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Near-Tight Algorithms for
the Chamberlin-Courant and Thiele Voting Rulesthanks: A conference version of this work appears in IJCAI 2022 [48].

Krzysztof Sornat [email protected]. Part of this work was done while Krzysztof was a postdoc at MIT CSAIL, USA. AGH University, Poland Virginia Vassilevska Williams [email protected] MIT CSAIL, USA Yinzhan Xu [email protected] MIT CSAIL, USA
Abstract

We present an almost optimal algorithm for the classic Chamberlin-Courant multiwinner voting rule (CC) on single-peaked preference profiles. Given nn voters and mm candidates, it runs in almost linear time in the input size, improving the previous best 𝒪(nm2)\mathcal{O}(nm^{2}) time algorithm of Betzler et al. (2013). We also study multiwinner voting rules on nearly single-peaked preference profiles in terms of the candidate-deletion operation. We show a polynomial-time algorithm for CC where a given candidate-deletion set DD has logarithmic size. Actually, our algorithm runs in 2|D|poly(n,m)2^{|D|}\cdot\operatorname*{poly}(n,m) time and the base of the power cannot be improved under the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis. We also adapt these results to all non-constant Thiele rules which generalize CC with approval ballots.

1 Introduction

We study computational aspects of the Chamberlin-Courant voting rule (CC) [13] with general misrepresentation function and the Thiele rules [49] in which we choose a committee of size kk such that the total utility of the voters is maximized. In the case of CC, the utility of a voter from a committee is determined by the most preferred committee member. In the case of a ww-Thiele rule, parameterized by a non-increasing sequence w=(w1,w2,)w=(w_{1},w_{2},\dots), the utility of a voter is equal to w1+w2++wxw_{1}+w_{2}+\dots+w_{x}, where xx is the number of committee members approved by the voter.

CC and Thiele rules are basic multiwinner voting rules studied in social choice theory and, in particular, in the computational social choice community [26, 11]. They were discussed broadly for their applications, not only in parliamentary elections but also in many scenarios when a group of agents has to pick some number of items for joint use [47].

Unfortunately, computing an optimal committee under CC is already 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hard for the case of approval ballots, i.e., when each voter gives a subset of approved candidates [43]. This special case is called Approval Chamberlin-Courant (Approval-CC) and it was considered by Procaccia et al. [43] as a minimization problem. Its maximization version is equivalent to the well-known Max kk-Coverage problem for which many hardness results have been shown [46]. In particular, Max kk-Coverage is 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hard111𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hardness of Max kk-Coverage directly implies 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hardness of Approval-CC. This consequence was mentioned (without a proof) in the conference paper of Procaccia et al. [42]. to approximate within (11/e+ε)(1-1/e+\varepsilon) factor for any ε>0\varepsilon>0 [27]. Moreover, this hardness of approximation holds even in FPT-time with respect to solution size kk assuming a gap version of the Exponential Time Hypothesis [36].

Notice that Approval-CC is equivalent to the (1,0,)(1,0,\dots)-Thiele rule, so all these hardness results for Approval-CC hold for this basic Thiele rule as well. One may consider other ww-Thiele rules with specific ww, e.g., ww-Thiele rule with wi=1/iw_{i}=1/i which is equivalent to the well-known Proportional Approval Voting [35] and wi=1/i2w_{i}=1/i^{2} which is related to Penrose apportionment method [11]. Notice that (1,1,)(1,1,\dots)-Thiele is equivalent to Multiwinner Approval Voting [4], which is solvable in polynomial-time. All the other ones222 We assume w1=1w_{1}=1 without loss of generality. are 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hard [47, Theorem 5].

Analogously to Max kk-Coverage, hardness of approximation results hold for the natural class of ww sequences such that partial sums of ww grows in a sublinear way, where a hardness constant depends strictly on ww [20, 5, 6]. It follows that for such Thiele rules one should not expect a PTAS nor even an FPT-approximation scheme.

Because of the hardness of CC and Thiele rules, both rules were studied in restricted domains, i.e., on preference profiles with certain structures, e.g., single-peaked (SP) and single-crossing (SC). For a survey on structured preferences, see [24]. Such restricted domains are motivated by real-world elections. For instance, SP preference profiles appear when, intuitively, the candidates can be placed on an one-dimensional axis, and the farther away a candidate is from a voter’s favorite candidate the more the voter dislikes the candidate. Examples of such SP-axis are different policies in an ideological spectrum: the Left vs the Right, more liberal vs more conservative etc.

Fortunately, CC and Thiele rules on SP domain (CC-SP and Thiele-SP respectively) are known to be polynomial-time solvable [7, 39]. However, the dynamic programming algorithm for CC-SP proposed by Betzler et al. [7] is not optimal in terms of running time. We fill this gap by showing an almost optimal algorithm and we study polynomial-time solvability for nearly single-peaked preference profiles for CC and Thiele rules.

1.1 Our Contribution

The previous best running time for CC-SP was 𝒪(nm2)\mathcal{O}(nm^{2}) [7]. We improve it by presenting an almost linear time algorithm (up to subpolynomial factors) in Theorem 8. To achieve this result we reduce our problem to the Minimum Weight tt-Link Path problem and prove that our weight function has the concave Monge property (see Lemma 5). First, we construct an edge-weight oracle in 𝒪(nmlog(n))\mathcal{O}(nm\log(n)) pre-processing time that gives a response in 𝒪(logm)\mathcal{O}(\log m) time. Then, for k=Ω(log(m))k=\Omega(\log(m)), using the algorithm of Schieber [45] we find a solution in m2𝒪(log(k)loglog(m))=m1+o(1)m\cdot 2^{\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{\log(k)\log\log(m)})}=m^{1+o(1)} time and oracle accesses. For the case k=𝒪(log(m))k=\mathcal{O}(\log(m)) we use the 𝒪(mk)\mathcal{O}(mk) time algorithm of Aggarwal and Park [1] to achieve 𝒪(mlog(m))\mathcal{O}(m\log(m)) time and oracle accesses. Overall, the running time is 𝒪(nmlog(n)+m1+o(1)log(m)+mlog2(m))\mathcal{O}(nm\log(n)+m^{1+o(1)}\log(m)+m\log^{2}(m)), which is almost linear in the input size.

We believe our algorithm will be efficient in practice as the nmlog(n)nm\log(n) part comes from sorting (hence, it is very efficient in practice) and the m1+o(1)m^{1+o(1)} part is a lower order term when n=Ω(m)n=\Omega(m) (which is typical in many voting scenarios). All other components have running time 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm) and are efficient. Moreover, one can also replace the m1+o(1)m^{1+o(1)} part with any other (asymptotically slower) implementation for Minimum Weight tt-Link Path (such as the ones in [2]) to potentially obtain better practical performance for specific applications.

We then investigate the computational complexity of CC when the preference profile is not SP but close to SP in terms of the candidate-deletion operation. We assume a subset of dd candidates is given, whose removal makes an instance SP. We call it the candidate-deletion set. We use this general problem formulation, as for some popular utility functions a smallest candidate-deletion set is easy to compute, but for some it is 𝖭𝖯{\mathsf{NP}}-hard. One of the standard motivations for considering nearly structured preferences is preference elicitation with small errors possible [24, Chapter 10.5]. Here, we present one more scenario when nearly SP preferences may appear: when a few new politicians come to the political scene and the voters are not sure how to place them on the left-right political spectrum. Clearly, the new politicians form a candidate-deletion set (assuming that the previously known politicians are placed on an SP-axis due to their longer public activity).

It is known that given the candidate-deletion set, CC can be solved in 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d}) time [37], and thus is FPT with respect to dd. Importantly, we show that the base of the power is optimal assuming the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis. Notice that for d=𝒪(log(nm))d=\mathcal{O}(\log(nm)) our algorithm runs in polynomial-time. On the other hand, we show in Theorem 13 that if dd is slightly larger (e.g., ω(logn)\omega(\log n) or ω(logm)\omega(\log m)), then polynomial-time solvability of CC contradicts the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH). Overall, we derive polynomial-time algorithm for CC for almost all values of dd for which such a polynomial-time algorithm may exist under ETH.

We adapt the above algorithm to Thiele rules by extending the Integer Linear Programming approach of Peters [39] to generalized Thiele rules (allowing different weight sequences for each voter) on SP preference profiles. This allows us to pre-elect some winning candidates by guessing the winners from the candidate-deletion set. As a result we obtain an 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d})-time algorithm. Unlike the case for CC, we were not able to prove that the base of the power cannot be improved. However, we show that there is no 𝒪(2o(d))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(d)})-time algorithm under ETH for each non-constant ww-Thiele rule. Using this, we show that if dd is allowed to be slightly larger than 𝒪(log(nm))\mathcal{O}(\log(nm)) then polynomial-time solvability of any non-constant ww-Thiele rule contradicts ETH.

1.2 Related Work

First, we present two papers that are the most relevant from a technical point of view.

The paper of Constantinescu and Elkind [15].

