Modal completeness of sublogics of the interpretability logic
Abstract
We study modal completeness and incompleteness of several sublogics of the interpretability logic . We introduce the sublogic , and prove that is sound and complete with respect to Veltman prestructures which are introduced by Visser. Moreover, we prove the modal completeness of twelve logics between and with respect to Veltman prestructures. On the other hand, we prove that eight natural sublogics of are modally incomplete. Finally, we prove that these incomplete logics are complete with respect to generalized Veltman prestructures. As a consequence of these investigations, we obtain that the twenty logics studied in this paper are all decidable.
1 Introduction
The notion of formalized provability is well-studied in the framework of modal logic. The provability logic of Peano Arithmetic is the set of all modal formulas that are verifiable in when the modal operator is interpreted as the provability predicate of . Solovayโs arithmetical completeness theorem [12] states that the provability logic of is exactly axiomatized by the modal logic that is obtained from the smallest normal modal logic by adding the axiom scheme . Segerberg [10] proved that the logic is sound and complete with respect to the class of all transitive and conversely well-founded finite Kripke frames.
The interpretability logic is the base logic for modal logical investigations of the notion of relative interpretability. The language of is that of with the additional binary modal operator . The binary modal operator binds stronger than , but weaker than , , and . The intended meaning of the formula is โ is relatively interpretable in โ. The inference rules of are the same as those of , and the axioms of are those of together with the following axioms:
-
;
-
;
-
;
-
;
-
.
The logic is not arithmetically complete by itself. The logic is obtained from by adding Montagnaโs Principle , then Berarducci [1] and Shavrukov [11] independently proved that is arithmetically sound and complete with respect to arithmetical interpretations for . Also let be the logic with the Persistence Principle . Visser [15] proved the arithmetical completeness theorem of the logic with respect to arithmetical interpretations for suitable finitely axiomatized fragments of .
These logics have Kripkean semantics. A triple is said to be an -frame or a Veltman frame if is a Kripke frame of and for each , is a transitive and reflexive binary relation on satisfying the following property: . De Jongh and Veltman [3] proved that is sound and complete with respect to all finite -frames. Also they proved that the logics and are sound and complete with respect to corresponding classes of finite -frames, respectively.
The logic and its extensions are not only arithmetically significant. It is known that for extensions of , relative interpretability is equivalent to -conservativity, and this equivalence is provable in (see [8]). Therefore the logic is also the logic of -conservativity for (see also [5]). On the other hand, when we consider the logics of -conservativity for , the principle is no longer arithmetically valid. Ignatiev [6] introduced the logic of conservativity which is obtained from by removing , and he proved that the extensions and of are exactly the logic of -conservativity and the logic of -conservativity for , respectively.
Ignatiev also proved that is complete with respect to Kripkean semantics. A triple is said to be a -frame if it is a structure with all properties of -frame but . Then is sound and complete with respect to the class of all finite -frames. The correspondence between and the property is explained in the framework of -frames. A triple is called an -frame or a Veltman prestructure if is a frame of and for each , is a binary relation on with . Then Visser [14] stated that for any -frame, the validity of the scheme is equivalent to the property .
Visser also showed, for example, that for any -frame, the validity of is equivalent to the property . However, systematic study of sublogics of through -frames has not been done so far. In this paper, we do this study, and prove the modal completeness and incompleteness of several sublogics of .
In Section 2, we introduce the logic that is valid in all -frames. We introduce the notion of -frames that serves a wider class of models than -frames. Then we show that is also valid in all -frames. In Section 3, we investigate several axiom schemata and extensions of . Section 4 is devoted to proving lemmas used to prove our modal completeness theorems. Our modal completeness theorem with respect to -frames is proved in Section 5. In Section 6, we prove several natural sublogics of are incomplete with respect to -frames. In Section 7, we prove these incomplete logics are complete with respect to -frames. Finally, Section 8 concludes the present paper with a few words.
