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Non-Coherent Active Device Identification for Massive Random Access

Jyotish Robin,  Elza Erkip Jyotish Robin and Elza Erkip are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, NYU Tandon School of Engineering, 6 MetroTech Center, Brooklyn, NY 11201 USA. (e-mail: [email protected]).
Abstract

Massive Machine-Type Communications (mMTC) is a key service category in the current generation of wireless networks featuring an extremely high density of energy and resource-limited devices with sparse and sporadic activity patterns. In order to enable random access in such mMTC networks, base station needs to identify the active devices while operating within stringent access delay constraints. In this paper, an energy efficient active device identification protocol is proposed in which active devices transmit On-Off Keying (OOK) modulated preambles jointly and base station employs non-coherent energy detection avoiding channel estimation overheads. The minimum number of channel-uses required by the active user identification protocol is characterized in the asymptotic regime of total number of devices \ell when the number of active devices kk scales as k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) along with an achievability scheme relying on the equivalence of activity detection to a group testing problem. Several practical schemes based on Belief Propagation (BP) and Combinatorial Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (COMP) are also proposed. Simulation results show that BP strategies outperform COMP significantly and can operate close to the theoretical achievability bounds. In a partial-recovery setting where few misdetections are allowed, BP continues to perform well.

Index Terms:
Massive machine-type communication (mMTC), massive random access, active device identification, IoT, group testing.

I Introduction

Sixth generation (6G) wireless communication networks are expected to serve a myriad of smart sensing applications involving massive machine-type communications (mMTC) as in Internet of Things (IoT). In contrast to the traditional cellular systems, mMTC has to tackle a novel set of technical challenges posed by the diversity in data traffic patterns and application-specific constraints in machine-centric communications [1]. Typically, mMTC networks are comprised of sensors, tracking devices, actuators, etc., which engage in the monitoring and recording of critical information. These mMTC devices often need to support dynamic service requirements such as variable payload sizes, data security and delay constraints while reliably operating on low duty cycles and stringent energy budget constraints to enhance efficiency [2]. Machine-type applications naturally lead to a sparse and sporadic data traffic since only a small subset of devices are active at any given time instant [3]. Moreover, since the payload size is small and data transmissions are infrequent, On-Off Keying (OOK) based modulation schemes are known to be energy efficient as the devices can save energy during off-slots [4, 5, 6]. Furthermore, in the context of green communication, there has been a renewed interest in OOK modulation schemes for serving low-rate and high-reliability applications [7].

Another key distinction of mMTC systems w.r.t. cellular systems is that they are more prone to security threats since they are composed of simple nodes with limited computational capabilities [8]. Hence, it is critical to maintain data security and provide robustness against malicious attacks such as jamming, spoofing and denial-of-service [9]. To combat malicious jamming attacks, spread-spectrum techniques, viz., direct sequence spread spectrum and frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), have been considered for commercial wireless networks [10]. Specifically, FHSS approaches are more suitable in IoT scenarios due to their scalability and superior resilience to narrow band interference [11]. For example, many mMTC architectures rely on fast frequency hopping where each symbol experiences independent fading to enhance communication security against jamming attacks [12, 13].

In mMTC networks, the BS faces the challenging task of successfully decoding data packets transmitted by a random unknown active subset of sensors. In fact, efficiently identifying the active devices is a critical part of many Random Access (RA) architectures [14, 15, 16] as misidentifications can lead to data losses which significantly impact critical IoT environments [17]. In this paper, our focus is on this key problem of active device identification in mMTC networks which are operating under stringent requirements in terms of latency, data rates, reliability, energy consumption, and security/privacy. In dense mMTC networks, traditional grant-based random access strategies result in excessive preamble collisions drastically increasing the signaling overheads and transmission delays [18]. On the other hand, grant-free random access suffers from severe co-channel interference caused by the non-orthogonality of preambles [19]. Thus, active device identification is a more intricate problem in massive mMTC systems than traditional cellular systems and requires novel strategies.

Several recent works [20, 21, 22, 23, 24] exploit the sporadic device activity pattern to employ compressed sensing techniques such as Approximate Message Passing (AMP) [20, 21, 22, 23] and sparse graph codes [24] to detect active users. In AMP based approaches, preamble sequences are typically generated from i.i.d. Gaussian distributions and the activity detection performance in massive user settings can be characterized using state evolution [23]. Senel et al. in [25] proposed an activity detection scheme by using symmetric Bernoulli pilot sequences under the assumption of state evolution. In [26], an RA protocol for short packet transmission was presented by viewing activity detection as a group testing (GT) problem. Our previous works in [27, 28] address the activity detection problem taking into account the access delay and energy constraints. Chen et al. in [29, 30] proposed a novel many-access channel (MnAC) model for systems with many transmitters and a single receiver in which the number of transmitters grows with the blocklength. Another related work is [31] where the problem of designing unsourced massive random access architectures for an AWGN random access channel with random fading gains unknown to the receiver is discussed.

Most of the existing literature assumes either a Gaussian channel or a block-fading channel model where the channel remains static in each block in which channel state information (CSI) can be accurately obtained at the BS through the use of pilots before activity detection. For secure mMTC networks such as the FHSS systems mentioned before, a more accurate channel model would incorporate fast fading where reliable channel estimates cannot be obtained [32].

In this paper, unlike the coherent detection approaches, we focus on efficiently detecting the active devices in an mMTC system using a threshold-based energy detection which is a low-complex energy efficient non-coherent method [33, 34]. Active devices in the network transmit their OOK modulated unique preambles synchronously and BS performs energy detection. Our aim is estimate the set of active devices reliably using the binary energy detector outputs corresponding to the joint OOK preamble transmissions without CSI knowledge. Note that our framework can accommodate a massive number of users since we are not constrained to orthogonal preambles. In addition, as preambles are designed independently for each user, new users can be added without network-wide changes thereby promoting scalability.

The above framework for recovering the sparse set of active devices using binary measurements can be viewed as an instance of the well known GT problem [35]. In essence, GT aims to identify a small number of “defective” items within a large population by performing tests on pools of items. A test is classified as positive if the pool contains at least one defective, and negative if it contains no defectives. Though connection between GT and RA has previously been exploited in the literature [36, 37, 38, 39, 40], the channel models used are often too simplistic or unrealistic for many secure mMTC networks such as the one using FHSS techniques to ensure data security. In our paper, we bridge this gap by incorporating a fast fading channel to the GT model. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that integrates an OOK modulated preamble signaling at the sensors, a fast fading channel model and a non-coherent threshold-based energy detection at the BS for identifying the sparsely active devices in an mMTC network.

The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:

  • We propose a novel non-coherent activity detection strategy for secure energy-constrained mMTC networks in which active devices jointly transmit their OOK-modulated preambles and the BS uses a non-coherent energy detection strategy to identify the active devices.

  • We use information theoretic tools to characterize the minimum user identification cost, defined as the minimum number of channel-uses required to identify the active users [41, 29]. Using results from GT [35], we derive an achievable minimum user identification cost for our activity detection framework in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime as well as a valid lower bound in the general sub-linear regime where k=Θ(α);0α<1k=\Theta(\ell^{\alpha});0\leq\alpha<1 which is shown to be tight when α=0\alpha=0. Here, kk denotes the number of active devices whereas \ell denotes the total number of devices.

