumed to be perfectly known, despite the fact that the N-DSTC scheme does not incorporate any procedure for channel estimation.

  • Noise-free Prior Information: it is assumed that Eve is in knowledge of the first transmitted message 𝐗~𝐗(M/T+1)\tilde{\mathbf{X}}\triangleq\mathbf{X}(M/T+1) and in possession of a noise-free copy of the corresponding received signal, namely

    𝐘~Eve=𝐇Eve𝐗~𝐄1.\tilde{\mathbf{Y}}_{\mathrm{Eve}}=\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\tilde{\mathbf{X}}\mathbf{E}_{1}. (50)
  • Coherent Detection: combining the perfect CSI assumption with the prior information summarized in equation (50), and in view of the N-DSTC transmission model of equation (46), it is assumed that Eve can attempt to detect Alice’s messages coherently from the signal model

    𝐘Eve(i)=𝐇Eve𝐗(i)𝐄1+𝐕Eve(i).\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i)=\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\,\mathbf{X}(i)\,\mathbf{E}_{1}+\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i). (51)
  • System Information: it is assumed that Eve is in full knowledge of the fact that Alice and Bob generate 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} via the solution of problem (28) with the objective function given in equation (29).

Under the highly favorable conditions described above, Eve can mount the following idealized attack555Referring to equation (22), notice that the search space of 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1} is of dimension 2βM2^{\beta M}, where β\beta denotes the resolution of θm\theta_{m}, and that under practical conditions Eve must also estimate 𝐇Eve\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}} and infer 𝐗(M/T+1)\mathbf{X}(M/T+1) while searching for 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}, making brute-force approaches virtually impossible with sufficiently large β\beta and/or MM. aiming at extracting the encrypting projection matrix 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}

𝐄^1=argmin𝐄1Eve𝐘~Eve𝐇Eve𝐗~𝐄1EveF2+n=1M/2|𝐄1EveH𝐌n𝐄1Eve|,\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1}\!=\!\mathop{\rm arg~{}min}\limits_{\mathbf{E}_{1_{\mathrm{Eve}}}}\!\big{\|}\tilde{\mathbf{Y}}_{\mathrm{Eve}}-\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\tilde{\mathbf{X}}\mathbf{E}_{1_{\mathrm{Eve}}}\big{\|}^{2}_{F}+\!\sum_{n=1}^{M/2}\!\big{|}\mathbf{E}_{1_{\mathrm{Eve}}}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{E}_{1_{\mathrm{Eve}}}\big{|}, (52)

and subsequently attempt to decipher 𝐗(i)\mathbf{X}(i) by solving

𝐗^(i)=argmin𝐗𝐘Eve(i)𝐇Eve𝐗𝐄^1F2,for i>M/T.\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i)=\mathop{\rm arg~{}min}\limits_{\mathbf{X}}\big{\|}\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(i)-\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\mathbf{X}\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1}\big{\|}^{2}_{F},\;\text{for }i>M/T. (53)

V-C Secrecy Rate Analysis

The resilience of the proposed PLS-protected N-DSTC scheme described in Subsection V-A to the eavesdropping attack described above can be assessed via its secrecy rate under a finite-alphabet signaling which is given by [30, 31, 32, 33]

C=max{0,(IBobIEve)},C=\mathrm{max}\{0,(I_{\mathrm{Bob}}-I_{\mathrm{Eve}})\}, (54)

where IBobI_{\mathrm{Bob}} and IEveI_{\mathrm{Eve}} denote the average mutual information (AMI) between the information source Alice, and Bob or Eve, respectively, which are given by [34]

IBob=1T(B1Lp=1LE𝐇,𝐕log2(q=1Lp(𝐘Bob(p)|𝐗(q)𝐄1)p(𝐘Bob(p)|𝐗(p)𝐄1))),I_{\mathrm{Bob}}\!=\!\frac{1}{T}\!\left(\!B\!-\!\frac{1}{L}\!\sum_{p=1}^{L}\mathrm{E}_{\mathbf{H},\!\mathbf{V}}\mathrm{log}_{2}\!\left(\sum_{q=1}^{L}\frac{\mathrm{p}(\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Bob}}^{(p)}|\mathbf{X}^{(q)}\mathbf{E}_{1})}{\mathrm{p}(\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Bob}}^{(p)}|\mathbf{X}^{(p)}\mathbf{E}_{1})}\right)\!\!\right)\!, (55)

with 𝐘Bob\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Bob}} simplified, for analytical purposes to