2 The logic
In this section, we introduce and investigate the logic . The language of consists of countably many propositional variables , logical constants , , connectives , , , and modal operators , . The expression is an abbreviation for . We show that every theorem of is valid in all -frames defined below (see Definition 2.2). In fact, we will prove in Section 5 that is sound and complete with respect to the class of all (finite) -frames. The logic is the basis for our logics discussed in this paper.
First, we introduce the logic . Note that the axioms and rules of the logic are intended to characterize the logic of the class of all -frames.
Definition 2.1.
The axiom schemata of the logic are as follows:
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All tautologies in the language of ;
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;
-
;
-
;
-
.
The inference rules of are Modus Ponens , Necessitation , and . Here the rules and are defined as follows:
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;
-
.
The logic consists of the axiom schemata and , and of the inference rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation (in the language without ). Hence is an extension of . In Subsection 3.5, we prove that proves the axiom and admits the rules and (see Proposition 3.20). Therefore is a sublogic of .
We introduce -frames that are originally introduced by Visser [14] as Veltman prestructures.
Definition 2.2.
We say that a triple is an -frame if it satisfies the following conditions:
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1.
is a non-empty set;
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2.
is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on ;
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3.
For each , is a binary relation on satisfying .
A quadruple is called an -model if is an -frame and is a binary relation between and the set of all formulas satisfying the usual conditions for satisfaction with the following conditions:
-
โข
.
-
โข
.
A formula is said to be valid in an -frame if for all satisfaction relations on the frame and all , .
For each , let . In this notation, the third clause in the definition of -frames states that is a relation on . Note that this clause can be removed from the definition because it is not forced by axiom schemata of and does not affect the definition of . We impose this clause to simplify our arguments.
We prove that is sound with respect to the class of all -frames.
Proposition 2.3.
Every theorem of is valid in all -frames.
Proof.
We prove the claim by induction on the length of proofs in . Since the modal logic is sound with respect to the class of all transitive and conversely well-founded Kripke frames (see [2]), all theorems of in the language of are valid in all -frames. That is, , and are valid in all -frames, and the rules Modus Ponens and Necessitation preserve the validity. Then it suffices to prove that and are valid in all -frames, and the rules and preserve the validity.
Let be an -frame, be any element and be any satisfaction relation on .
: Suppose . Let be any element with and . In either case of and , there exists such that and . Thus we obtain .
: : Suppose . Then there is no such that and . Hence .
: Suppose . If there were with and , then there would be some such that , a contradiction. Thus if , then , and this means .
: Assume is valid in . Suppose and let be such that and . Then there exists such that and . By the assumption, . Then we obtain .
: Assume is valid in . Suppose and let be such that and . By the assumption, , and hence there exists such that and . Thus we have . โ
By the rules and , we immediately obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4.
Let be a logic with the inference rules and . If and , then .
In this paper, we freely use Proposition 2.4 without any mention. In , the inference rule is strengthened as follows.
Proposition 2.5.
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1.
.
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2.
.
Proof.
1. Since , we have by the rule . By the axiom , we obtain .
2. Since , we have by 1. Then by the axiom . Since , we have by the rule . Therefore we conclude . โ
Thus is deductively equivalent to the system obtained from by replacing the rule by the axiom scheme .
In Section 5, we will prove that several extensions of are complete with respect to corresponding classes of -frames. On the other hand, we will also prove that several logics are not complete. To prove this incompleteness, we use the notion of -frames that is a general notion of -frames or generalized Veltman frames introduced by Verbrugge [13] (see also [16, 9]).
Definition 2.6.
A tuple is called an -frame if it satisfies the following conditions:
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1.
is a non-empty set;
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2.
is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on ;
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3.
For each , is a relation on such that ;
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4.
(Monotonicity) .
As in the definition of -frames, we can define -models with the following clause:
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โข
.
Let be an -model. For each , we define the relation by . Then it is shown that is an -frame. Let be the unique satisfaction relation on this -frame satisfying that for any and any propositional variable , if and only if . Then is an -model, and for any and any formula , if and only if . Therefore, in this sense, every -frame (resp.ย model) can be recognized as an -frame (resp.ย model). We strengthen Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.7.
Every theorem of is valid in all -frames.
Proof.