Recently, Constantinescu and Elkind [15] also used fast algorithms for Minimum Weight tt-Link Path to solve CC, but on SC preference profiles. In their reduction, they construct an instance of Minimum Weight tt-Link Path on an 𝒪(n)\mathcal{O}(n)-node graph with the concave Monge property while the graph we construct has 𝒪(m)\mathcal{O}(m) nodes. The best algorithm for solving Minimum Weight tt-Link Path on an 𝒪(n)\mathcal{O}(n)-node graph with the concave Monge property runs in n1+o(1)n^{1+o(1)} time [45], but Constantinescu and Elkind used an 𝒪(m)\mathcal{O}(m) time algorithm to query the weight of each edge, so they end up getting an mn1+o(1)mn^{1+o(1)} running time. In our algorithm, we first pre-process the preference profile in 𝒪(nmlog(n))\mathcal{O}(nm\log(n)) time, and then an algorithm is able to query the weight of each edge in 𝒪(log(m))\mathcal{O}(\log(m)) time, so we get an 𝒪(nmlog(n)+m1+o(1))\mathcal{O}(nm\log(n)+m^{1+o(1)}) overall running time. Even though both algorithms have near-linear running times, our algorithm is arguably faster since the no(1)n^{o(1)} factor of their algorithm (and the mo(1)m^{o(1)} factor of our algorithm) could be super poly-logarithmic. Therefore, in the natural case where a preference profile is both SC and SP [21], it is potentially more efficient to use our algorithm. The difference enlarges if an SP-axis and an SC-axis are not given. Indeed, for ballots given as linear orders333 It is the case for, e.g., utility functions defined as committee scoring rules [22] such as Borda scores. the problem of finding an SC-axis is known to be computable in 𝒪(nm2)\mathcal{O}(nm^{2}) time [9] while finding an SP-axis can be done in 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm) time (even if only one vote is a linear order) [28].

The paper of Misra, Sonar, and Vaidyanathan [37].

Misra et al. [37] presented an 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d}) time algorithm for CC-SP, whose main idea is to try all subsets of a given candidate-deletion set as winners and compute remaining winners. This construction is well-suited for generalization to Thiele rules, so we provide a proof similar to theirs for the CC-SP case for completeness. We note that Misra et al. also considered other research directions in their paper, e.g., voter-deletion distance to SP and egalitarian version of CC.

Next, we present related works that are less technically related to our paper but give a broader picture on the topic.

Other nearly SP measures.

Different notions of nearly single-peaked preference profiles have been proposed [24, 25]. Let us mention just a few of them. Voter-deletion distance is the minimum number of voters one has to delete from the instance to achieve the SP property. Swap distance is the minimum number of swaps one has to make within the votes (in a model with ordinal ballots) to obtain the SP property. Computing some of SP measures appears to be 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hard, in particular, it is the case for both notions mentioned above [25]. Hence, some FPT and approximation algorithms have been proposed [23].

Generalizations of SP to other graphs.

There are generalizations of SP to more complex graphs, e.g., a circle or a tree. For example, all Thiele rules are polynomial-time solvable for SP preference profiles on a line, and also on a circle [40]. Peters et al. [41] generalized the algorithm of Betzler et al. [7] to SP on a tree, but their running time is poly(n,mλ,kλ)\operatorname*{poly}(n,m^{\lambda},k^{\lambda}), where λ\lambda is the number of leaves. Actually they showed that CC-SP is 𝖭𝖯{\mathsf{NP}}-hard on a tree, even for Borda scores, and they ask if the problem is FPT w.r.t. λ\lambda (as their algorithm is only XP w.r.t. λ\lambda).

Clustering problems.

CC is equivalent to a maximization version of classic clustering problem called kk-Median (in discrete but not necessarily metric space) [12]. Therefore, CC may be seen as a clustering method in which we partition voters into kk clusters, where cluster centers are defined by the winning committee members and the voters from a common cluster have the same most preferred committee member. Procaccia et al. [43] showed 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hardness for the Monroe rule [38] which, in addition to CC, requires to have a balanced representation assignment. The Monroe rule is related to the Capacitated kk-Median clustering problem (see e.g. the paper of Cohen-Addad and Li [14]) with all cluster center capacities equal to nk\lceil\frac{n}{k}\rceil but in the case of the Monroe rule there are also lower-bounds on the capacities used: nk\lfloor\frac{n}{k}\rfloor.

2 Preliminaries

First we introduce some notations and define the computational problems formally. The 𝒪~\tilde{\mathcal{O}} notation suppresses factors subpolynomial in the input size, i.e., factors (nm)o(1)(nm)^{o(1)}. The 𝒪\mathcal{O}^{*} notation suppresses factors polynomial in the input size, i.e., factors (nm)𝒪(1)(nm)^{\mathcal{O}(1)}.

Elections, misrepresentation, approval ballots.

An election is a pair (V,C)(V,C) consisting of a set VV of nn voters and a set CC of mm candidates.

A misrepresentation function r:V×C0r:V\times C\rightarrow{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0} measures how much a voter is misrepresented by a particular candidate (0{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0} denotes a set of non-negative real numbers)444We consider the real-RAM model of computation in this paper. Our algorithms can run perfectly on a typical word-RAM machine if the misrepresentations are given as integers. . Its dual measure is the utility function u:V×C0u:V\times C\rightarrow{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0} that indicates how well a voter is represented by a particular candidate. A tuple (V,C,r)(V,C,r) or (V,C,u)(V,C,u) is called a preference profile or just a profile or preferences.

Balloting a misrepresentation function fully is costly for a voter (needs to provide mm exact numbers). A simpler and one of the most popular type of a misrepresentation function is based on approval ballots. In approval voting a voter vv gives an approval ballot as a vote, i.e., a subset AvA_{v} of candidates that vv approves. In the case of approval voting we obtain an approval utility function, i.e., u(v,c)=1u(v,c)=1 iff cAvc\in A_{v} and u(v,c)=0u(v,c)=0 iff cAvc\notin A_{v}. Furthermore, we define an approval misrepresentation function as r(v,c)=1u(v,c)r(v,c)=1-u(v,c).

Another popular misrepresentation function is based on Borda scores. We call rr a Borda misrepresentation function if for each voter vv we have that r(v,)r(v,\cdot) is a bijection from CC to {0,1,,m1}\{0,1,\dots,m-1\}. It represents a linear ordering of candidates and counts how many candidates beat a particular candidate within the vote.

For a voter vv, if r(v,c)r(v,c) has different values for distinct candidates, then a vote of vv can be seen as a linear order over candidates. If there exists two distinct candidates c,cc,c^{\prime} such that r(v,c)=r(v,c)r(v,c)=r(v,c^{\prime}) then we call a vote of vv a weak order.

Chamberlin-Courant voting rule.

Originally, Chamberlin and Courant [13] defined a voting rule on the Borda misrepresentation function (currently, it is often called Borda-CC). In this paper, analogously to Betzler et al. [7], we study a more general computational problem. In the Chamberlin-Courant problem (CC) we are given an election (V,C)(V,C), a misrepresentation function rr, a misrepresentation bound R0R\in{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0} and a positive integer kk. Our task is to find a size-kk subset WCW\subseteq C (called a winning committee) such that vVmincWr(v,c)R\sum_{v\in V}\min_{c\in W}r(v,c)\leq R or return NO if such subset does not exist. Additionally, for CCC^{\prime}\subseteq C, we overload the notation by writing r(v,C)=mincCr(v,c)r(v,C^{\prime})=\min_{c\in C^{\prime}}r(v,c) and we define total misrepresentation of CC^{\prime} by r(C)=vVr(v,C)r(C^{\prime})=\sum_{v\in V}r(v,C^{\prime}). In a minimization version of the CC problem we want to find a size-kk committee WW with the minimum total misrepresentation value r(W)r(W).

ww-Thiele voting rules.

We define a computational problem ww-Thiele parameterized by an infinite non-increasing non-negative sequence555If not stated otherwise, we consider only such sequences throughout this paper and call them Thiele sequences. w=(w1,w2,)w=(w_{1},w_{2},\dots), with w1=1w_{1}=1, as follows. We are given an election (V,C)(V,C), approval ballots AvA_{v} for each voter vVv\in V, an utility bound U0U\in{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0}, and a positive integer kk. Our task is to find a size-kk subset WCW\subseteq C such that vVi=1|AvW|wiU\sum_{v\in V}\sum_{i=1}^{|A_{v}\cap W|}w_{i}\geq U or return NO if no such subset exists. Additionally, for CCC^{\prime}\subseteq C, we overload the notation by writing u(v,C)=i=1|AvC|wiu(v,C^{\prime})=\sum_{i=1}^{|A_{v}\cap C^{\prime}|}w_{i} and we define total utility of CC^{\prime} by u(C)=vVu(v,C)u(C^{\prime})=\sum_{v\in V}u(v,C^{\prime}). In a maximization version of ww-Thiele we want to find a size-kk committee WW with the maximum total utility value. We notice that, a dual minimization version of ww-Thiele is equivalent to the OWA kk-Median problem with 0/10/1 connection costs [12].

Single-peaked preference profiles.