𝐘Bob(i)=𝐇𝐗(i)𝐄1+𝐕(i),\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Bob}}(i)=\mathbf{H}\mathbf{X}(i)\mathbf{E}_{1}+\mathbf{V}(i), (56)

and

IEve=1T(B1Lp=1LE𝐇Eve,𝐕Evelog2(q=1Lp(𝐘Eve(p)|𝐗(q)𝐄^1)p(𝐘Eve(p)|𝐗(p)𝐄^1)),I_{\mathrm{Eve}}\!=\!\frac{1}{T}\!\left(\!\!B\!-\!\frac{1}{L}\!\sum_{p=1}^{L}\mathrm{E}_{\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}},\!\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}}\mathrm{log}_{2}\!\left(\sum_{q=1}^{L}\!\frac{\mathrm{p}(\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}^{(p)}|\mathbf{X}^{(q)}\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1})}{\mathrm{p}(\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}^{(p)}|\mathbf{X}^{(p)}\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1}}\!\right)\!\!\right)\!, (57)

where we remind that L2BL\triangleq 2^{B}, and the auxiliary indices pp and qq, with 1p,qL1\leq p,q\leq L are used to indicate distinct symbol matrices in the codebook 𝒳{𝐗1,,𝐗2B}M×M\mathcal{X}\triangleq\{\mathbf{X}_{1},\cdots,\mathbf{X}_{2^{B}}\}\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M}.

In light of equations (51) and (56), the conditional probabilities in equations (55) and (57) are respectively given by

p(𝐘Bob|𝐗𝐄1)=1(πσv2)NTexp(𝐘Bob𝐇𝐗𝐄1F2σv2),\mathrm{p}(\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Bob}}|\mathbf{X}\mathbf{E}_{1})\!=\!\frac{1}{(\pi\sigma_{v}^{2})^{NT}}\mathrm{exp}\!\left(\!\frac{-\|\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Bob}}\!\!-\!\mathbf{H}\mathbf{X}\mathbf{E}_{1}\|^{2}_{F}}{\sigma_{v}^{2}}\!\right)\!, (58)
p(𝐘Eve|𝐗𝐄^1)=1(πσv:Eve2)NTexp(𝐘Eve𝐇Eve𝐗𝐄^1F2σv:Eve2).\mathrm{p}(\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}|\mathbf{X}\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1})\!=\!\frac{1}{(\pi\sigma_{v:\text{Eve}}^{2})^{NT}}\mathrm{exp}\bigg{(}\!\frac{-\|\mathbf{Y}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\!-\!\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\mathbf{X}\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1}\|^{2}_{F}}{\sigma_{v:\text{Eve}}^{2}}\!\bigg{)}. (59)

Substituting equations (58) and (59) into (55) and (57), respectively, yields

IBob=1T(B1Lf=1LE𝐇,𝐕[log2g=1LeηBob(p,q)]),I_{\text{Bob}}=\frac{1}{T}\bigg{(}B-\frac{1}{L}\sum_{f=1}^{L}\mathrm{E_{\mathbf{H},\mathbf{V}}}\Big{[}\mathrm{log}_{2}\sum_{g=1}^{L}e^{\eta^{(p,q)}_{\text{Bob}}}\Big{]}\bigg{)}, (60)
IEve=1T(B1Lf=1LE𝐇Eve,𝐕Eve[log2g=1LeηEve(p,q)]),I_{\text{Eve}}=\frac{1}{T}\bigg{(}B-\frac{1}{L}\sum_{f=1}^{L}\mathrm{E_{\mathbf{H}_{\text{Eve}},\mathbf{V}_{\text{Eve}}}}\Big{[}\mathrm{log}_{2}\sum_{g=1}^{L}e^{\eta^{(p,q)}_{\text{Eve}}}\Big{]}\bigg{)}, (61)

where

ηBob(p,q)𝐇(𝐗(p)𝐗(q))𝐄1+𝐕F2σv2,\eta_{\mathrm{Bob}}^{(p,q)}\triangleq\frac{-||\mathbf{H}(\mathbf{X}^{(p)}-\mathbf{X}^{(q)})\mathbf{E}_{1}+\mathbf{V}||^{2}_{F}}{\sigma_{v}^{2}}, (62)
ηEve(p,q)\displaystyle\eta_{\mathrm{Eve}}^{(p,q)}\triangleq 𝐇Eve(𝐗(p)𝐄1𝐗(q)𝐄^1)+𝐕EveF2σv:Eve2\displaystyle\;\frac{-\|\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}(\mathbf{X}^{(p)}\mathbf{E}_{1}-\mathbf{X}^{(q)}\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1})+\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\|^{2}_{F}}{\sigma_{v:\text{Eve}}^{2}}
+𝐇Eve𝐗(p)(𝐄1𝐄^1)+𝐕EveF2σv:Eve2.\displaystyle+\frac{\|\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\mathbf{X}^{(p)}(\mathbf{E}_{1}-\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1})+\mathbf{V}_{\mathrm{Eve}}\|^{2}_{F}}{\sigma_{v:\text{Eve}}^{2}}. (63)

VI Simulation Results

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme, first in terms of the communication between Alice and Bob, and then in terms of its security, in particular in terms of the leakage in the Alice-to-Eve channel.