  • We present and study several practical schemes for active device identification in the non-coherent OOK setting based on Noisy-Combinatorial Orthogonal Matching Pursuit (N-COMP) and Belief Propagation (BP) techniques [42, 43]. We also present the performance gap incurred by these practical strategies in comparison to our theoretical characterization of minimum user identification cost. We show that BP can come very close, and with some practical relaxations such as partial recovery where few misdetections and false positives are allowed, can even exceed the theoretical bounds.

The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In Section II, we define the system model for the problem of active device identification in an mMTC network and establish its equivalence to a GT problem. In addition, we formally define the key metric of interest, viz, the minimum user identification cost. In Section III, we derive the minimum user identification cost for the non-coherent many-access channel (MnAC) with \ell total and kk active devices by viewing active device identification as a decoding problem in an equivalent point-to-point communication channel. Moreover, we present a decoder achieving the minimum user identification cost in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime which has severe computational complexity. In Section IV, we present several practical strategies for user identification under the constraints of exact recovery and partial recovery and compare them against the minimum user identification cost. Section V concludes the paper.

II System model

II-A Network model

Consider an mMTC network consisting of \ell users belonging to the set 𝒟={1,2,,}\mathcal{D}=\{1,2,\ldots,\ell\}. Among the \ell users, only a subset of kk are active and wants to access the channel. We assume that the value of kk is periodically estimated at the BS and hence known a-priori [44]. The active user set denoted by 𝒜={a1,a2,ak}\mathcal{A}=\{a_{1},a_{2}\ldots,a_{k}\} is assumed to be randomly chosen among all (k){\ell\choose k} subsets of size kk from 𝒟\mathcal{D} and is unknown to the BS. The BS aims to identify the active user set 𝒜\mathcal{A} in a time-efficient manner so that they could be allocated required resources for prompt channel access.

Xt1X_{t}^{1}Xt2X_{t}^{2}XtX_{t}^{\ell}ht1h_{t}^{1}ht2h_{t}^{2}hth_{t}^{\ell}\sumwtw_{t}StS_{t}ThresholdingEnvelope detectorYtY_{t}ZtZ_{t}β1\beta_{1}β2\beta_{2}β\beta_{\ell}
Figure 1: Non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-Many Access Channel.
1   0    0   0   1    1    0  0   1    1   0   0    0    0  0   0    0   1   0    0    1  0   1    0   0   1    0    0  0   0    0   0   0    1    1  1   0    1   0   0    1    0  1   1    0   1   0    0    0  User 7\displaystyle 7User 1User 2𝑿1\displaystyle\boldsymbol{X}^{1}𝑿2\displaystyle\boldsymbol{X}^{2}𝑿3\displaystyle{\boldsymbol{X}^{3}}𝑿6\displaystyle{\boldsymbol{X}^{6}}𝑿5\displaystyle\boldsymbol{X}^{5}𝑿4\displaystyle\boldsymbol{X}^{4}𝑿7\displaystyle\boldsymbol{X}^{7}Channel-use index (t)Output is the simple XOR of the active inputs𝐙= 1 0 0 1 1 0 1\mathbf{Z\ \ =\ \ 1\ \ \ 0\ \ \ 0\ \ \ 1\ \ \ 1\ \ \ \ 0\ \ \ \ 1}\ Fading +Envelope Detection 𝐙= 1 1 0 1 0 0 1\mathbf{Z\ \ =\ \ 1\ \ \ 1\ \ \ 0\ \ \ 1\ \ \ 0\ \ \ \ 0\ \ \ \ 1}\ Ideal channel   ::Potential bit-flips (shown as circled) due to channel noiseUser set: 𝒟={1,2,,7}\mathcal{D}=\{1,2,\ldots,7\}.Active user set: 𝒜={3,6}\mathcal{A}=\{3,6\}.Xi(X1i,X2i,Xni){0,P}n\textbf{X}^{i}\triangleq(\hskip 1.42271ptX_{1}^{i},X_{2}^{i},\ldots X_{n}^{i})\in\{0,\sqrt{P}\}^{n}: Preamble of user ii.(Table entries are normalized by P\sqrt{P}. )Z(Z1,,Zn)\textbf{Z}\triangleq(Z_{1},\ldots,Z_{n}): Binary energy detector outputs.
Figure 2: Non-coherent (7,2)(7,2)-MnAC and its equivalence to GT. Users 3 and 6 are assumed to be active.

Taking into account sparse user activity, we focus on the asymptotic regime where \ell can be unbounded while the number of active users scale as k=Θ(α);k=\Theta(\ell^{\alpha}); 0α<10\leq\alpha<1. This is consistent with the notion of Many Access channel (MnAC) model introduced by Chen et al. [29] with the difference that instead of our combinatorial setting with kk active users, [29] considers the setting where each user can be active probabilistically.

For purposes of activity detection, each user ii is assigned an i.i.d binary preamble Xi(X1i,X2i,Xni){0,P}n\textbf{X}^{i}\triangleq(\hskip 1.42271ptX_{1}^{i},X_{2}^{i},\ldots X_{n}^{i})\in\{0,\sqrt{P}\}^{n} of length nn generated via a Bernoulli process with probability qiq_{i}, i𝒟\forall i\in\mathcal{D}. The sampling probability vector is defined as q:=(q1,q2,,q)\textbf{q}:=(q_{1},q_{2},\ldots,q_{\ell}). We use 𝒫\mathcal{P} to denote the entire set of preambles. During activity detection, the active users transmit their OOK-modulated preamble in a time-synchronized manner over nn channel-uses with power PP during the ‘On’ symbols. The received symbol StS_{t} during the ttht^{th} channel-use is

St=(𝜷𝐡t)𝐗t+Wt,t{1,2,,n}.S_{t}=(\boldsymbol{\beta}\circ\mathbf{h}_{t})\cdot\mathbf{X}_{t}+W_{t},\forall t\in\{1,2,\ldots,n\}. (1)

Here, Xt=(Xt1,,Xt)\textbf{X}_{t}=(X^{1}_{t},\ldots,X^{\ell}_{t}) is the vector representing the ttht^{th} preamble entries of the \ell users and ht=(ht1,,ht)\textbf{h}_{t}=(h^{1}_{t},\ldots,h^{\ell}_{t}) is the vector of channel coefficients of the \ell users during the ttht^{th} channel-use where htih_{t}^{i}’s are i.i.d 𝒞𝒩(0,σ2),i𝒟,t{1,2,n}\mathcal{C}\mathcal{N}\left(0,\sigma^{2}\right),\forall i\in\mathcal{D},\forall t\in\{1,2,\ldots n\}. The AWGN noise vector W=(W1,,Wn)\textbf{W}=(W_{1},\ldots,W_{n}) is composed of i.i.d entries, Wt𝒞𝒩(0,σw2)W_{t}\sim\mathcal{C}\mathcal{N}\left(0,\sigma_{w}^{2}\right) and is independent of ht\textbf{h}_{t} t{1,2,,n}\forall t\in\{1,2,\ldots,n\}. The vector 𝜷=(β1,,β)\boldsymbol{\beta}=(\beta_{1},\ldots,\beta_{\ell}) represents the activity status such that βi=1\beta_{i}=1, if ithi^{th} user is active; 0 otherwise. 𝜷𝐡t\boldsymbol{\beta}\circ\mathbf{h}_{t} denotes the element-wise product between the vectors 𝜷\boldsymbol{\beta} and 𝐡t\mathbf{h}_{t}.