Following Proposition 3 in [7] we say that a preference profile (V,C,r)(V,C,r) is single-peaked (SP)666 Sometimes called possibly single-peaked [24] as in this paper we allow ties (weak orders). if there exists a linear order \prec over CC (called the single-peaked-axis or SP-axis) such that for every triple of distinct candidates ci,cj,ckCc_{i},c_{j},c_{k}\in C with cicjckc_{i}\prec c_{j}\prec c_{k} or ckcjcic_{k}\prec c_{j}\prec c_{i} we have the following implication for each voter vVv\in V: r(v,ci)<r(v,cj)r(v,cj)r(v,ck)r(v,c_{i})<r(v,c_{j})\implies r(v,c_{j})\leq r(v,c_{k}). Note that an SP profile with approval ballots can be seen as intervals of candidates (when ordering the candidates w.r.t. an SP-axis).

Candidate-deletion set.

For a given preference profile (V,C,r)(V,C,r), a subset of candidates DCD\subseteq C is called a candidate-deletion set if its removal from the instance makes the profile SP, i.e., (V,CD,rD)(V,C\setminus D,r_{-D}) is an SP profile, where its misrepresentation function rD:V×(CD)0r_{-D}:V\times(C\setminus D)\rightarrow{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0} is defined as rr restricted to V×(CD)V\times(C\setminus D). Typically we use d=|D|d=|D|.

Approval-CC-SP.

As we mentioned earlier, Approval-CC is equivalent to (1,0,)(1,0,\dots)-Thiele. If an SP-axis is given then the input of Approval-CC-SP can be given as two numbers per voter: both endpoints of the approval interval. Then the input size is Θ(n)\Theta(n). It means that the running time of our algorithm from Theorem 8, which is 𝒪~(nm)=𝒪~(n2)\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(nm)=\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n^{2}), can be much larger than the input size. We would like to observe that Approval-CC-SP, i.e. CC with a preference restriction called Voter Interval [24], can also be solved in almost optimal time because it is actually equivalent to finding the maximum kk-cliques of an interval graph.

Observation 1.

(Application III in [45]) Approval-CC-SP can be solved in time n1+o(1)n^{1+o(1)}.

Parameterized complexity, ETH and SETH.

We assume basic knowledge of parameterized complexity as this is common in computational social choice research [8, 19]. For a textbook on the topic see, e.g., [17]. To provide lower bounds we will use two popular conjectures on solving the satisfiability of propositional formulas in conjunctive normal form (CNF-SAT): Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH) and its stronger version—Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (SETH). For formal statements see, e.g., Conjectures 14.1 and 14.2 in [17], but here we state simple consequences of both conjectures as follows. 1) ETH implies that there is no 2o(N)2^{o(N)}-time algorithm for 33-SAT with NN variables and 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) clauses, 2) SETH implies that there is no (2ε)N(2-\varepsilon)^{N}-time algorithm for CNF-SAT, with NN variables and 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) clauses.

3 Single-Peaked Preferences and Chamberlin-Courant Voting Rule

In this section we present our algorithm for CC-SP that is almost optimal under the assumption that an SP-axis is given in the input or at least one vote is a linear order. In the latter case we can find an SP-axis in 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm) time, otherwise, if all votes are weak orders we do this in 𝒪(nm2)\mathcal{O}(nm^{2}) time [28]. This is a bottle-neck for our algorithm. In such a case, we obtain the same 𝒪(nm2)\mathcal{O}(nm^{2}) running time as the original dynamic programming approach of Betzler et al. [7].

We first label the candidates so that c1c2cmc_{1}\prec c_{2}\prec\cdots\prec c_{m} with respect to the SP-axis. For simplicity of our analysis, we add an artificial candidate c0c1c_{0}\prec c_{1} so that r(v,c0)=Ur(v,c_{0})=U for any vVv\in V, where UU is the maximum value of misrepresentation. Similarly, we add another artificial candidate cm+1cmc_{m+1}\succ c_{m} so that r(v,cm+1)=Ur(v,c_{m+1})=U for any vVv\in V. After the additions, the profile is still single-peaked and the solution to the SP-CC instance does not change.

We first reduce CC-SP to the well-studied Minimum Weight tt-Link Path problem which is defined as follows.

Definition 2 (Minimum Weight tt-Link Path).

Given an edge-weighted directed acyclic graph (DAG), a source node and a target node, compute a min-weight path from the source to the target that uses exactly tt edges.

We create a graph on vertex set {0,,m+1}\{0,\ldots,m+1\}. For every i,ji,j where 0i<jm+10\leq i<j\leq m+1, we add an edge from ii to jj with weight w(i,j)=r({ci,cj}))r({ci})w(i,j)=r(\{c_{i},c_{j}\}))-r(\{c_{i}\}). We let the source vertex be vertex 0 and let the target vertex be vertex m+1m+1. We set t=k+1t=k+1. To show the correctness of this reduction, we use the following claim which is a key consequence of SP.

Claim 3.

For any vVv\in V, 0i<jm+10\leq i<j\leq m+1, and for any C{c0,,ci1}C^{\prime}\subseteq\{c_{0},\ldots,c_{i-1}\}, it holds r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,{ci})=r(v,C{ci,cj})r(v,C{ci})r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\})-r(v,\{c_{i}\})=r(v,C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i},c_{j}\})-r(v,C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i}\}).

Proof.

Suppose cic_{i} has the minimum misrepresentation of vv among C{ci}C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i}\}, then clearly r(v,C{ci})=r(v,{ci})r(v,C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i}\})=r(v,\{c_{i}\}) and r(v,C{ci,cj})=r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i},c_{j}\})=r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\}) so the equality follows.

Otherwise, there exists cCc^{\prime}\in C^{\prime} such that r(v,c)<r(v,ci)r(v,c^{\prime})<r(v,c_{i}). Since the profile is single-peaked and ccicjc^{\prime}\prec c_{i}\prec c_{j}, we must have r(v,ci)r(v,cj)r(v,c_{i})\leq r(v,c_{j}). Therefore, r(v,{ci})=r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,\{c_{i}\})=r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\}) and r(v,C{ci})=r(v,C{ci,cj})r(v,C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i}\})=r(v,C^{\prime}\cup\{c_{i},c_{j}\}), so the equality follows. ∎

The following lemma shows the correctness of our reduction from CC-SP to Minimum Weight tt-Linked Path.

Lemma 4.

Given the min-weight path from vertex 0 to vertex m+1m+1 that uses k+1k+1 edges, we can compute a winning committee WCW\subseteq C of size kk in linear time.

Proof.

Let PP be any path from vertex 0 to vertex m+1m+1 that uses k+1k+1 edges, and let the vertices on PP be a0,a1,,ak,ak+1a_{0},a_{1},\ldots,a_{k},a_{k+1} for some 0=a0<a1<<ak<ak+1=m+10=a_{0}<a_{1}<\ldots<a_{k}<a_{k+1}=m+1. The weight of path PP is thus

i=0kw(ai,ai+1)\displaystyle\sum_{i=0}^{k}w(a_{i},a_{i+1}) =def.vVi=0kr(v,{cai,cai+1})r(v,{cai})\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\text{def.}}}{{\mathmakebox[width("$\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\text{Claim\leavevmode\nobreak\ \ref{cl:CC-SP}}}}{{=}}$")]{=}}}\sum_{v\in V}\sum_{i=0}^{k}r(v,\{c_{a_{i}},c_{a_{i+1}}\})-r(v,\{c_{a_{i}}\})
=Claim 3vVi=0kr(v,{caj}0ji+1)r(v,{caj}0ji)\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\text{Claim\leavevmode\nobreak\ \ref{cl:CC-SP}}}}{{=}}\sum_{v\in V}\sum_{i=0}^{k}r(v,\{c_{a_{j}}\}_{0\leq j\leq i+1})-r(v,\{c_{a_{j}}\}_{0\leq j\leq i})
=vVr(v,{caj}0jm+1)r(v,{caj}0j0)\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle}}{{\mathmakebox[width("$\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\text{Claim\leavevmode\nobreak\ \ref{cl:CC-SP}}}}{{=}}$")]{=}}}\sum_{v\in V}r(v,\{c_{a_{j}}\}_{0\leq j\leq m+1})-r(v,\{c_{a_{j}}\}_{0\leq j\leq 0})
=Un+vVr(v,{ca1,,cak}),\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle}}{{\mathmakebox[width("$\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\text{Claim\leavevmode\nobreak\ \ref{cl:CC-SP}}}}{{=}}$")]{=}}}-Un+\sum_{v\in V}r(v,\{c_{a_{1}},\ldots,c_{a_{k}}\}),

which is Un-Un plus the total misrepresentation of the committee {ca1,,cak}C\{c_{a_{1}},\ldots,c_{a_{k}}\}\subseteq C.

Conversely, for any subset of CC of size kk with total misrepresentation RR, we can find a path from vertex 0 to vertex m+1m+1 using k+1k+1 edges with weight Un+R-Un+R in the graph by following the equations reversely. ∎

By Lemma 4, it suffices to compute the minimum weight tt-link path of the auxiliary graph. To do so efficiently, we use the fact that the edge weights have a certain structure.

Lemma 5.

The edge weights of the Minimum Weight tt-Link Path instance satisfy the concave Monge property, i.e., for all 1i+1<jm1\leq i+1<j\leq m, it holds that w(i,j)+w(i+1,j+1)w(i,j+1)+w(i+1,j)w(i,j)+w(i+1,j+1)\leq w(i,j+1)+w(i+1,j).