VI-A Performance Comparison

In this subsection we compare the proposed nonsquare coding (ADSM with the proposed projection vector/matrix designed in Subsections IV-A and IV-B) and the conventional nonsquare coding (ADSM and DUC with the conventional projection vector/matrix designed in Subsection III-C) in terms of the coding gain and the bit error rate (BER).

Refer to caption
Figure 4: Comparison of coding gains achieved as per equation (23), with projection vectors designed as given by result of optimization problem (28), M=64M=64, N=2N=2, T=1T=1, B=8B=8 and Nb=164N_{b}=1\to 64.

Fig. 4 compares the coding gain achieved with projection vectors obtained from equation (30), systems with parameters M=64,N=2,T=1M=64,N=2,T=1, and B=8B=8, as a function of the sparsity of the vector, ranging from Nb=1N_{b}=1 to 6464. As references, curves corresponding to the conventional nonsquare ADSM and DUC scheme are also included666In the DUC case, the factors u1,u2,,uMu_{1},u_{2},\cdots,u_{M} are optimized as described in [21] and indicated by equation (4), but only NbN_{b} elements are utilized..

It can be seen that the coding gain of conventional nonsquare ADSM schemes decreases as the projection vector becomes more dense, with the opposite occurring in DUC approach. In turn, the coding gain achieved using projection vectors designed via the method proposed in Subsections IV-A and IV-B is found to be independent of sparsity, and to upper-bound those achieved by the latter schemes.

Refer to caption
Figure 5: Comparison of coding gains achieved as per equation (23), with projection matrices designed as given by equation (32), M=64M=64, N=2N=2, B=8B=8, Nb=64N_{b}=64 and T=116T=1\to 16.

Fig. 5 compares the coding gain achieved with projection matrices obtained from equation (32), systems with parameters M=64,N=2,Nb=64M=64,N=2,N_{b}=64, and B=8B=8, as the number of timeslots, ranging from T=1T=1 to 1616. Notice that with such parameterization, the matrices are actually dense. It can be seen that in this case the proposed dense matrix design via (32) achieves max coding gain, still outperforming the DUC approach. It is also seen, furthermore, that the gain achieved under maximum compression (i.e.i.e., with T=1T=1) is not much lower than that achieved with T=16T=16, which, taken together with the implications of the value of TT onto the rate of the system, indicates the desirability of designs with the T1T\to 1. The latter feature will also be exploited in Section V, where the proposed scheme is further extended to incorporate physical layer security.

Refer to caption
Figure 6: Comparison of BERs achieved with projection vectors designed via optimization problem (28) and equation (30), with M=64M=64, N=2N=2, Nb=4N_{b}=4 or 6464, T=1T=1 and B=8B=8.

Next, Fig. 6 shows the BER comparison of the proposed and conventional codings, system with parameters M=64,N=2,Nb=4M=64,N=2,N_{b}=4 or 64,T=164,T=1, and B=8B=8. The results corroborate those of Figs. 4 and 5, by showing that the BER performance of the proposed schemes is, unlike that of conventional methods, independent of sparsity.

Refer to caption
Figure 7: Comparison of BERs achieved with projection matrices designed via equation (32), with M=64M=64, N=2N=2, Nb=64N_{b}=64, T=2T=2 and B=8B=8.

Finally, Fig. 7 shows the BER comparison of the proposed and conventional schemes, system with parameters M=64,N=2,Nb=64,T=2M=64,N=2,N_{b}=64,T=2, and B=8B=8. It is seen that the proposed method achieves the same performance as the DUC, despite the significantly lower complexity. Notice that the BER of the proposed method, with T=2T=2 is much better than that with T=1T=1, however, the transmit rate RB/T[bit/symbol]R\triangleq B/T~{}\text{[bit/symbol]} decreases from R=8R=8 to R=4R=4. These results reflect the results of Fig. 5 for the T=2T=2 case. Further BER performance improvement can be obtained, albeit at the sacrifice of transmission rate, by setting T>2T>2.

VI-B Security Performance Evaluation

For the benefit of the eavesdropper, we evaluate in this subsection the secrecy performance of the proposed N-DSTC scheme with embedded security with parameters Nb=MN_{b}=M and T=1T=1, since the sparsity resulting from setting Nb<MN_{b}<M and T>1T>1 on the one hand was shown in Subsection VI-A not to negatively impact the BER performance of the proposed scheme, and on the other hand only increases the complexity of solving equation (52). In addition, in what follows, we denote the number of receive antennas at Bod and Eve respectively by NBobN_{\mathrm{Bob}} and NEveN_{\mathrm{Eve}}.