We assume that there is no CSI available at the BS since we are operating in a fast fading scenario such as FHSS or mobile IoT environments [45, 32]. i.e., ht,t{1,2,,n}\textbf{h}_{t},\forall t\in\{1,2,\ldots,n\} is unknown a-priori. Hence, the BS employs non-coherent detection [7] as shown in Fig. 1. During the ttht^{th} channel use, the envelope detector processes StS_{t} to obtain Yt=|St|Y_{t}=|S_{t}|, the envelope of StS_{t}. Thresholding after envelope detection produces a binary output ZtZ_{t} such that

Zt=1 if |St|2>γ; else Zt=0.Z_{t}=1\text{ if }|S_{t}|^{2}>\gamma;\text{ else }Z_{t}=0. (2)

Here, γ\gamma represents a pre-determined threshold parameter.

Here onwards, we use the terminology non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC to refer to the constrained version of (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC channel model described above where devices are limited by OOK preamble transmissions and base station is limited by non-coherent energy detection.

II-B Problem formulation

Given the preambles 𝒫={Xi:i𝒟}\mathcal{P}=\{\textbf{X}^{i}:i\in\mathcal{D}\} and the vector Z=(Z1,,Zn)\textbf{Z}=(Z_{1},\ldots,Z_{n}) of channel outputs, BS aims to identify the set of active users 𝒜\mathcal{A}, alternatively the vector 𝜷\boldsymbol{\beta}, during the activity detection phase. We use the following definitions:

Definition 1.

Activity detection: For a given set of preambles 𝒫={Xi:i𝒟}\mathcal{P}=\{\textbf{X}^{i}:i\in\mathcal{D}\}, an activity detection function 𝛃^:{0,1}n{0,1}\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}:\{0,1\}^{n}\rightarrow\{0,1\}^{\ell} is a deterministic rule that maps the binary valued channel outputs Z to an estimate 𝛃^\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}} of the activity status vector such that the Hamming weight of 𝛃^\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}} is kk.

Definition 2.

Probability of erroneous identification: For an activity detection function 𝛃^\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}, probability of erroneous identification e()\mathbb{P}_{e}^{(\ell)} is defined as

e():=1(k)𝜷:i=1βi=k(𝜷^𝜷).\mathbb{P}_{e}^{(\ell)}:=\frac{1}{{\ell\choose k}}\sum_{\boldsymbol{\beta}:\sum_{i=1}^{\ell}{\beta_{i}}=k}\mathbb{P}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}\neq\boldsymbol{\beta}). (3)
Definition 3.

Minimum user identification cost [29]: The minimum user identification cost is said to be n()n(\ell) if for every 0<ϵ<10<\epsilon<1, there exists a preamble of length n0=(1+ϵ)n()n_{0}=(1+\epsilon)n(\ell) such that the probability of erroneous identification tends to 0 as \ell\rightarrow\infty, whereas the error probability is strictly bounded away from 0 if n0=(1ϵ)n()n_{0}=(1-\epsilon)n(\ell).

Note that the minimum user identification cost n()n(\ell) is a function of the number of users \ell and is defined based on its asymptotic behaviour as \ell\rightarrow\infty.

Our goal is to characterize n()n(\ell) of the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC which would be indicative of the time-efficiency of BS in identifying the active users.

II-C GT model for active device identification

GT problem [35] is a sparse inference problem where the objective is to identify a sparse set of defective items from a large set of items by performing tests on groups of items. In the error-free scenario, each group test produces a binary output where a 1 corresponds to the inclusion of at least one defective in the group being tested whereas a 0 indicates that the tested group of items excludes all defectives. The tests need to be devised such that the defective set of items can be recovered using the binary vector of test outcomes with a minimum number of tests. On a high level, GT models can be classified as adaptive and non-adaptive models. In adaptive GT, the previous test results can be used to design the future tests. In non-adaptive setting, all group tests are designed independent of each other.

To draw the equivalence between active device identification in the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC and GT, we can consider the devices in the mMTC network as items and the active devices as defective items. Each channel-use t{1,2,,n}t\in\{1,2,\ldots,n\} corresponds to a group test in which a randomly chosen subset of devices engage in joint transmission of ‘On’ symbols, if active. The random selection of devices during the nn testing instances is based on the binary preambles Xi{0,P}n,i𝒟\textbf{X}^{i}\in\{0,\sqrt{P}\}^{n},\forall i\in\mathcal{D}. The BS measures received energy during each channel-use and produces a binary 0-1 output ZtZ_{t} as in (2). These 1-bit energy measurements at the receiver side corresponds to the group test results.

In summary, the random binary preambles and the binary energy measurements renders active device identification as a GT problem where testing corresponds to energy detection on the received signal envelope. This is illustrated in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. Note that active device identification in non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC is a noisy GT problem since channel noise and fading can probabilistically lead to a 0 or 1 energy detector output even in the presence or absence of active devices respectively. Moreover, our framework corresponds to non-adaptive GT since the testing/grouping pattern is based on predefined binary preambles and is not updated based on the GT results of previous channel-uses. We will observe in Section III that the GT model can be leveraged to provide an achievability scheme to the minimum user identification cost for the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC when α=0\alpha=0, ie., k=O(1)k=O(1) and a corresponding lower bound when α0\alpha\neq 0.

III minimum user identification cost

In this section, we derive the minimum user identification cost for the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)- MnAC in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime as presented in Theorem 1. First, we provide an equivalent characterization of the active device identification problem in the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)- MnAC by viewing it as a decoding problem in a point-to-point vector input - scalar output channel whose inputs correspond to the active users as shown in Fig. 3. Thereafter, we derive the maximum rate of the equivalent channel by exploiting its cascade structure. Then, we use GT theory [35, 46] to relate the maximum rate with the minimum user identification cost of non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC. Here onwards, we drop the subscript tt denoting channel-use index. All logarithms are in base 2.

III-A Equivalent Channel Model

The aim of active device identification in non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)- MnAC is to identify the set of active devices based on the binary detector output vector Z and the preamble set 𝒫\mathcal{P}. This can be alternatively viewed as a decoding problem in a traditional point to point communication channel as follows: The source message is the activity status vector 𝜷\boldsymbol{\beta} denoting the set of active users 𝒜\mathcal{A} and the codebook is the entire set of preambles 𝒫\mathcal{P}. Given 𝜷\boldsymbol{\beta} for an active set 𝒜={a1,ak}\mathcal{A}=\{a_{1},\ldots a_{k}\}, the codeword becomes the corresponding subset of preambles {Xi:i𝒜}\{\textbf{X}^{i}:i\in\mathcal{A}\}. Note that since the preambles for each user i𝒜i\in\mathcal{A} are independently designed using a Bern(qi)Bern(q_{i}) random variable, our equivalent channel model has the additional constraint that the only tunable parameters available for codebook design are the sampling probabilities {qi:i𝒟}\{{q}_{i}:i\in\mathcal{D}\}. Hence, identifying active devices reduces to the problem of decoding messages in this equivalent constrained channel. Clearly, the minimum user identification cost for the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC is at least the number of channel-uses required to communicate the set of active users; i.e., log(k)\log{\ell\choose k} bits of information over this equivalent constrained point-to-point channel. We formally setup this equivalent channel model below.