Proof.

By expanding the definition of w(,)w(\cdot,\cdot) and focusing on the terms involving some vVv\in V, it suffices to show

r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,{ci})+r(v,{ci+1,cj+1})r(v,{ci+1})\displaystyle r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\})-r(v,\{c_{i}\})+r(v,\{c_{i+1},c_{j+1}\})-r(v,\{c_{i+1}\})
\displaystyle\leq\hskip 4.0pt r(v,{ci,cj+1})r(v,{ci})+r(v,{ci+1,cj})r(v,{ci+1}),\displaystyle r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j+1}\})-r(v,\{c_{i}\})+r(v,\{c_{i+1},c_{j}\})-r(v,\{c_{i+1}\}),

which simplifies to

r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,{ci+1,cj})\displaystyle r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\})-r(v,\{c_{i+1},c_{j}\})
\displaystyle\leq\hskip 4.0pt r(v,{ci,cj+1})r(v,{ci+1,cj+1}).\displaystyle r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j+1}\})-r(v,\{c_{i+1},c_{j+1}\}). (1)

Since the profile is single-peaked, one of the following must happen.

  1. 1.

    r(v,ci)r(v,ci+1)r(v,cj)r(v,c_{i})\geq r(v,c_{i+1})\geq r(v,c_{j}). In this case, Equation (1) further simplifies to

    r(v,cj)r(v,cj)r(v,{ci,cj+1})r(v,{ci+1,cj+1}).r(v,c_{j})-r(v,c_{j})\leq r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j+1}\})-r(v,\{c_{i+1},c_{j+1}\}).

    The right hand side is non-negative because r(v,ci)r(v,ci+1)r(v,c_{i})\geq r(v,c_{i+1}), so the inequality holds.

  2. 2.

    r(v,ci)r(v,ci+1)r(v,c_{i})\geq r(v,c_{i+1}) and r(v,cj)r(v,cj+1)r(v,c_{j})\leq r(v,c_{j+1}). In this case, we consider a function f(x)=min(r(v,ci),x)min(r(v,ci+1),x)f(x)=\min(r(v,c_{i}),x)-\min(r(v,c_{i+1}),x). Since r(v,ci)r(v,ci+1)r(v,c_{i})\geq r(v,c_{i+1}), it is not hard to verify that f(x)f(x) is non-decreasing. Since the left hand side of Inequality (1) is f(r(v,cj))f(r(v,c_{j})) and the right hand side is f(r(v,cj+1))f(r(v,c_{j+1})), the inequality holds because r(v,cj)r(v,cj+1)r(v,c_{j})\leq r(v,c_{j+1}) and f(x)f(x) is non-decreasing.

  3. 3.

    r(v,ci+1)r(v,cj)r(v,cj+1)r(v,c_{i+1})\leq r(v,c_{j})\leq r(v,c_{j+1}). In this case, Equation (1) further simplifies to

    r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,ci+1)r(v,{ci,cj+1})r(v,ci+1),r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\})-r(v,c_{i+1})\leq r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j+1}\})-r(v,c_{i+1}),

    which is true because r(v,cj)r(v,cj+1)r(v,c_{j})\leq r(v,c_{j+1}) implies r(v,{ci,cj})r(v,{ci,cj+1})r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j}\})\leq r(v,\{c_{i},c_{j+1}\}).

By Lemma 5, we can use the m1+o(1)m^{1+o(1)} time algorithm for the Minimum Weight tt-Link Path instance (we use the algorithm by Schieber [45] for the case where k=Ω(logm)k=\Omega(\log m) and use the algorithm by Aggarwal and Park [1] for the case where k=𝒪(log(m))k=\mathcal{O}(\log(m))). Note that by a brute-force algorithm, we can compute each edge weight in 𝒪(n)\mathcal{O}(n) time, so the overall running time becomes nm1+o(1)nm^{1+o(1)}. The subpolynomial factor in this running time is 2𝒪(log(k)loglog(m))2^{\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{\log(k)\log\log(m)})} when k=Ω(log(m))k=\Omega(\log(m)), which can be quite large. The following lemma gives a way to compute the edge weights faster, and consequently improves the subpolynomial factor.

Lemma 6.

After an 𝒪(mIntSort(n,nm))\mathcal{O}(m\operatorname*{Int\-Sort}(n,nm)) time pre-processing where IntSort(n,nm)\operatorname*{Int\-Sort}(n,nm) is the time for sorting nn non-negative integers bounded by 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm), we can create a data structure that supports edge weight queries in 𝒪(log(m))\mathcal{O}(\log(m)) time per query.

Proof.

Recall that the edge weight of an edge from ii to jj is r({ci,cj})r({ci})r(\{c_{i},c_{j}\})-r(\{c_{i}\}). We can easily compute r({ci})r(\{c_{i}\}) for every ii in 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm) time and store the result, so it remains to consider r({ci,cj})r(\{c_{i},c_{j}\}), which was defined as

vVmin(r(v,ci),r(v,cj)).\sum_{v\in V}\min(r(v,c_{i}),r(v,c_{j})).

Fix vv, we let clvc_{l_{v}} be any of the candidates where r(v,clv)r(v,c_{l_{v}}) is minimized. Then we define f(i,j)f(i,j) as

vVr(v,ci)>r(v,cj) OR (r(v,ci)=r(v,cj) AND ilv)r(v,cj).\sum_{\begin{subarray}{c}v\in V\\ r(v,c_{i})>r(v,c_{j})\text{ OR }\\ (r(v,c_{i})=r(v,c_{j})\text{ AND }i\leq l_{v})\end{subarray}}r(v,c_{j}).

We define g(i,j)g(i,j) as

vVr(v,ci)<r(v,cj) OR (r(v,ci)=r(v,cj) AND i>lv)r(v,ci)\sum_{\begin{subarray}{c}v\in V\\ r(v,c_{i})<r(v,c_{j})\text{ OR }\\ (r(v,c_{i})=r(v,c_{j})\text{ AND }i>l_{v})\end{subarray}}r(v,c_{i})

to cover the remaining cases. Clearly, w(i,j)=f(i,j)+g(i,j)w(i,j)=f(i,j)+g(i,j), so we can focus on f(i,j)f(i,j) from now on as we can handle g(i,j)g(i,j) similarly.

We need to have the following claim.

Claim 7.

For any fixed jj and vv, the set of i<ji<j that satisfies r(v,ci)>r(v,cj) OR (r(v,ci)=r(v,cj) AND ilv)r(v,c_{i})>r(v,c_{j})\text{\ OR\ }(r(v,c_{i})=r(v,c_{j})\text{\ AND\ }i\leq l_{v}) always has the form {0,1,,pv,j}\{0,1,\ldots,p_{v,j}\} for some pv,jp_{v,j}. Furthermore, we can compute the values of pv,jp_{v,j} for all vv and jj in 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm) time in total.

Proof.

Let SS be the set of i<ji<j such that r(v,ci)>r(v,cj) OR (r(v,ci)=r(v,cj) AND ilv)r(v,c_{i})>r(v,c_{j})\text{ OR }(r(v,c_{i})=r(v,c_{j})\text{ AND }i\leq l_{v}). We aim to show that if xSx\in S, then any integer yy, where 0y<x0\leq y<x, is also in SS.

Then there are two cases:

  • In the first case, r(v,cx)>r(v,cj)r(v,c_{x})>r(v,c_{j}). In this case, we must have r(v,cy)r(v,cx)r(v,c_{y})\geq r(v,c_{x}) because the profile is single-peaked. Therefore, r(v,cy)>r(v,cj)r(v,c_{y})>r(v,c_{j}), and thus pSp\in S.

  • In the second case, r(v,cx)=r(v,cj)r(v,c_{x})=r(v,c_{j}). In this case, clearly ylvy\leq l_{v}, so it suffices to show r(v,cy)r(v,cj)=r(v,cx)r(v,c_{y})\geq r(v,c_{j})=r(v,c_{x}). For the sake of contradiction, suppose r(v,cy)<r(v,cx)r(v,c_{y})<r(v,c_{x}). Since y<xlvy<x\leq l_{v}, r(v,cy)<r(v,cx)r(v,c_{y})<r(v,c_{x}) implies r(v,cx)r(v,clv)r(v,c_{x})\leq r(v,c_{l_{v}}). Also, since r(v,clv)r(v,c_{l_{v}}) is minimum, we must have r(v,cx)=r(v,clv)r(v,c_{x})=r(v,c_{l_{v}}), i.e., r(v,cx)r(v,c_{x}) is also a minimum, and it contradicts to r(v,cy)<r(v,cx)r(v,c_{y})<r(v,c_{x}).

For each vv, if we iterate jj from 0 to m+1m+1, the value of pv,jp_{v,j} will first (weakly) increase and then (weakly) decrease, due to single-peakedness. More formally, we aim to show that for any j1<j2<j3j_{1}<j_{2}<j_{3}, pv,j1>pv,j2pv,j2pv,j3p_{v,j_{1}}>p_{v,j_{2}}\Rightarrow p_{v,j_{2}}\geq p_{v,j_{3}}. Assume for the sake of contradiction that pv,j1>pv,j2p_{v,j_{1}}>p_{v,j_{2}} and pv,j2<pv,j3p_{v,j_{2}}<p_{v,j_{3}} are both true. In other words, there exists ii such that ipv,j1i\leq p_{v,j_{1}} and ipv,j3i\leq p_{v,j_{3}} while i>pv,j2i>p_{v,j_{2}}. Since i>pv,j2i>p_{v,j_{2}}, one of the following must happen:

  • ij2i\geq j_{2}. This is not possible since ipv,j1i\leq p_{v,j_{1}} implies i<j1<j2i<j_{1}<j_{2}.