Refer to caption
Figure 8: Information leakage probability in an environment ideal to Eve, with NEve=2,4,8,16N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=2,4,8,16, M=2128M=2\to 128 and B=log2(M)+2B=\mathrm{log}_{2}(M)+2.

Our first assessment, depicted in Fig. 8, is the information leakage probability to Eve, measured as 12×BEREve1-2\times\mathrm{BER}_{\text{Eve}} [35], with BEREve\mathrm{BER}_{\text{Eve}} given by the average bits in error in the symbols 𝐗^(i)\hat{\mathbf{X}}(i) detected by Eve under equation (53), using projection matrices 𝐄^1\hat{\mathbf{E}}_{1} estimated by solving equation (52), and given received signals 𝐘~Eve\tilde{\mathbf{Y}}_{\mathrm{Eve}} obtained in the absence of noise, as described by equation (50). As can be seen from the definition of channel reliability [35], which in the context hereby can be understood as a leakage probability, when BEREve=0.5\mathrm{BER}_{\text{Eve}}=0.5 Eve’s entropy becomes zero.

The figure shows plots of such leakage as a function of the number of transmit antennas MM, varied from M=2M=2 to 128128, and for different configurations receive antennas at Eve, varying from NEve=2N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=2 to NEve=16N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=16.

It can be seen that even under the highly idealized conditions assumed in favor of Eve, zero leakage can be achieved by the proposed scheme, as long as the number of the transmit antennas MM of the system is significantly larger than the number of receive antennas employed by Eve since NEveN_{\mathrm{Eve}} degrees of freedom are not sufficient for estimating the MM variables in 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}. We remark that the curves must be interpreted as fundamental bounds, not only because the assumption SNR=\text{SNR}=\infty at Eve is impractical, but also because in realistic conditions it is very hard for Eve to estimate 𝐇Eve\mathbf{H}_{\mathrm{Eve}} at all (let alone perfectly), since the N-DSTC scheme does not include a channel estimation procedure between Alice and Bob (i.e.i.e., no pilot symbols are transmitted by the system).

Refer to caption
Figure 9: Average mutual information from Alice to Bob and Eve, and corresponding secrecy rate as a function of SNR, with M=16M=16, NBob=2N_{\mathrm{Bob}}=2, NEve=8N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=8 and B=6B=6.

Next, we compare in Fig. 9 average mutual information from Alice to Bob and Eve, respectively, as given by equations (60) and (61), with M=16,NBob=2,NEve=8M=16,~{}N_{\mathrm{Bob}}=2,~{}N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=8 and as a function of the SNR, assumed to be the same both at Bob and Eve. For the sake of convenience, the secrecy rate obtained by equation (54) is also included. The results highlight the consistency of the proposed secure N-DSTC scheme, as it can be seen that under the evaluated conditions Bob enjoys monotonically increasing AMI and secrecy rate, as SNR increases, with the maximum rate of 6 bit/symbol (determined by BB) achieved at around SNR=20\text{SNR}=20 dB.

Refer to caption
Figure 10: Secrecy rate of a system with fixed transmit antennas M=16M=16, legitimate receive antennas NBob=2N_{\mathrm{Bob}}=2, in presence of eavesdroppers with different numbers of receive antennas NEve=4,8,16N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=4,8,16, with B=6B=6.

Finally, we study in Fig. 10 the evolution of the secrecy rate achieved when the number of receive antennas employed by Eve increased to NEve=4,8,16N_{\mathrm{Eve}}=4,8,16, in a system with a fixed number of transmit antennas, set to M=16M=16, and of receive antennas employed by Bob, set to NBob=2N_{\mathrm{Bob}}=2. The results highlight the robustness of the scheme, as it can be seen that a secrecy rate equal to the achievable rate of the system, namely B=6B=6 bit/symbol, can be reached at reasonable SNRs even when Eve has double the number of receive antennas as Bob, i.e.i.e., NEve=4N_{\text{Eve}}=4 and NBob=2N_{\text{Bob}}=2, respectively.

In fact, it is found that even if Eve has four times the number of antennas employed by Bob (NEve=8N_{\text{Eve}}=8 against NBob=2N_{\text{Bob}}=2), the system still reaches a secrecy rate only a fraction of a bit away from the maximum achievable rate. It is only when Eve employs as many receive antennas as the transmitter itself, i.e.i.e. NEve=M=16N_{\text{Eve}}=M=16, that the secrecy rate of the system drops to a fraction of the total achievable rate.