Considering the channel in Fig. 1, since the set of active users is 𝒜={a1,ak}\mathcal{A}=\{a_{1},\ldots a_{k}\}, the input to the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC is X~=(Xa1,Xak)\tilde{\textbf{X}}=(X^{a_{1}},\ldots X^{a_{k}}). Thus, the signal at the input of envelope detector is S=Pm=1kham+W.S=\sqrt{P}\sum_{m=1}^{k}h^{a_{m}}+W. Let V=i=1kXaiPV=\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k}X^{a_{i}}}{\sqrt{P}} denote the Hamming weight of X~\tilde{\textbf{X}} which is the number of active users transmitting ‘On’ signal during the particular channel-use we have at hand. Thus, conditioned on V=vV=v, U:=|S|2U:=|S|^{2} follows an exponential distribution given by

fU|V(u|v)=1vσ2P+σw2euvσ2P+σw2,u0.f_{U|V}(u|v)=\frac{1}{v\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}e^{-\frac{u}{v\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}},u\geq 0. (4)

As evident from (2) and (4), we have X~VZ\tilde{\textbf{X}}\rightarrow V\rightarrow Z, i.e., the transition probability p(zx~,v)p\left(z\mid\tilde{\textbf{x}},v\right) is only dependent on the channel input X~=(Xa1,Xa2,Xak)\tilde{\textbf{X}}=(X^{a_{1}},X^{a_{2}},\ldots X^{a_{k}}) through its Hamming weight VV. Also, since fU|Vf_{U|V} is an exponential distribution, pv:=p(Z=0V=v)p_{v}:=p\left(Z=0\mid V=v\right) can be expressed as

pv=1eγvσ2P+σw2.p_{v}=1-e^{-\frac{\gamma}{v\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}. (5)

Similarly, Pr(Z=1V=v)=1pv.\operatorname{Pr}\left(Z=1\mid V=v\right)=1-p_{v}. Note that pvp_{v} is a strictly decreasing function of vv where v{0,1,..,k}v\in\{0,1,..,k\} assuming w.l.o.g. positive values for σ2,σw2\sigma^{2},\sigma_{w}^{2} and γ\gamma.

Thus, the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC can be equivalently viewed as a traditional point-to-point communication channel whose input is the active user set as in Fig. 3. Moreover, this equivalent channel can be modeled as a cascade of two channels; the first channel computes the Hamming weight VV of the input X~\tilde{\textbf{X}} whereas the second channel translates the Hamming weight VV into a binary output ZZ depending on the fading statistics (σ2)(\sigma^{2}), noise variance (σw2)(\sigma_{w}^{2}) of the wireless channel and the non-coherent detector threshold γ\gamma. We exploit this cascade channel structure to establish the minimum user identification cost n()n(\ell) for the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC.

i=1kXtaiP\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{k}X_{t}^{a_{i}}}{\sqrt{P}}Hamming weight (V)(V)computationChannel inputX~\displaystyle\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \tilde{\textbf{X}}Hamming weight VV011Channel OutputZ\displaystyle\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ Zactiveuserset:{a1,a2,,ak}active\ user\ set:\ \{a_{1},a_{2},\dotsc,a_{k}\}iipip_{i}1pi1-p_{i}Xai{0,P}X^{a_{i}}\in\{0,\sqrt{P}\}pi=1eγiσ2P+σw2p_{i}=1-e^{-\frac{\gamma}{i\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}Xa1X^{a_{1}}XakX^{a_{k}}Xa2X^{a_{2}}kk110
Figure 3: Equivalent channel with only the active users of the (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC as inputs.

III-B Maximum rate of the equivalent channel

Lemma 1.

For a given fading statistics σ2\sigma^{2}, noise variance σw2\sigma_{w}^{2}, and non-coherent detector threshold γ\gamma for the (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC, the maximum rate of the equivalent point-to-point channel in Fig. 3 is

C=max(γ,qsp)h(E[eγVσ2P+σw2])E[h(eγVσ2P+σw2)]C=\max_{(\gamma,q_{sp})}h\Big{(}E\Big{[}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{]}\Big{)}-E\Big{[}h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\Big{]} (6)

where E()E(\cdot) denotes expectation w.r.t VV, h(x)=xlogx(1x)log(1x)h(x)=-x\log x-(1-x)\log(1-x) is the binary entropy function and qspq_{sp} denotes the optimal sampling probability used for i.i.d preamble generation across all users.

Proof.

The equivalent point-to-point communication channel in Fig. 3 has two tunable parameters, viz, the sampling probability vector q={qa1qak}\textbf{q}=\{q_{a_{1}}\ldots q_{a_{k}}\} at the user side and the non-coherent detector threshold γ\gamma at the BS. Thus, the maximum rate of this equivalent channel between the binary vector input X~\tilde{\textbf{X}} and binary scalar output ZZ is

C=max(γ,q)I(X~;Z)C=\max_{(\gamma,\textbf{q})}I(\tilde{\textbf{X}};Z) (7)

where q={qa1qak}\textbf{q}=\{q_{a_{1}}\ldots q_{a_{k}}\} are sampling probabilities of independent Bernoulli processes that users {a1ak}\{a_{1}\ldots a_{k}\} employ for preamble generation, i.e., XaiBern(qai)X^{a_{i}}\sim Bern(q_{a_{i}}) such that XaiXajX^{a_{i}}\perp\!\!\!\!\perp X^{a_{j}} i,j{1,k};ij\forall i,j\in\{1,\ldots k\};i\neq j.

Symmetry of the problem with respect to the entries of X~\tilde{\textbf{X}} and concavity of I(X~;Z)I(\tilde{\textbf{X}};Z) as a function of p(x~)p(\tilde{\textbf{x}}) suggest that for optimality we need qa1=qak=qsp.q_{a_{1}}=\ldots q_{a_{k}}=q_{sp}. Thus, VV follows Binomial distribution denoted by VBin(k,qsp).V\sim Bin(k,q_{sp}). Using (7), X~VZ\tilde{\textbf{X}}\rightarrow V\rightarrow Z and that VV is a deterministic function of X~\tilde{\textbf{X}}, we have

C=max(γ,qsp)I(V;Z) where VBin(k,qsp).C=\max_{(\gamma,q_{sp})}I(V;Z)\text{ where }V\sim Bin(k,q_{sp}). (8)

We can write H(Z)=h(qs)H(Z)=h(q_{s}) where qsq_{s} is

qs=E(eγiσ2P+σw2)=i=0k(ki)(1qsp)ki(qsp)i×eγiσ2P+σw2.q_{s}=E\left(e^{-\frac{\gamma}{i\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\right)=\sum_{i=0}^{k}{k\choose i}(1-q_{sp})^{k-i}(q_{sp})^{i}\times e^{-\frac{\gamma}{i\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}. (9)

Also, we have

H(ZV)=i=0k(ki)(1qsp)ki(qsp)i×h(eγiσ2P+σw2)\small H(Z\mid V)=\sum_{i=0}^{k}{k\choose i}(1-q_{sp})^{k-i}(q_{sp})^{i}\times h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{i\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\hskip 14.22636pt
=E[h(eγVσ2P+σw2)].=E\left[h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\right].\hskip 54.06006pt (10)

Thus, jointly optimizing over γ\gamma and qspq_{sp}, the maximum rate is given by

C=max(γ,qsp)h(E[eγVσ2P+σw2])E[h(eγVσ2P+σw2)],C=\max_{(\gamma,q_{sp})}h\Big{(}E\Big{[}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{]}\Big{)}-E\Big{[}h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\Big{]},

completing the proof.∎

Note that the minimum user identification cost n()n(\ell) for the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC, must obey n()log(k)Cn(\ell)\geq\frac{\log{\ell\choose k}}{C}. However, we cannot directly claim that n()n(\ell) exactly matches the number of channel-uses required to send log(k)\log{\ell\choose k} bits of information over the equivalent channel at maximum rate CC. The reason is that the effective codeword corresponding to a user set 𝒜\mathcal{A} is the subset of preambles {Xi:i𝒜}\{\textbf{X}^{i}:i\in\mathcal{A}\} indexed by the set 𝒜\mathcal{A}. Thus, the effective codewords of different user sets are potentially dependent due to overlapping preambles. This is in contrast to the independent codeword assumptions typical to channel capacity analysis thereby rendering the traditional random coding approach ineffective. We close this gap by making use of the equivalence of active device identification and GT to propose a decoding scheme achieving the minimum user identification cost as presented below.