  • i<j2i<j_{2} and r(v,ci)<r(v,cj2)r(v,c_{i})<r(v,c_{j_{2}}). Since i<j2<j3i<j_{2}<j_{3}, the single-peakedness of the profile implies that r(v,cj2)r(v,cj3)r(v,c_{j_{2}})\leq r(v,c_{j_{3}}). Therefore, r(v,ci)<r(v,cj3)r(v,c_{i})<r(v,c_{j_{3}}), which contradicts to ipv,j3i\leq p_{v,j_{3}}.

  • i<j2i<j_{2}, r(v,ci)=r(v,cj2)r(v,c_{i})=r(v,c_{j_{2}}) and i>clvi>c_{l_{v}}. In this case, if r(v,ci)r(v,c_{i}) equals r(v,cj1)r(v,c_{j_{1}}), ii must be less than or equal to clvc_{l_{v}}, thus leading to a contradiction. Therefore, r(v,ci)>r(v,cj1)r(v,c_{i})>r(v,c_{j_{1}}). Thus, r(v,cj2)>r(v,cj1)r(v,c_{j_{2}})>r(v,c_{j_{1}}). By single-peakedness, r(v,cj3)r(v,cj2)r(v,c_{j_{3}})\geq r(v,c_{j_{2}}). Thus, r(v,cj3)r(v,ci)r(v,c_{j_{3}})\geq r(v,c_{i}). Since ipv,j3i\leq p_{v,j_{3}}, it is not possible that r(v,cj3)>r(v,ci)r(v,c_{j_{3}})>r(v,c_{i}). Therefore, r(v,cj3)=r(v,ci)r(v,c_{j_{3}})=r(v,c_{i}) and iclvi\leq c_{l_{v}}, leading to a contradiction.

Therefore, by increasing or decreasing the value of pv,jp_{v,j} accordingly after we increment jj, we can efficiently compute pv,jp_{v,j} for all jj. The total amount of changes to the values of pv,jp_{v,j} over all values of jj for a fixed vv is 𝒪(m)\mathcal{O}(m). Thus, this takes 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm) time overall to compute all pv,jp_{v,j}. ∎

Now we can use pv,jp_{v,j} to reformulate f(i,j)f(i,j): for any i<ji<j, f(i,j)=vV,ipv,jr(v,cj)f(i,j)=\sum_{v\in V,i\leq p_{v,j}}r(v,c_{j}). Conceptually, for every jj, we consider nn numbers pv,jp_{v,j}, where pv,jp_{v,j} has a weight r(v,cj)r(v,c_{j}). Then for each ii, we just need to report the total weights of numbers that are at least ii. To achieve this task, we first sort nn numbers npv,j+vn\cdot p_{v,j}+v for vVv\in V. We will be able to retrieve vv from each npv,j+vn\cdot p_{v,j}+v in the sorted array, and thus retrieve r(v,cj)r(v,c_{j}). Then we compute the suffix sums of r(v,cj)r(v,c_{j}) in the sorted order. For every query ii, we can easily find the smallest pv,jp_{v,j} that is greater than or equal to ii in 𝒪(log(m))\mathcal{O}(\log(m)) time (for instance, we can first remove duplicated pv,jp_{v,j} during pre-processing to guarantee that there are at most mm of them, then use binary search to find such a pv,jp_{v,j}), then use the suffix sum associated with it as the answer.

Therefore, the time complexity for the pre-processing is upper bounded by the cost of sorting nn non-negative integers bounded by 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm), multiplied by a factor of mm, and the query time is 𝒪(log(m))\mathcal{O}(\log(m)). ∎

In the real-RAM model of computation we consider in this paper, we can use any standard sorting algorithm to sort nn integers in 𝒪(nlog(n))\mathcal{O}(n\log(n)) time, so the pre-processing time of Lemma 6 becomes 𝒪(nmlog(n))\mathcal{O}(nm\log(n)). In the word-RAM model of computation, faster algorithms for sorting integers are known. For instance, it is known that IntSort(n,nm)=𝒪(nloglog(n))\operatorname*{Int\-Sort}(n,nm)=\mathcal{O}(n\sqrt{\log\log(n)}) [30]. Also, in a common case where m=poly(n)m=\operatorname*{poly}(n), IntSort(n,nm)=𝒪(n)\operatorname*{Int\-Sort}(n,nm)=\mathcal{O}(n) by radix sort. One may use such faster integer sorting algorithms to obtain faster running time for the overall algorithm in the word-RAM model of computation, when all misrepresentations are given as integers (e.g. when we use Borda misrepresentation function).

Combining Lemma 6 with previous ideas we obtain the following theorem.

Theorem 8.

We can solve Chamberlin-Courant on single-peaked preference profiles in time 𝒪(nmlog(n)+m1+o(1))\mathcal{O}(nm\log(n)+m^{1+o(1)}) assuming that an SP-axis is given or at least one vote is a linear order.

4 Nearly Single-Peaked Preferences and Chamberlin-Courant Rule

Betzler et al. [7] showed that Approval-CC is 𝖶[2]{\mathsf{W}}[2]-hard w.r.t. kk. Their reduction is from the Hitting Set problem (HS), in which we are given a family ={F1,Fn}\mathcal{F}=\{F_{1},\dots F_{n}\} of sets over a universe U={u1,,um}U=\{u_{1},\dots,u_{m}\} and a positive integer kk, and the task is to decide whether there exists a size-kk subset UUU^{\prime}\subseteq U such that UFiU^{\prime}\cap F_{i}\neq\emptyset for every FiF_{i}\in\mathcal{F}.

Actually, the reduction presented by Betzler et al. [7] also works for the Monroe rule. This makes the reduction more complex than it is needed for Approval-CC. A simple reduction from HS to Approval-CC has a strict correspondence between a universe and candidates, and between a family of sets and voters. A voter approves a candidate if the corresponding set to the voter contains the corresponding element to the candidate. The misrepresentation bound is equal to 0 as this will require to cover (hit) all the voters (sets). Because of this correspondence, Approval-CC with R=0R=0 is equivalent to HS.

It was observed recently [29] that, assuming Set Cover Conjecture (SCC) there is no 𝒪((2ε)n)\mathcal{O}^{*}((2-\varepsilon)^{n})-time algorithm for Approval-CC or Borda-CC, for every ε>0\varepsilon>0. This observation follows directly from the reductions presented by Betzler et al. [7] and SCC-hardness of HS [17, Conjecture 14.36]. On the other hand, for general misrepresentation function, Betzler et al. [7] showed an 𝒪(nn)\mathcal{O}^{*}(n^{n})-time algorithm. An interesting open question is to close this gap for general misrepresentation functions. Note that for the case of Borda-CC, Gupta et al. [29] showed an 𝒪(2n)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{n})-time algorithm.

Below, we observe the SETH-hardness of CC, due to the SETH-hardness of HS [16] and the reduction of Betzler et al. [7].

Observation 9.

Assuming the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis, for every ε>0\varepsilon>0, there is no 𝒪((2ε)m)\mathcal{O}^{*}((2-\varepsilon)^{m})-time algorithm for CC, even for approval ballots.

It means that the 𝒪(2m)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{m})-time brute-force algorithm, which checks all size-kk subsets of candidates, is essentially optimal for CC in terms of parameter mm. On the other hand, for CC-SP we showed an almost optimal algorithm (Theorem 8). Hence, it is natural to study computational complexity of CC on preferences that are close to SP in terms of the candidate-deletion operation.

We assume that a candidate-deletion set is given as this makes the problem formulation as general as possible. Otherwise, finding the minimum size candidate-deletion set would be a bottleneck for our algorithm as, in general, the problem is 𝖭𝖯{\mathsf{NP}}-hard. The hardness follows from the observation that the problem with approval ballots is equivalent to the problem of deleting a minimum number of columns to transform a given binary matrix into a matrix with the consecutive ones property (Min-COS-C). For an overview on the computational complexity of Min-COS-C see, e.g., [18]. An interesting hardness result for Min-COS-C described therein is that an α\alpha-approximation algorithm for Min-COS-C derives an α/2\alpha/2-approximate solution to the Vertex Cover problem. As a consequence, it is 𝖭𝖯{\mathsf{NP}}-hard to approximate the smallest candidate-deletion set within a factor of 2.722.72 [33] and it is Unique Games Conjecture-hard to approximate within a factor of 4ϵ4-\epsilon, for every ϵ>0\epsilon>0 [34]. The hardness holds already for approval preferences, where each voter approves at most 22 candidates. On the other hand, we can compute the minimum size candidate-deletion set in polynomial-time if all votes are linear orders [44, 25]. This holds, e.g., when the misrepresentation function is derived from a committee scoring rule [22] where a classic example is Borda scoring rule used in Borda-CC.