We remark that the fact that secrecy performance of the proposed secure N-DSTC is higher with increasing MM, combined with the fact that the BER performance of the system is unaffected by sparsity in the projection matrices 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}, make the contribution here presented particularly attractive to massive MIMO systems, since systems to a large number of transmit antennas and smaller number of RF chains can take full advantage of the embedded physical security provided by the proposed scheme, without any compromise in rate-performance.

VII Conclusions

We proposed a novel nonsquare differential space-time coding MIMO scheme with embedded physical layer security. In particular, in the proposed method, the space-time projection matrices characteristic of N-DSTC are constructed via the sparsification and column-wise expansion of vector solutions of a non-convex, continuous, coding gain maximization. As a consequence of the non-convexity of the design problem and the use of a secret key private to Alice and Bob as initial value, the proposed projection matrices are similar to one way-functions, being difficult to be extracted by an eavesdropper even under highly favorable idealized conditions. The proposed N-DTSC scheme is shown to improve upon the state of the art by providing embedded physical layer security, without any sacrifice in BER performance and with a significant reduction in the complexity of designing the projection matrices 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}. Since both the coding gain and the BER performance of the proposed scheme are shown to be independent of eventual sparsity of the projection matrices 𝐄1\mathbf{E}_{1}, and since the physical layer security achieved by the method improves with the number of transmit antennas irrespective of the sparse utilization of such resources.

Appendix A Coding Gain in ADSM Case

Referring back to the construction of data matrices in the ADSM scheme, as per equation (7), let us express two generic and distinct ADSM data matrices by 𝐗p=s1𝐀p\mathbf{X}_{p}=s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p} and 𝐗q=s2𝐀q\mathbf{X}_{q}=s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q}, with 1p,qM1\leq p,q\leq M and s1,s2𝒮s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}. Substituting 𝐗p=s1𝐀p\mathbf{X}_{p}=s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p} and 𝐗q=s2𝐀q\mathbf{X}_{q}=s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q} into equation (23), the ADSM coding gain g(𝐞1)g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) can be rewritten as follows

g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) =min𝐗p𝐗q𝒳(𝐞1H(𝐗p𝐗q)H(𝐗p𝐗q)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle=\!\!\min_{\mathbf{X}_{p}\neq\mathbf{X}_{q}\in\mathcal{X}}\!\!\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(\mathbf{X}_{p}-\mathbf{X}_{q})^{H}(\mathbf{X}_{p}-\mathbf{X}_{q})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}} (64)
=mins1,s2𝒮𝐀p,𝐀q𝒜(𝐞1H(s1𝐀ps2𝐀q)H(s1𝐀ps2𝐀q)𝐞1)1N.\displaystyle=\!\!\min_{{s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}}\atop{\mathbf{A}_{p},\mathbf{A}_{q}\in\mathcal{A}}}\!\!\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p}-s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q})^{H}(s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p}-s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}\!\!\!.

Notice that in order to have 𝐗p𝐗q\mathbf{X}_{p}\neq\mathbf{X}_{q}, it is sufficient that either s1s2s_{1}\neq s_{2}, or 𝐀p𝐀q\mathbf{A}_{p}\neq\mathbf{A}_{q}, or both.

Starting with the first case, i.e.i.e. for 𝐀p=𝐀q=𝐀𝒜\mathbf{A}_{p}=\mathbf{A}_{q}=\mathbf{A}\in\mathcal{A} and thus p=qp=q, and using the fact that 𝒜\mathcal{A} is a set of unitary matrices as evidenced by equations (5) and (6), equation (64) reduces to

g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) =mins1,s2𝒮𝐀𝒜(𝐞1H(s1s2)𝐀H𝐀(s1s2)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle=\min_{{s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}}\atop{\mathbf{A}\in\mathcal{A}}}\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(s_{1}-s_{2})^{*}\mathbf{A}^{H}\mathbf{A}(s_{1}-s_{2})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=mins1,s2𝒮[(s1s2)(s1s2)𝐞1H𝐞1]1N\displaystyle=\min_{s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}}\left[(s_{1}-s_{2})(s_{1}-s_{2})^{*}\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{e}_{1}\right]^{\frac{1}{N}}
=mins1,s2𝒮|s1s2|2N,for p=q,\displaystyle=\min_{s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}}\left|s_{1}-s_{2}\right|^{\frac{2}{N}},\;\text{for }p=q, (65)

which is identical to equation (26).