III-C Minimum user identification cost

Theorem 1.

The minimum user identification cost n()n(\ell) of the non-coherent (,k)MnAC(\ell,k)-MnAC with k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) is given by

n()=klog()max(γ,qsp)h(E[eγVσ2P+σw2])E[h(eγVσ2P+σw2)]\small n(\ell)=\frac{k\log(\ell)}{\max_{(\gamma,q_{sp})}h\Big{(}E\Big{[}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{]}\Big{)}-E\Big{[}h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\Big{]}}

where E(.)E(.) denotes the expectation w.r.t VBin(k,qsp)V\sim\operatorname{Bin}(k,q_{sp}), qspq_{sp} is the sampling probability for i.i.d preamble generation and γ\gamma denotes the threshold for non-coherent energy detection.

Proof.

Using standard capacity arguments [47] along with Lemma 1, it is evident that user identification cost in the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC must obey n()log(k)Cn(\ell)\geq\frac{\log{\ell\choose k}}{C} where CC is as given in Lemma 1. Thus, in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime we have

n()klog()max(γ,qsp)h(E[eγVσ2P+σw2])E[h(eγVσ2P+σw2)].n(\ell)\geq\frac{k\log(\ell)}{\max_{(\gamma,q_{sp})}h\Big{(}E\Big{[}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{]}\Big{)}-E\Big{[}h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\Big{]}}. (11)

Next, we present a decoder as shown in Algorithm 1 which can achieve the equality in (11)(\ref{equ}) relying on classical thresholding techniques in information theory [48]. Due to the equivalence of active user identification and GT, we use an adaptation of the GT decoding strategy in [46] to the context of user identification in non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC.

Algorithm 1 Decoder achieving the minimum user identification cost in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime.
1:Given: Set of preambles, 𝒫{Xi:i𝒟}\mathcal{P}\triangleq\{\textbf{X}^{i}:i\in\mathcal{D}\}; Energy detector outputs: Z(Z1,,Zn)\textbf{Z}\triangleq(Z_{1},\ldots,Z_{n});    kk: Number of active devices.
2:Initialize: Set of all size-kk subsets of 𝒟\mathcal{D} denoted by 𝒮={𝒦1,𝒦2,,𝒦(k)}\mathcal{S}=\{\mathcal{K}_{1},\mathcal{K}_{2},\ldots,\mathcal{K}_{{\ell\choose k}}\}; Estimate of activity status vector denoted by 𝜷^=𝟎1×;\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}=\mathbf{0}_{1\times\ell}; 𝒜est=Φ.\mathcal{A}_{est}=\Phi.
3:for i=1:|𝒮|i=1:\left|\mathcal{S}\right|  do
4:     𝒜^=𝒦i\hat{\mathcal{A}}=\mathcal{K}_{i}.
5:     Number of threshold tests passed, nt=0n_{t}=0.
6:     Threshold testing:
7:     for j=1:kj=1:k do
8:         Partition: Λ{j}={(0,1):01=,01=𝒜^,|0|=j,|1|=kj}\Lambda^{\{j\}}=\left\{\left(\mathcal{I}^{0},\mathcal{I}^{1}\right):\mathcal{I}^{0}\bigcap\mathcal{I}^{1}=\emptyset,\mathcal{I}^{0}\bigcup\mathcal{I}^{1}=\hat{\mathcal{A}},\left|\mathcal{I}^{0}\right|=j,\left|\mathcal{I}^{1}\right|=k-j\right\}
9:         Set threshold values: ηj=log2ρk(kj)(kj),j{1,2,,k}\eta_{j}=\log_{2}\frac{\rho}{k{k\choose j}{\ell-k\choose j}},\forall j\in\{1,2,\ldots,k\} for some ρ>0\rho>0.
10:         if log2(p(zx(I0),x(I1))p(zx(I1)))>ηj,(I0,I1)Λ{j}\log_{2}\left(\frac{p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}({I_{0}}),\textbf{x}({I_{1}})\right)}{p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}({I_{1}})\right)}\right)>\eta_{j},\forall(I_{0},I_{1})\in\Lambda^{\{j\}} then
11:              nt=nt+(kj)n_{t}=n_{t}+{k\choose j}.
12:         end if
13:     end for
14:     if nt=2k1n_{t}=2^{k}-1 then 𝒜est=𝒜est𝒜^.\mathcal{A}_{est}=\mathcal{A}_{est}\bigcup\hat{\mathcal{A}}.
15:     end if
16:end for
17:if |𝒜est|=k\left|\mathcal{A}_{est}\right|=k then
18:     The estimated active device set is 𝒜est\mathcal{A}_{est}.
19:     𝜷^:βi^=1,i𝒜est\hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}:\hat{{\beta_{i}}}=1,\forall i\in\mathcal{A}_{est}.
20:else if |𝒜est|=0 OR|𝒜est|>1\left|\mathcal{A}_{est}\right|=0\text{ OR}\left|\mathcal{A}_{est}\right|>1 then
21:     Declare error.
22:end if

The algorithm operates as follows: Given the set of preambles 𝒫\mathcal{P} and the detector outputs Z, the decoder exhaustively searches for an approximate maximum likelihood (ML) size-kk set from all possible (k){\ell\choose k} subsets. The decoder declares 𝒜\mathcal{A}^{*} as the active set iff

p(zx(𝒜))>p(zx(𝒜^));𝒜^𝒜,p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}({\mathcal{A}^{*}})\right)>p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}({\hat{\mathcal{A}}})\right);\quad\forall\hat{\mathcal{A}}\neq\mathcal{A}^{*}, (12)

where x(𝒜)\textbf{x}(\mathbf{\mathcal{A}}) denotes {xai:ai𝒜}\{\textbf{x}^{a_{i}}:a_{i}\in\mathcal{A}\}. The corresponding activity status vector is 𝜷:βi=1,i𝒜{\boldsymbol{\beta}^{*}}:{{\beta_{i}}}=1,\forall i\in\mathcal{A}^{*}. We perform this search through a series of threshold tests for each candidate set 𝒜^𝒮\hat{\mathcal{A}}\in\mathcal{S}. For each 𝒜^\hat{\mathcal{A}}, we consider a partition (0,1)(\mathcal{I}^{0},\mathcal{I}^{1}) of the candidate active set into its overlap and difference with the true active set as in step (6). i.e., 1:=𝒜𝒜^\mathcal{I}^{1}:=\mathcal{A}\cap\hat{\mathcal{A}} and 0:=𝒜^𝒜\mathcal{I}^{0}:=\hat{\mathcal{A}}\setminus{\mathcal{A}}. Then, we perform 2k12^{k}-1 threshold tests as below.

log2(p(zx(I0),x(I1))p(zx(I1)))>ηs,(I0,I1) partitions of 𝒜^,\log_{2}\left(\frac{p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}({I_{0}}),\textbf{x}({I_{1}})\right)}{p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}({I_{1}})\right)}\right)>\eta_{s},\forall(I_{0},I_{1})\text{ partitions of }\hat{\mathcal{A}},

for predetermined thresholds ηs\eta_{s} where s:=|I0|{1,2,,k}s:=|I_{0}|\in\{1,2,\ldots,k\}. Here, we used x(𝐆)\textbf{x}(\mathbf{G}) to denote {xai:ai𝐆}\{\textbf{x}^{a_{i}}:a_{i}\in\mathbf{G}\}.