In the following theorem we show that CC is FPT w.r.t. the size of a given candidate-deletion set777This result was presented before by Misra et al. [37], however our construction is well-suited for generalization to Thiele rules presented in Section 5, so we provide a proof for completeness. (denoted by DD) and the obtained algorithm is essentially optimal assuming SETH. The main idea of the algorithm is to: 1) guess pre-elected winners among DD; 2) delete DD from the instance together with appropriate modification of the instance with respect to the pre-elected winners; 3) as the modified instance appears to be a CC-SP instance, we use our algorithm from Theorem 8.

Theorem 10.

We can solve Chamberlin-Courant with a given candidate-deletion set of size dd in time 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d}). Furthermore, assuming the Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis, for any ε>0\varepsilon>0 there is no 𝒪((2ε)d)\mathcal{O}^{*}((2-\varepsilon)^{d})-time algorithm that solves the problem, even for approval ballots.

Proof.

Let I=(V,C,r,k)I=(V,C,r,k) be an instance of the optimization version of CC and DD be a candidate-deletion set of size dd. For the sake of analysis let us fix an optimal solution WW^{*} to the instance II.

Algorithm. First, we would like to find WD=WDW_{D}^{*}=W^{*}\cap D which we call pre-elected winners. It is enough to consider all subsets WDDW_{D}\subseteq D of size at most kk. We have at most i=0min(k,d)(di)2d\sum_{i=0}^{\min(k,d)}\binom{d}{i}\leq 2^{d} many such subsets and WDW_{D}^{*} is one of them. For each subset WDW_{D}, we will remove DD from the instance and find remaining k=k|WD|k^{\prime}=k-|W_{D}| winners that minimizes total misrepresentation of a committee consisted of the members of WDW_{D} and the remaining kk^{\prime} candidates. We will store all committees constructed for each considered WDW_{D} and we will return the committee with the smallest total misrepresentation. Notice that in the case where WD=WDW_{D}=W_{D}^{*} we will construct WW^{*} (or another optimal solution to the instance II) as one of the potential solutions. Below, we describe how to fill optimally a pre-elected committee WDW_{D}.

If |WD|=k|W_{D}|=k then we simply save WDW_{D} as one of potential solutions of our algorithm. Otherwise, if |WD|<k|W_{D}|<k, we need to choose additional k=k|WD|k^{\prime}=k-|W_{D}| winners to the committee among a subset C=CDC^{\prime}=C\setminus D. For this purpose, we define a new instance I=(V,C,r,k)I^{\prime}=(V,C^{\prime},r^{\prime},k^{\prime}) of CC, where r:V×C0r^{\prime}:V\times C^{\prime}\rightarrow{{\mathbb{R}}}_{\geq 0} is defined as follows:

r(v,c)=min(r(v,WD),r(v,c))=r(v,WD{c}).r^{\prime}(v,c)=\min(r(v,W_{D}),r(v,c))=r(v,W_{D}\cup\{c\}).

The misrepresentation function rr^{\prime} is constructed in such a way that misrepresentation of vv from a candidate cCc\in C^{\prime} is not greater than misrepresentation of vv by any pre-elected candidate, i.e., a candidate from WDW_{D}. Moreover, we have r(v,W)=r(v,WDW)r^{\prime}(v,W^{\prime})=r(v,W_{D}\cup W^{\prime}). It means that an optimal solution to II^{\prime} has the same misrepresentation as an optimal extension of the pre-elected committee WDW_{D}, as desired. Note that, when WD=WDW_{D}=W_{D}^{*}, an optimal solution to II^{\prime} has the same total misrepresentation as an optimal solution WW^{*}. Below we show formally that the obtained preference profile (V,C,r)(V,C^{\prime},r^{\prime}) is single-peaked.

Lemma 11.

The preference profile (V,C,r)(V,C^{\prime},r^{\prime}) is single-peaked.

Proof.

By the definition of DD, we know that (V,CD,rD)(V,C\setminus D,r_{-D}) is SP. It means that there exists a linear order \prec over CD=CC\setminus D=C^{\prime} such that rDr_{-D} has the single-peakedness conditions. We will show that the linear order \prec is also an SP-axis for rr^{\prime}. For this purpose, let us consider a triple of distinct candidates a,b,cCa,b,c\in C^{\prime} such that abca\prec b\prec c and let vVv\in V be any voter. If r(v,a)<r(v,b)r^{\prime}(v,a)<r^{\prime}(v,b) then by the definition of rr^{\prime} we have r(v,WD{a})<r(v,WD{b})r(v,W_{D}\cup\{a\})<r(v,W_{D}\cup\{b\}). Due to the strictness of the inequality and the definition of r(v,)r(v,\cdot) we obtain r(v,a)<r(v,b)r(v,a)<r(v,b). Single-peakedness of (V,C,r)(V,C^{\prime},r) on the SP-axis \prec implies r(v,b)r(v,c)r(v,b)\leq r(v,c). From the definition of r(v,)r(v,\cdot) we obtain r(v,WD{b})r(v,WD{c})r(v,W_{D}\cup\{b\})\leq r(v,W_{D}\cup\{c\}) and, by the definition of rr^{\prime}, this is equivalent to r(v,b)r(v,c)r^{\prime}(v,b)\leq r^{\prime}(v,c) as desired in the condition for single-peakedness for (V,C,r)(V,C^{\prime},r^{\prime}). The condition when cbac\prec b\prec a can be proven analogously. ∎

Therefore, the new instance is an CC-SP instance which can be solved in polynomial-time, e.g., using our algorithm from Theorem 8. In such a way, we find the remaining kk^{\prime} winners optimally.

Running time. The running time comes from a consideration of all subsets of DD of size at most kk (there are at most 2d2^{d} such subsets) and, for each such subset, run an algorithm that solves an CC-SP instance in polynomial-time.

Lower bound. Let I=(V,C,r,k)I=(V,C,r,k) be an instance of Approval-CC. Let DD be any size-(m2)(m-2) subset of CC. Note that DD is a candidate-deletion set, as a profile with two candidates is always SP. Then, an 𝒪((2ε)d)\mathcal{O}^{*}((2-\varepsilon)^{d})-time algorithm for Approval-CC on an instance II with a given candidate-deletion set DD, for some ϵ>0\epsilon>0, would solve II in time at most 𝒪((2ε)d)𝒪((2ε)m)\mathcal{O}^{*}((2-\varepsilon)^{d})\leq\mathcal{O}^{*}((2-\varepsilon)^{m}). This is a contradiction with SETH due to Observation 9. ∎

A simple corollary from Theorem 10 is that CC is polynomial-time solvable if dd is logarithmic in the input size.

Corollary 12.

Chamberlin-Courant with a given candidate-deletion set of size dd, where d𝒪(log(nm))d\leq\mathcal{O}(\log(nm)), is polynomial-time solvable.

One would ask whether we can have polynomial-time algorithm for larger values of dd. Unfortunately, in the following theorem we show that if dd is slightly larger than logarithm in the input size, say d=𝒪(lognloglogm)d=\mathcal{O}(\log n\log\log m), then it is not possible under ETH.

Theorem 13.

Under the Exponential Time Hypothesis, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin-Courant with a given candidate-deletion set of size at most f(n,m)f(n,m) for any function f(n,m)=ω(log(n))f(n,m)=\omega(\log(n)) or f(n,m)=ω(log(m))f(n,m)=\omega(\log(m)).

Proof.

By the known ETH hardness of HS [31] and the above-mentioned reduction from HS to Approval-CC, Approval-CC does not have 2o(N)2^{o(N)} time algorithm when there are 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) candidates and 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) voters under ETH. From such hard instances, we construct hard instances for every function f(n,m)=ω(log(n))f(n,m)=\omega(\log(n)) or f(n,m)=ω(log(m))f(n,m)=\omega(\log(m)).

For the first case, given an Approval-CC instance with 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) candidates and 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) voters, we aim to create an instance where the size of the candidate-deletion set dd is 𝒪(h(n,m)log(n))\mathcal{O}(h(n,m)\log(n)) for h(n,m)=f(n,m)/log(n)=ω(1)h(n,m)=f(n,m)/\log(n)=\omega(1). We then add some dummy voters, one by one, until n2N/h(n,m)n\geq 2^{N/h(n,m)} so that for each dummy voter vv, r(v,c)=0r(v,c)=0 for every candidate cc (rr is still an approval misrepresentation function). The minimum total misrepresentation will not change with the addition of these voters. The candidate-deletion set could be the set of all candidates. In the new instance n2N/h(n,m)n\geq 2^{N/h(n,m)} and d=m=𝒪(N)d=m=\mathcal{O}(N). Thus, d=𝒪(h(n,m)log(n))d=\mathcal{O}(h(n,m)\log(n)) as desired. Since the reduction clearly has running time 2o(N)2^{o(N)}, the new instance does not have poly(n)=poly(2N/h(n,m))=2o(N)\operatorname*{poly}(n)=\operatorname*{poly}(2^{N/h(n,m)})=2^{o(N)} time algorithm under ETH.