Next, let us consider the case when pqp\neq q. For convenience, and without loss of generality, let us set p<qp<q, such that equation (64) becomes

g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) =minpq{1,,M}s1,s2𝒮(𝐞1H(s1𝐀ps2𝐀q)H(s1𝐀ps2𝐀q)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}p\neq q\in\{1,\cdots,M\}\\ s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p}\!-\!s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q})^{H}(s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p}\!-\!s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=minpq{1,,M}s1,s2𝒮(𝐞1H(s1𝐀pHs2𝐀qH)(s1𝐀ps2𝐀q)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}p\neq q\in\{1,\cdots,M\}\\ s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(s_{1}^{*}\mathbf{A}_{p}^{H}-s_{2}^{*}\mathbf{A}_{q}^{H})(s_{1}\mathbf{A}_{p}-s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{q})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=minpq{1,,M}s1,s2𝒮(𝐞1H(|s1|2𝐀pH𝐀ps1s2𝐀pH𝐀q\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}p\neq q\in\{1,\cdots,M\}\\ s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(|s_{1}|^{2}\mathbf{A}_{p}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{p}-s_{1}^{*}s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{p}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{q}\right.
s1s2𝐀qH𝐀p+|s2|2𝐀qH𝐀q)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle\hskip 64.58313pt\left.-s_{1}s_{2}^{*}\mathbf{A}_{q}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{p}+|s_{2}|^{2}\mathbf{A}_{q}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{q})\,\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=minpq{1,,M}s1,s2𝒮(2𝐞1H(s1s2𝐀pH𝐀q+(s1s2𝐀pH𝐀q)H)𝐞1)1N,\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}p\neq q\in\{1,\cdots,M\}\\ s_{1},s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\!\left(2\!-\!\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(s_{1}^{*}s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{p}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{q}\!\!+\!(s_{1}^{*}s_{2}\mathbf{A}_{p}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{q})^{H})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\!\frac{1}{N}}\!\!\!\!, (66)

where we have used the fact that 𝒮\mathcal{S} is an LL-PSK constellation, such that |s|2=1,s𝒮|s|^{2}=1,\;\forall\;s\in\mathcal{S}.

Using also that fact that 𝐀pH𝐀q=𝐌qp=𝐌n\mathbf{A}_{p}^{H}\mathbf{A}_{q}=\mathbf{M}^{q-p}=\mathbf{M}^{n}, where nqpn\triangleq q-p with 1nM11\leq n\leq M-1, and given that s1s2𝒮s_{1}^{*}s_{2}\in\mathcal{S}, let us for notational convenience define ss1s2s\triangleq s_{1}^{*}s_{2} such that we may re-write equation (66) as

g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) =minn{1,,M1}s𝒮(2𝐞1H(s𝐌n+s(𝐌n)H)𝐞1)1N\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}n\in\{1,\cdots,M-1\}\\ s\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(2-\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(s\,\mathbf{M}^{n}+s^{*}(\mathbf{M}^{n})^{H})\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}} (67)
=minn{1,,M1}s𝒮(2s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1+s𝐞1H(𝐌n)H𝐞1)1N.\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}n\in\{1,\cdots,M-1\}\\ s\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(2-s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}+s^{*}\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(\mathbf{M}^{n})^{H}\mathbf{e}_{1}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}\!\!\!\!.

Next, let us define the auxiliary matrix

𝐏[]=[]M×M,\mathbf{P}\triangleq\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 54.44226pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]=\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 29.95447pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]\in\mathbb{C}^{M\times M}, (73)

where 𝐏m\mathbf{P}_{m} denotes the mmth column of 𝐏\mathbf{P}, and such that the matrices 𝐌\mathbf{M}, 𝐌n\mathbf{M}^{n} and (𝐌n)H(\mathbf{M}^{n})^{H} appearing above can, referring to equation (6), be respectively expressed as

𝐌=[],\mathbf{M}=\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 51.64874pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right], (74c)

Using the expressions above, we obtain

𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1\displaystyle\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1} =en+1e1++eMeMn\displaystyle=e_{n+1}^{*}e_{1}+\cdots+e_{M}^{*}e_{M-n}
+eju1(e1eMn+1++eneM),\displaystyle\quad+e^{ju_{1}}\left(e_{1}^{*}e_{M-n+1}+\cdots+e_{n}^{*}e_{M}\right), (74bwa)
𝐞1H(𝐌n)H𝐞1\displaystyle\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(\mathbf{M}^{n})^{H}\mathbf{e}_{1} =en+1e1++eMeMn\displaystyle=e_{n+1}e_{1}^{*}+\cdots+e_{M}e_{M-n}^{*}
+eju1(e1eMn+1++eneM)\displaystyle\quad+e^{-ju_{1}}\left(e_{1}e_{M-n+1}^{*}+\cdots+e_{n}e_{M}^{*}\right)
=(𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1),\displaystyle=(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1})^{*}, (74bwb)