We declare 𝒜^\hat{\mathcal{A}} as the active user set if it is the only set passing all threshold tests. An error occurs if the active user set fails at least one of the tests in (III-C) or an incorrect set passes all the tests. As shown in [46], using a set of thresholds given by ηs=logρk(ks)(ks)\eta_{s}=\log\frac{\rho}{k{k\choose s}{\ell-k\choose s}} for some ρ>0\rho>0, we can upper bound e()\mathbb{P}_{e}^{(\ell)} as

e()s=1k(ks)(log(p(zx(0),x(1))p(zx(1)))logρk(ks)(ks))+ρ.\mathbb{P}_{e}^{(\ell)}\leq\sum_{s=1}^{k}{k\choose s}\mathbb{P}\Bigg{(}\log\left(\frac{p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}(\mathcal{I}^{0}),\textbf{x}(\mathcal{I}^{1})\right)}{p\left(\textbf{z}\mid\textbf{x}(\mathcal{I}^{1})\right)}\right)\leq\log\frac{\rho}{k{k\choose s}{\ell-k\choose s}}\Bigg{)}+\rho.

Since preamble design uses i.i.d Bernoulli random variables, using concentration inequalities [35] for the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime, we can achieve e()0,\mathbb{P}_{e}^{(\ell)}\rightarrow 0, with \ell\rightarrow\infty as long as n()n(\ell) obeys

n()maxs=1,,klog(ks)I(X(0s);ZX(1s))(1+o(1)).n(\ell)\geq\max_{s=1,\ldots,k}\frac{\log{\ell-k\choose s}}{I(\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{0}}_{s});Z\mid\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{1}}_{s}))}(1+o(1)). (13)

Here, X(0s):={X(0):|0|=s}\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{0}}_{s}):=\{\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{0}}):|\mathcal{I}^{0}|=s\} and X(1s):={X(1):|0|=s}\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{1}}_{s}):=\{\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{1}}):|\mathcal{I}^{0}|=s\}. Using the asymptotic expression log(ks)=slog+O(1)\log{\ell-k\choose s}=s\log\ell+O(1) in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime implies

n()maxs=1,,kslogI(X(0s);ZX(1s))(1+o(1)).n(\ell)\geq\max_{s=1,\ldots,k}\frac{s\log\ell}{I(\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{0}}_{s});Z\mid\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{1}}_{s}))}(1+o(1)). (14)

We can rewrite Is:=I(X(0s);ZX(1s))I_{s}:=I(\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{0}}_{s});Z\mid\textbf{X}({\mathcal{I}^{1}}_{s})) as

Is=j=ks+1k(H(X(j))H(X(j)Z,𝐗(1,2,..,j1))).I_{s}=\sum_{j=k-s+1}^{k}\Big{(}H\big{(}\textbf{X}(j)\big{)}-H\big{(}\textbf{X}(j)\mid Z,\mathbf{X}(1,2,..,j-1)\big{)}\Big{)}. (15)

Note that Iss\frac{I_{s}}{s} attains its minimum when s=ks=k since conditioning reduces entropy [47]. Thus, when k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1), (14) simplifies to

n()klog()I(X;Z)(1+o(1)).n(\ell)\geq\frac{k\log(\ell)}{I(\textbf{X};Z)}(1+o(1)). Using the maximum rate of the equivalent channel CC in Lemma 1, we can conclude that, our proposed decoder has e()0\mathbb{P}_{e}^{(\ell)}\rightarrow 0 with \ell\rightarrow\infty as long as

n()klog()max(γ,qsp)h(E[eγVσ2P+σw2])E[h(eγVσ2P+σw2)](1+o(1)),n(\ell)\geq\frac{k\log(\ell)}{\max_{(\gamma,q_{sp})}h\Big{(}E\Big{[}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{]}\Big{)}-E\Big{[}h\Big{(}e^{-\frac{\gamma}{V\sigma^{2}P+\sigma_{w}^{2}}}\Big{)}\Big{]}}(1+o(1)),

completing the proof.

Remark 1. Note that k(1α)log2()C\frac{k(1-\alpha)\log_{2}(\ell)}{C} where CC is as given in Lemma 1 is a valid lower bound for k=Θ(α);0α<1k=\Theta(\ell^{\alpha});0\leq\alpha<1. This is because user identification requires communicating at least log2(k)=klog2k+O(k)\log_{2}{\ell\choose k}=k\log_{2}\frac{\ell}{k}+O(k) bits which corresponds to at least k(1α)log2()C\frac{k(1-\alpha)\log_{2}(\ell)}{C} number of channel-uses. As shown in Theorem 1, this lower bound is tight when k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) or α=0.\alpha=0.

Remark 2. The minimum user identification cost n0()n_{0}(\ell) for a Gaussian MnAC with average power constraint PavP_{av} as described by Chen et al. in [29] obeys

n0()=klog()12log(1+kPav)<n(),n_{0}(\ell)=\frac{k\log(\ell)}{\frac{1}{2}\log(1+kP_{av})}<n(\ell),

where n()n(\ell) is as given in Theorem 1. This is because CC in Lemma 1 is smaller than 12log(1+kPav)\frac{1}{2}\log(1+kP_{av}) where Pav:=qspPP_{av}:=q_{sp}^{*}P, with qspq_{sp}^{*} being the optimal qspq_{sp} in Theorem 1. Clearly, the user identification in a Gaussian MnAC requires lesser number of channel uses due to the fact that the model does not incorporate fading and is not constrained to OOK signaling and non-coherent detection as in our non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC.

IV Practical schemes for user identification

The decoder achieving the minimum user identification cost presented in Algorithm 1 is practically infeasible as its implementation requires exhaustive search over all candidate active user sets of size kk. In this section, we present several practical schemes for active user identification in a non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC by viewing it as a decoding problem in an equivalent point to point communication channel as illustrated in Section III.A. Our proposed schemes are primarily based on N-COMP and BP algorithms, which although have been extensively studied for compressed sensing problems [42, 49, 50], were not used in the context of non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC setting. We are also interested in evaluating how close our proposed practical algorithms can come to achieving the theoretical minimum user identification cost presented in Theorem 1.

In addition to exact recovery (Def. 2), we consider the performance of our proposed strategies under a partial recovery criterion where instead of identifying all the kk active devices correctly, we are willing to tolerate some amount of misclassifications where an inactive is declared as active and vice-versa. We formally define the partial recovery setting as follows.

Definition 4.