The other case is analogous. Given an Approval-CC instance with 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) candidates and 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) voters, we aim to create an instance where d=𝒪(h(n,m)log(m))d=\mathcal{O}(h(n,m)\log(m)) for h(n,m)=f(n,m)/log(m)=ω(1)h(n,m)=f(n,m)/\log(m)=\omega(1). We then add some dummy candidates until m2N/h(n,m)m\geq 2^{N/h(n,m)} so that for each dummy candidate cc, r(v,c)=1r(v,c)=1 for every voter vv (rr is still an approval misrepresentation function). The minimum total misrepresentation will not change with the addition of these candidates. Also, note that if we delete the original 𝒪(N)\mathcal{O}(N) candidates, the profile will be single-peaked. Thus, d𝒪(N)=𝒪(h(n,m)logm)d\leq\mathcal{O}(N)=\mathcal{O}(h(n,m)\log m) as desired. Under ETH, the new instance does not have poly(m)=poly(2N/h(n,m))=2o(N)\operatorname*{poly}(m)=\operatorname*{poly}(2^{N/h(n,m)})=2^{o(N)} time algorithm. ∎

5 Nearly Single-Peaked Preferences and Thiele Voting Rules

In this section, we first provide an ETH-based lower bound on the running times of algorithms that solve any non-constant ww-Thiele.

The first proof of 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hardness of all non-constant ww-Thiele follows from 𝖭𝖯\mathsf{NP}-hardness proof for the OWA-Winner problem for a specific family of OWA vectors [47, Theorem 5]. To show ETH-hardness straightforwardly, we will instead use a reduction from the Independent Set problem (IS). In IS we are given a graph, a positive integer kk and we are asked whether there exists a size-kk subset of vertices such that no two of them are adjacent. The idea to reduce from IS was used in [4] for the above-mentioned Proportional Approval Voting. Actually, their reduction works for any ww-Thiele with w2<1w_{2}<1. The idea was extended by Jain et al. [32] to other non-constant ww-Thiele rules when w2=1w_{2}=1 by introducing a proper number of dummy candidates. They presented their result for a more general problem and, actually, they did not include a formal construction in their paper, so in the proof of Theorem 14 we include a simplified proof that works specifically for all non-constant ww-Thiele.

In our reduction, we have m=|V(G)|+𝒪(1)m=|V(G)|+\mathcal{O}(1) and n=32|V(G)|n=\frac{3}{2}|V(G)|, where V(G)V(G) is the set of vertices in an IS instance on a 33-regular graph. Therefore, since IS on 33-regular graphs does not have 2o(|V(G)|)2^{o(|V(G)|)} time algorithms under ETH [3, Theorem 5], we obtain the following theorem.

Theorem 14.

Assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis, there is neither 𝒪(2o(m))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(m)}) nor 𝒪(2o(n))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(n)})-time algorithm for any non-constant ww-Thiele.

Proof.

First, we provide a formal construction of the reduction from IS to ww-Thiele for any non-constant Thiele sequence ww. Its idea was described in [32] for an even more general problem (related to a participatory budgeting problem which allows interactions between items we choose). For completeness we include a simplified construction of the reduction tailored for our needs.

Reduction. Let (G,K)(G,K) be an instance of IS, where GG is a 33-regular graph with a vertex set V(G)V(G) and an edge set E(G)E(G), and KK is a positive integer. For a fixed Thiele sequence ww we construct an instance of ww-Thiele as follows. For each vertex vV(G)v\in V(G) we define a vertex-candidate cvc_{v}. As ww is a fixed non-constant Thiele sequence, there exists a minimum constant {2,3,}\ell\in\{2,3,\dots\} such that w<1w_{\ell}<1. We add 2\ell-2 dummy candidates CD={d1,d2,d2}C_{D}=\{d_{1},d_{2},\dots d_{\ell-2}\} to the instance. Hence, the total number of candidates equals m=|V(G)|+2=|V(G)|+𝒪(1)m=|V(G)|+\ell-2=|V(G)|+\mathcal{O}(1). For each edge eE(G)e\in E(G) we define a voter vev_{e} which approves exactly two candidates that are not dummy corresponding to the endpoints xx and yy of ee and all dummy candidates, i.e., Ave={x,y}CDA_{v_{e}}=\{x,y\}\cup C_{D}. The number of voters equals n=E(G)=32V(G)n=E(G)=\frac{3}{2}V(G). We define the desired size of the committee as k=K+2k=K+\ell-2 and the utility bound as U=(2)E(G)+3KU=(\ell-2)E(G)+3K. Clearly, it is a polynomial-time reduction.

Correctness. Let VV^{\prime} be a size-KK independent set of GG. We use C(V)C(V^{\prime}) to denote the set of candidates corresponding to vertices from VV^{\prime}. We define a solution WW to the constructed instance of ww-Thiele as candidates from C(V)C(V^{\prime}) and all dummy candidates, i.e., W=C(V)CDW=C(V^{\prime})\cup C_{D}. We will show that this is a feasible solution. Clearly |W|=K+2=k|W|=K+\ell-2=k. The total utility achieved by the solution WW consists of: |E(G)|i=12wi=|E(G)|(2)|E(G)|\sum_{i=1}^{\ell-2}w_{i}=|E(G)|(\ell-2) from dummy candidates and 3K3K from CDC_{D} as each vertex from the corresponding size-KK independent set covers exactly 33 edges and none of the edges is covered twice (hence each voter is covered at most 1\ell-1 times). Formally, the total utility achieved by WW can be computed as follows:

u(W)=eE(G)u(ve,W)=eE(G)i=1|AveW|wi={x,y}E(G)i=1|({cx,cy}CD)(C(V)CD)|wi={x,y}E(G)i=1|{cx,cy}C(V)|+2wi=(2)|E(G)|+{x,y}E(G)i=1|{cx,cy}C(V)|wi+2\begin{array}[]{lcl}u(W)&=&\sum_{e\in E(G)}u(v_{e},W)=\sum_{e\in E(G)}\sum_{i=1}^{|A_{v_{e}}\cap W|}w_{i}\\ &=&\sum_{\{x,y\}\in E(G)}\sum_{i=1}^{|(\{c_{x},c_{y}\}\cup C_{D})\cap(C(V^{\prime})\cup C_{D})|}w_{i}\\ &=&\sum_{\{x,y\}\in E(G)}\sum_{i=1}^{|\{c_{x},c_{y}\}\cap C(V^{\prime})|+\ell-2}w_{i}\\ &=&(\ell-2)|E(G)|+\sum_{\{x,y\}\in E(G)}\sum_{i=1}^{|\{c_{x},c_{y}\}\cap C(V^{\prime})|}w_{i+\ell-2}\end{array}
=(2)|E(G)|+{x,y}E(G)i=1|{x,y}V|wi+2=()(2)|E(G)|+{x,y}E(G)|{x,y}V|w1=()(2)|E(G)|+3K1=U,\begin{array}[]{lcl}&=&(\ell-2)|E(G)|+\sum_{\{x,y\}\in E(G)}\sum_{i=1}^{|\{x,y\}\cap V^{\prime}|}w_{i+\ell-2}\\ &\stackrel{{\scriptstyle(*)}}{{=}}&(\ell-2)|E(G)|+\sum_{\{x,y\}\in E(G)}|\{x,y\}\cap V^{\prime}|\cdot w_{\ell-1}\\ &\stackrel{{\scriptstyle(**)}}{{=}}&(\ell-2)|E(G)|+3K\cdot 1=U,\end{array}

where ()(*) follows because VV^{\prime} is an independent set, so it is never true that |{x,y}V|=2|\{x,y\}\cap V^{\prime}|=2, and ()(**) follows from the fact that w1=1w_{\ell-1}=1 and the number of incident edges to VV^{\prime} is 3K3K as GG is a 33-regular graph and |V|=K|V^{\prime}|=K. Hence, WW is a solution to the constructed instance.

In the other direction, let WW be a feasible solution to the constructed instance. First, we notice that CDWC_{D}\subseteq W. Otherwise, the total utility achieved by WW would be at most: (3)|E(G)|+3(K+1)=(2)|E(G)|+3K+(3|E(G)|)<U(\ell-3)|E(G)|+3(K+1)=(\ell-2)|E(G)|+3K+(3-|E(G)|)<U. We define a size-KK subset of V(G)V(G) as vertices that correspond to WCDW\setminus C_{D} and next, we argue that the constructed subset is an independent set. Indeed, if it is not the case, then there exists an edge e=(x,y)E(G)e=(x,y)\in E(G) such that cx,cyWCDc_{x},c_{y}\in W\setminus C_{D}, hence the voter vev_{e} is covered exactly \ell times. Then, the total utility achieved by WW is at most: (2)|E(G)|+3K1+w=U+(w1)<U(\ell-2)|E(G)|+3K-1+w_{\ell}=U+(w_{\ell}-1)<U. It is a contradiction with the fact that WW is a feasible solution.

Lower bound. To achieve a lower bound, let us assume there is an 𝒪(2o(m))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(m)})-time algorithm for a fixed non-constant ww-Thiele. Using the reduction presented above we can solve IS on a 33-regular graph GG in time: 𝒪(2o(m))=𝒪(2o(|V(G)|+𝒪(1)))=𝒪(2o(|V(G)|))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(m)})=\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(|V(G)|+\mathcal{O}(1))})=\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(|V(G)|)}), which contradicts ETH [3, Theorem 5].