which substituted into equation (67) yields

g(𝐞1)\displaystyle g(\mathbf{e}_{1}) =minn{1,,M1}s𝒮(2s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1+s(𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1))1N\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}n\in\{1,\cdots,M-1\}\\ s\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(2-s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}+s^{*}(\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1})^{*}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=minn{1,,M1}s𝒮(2s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1+(s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1))1N\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}n\in\{1,\cdots,M-1\}\\ s\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(2-s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}+(s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1})^{*}\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}
=minn{1,,M1}s𝒮(2(1{s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1}))1N,for p<q,\displaystyle=\!\!\!\!\!\!\min_{\begin{subarray}{c}n\in\{1,\cdots,M-1\}\\ s\in\mathcal{S}\end{subarray}}\!\left(2\,(1-\Re\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\})\right)^{\frac{1}{N}}\!\!\!\!,\;\text{for }p<q, (74bx)

where {}\Re\{\cdot\} denotes the real part of a complex number.

Finally, notice that 𝐌Mn\mathbf{M}^{M-n} can be expressed as

(74cc)

which in turn implies the relations

{s𝐞1H𝐌Mn𝐞1}\displaystyle\Re\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{M-n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\} ={seju1𝐞1H(𝐌n)H𝐞1}\displaystyle=\Re\{s\,e^{ju_{1}}\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(\mathbf{M}^{n})^{H}\mathbf{e}_{1}\} (74cd)
={(s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1)}={s𝐞1H𝐌n𝐞1},\displaystyle=\Re\{(s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1})^{*}\}=\Re\{s\,\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}\},

from which it is found that it is sufficient to consider n{1,,M/2}n\in\{1,\cdots,M/2\} in equation (74bx), as in equation (27), concluding the proof. \square

Appendix B Coding Gain of Sparse Projection Matrices

We seek to prove that the coding gain under a dense sparse projection vector 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1} designed via equation (30) is the same as that under the dense vector obtained by solving problem (28). To this end, let us first rewrite equation (29) as

f(𝐞1(M,Nb))=n=1M/2F(𝐞1(M,Nb),n),\displaystyle f\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b})\right)=\sum_{n=1}^{M/2}F\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}),n\right), (74ce)

with

F(𝐞1(M,Nb),n)|𝐞1H(M,Nb)𝐌n𝐞1(M,Nb)|,\displaystyle F\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}),n\right)\triangleq|\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(M,N_{b})\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b})|, (74cf)

where we remark that 𝐞1T(M,Nb)\mathbf{e}_{1}^{T}(M,N_{b}) designed via equation (30) is explicitly expressed by

𝐞1T(M,Nb)=[],\mathbf{e}_{1}^{T}(M,N_{b})\!=\!\!\left[\vbox{\hbox{\kern-1.15198pt\raise 0.0pt\hbox{\kern 99.92157pt}\kern 0.0pt\vbox{}\kern-1.15198pt}}\right]\!, (74ci)

where β(M/Nb)\beta\triangleq(M/N_{b}) is a natural number.

Next, define γn/β\gamma\triangleq n/\beta and let the remainder of the division of nn by β\beta be denoted by mod(n,β)\mathrm{mod}(n,\beta), such that for all values of nn with mod(n,β)=0\mathrm{mod}(n,\beta)=0, γ{1,,Nb/2}\gamma\in\{1,\cdots,N_{b}/2\}. For these cases, using equations (LABEL:eq:M:n) and (74ci), the term 𝐞1H(M,Nb)𝐌n\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(M,N_{b})\mathbf{M}^{n} in equation (74cf) can be expressed as

(74cl)

Combining equations (74ci) and (LABEL:eq:e1:H:M:H), we obtain

𝐞1H(M,Nb)𝐌n𝐞1(M,Nb)\displaystyle\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(M,N_{b})\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}) =eγ+1e1++eNbeNbγ\displaystyle=e_{\gamma+1}^{*}e_{1}+\cdots+e_{N_{b}}^{*}e_{N_{b}-\gamma}
+eju1(e1eNbγ+1++eγeNb).\displaystyle+e^{ju_{1}}\left(e_{1}^{*}e_{N_{b}-\gamma+1}+\cdots+e_{\gamma}^{*}e_{N_{b}}\right)\!\!\,. (74co)

Comparing the latter expression with equation (74bwa), it is noticeable that γ\gamma and NbN_{b} in equation (74co) play the same roles as nn and MM in equation (74bwa), such that the norm of the quantity in equation (74co) can be expressed using the notation introduced in equation (74cf), i.e.i.e. |𝐞1H(M,Nb)𝐌n𝐞1(M,Nb)|=F(𝐞1(Nb,Nb),γ)|\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(M,N_{b})\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b})|=F(\mathbf{e}_{1}(N_{b},N_{b}),\gamma). But using equation (74cf) it then follows that