ζ%\zeta\%- partial recovery: For a true active set 𝒜\mathcal{A} and an estimated active set 𝒜^\hat{\mathcal{A}}, consider an error event E1E_{1} defined as

E1:={|𝒜^c𝒜|>k(1ζ100)}.E_{1}:=\left\{\left|\hat{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{c}}\cap\mathcal{A}\right|>k\left(1-\frac{\zeta}{100}\right)\right\}. (16)

We have ζ%\zeta\%-partial recovery, if

e,ζ():=P(E1)0 as ,\mathbb{P}_{e,\zeta}^{(\ell)}:=P(E_{1})\rightarrow 0\text{ as }\ell\rightarrow\infty,

where e,ζ()\mathbb{P}_{e,\zeta}^{(\ell)} denotes the probability of error for ζ%\zeta\%- partial recovery. Probability of successful identification for ζ%\zeta\%- recovery is defined as succ,ζ():=1e,ζ().\mathbb{P}_{succ,\zeta}^{(\ell)}:=1-\mathbb{P}_{e,\zeta}^{(\ell)}.

The error event E1E_{1} considers if the fraction of true active devices in 𝒜\mathcal{A} that are misdetected exceeds (1ζ100)\left(1-\frac{\zeta}{100}\right). Note that since our proposed strategies output a set of size kk, both false positives and misdetections occur in equal numbers. Thus, the error event E1E_{1} in (16) is essentially equivalent to {|𝒜^c𝒜|>k(1ζ100)|𝒜^𝒜c|>k(1ζ100)}\left\{\left|\hat{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{c}}\cap\mathcal{A}\right|>k\left(1-\frac{\zeta}{100}\right)\bigcup\left|\hat{\mathcal{A}}\cap\mathcal{A}^{c}\right|>k\left(1-\frac{\zeta}{100}\right)\right\}. Moreover, when ζ=100\zeta=100, the partial recovery setting boils down to our original setting of exact recovery given in Def. 2. The case when the number of active users kk is unknown at the BS will be discussed in Section IV.C.

IV-A N-COMP based user identification

N-COMP is a decoding strategy for noisy GT proposed by Chan et al. in [42]. The basic idea is to declare an item to be defective or non-defective based on the fraction of positive tests they participate in [51]. This significantly simplifies the run-time and storage requirements in comparison to the optimal exhaustive search strategy in Algorithm 1. As established in Section III, the active device identification framework in non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC can be viewed as a GT problem. This motivates us to study the performance of N-COMP approach in identifying active devices in the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC. Note that in the existing literature, the N-COMP GT decoder was primarily analyzed in the context of symmetric noise models wherein errors in test results are equally likely [7, 52]. In contrast, the active device identification problem as modeled by the equivalent channel in Fig.3 has an asymmetric noise and hence requires further investigations to validate its performance. Another work which considers N-COMP GT decoder is [49] where the focus is on the problem of neighbor discovery in a wireless sensor network rather than the massive random access setting considered in this paper.

Let 𝒢i:=t=1nXtiP\mathcal{G}_{i}:=\frac{\sum_{t=1}^{n}X^{i}_{t}}{\sqrt{P}} denote the Hamming weight of Xi\textbf{X}^{i}, the binary preamble assigned to user ii. In other words, 𝒢i\mathcal{G}_{i} indicates the number of channel uses in which the user ii transmits ‘On’ symbols if it is in active state. Let i:=t=1nXtiZtP\mathcal{R}_{i}:=\frac{\sum_{t=1}^{n}X^{i}_{t}Z_{t}}{\sqrt{P}} denote the number of these channel uses in which the received energy at the detector exceeds a predetermined threshold. In N-COMP based user identification, our strategy is to classify the kk users with highest value for i𝒢i\frac{\mathcal{R}_{i}}{\mathcal{G}_{i}} as active.

We conducted simulations of the N-COMP strategy to analyze the number of channel-uses required for identifying the active devices successfully. We considered two different success criterion, viz, exact recovery in which all active devices are to be correctly identified and 90%\% recovery (ζ=90)\zeta=90) in which we require atleast 90%\% of the active devices to be correctly identified. In other words, with 90%\% recovery, we are willing to tolerate upto 10%\% of false positives and false negatives. Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show how the probability of successful identification varies with the number of channel-uses for =1000\ell=1000 users with k=25k=25. We considered different values for the SNR (defined as Pσ2σw2\frac{P\sigma^{2}}{\sigma_{w}^{2}}) ranging from 0 dB to 10 dB. As expected, with increase in SNR, N-COMP decoding performance gets better leading to a faster identification of active devices in the network. From Fig. 5, one can infer that relaxing the success criteria to 90%\% recovery improves the probability of successful identification significantly.

Refer to captionRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses, nnRefer to captionProbability of successful identification
Figure 4: NCOMP: Exact recovery for (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC.
Refer to captionRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses, nnRefer to captionProbability of successful identification
Figure 5: NCOMP: 90%\% recovery for (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC.

IV-B BP based user identification

BP is an efficient method for solving sparse inference problems by iteratively propagating messages over the edges of the factor graph [43]. BP is known to produce good approximations to the marginals of the posterior distribution of the variables in the factor graph. In wireless communications, BP is well known in the context of iterative decoding for Turbo and LDPC codes [50]. BP is also used in GT decoding, which is essentially a Boolean sparse inference problem [53, 54]. In [53], the authors considered BP based GT decoding under a noise model that combines the addition and dilution models. In the context of mMTC, BP has been previously studied as a means for unsourced random access the users share the same codebook and the decoder is only required to provide an unordered list of user messages [55].

Recognizing the suitability of BP in sparse recovery problems including GT, we aim to employ a BP based strategy for the problem of active device identification in the non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC. In BP based user identification, we estimate the set of active devices by approximately performing bitwise-MAP detection through message passing on a bipartite graph with devices on one side and the binary energy measurements on the other side [53]. In contrast to the previous studies in [53], our noise model as given in (5)(\ref{channeleq}) incorporating channel fading effects and non-coherent detection at the BS side is more intricate. Note that in [31], Polyanskiy proposed an alternating BP scheme as a candidate practical solution for random access in a quasi-static fading multiple access channel where each user’s transmissions are attenuated by random fading gains, unknown to the receiver. However, [31] considers iterative coding scheme based on LDPC codes and slow fading scenarios whereas our work focus on energy-efficient OOK signaling in a fast fading non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC.

To identify the activity status vector 𝜷\boldsymbol{\beta} using the binary vector of energy detector outputs Z=(Z1,,Zn)\textbf{Z}=(Z_{1},\ldots,Z_{n}), BP relies on an approximate Maximum Aposteriori Probability (MAP) based decoding where instead of maximizing the posterior as a function of all the βi\beta_{i}’s, we use the marginals of the posterior distribution. i.e., βi^=argmaxβi{0,1}(βi𝐙)\widehat{\beta_{i}}=\underset{\beta_{i}\in\{0,1\}}{\arg\max}\hskip 2.0pt\mathbb{P}\left(\beta_{i}\mid\mathbf{Z}\right). This approximation drastically reduces the search space corresponding to the original MAP optimization. βi^\widehat{\beta_{i}} can be rewritten as

β^i=argmaxβi{0,1}βi[t=1np(Zt𝜷)j=1p(βj)].\hat{\beta}_{i}=\underset{\beta_{i}\in\{0,1\}}{\arg\max}\sum_{\sim\beta_{i}}\left[\prod_{t=1}^{n}p\left(Z_{t}\mid\boldsymbol{\beta}\right)\prod_{j=1}^{\ell}p\left(\beta_{j}\right)\right]. (17)

Eqn. (17) can be approximately computed using loopy BP based on a bipartite graph with \ell devices at one side and the nn energy detector outputs at the other side. The priors p(βj)p\left(\beta_{j}\right)’s are initialized to k\frac{k}{\ell} and updated through message passing in further iterations. Note that

p(Zt𝜷)=p(ZtV),p(Z_{t}\mid\boldsymbol{\beta})=p\left(Z_{t}\mid V\right), (18)

since ZtZ_{t} depends on 𝜷\boldsymbol{\beta} only through VV (defined in Section III.A), the number of active devices transmitting ‘On’ symbols during the ttht^{th} channel-use. This symmetry as illustrated in our equivalent channel model in Fig.3 is key in guaranteeing an efficient computation of BP message update rules [53]. We employ BP with Soft Thresholding (BP-ST) in which we classify the kk users with the highest marginals as active. Similar to the NCOMP strategy, we observed that BP-ST decoding performance shows improvement with SNR (plots are omitted for brevity).