Analogously we prove the other lower bound using the fact that n=32|V(G)|n=\frac{3}{2}|V(G)|. ∎

Theorem 14 means that the 𝒪(2m)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{m})-time brute-force algorithm is essentially optimal for non-constant ww-Thiele rules in terms of parameter mm. In contrast to CC, the gap for parameter nn is much larger in the case of Thiele rules. Known algorithm that is FPT w.r.t. nn for Thiele rules has double exponential dependence, namely 𝒪(22𝒪(n))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{2^{\mathcal{O}(n)}}) [10]. Narrowing the gap for the parameter nn is an interesting research direction.

It is known that ww-Thiele is polynomial-time solvable on SP profiles by, e.g., using an Integer Linear Programming formulation (ILP) which has totally unimodular matrix (TUM) [39]. Such ILP can be solved by a polynomial-time algorithm for Linear Programming.

Analogously to CC, we study the computational complexity of ww-Thiele where a candidate-deletion set DD of size dd is given.

In Theorem 16 we show that ww-Thiele is also FPT w.r.t. dd, with an 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d}) running time by checking all subsets of a candidate-deletion set as pre-elected winners. However, the way we solve an instance with pre-elected winners is completely different from what we do for CC (Theorem 10). In order to derive the above result we first define generalized Thiele rules in which each voter has a private Thiele sequence. Formally, the input of Generalized Thiele is a superset of the input of regular ww-Thiele and additionally there is also a collection of nn Thiele sequences, one for each voter. (In contrast, the Thiele sequence is not an input to ww-Thiele. We emphasize that ww-Thiele is a collection of computational problems parameterized by a Thiele sequence ww, hence we can provide results for specific Thiele sequences, e.g., in Theorem 14). Precisely, a collection of nn Thiele sequences ww is represented by a function of two arguments: w:V×+[0,1]w:V\times{{\mathbb{N}}}^{+}\rightarrow[0,1], where (w(v,i))i+(w(v,i))_{i\in{{\mathbb{N}}}^{+}} is a Thiele sequence for each voter vVv\in V. For brevity we define wiv=w(v,i)w_{i}^{v}=w(v,i). Now, utility of a voter vv from a committee CC^{\prime} is defined as u(v,C)=i=1|AvC|wivu(v,C^{\prime})=\sum_{i=1}^{|A_{v}\cap C^{\prime}|}w_{i}^{v}. As in ww-Thiele, in Generalized Thiele our task is to find a size-kk subset WCW\subseteq C such that the total utility u(W)u(W) is at least UU.

It is easy to see that any ww-Thiele is a special case of Generalized Thiele. Indeed, a given instance of ww-Thiele is an instance of Generalized Thiele where ww is the Thiele sequence for each voter.

One immediate yet interesting result, is that Generalized Thiele on SP profiles is polynomial-time solvable. The proof follows from a proper modification of the objective function of ILP presented by Peters [39].

Theorem 15.

Generalized Thiele on single-peaked preferences profiles can be solved in polynomial-time.

Proof.

We use the approach presented by Peters [39] for ww-Thiele, i.e. the ILP formulation labeled PAV-IP therein, which has totally unimodular matrix. We modify the objective function as follows. Instead of

maxvV=1kwxv,,\max\sum_{v\in V}\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}w_{\ell}\cdot x_{v,\ell},

we use

maxvV=1kwvxv,.\max\sum_{v\in V}\sum_{\ell=1}^{k}w_{\ell}^{v}\cdot x_{v,\ell}.

A binary variable xv,x_{v,\ell} encodes information whether vv has at least \ell approved candidates in a solution. Clearly, such ILP solves Generalized Thiele. Notice that the constraints are exactly the same as in PAV-IP, therefore the constraint matrix is totally unimodular for SP profiles, so we can solve Generalized Thiele on SP profiles using any polynomial-time algorithm for Linear Programming. ∎

Now we are ready to show our main result in this section, i.e., an algorithm which is FPT w.r.t. the size of a given candidate-deletion set that works not only for ww-Thiele but also for Generalized Thiele.

Theorem 16.

We can solve Generalized Thiele with a given candidate-deletion set of size dd in time 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d}). Furthermore, assuming the Exponential Time Hypothesis, there is no 𝒪(2o(d))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(d)})-time algorithm that solves the problem, even for any non-constant ww-Thiele.

Proof.

Let DD be a given candidate-deletion set of size dd. First, we guess pre-elected winners among DD, call them WDW_{D}. Next we delete DD from the instance, but then the proper modification of the instance with respect to the pre-elected winners is different with that in Theorem 10. Instead of modifying utility function we modify Thiele sequences for each voter depending on the number of approved candidates among pre-elected winners WDW_{D}.

For each voter vVv\in V we define a new Thiele sequence such that w^iv=wi+|AvWD|v\hat{w}_{i}^{v}=w_{i+|A_{v}\cap W_{D}|}^{v} for every ii. Note that a given instance of Generalized Thiele with removed candidates from DD and modified Thiele sequences as defined above is a Generalized Thiele instance with an SP profile. Therefore, we can solve it in polynomial-time using Theorem 15.

In at least one case, when trying all subsets of DD, we consider the maximum subset of an optimal solution that is included in DD. In this case we find the remaining winners making a committee at least as good as an optimal one, so also optimal. Because of the guessing phase, the running time is clearly 𝒪(2d)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{d}).

Lower bound. Analogously to the lower bound proof of Theorem 10, for a given instance of non-constant ww-Thiele we define DD as a set of all candidates except arbitrary 22 candidates. After removing DD from the instance, we get a profile with 22 candidates, hence an SP profile, so DD is a candidate-deletion set. Then, an 𝒪(2o(d))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(d)})-time algorithm for Generalized Thiele on our instance with a given candidate-deletion set DD would solve II in time at most 𝒪(2o(d))𝒪(2o(m)))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(d)})\leq\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(m)})). This is a contradiction with ETH due to Theorem 14. ∎

Analogously to the results for CC, Generalized Thiele is polynomial-time solvable if dd is logarithmic in the input size and is not polynomial-time solvable under ETH if dd is slightly larger.

Corollary 17.

Generalized Thiele with a given candidate-deletion set of size dd, where d𝒪(log(nm))d\leq\mathcal{O}(\log(nm)), is polynomial-time solvable.

Theorem 18.

Under Exponential Time Hypothesis, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for Generalized Thiele with a given candidate-deletion set of size at most f(n,m)f(n,m) for any function f(n,m)=ω(log(n))f(n,m)=\omega(\log(n)) or f(n,m)=ω(log(m))f(n,m)=\omega(\log(m)), even for any non-constant ww-Thiele.

Proof.

After we apply Theorem 14, the remaining proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 13. The only difference is that in the case of adding dummy voters, which approve all the candidates, we have to increase the required utility bound properly. Indeed, each dummy voter will get exactly i=1kwi\sum_{i=1}^{k}w_{i} score from any solution of size kk. ∎

6 Conclusions

We showed an almost optimal algorithm for CC-SP (Theorem 8). The bottleneck of the algorithm is finding (if not given) an SP-axis in the case where all the votes are given as weak orders. Finding an SP-axis on weak orders takes 𝒪(nm2)\mathcal{O}(nm^{2}) time [28]—they reduce this problem to the Consecutive Ones problem and apply known algorithms for the latter problem. Can it be improved to 𝒪(nm)\mathcal{O}(nm)-time?

We showed that CC on general instances is FPT w.r.t. the size of a given candidate-deletion set DD (Theorem 10). Moreover, the achieved 𝒪(2|D|)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{|D|})-time algorithm is essentially optimal under SETH. We adapted this result to Thiele rules (Theorem 15), but we do not know how much the base of the power in our 𝒪(2|D|)\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{|D|})-time algorithm for Thiele rules can be improved. We know that, under ETH, we cannot hope for an 𝒪(2o(|D|))\mathcal{O}^{*}(2^{o(|D|)})-time algorithm. Can one provide a stronger lower bound (e.g., under SETH or SCC)?

OWA-based rules are generalization of both CC and Thiele rules. ww-OWA-Winner rule generalizes ww-Thiele by allowing any utility values (as in CC) instead of approval ballots [47]. It is tricky to define total utility that a voter gets from a committee as we have a sequence ww and different utilities for all the members of a committee. It is defined by sorting these utilities and taking a dot product with ww (the highest utility is multiplied by the highest weight etc.) A minimization version of the problem was studied under the name OWA kk-Median [12]. An open question is whether such ww-OWA-Winner is FPT w.r.t. the size of a given candidate-deletion set. Our approach from Theorem 16 does not seem to work because we need to know how to modify Thiele sequences for each voter when we pre-define winners.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Virginia Vassilevska Williams was supported by NSF Grants CCF-2129139 and CCF-1909429, a BSF Grant BSF:2020356, a Google Research Fellowship and a Sloan Research Fellowship. Yinzhan Xu was partially supported by NSF Grant CCF-2129139. Krzysztof Sornat was partially supported by the SNSF Grant 200021_200731/1, the National Science Centre, Poland (NCN; grant number 2018/28/T/ST6/00366) and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No 101002854).

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