F(𝐞1(M,Nb),n)=F(𝐞1(Nb,Nb),γ).\displaystyle F\left(\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}),n\right)=F(\mathbf{e}_{1}(N_{b},N_{b}),\gamma). (74cp)

In turn, for the values of nn such that mod(n,β)0\mathrm{mod}(n,\beta)\neq 0, it is obvious that 𝐞1H(M,Nb)𝐌n𝐞1(M,Nb)=0\mathbf{e}_{1}^{H}(M,N_{b})\mathbf{M}^{n}\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b})=0. In other words, the terms of the sum in equation (74ce) are either 0 or identical to the terms of the sum in equation (29), i.e.i.e.

f(𝐞1(M,Nb))=f(𝐞1),\displaystyle f(\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}))=f(\mathbf{e}_{1}), (74cq)

which implicates that the vector 𝐞1(M,Nb)\mathbf{e}_{1}(M,N_{b}) designed via equation (30) achieves the same coding gain as that of 𝐞1\mathbf{e}_{1}, since it minimizes the same objective function in problem (28), concluding proof. \square

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Yuma Katsuki (Member, IEEE) received the B.E. and M.E. degrees from Yokohama National University, Kanagawa, Japan, in 2021 and 2023, respectively. He is currently a researcher at NEC Corporation, Kanagawa, Japan.
Giuseppe Thadeu Freitas de Abreu (Senior Member, IEEE) received the B.Eng. degree in Electrical Engineering and a specialization (Latu Sensu) degree in Telecommunications Engineering from the Universidade Federal da Bahia (UFBa), Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, in 1996 and 1997, respectively; and the M. Eng. and D. Eng. degrees in Physics, Electrical and Computer Engineering from the Yokohama National University, Japan, in March 2001, and March 2004, respectively, being the recipient of the Uenohara Award by Tokyo University in 2000 for his Master’s Thesis work. He was a Post-doctoral Fellow and later Adjunct Professor (Docent) on Statistical Signal Processing and Communications Theory at the Department of Electrical and Information Engineering, University of Oulu, Finland from 2004 to 2006 and from 2006 to 2011, respectively. Since 2011 he is a Professor of Electrical Engineering at Jacobs University Bremen, renamed Constructor University in 2023. From April 2015 to August 2018 he also simultaneously held a full professorship at the Department of Computer and Electrical Engineering of Ritsumeikan University, Japan. His research interest span a wide range of topics within communications and signal processing, including communications theory, estimation theory, statistical modeling, wireless localization, cognitive radio, wireless security, MIMO systems, ultrawideband and millimeter wave communications, full-duplex and cognitive radio, compressive sensing, energy harvesting networks, random networks, connected vehicles networks, joint communications and sensing, and many others. He was the co-recipient of best paper awards at several international conferences, and was awarded JSPS, Heiwa Nakajima and NICT Fellowships (twice) in 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2018, respectively. Prof. Abreu served as an Associate Editor of the Transactions on Wireless Communications from 2009 to 2014, and of the Transactions on Communications from 2014 to 2017. He was an Executive Editor of the Transactions on Wireless Communications from 2018 to 2021 and since 2022, is serving as Editor to the IEEE Signal Processing Letters and the IEEE Communications Letters.
Koji Ishibashi (Senior Member, IEEE) received the B.E. and M.E. degrees in engineering from the University of Electro-Communications, Tokyo, Japan in 2002 and 2004, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in engineering from Yokohama National University, Yokohama, Japan in 2007. From 2007 to 2012, he was an assistant professor in the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, Shizuoka University, Hamamatsu, Japan. Since April 2012, he has been with the Communication Research Center (AWCC), the Advanced Wireless and University of Electro-Communications, where he is currently a professor. From 2010 to 2012, he was a visiting scholar at the School of Engineering and Applied Sciences at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA. His current research interests include grant-free access, cell-free architecture, millimeter-wave communications, energy harvesting communications, wireless power transfer, channel codes, signal processing, and information theory.
Naoki Ishikawa (Senior Member, IEEE) received the B.E., M.E., and Ph.D. degrees from the Tokyo University of Agriculture and Technology, Tokyo, Japan, in 2014, 2015, and 2017, respectively. In 2015, he was an Academic Visitor with the School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, U.K. From 2016 to 2017, he was a Research Fellow with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. From 2017 to 2020, he was an Assistant Professor with the Graduate School of Information Sciences, Hiroshima City University, Japan. He is currently an Associate Professor with the Faculty of Engineering, Yokohama National University, Kanagawa, Japan. His research interests include massive MIMO, physical layer security, and quantum speedup for wireless communications. He was certified as an Exemplary Reviewer of IEEE Transactions on Communications in 2017 and 2021.