Refer to captionRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses, nnRefer to captionProbability of successful identification
Figure 6: Exact recovery: (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC at SNR = 10 dB.
Refer to captionRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses, nnRefer to captionProbability of successful identification
Figure 7: 90%90\% recovery: (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC at SNR = 10 dB.

In Fig. 7 and Fig. 7, we compare the probability of successful identification in a (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC at SNR = 10 dB for BP-ST and NCOMP strategies under the two success criterion, viz, exact and 90%90\% recovery. As evident, BP shows significant performance gains over NCOMP which translates to faster identification of active devices. Moreover, the curves indicate that if we are willing to relax the success criterion by setting ζ\zeta to a lower value like 90%90\%, both strategies tend to perform better while maintaining the relative order in terms of probability of successful identification. Although N-COMP significantly lags behind BP, owing to its simplicity and non-iterative nature, it still can be used in applications where run-time and hardware complexity is a critical factor.

Refer to captionRefer to captionSNRRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses nn
Figure 8: Minimum user identification cost vs BP-ST for (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC.

In Fig. 8, we compare the minimum user identification cost in Theorem 1 with the performance of BP-ST. Evidently, the gap between the BP-ST curve and the minimum user identification cost reduces notably in the high SNR regime. We also observe that BP can approach and even exceed the minimum user identification cost if we relax the success criterion slightly to 90%90\% recovery by allowing room for a small number of misdetections.

IV-C BP-based user identification when kk is unknown

Since simulation results indicate that BP is more efficient compared to NCOMP, we restrict our focus to BP in this section. To take into account the uncertainty associated with the size k^\hat{k} of the estimated active set 𝒜^\hat{\mathcal{A}}, we consider an alternate definition for the error event different from (16) as below.

Definition 5.

ζ%\zeta\%- Partial recovery with unknown k: For a true active set 𝒜\mathcal{A} and an estimated active set 𝒜^\hat{\mathcal{A}}, consider an error event E2E_{2} defined as

E2:={k(1σ)k^k(1+σ)}cE1,E_{2}:=\left\{k(1-\sigma)\leq\hat{k}\leq k(1+\sigma)\right\}^{\mathrm{c}}\bigcup E_{1}, (19)

where E1E_{1} is as given in (16)(\ref{errev}). We have ζ%\zeta\%-partial recovery with unknown kk, if

e,ζ():=P(E2)0 as ,\mathbb{P}_{e,\zeta}^{(\ell)}:=P(E_{2})\rightarrow 0\text{ as }\ell\rightarrow\infty,

where e,ζ()\mathbb{P}_{e,\zeta}^{(\ell)} denotes the probability of error for ζ%\zeta\%- partial recovery. Probability of successful identification for ζ%\zeta\%- recovery is defined as succ,ζ():=1e,ζ().\mathbb{P}_{succ,\zeta}^{(\ell)}:=1-\mathbb{P}_{e,\zeta}^{(\ell)}.

Note that (E2)(E1)\mathbb{P}(E_{2})\geq\mathbb{P}(E_{1}) due to the first term {k(1σ)k^k(1+σ)}c\left\{k(1-\sigma)\leq\hat{k}\leq k(1+\sigma)\right\}^{\mathrm{c}} in (19). It implies that in addition to E1E_{1}, if the estimated active set has a size deviating from the size of the true active set by more than a fraction of σ\sigma, we declare an error. In the case when kk is known apriori, we can set σ=0\sigma=0 and (19) simplifies to (16).

We consider the performance of several loopy BP based strategies for non-coherent active user identification when kk is unknown as follows:

  • BP with Symmetric Hard Thresholding (BP-SHT) : Here, we classify user ii as active if the estimate of (βi=\mathbb{P}\left(\beta_{i}=\right. 1𝐙)1\mid\mathbf{Z}) exceeds 12\frac{1}{2}.

  • BP with Asymmetric Hard Thresholding (BP-AHT) : Here, we threshold the posterior probability (βi=\mathbb{P}\left(\beta_{i}=\right. 1𝐙)1\mid\mathbf{Z}) at a value η12\eta\neq\frac{1}{2} allowing more flexibility in controlling false positives and misdetections.

In our simulations, we set σ=0.1\sigma=0.1 allowing upto 10%10\% deviation in the value of k^\hat{k} w.r.t kk. Firstly, similar to NCOMP and BP-ST, we observed that the performance of BP-SHT and BP-AHT also show an increasing trend with SNR (plots omitted for brevity). Hence, here onwards, we focus on a particular SNR value (10 dB) for convenience.

In Fig. 9, we compare the exact recovery (ζ=100\zeta=100) performance of different BP strategies in terms of how the probability of successful identification varies with the number of channel-uses at an SNR of 1010 dB. Clearly, BP-ST demonstrates superior performance in comparison to BP-SHT and BP-AHT due to the fact that BP-ST has the knowledge of kk at its disposal which enables better decoding. The corresponding comparison curves for the 90%90\% recovery case (ζ=90\zeta=90) is shown in Fig. 10. Similar to the exact recovery case, BP-ST performs better than the other two strategies. However, the gap between the different strategies is less pronounced for 90%90\% recovery implying that the lack of knowledge of kk is less crucial in partial-recovery scenarios.

Refer to captionRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses nnRefer to captionProbability of successful identification
Figure 9: Comparison of various BP algorithms for exact recovery in (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC at SNR == 10 dB.
Refer to captionRefer to captionNumber of channel-uses nnRefer to captionProbability of successful identification
Figure 10: Comparison of various BP algorithms for 90%90\% recovery in (1000,25)(1000,25)-MnAC at SNR == 10 dB.

V Conclusion

In this paper, we have proposed an active device identification framework for non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC in which, during each channel-use the active devices engage in joint on-off preamble transmission and base station measures the received energy using a threshold-based binary energy detector. We have demonstrated that the active device identification problem in non-coherent (,k)(\ell,k)-MnAC can be modeled as a decoding problem in a constrained point-to-point communication channel. Exploiting this equivalence, we have evaluated the performance of our proposed scheme in terms of the minimum user identification cost - the minimum number of channel-uses required for reliable active user identification. Specifically, we have established a lower bound for the minimum user identification cost in the k=Θ(α)k=\Theta(\ell^{\alpha}) which is tight in the k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) regime. We have also illustrated an achievability scheme for k=Θ(1)k=\Theta(1) based on an approximate ML decoding approach. Considering the computational complexity of this achievability scheme, we have proposed several practical strategies for device identification based on NCOMP and BP strategies. We have also considered various scenarios in our simulations including partial recovery of active devices and unknown number of active devices. Through several numerical simulations, we have established that BP based strategies can outperform NCOMP strategies significantly in terms of the user identification cost. In fact, it was noted that if we are willing to tolerate a few number of misdetections, BP performance can even surpass the minimum user identification cost.

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