Let be an -frame, be any element and be any satisfaction relation on . As in the proof of Proposition 2.3, we only prove the cases , , and .
: Suppose . Let be any element such that and . In either case that and , there exists such that and . Therefore .
: This follows from the following equivalences:
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose . Let be such that and . Then there exists such that and . For each , by the assumption. Therefore we conclude .
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose and let be any element with and . Then by the assumption, and hence there exists such that and . Thus we have .
โ
3 Extensions of
In this section, we investigate several additional axiom schemata and several extensions of . Let be axiom schemata. Then is the logic together with the axiom schemata . Let be an extension of . We say that is complete with respect to finite -frames (resp.ย -frames) if for any formula , if and only if is valid in all finite -frames (resp.ย -frames) where all axioms of are valid.
3.1 The axiom scheme
In this subsection, we investigate the axiom scheme .
-
.
First, we show that the following axiom scheme is equivalent to over .
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.
Proposition 3.1.
The logics and are deductively equivalent.
Therefore, in this paper, we sometimes identify the axiom schemata and . The following proposition is stated in Visser.
Proposition 3.2 (Visser [14]).
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
.
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose . Let be any satisfaction relation on satisfying that for any , if and only if for some fixed propositional variable . Then . Since and , there exists a such that and . By the definition of , , and hence .
: Assume . Let be such that and . Then , and thus we conclude . โ
We prove a similar equivalence concerning -frames.
Proposition 3.3.
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
.
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose . Let be a satisfaction relation on satisfying for any , if and only if for some fixed propositional variable . Then . Since and , there exists such that and . By the definition of , because is non-empty. We obtain .
: Assume . Let be such that and . Then and . Thus we conclude . โ
3.2 The axiom scheme
This subsection is devoted to investigating the axiom scheme .
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.
First, we prove that is equivalent to the following axiom scheme over . The principle is introduced in Visser [14].
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.
Proposition 3.4.
The logics and are deductively equivalent.
Proof.
This is because by . โ
Since is a particular instance of the axiom scheme , we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5.
.
The axiom scheme does not behave well by itself in the sense of modal completeness. In fact, we will prove in Section 6 that for instance, is not complete with respect to corresponding class of -frames. Thus we introduce a well-behaved axiom scheme whose corresponding class of -frames is same as that of . The principle is originally introduced in Visser [14]. We also introduce the schemata and as follows:
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.
-
.
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.
Proposition 3.6.
The logics , and are deductively equivalent.
Proof.
: Since , . Then we have .
: Since , by the rule . Then .
: By the axiom , we have . Since , we have by the rule . Thus . โ
The axiom scheme is a strengthening of the inference rule , and hence in extensions of , the inference rule is redundant.
We show that implies over .
Proposition 3.7.
.
Proof.
Since by , . Then by , we have . By Proposition 3.4, we conclude . โ
We prove that and have the same frame condition with respect to -frames. This is stated in Visser [14].
Proposition 3.8 (Visser [14]).
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
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2.
is valid in .
-
3.
.
Proof.
: By Proposition 3.7.
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if , and if and only if for some fixed propositional variables and . Then by the definition of and our supposition. Since and , we have . Then by the validity of , . Hence there exists such that and . By the definition of , we obtain .
: Assume that . Suppose and . Then there exists such that and and hence there exists such that and . By the assumption and therefore we obtain . That is, is valid in . โ
On the other hand, and can be distinguished by considering -frames. That is, these logics have different frame conditions with respect to -frames.
Proposition 3.9.
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
.
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in , and suppose . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if , and if and only if for some fixed propositional variables and . Then because is non-empty. Since and , we have . Then by the validity of , . Hence there exists such that and . By the definition of , we obtain .
: Assume . Suppose . Then there exists such that and , and also there exists a such that and . By the assumption, for some . Hence . This shows that is valid in . โ
Proposition 3.10.
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
.
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if , if and only if , and if and only if ( and ), for some fixed propositional variables and . Then because is non-empty. Let be any element such that and , then and . This means . Therefore . By the validity of , we obtain . Since and , there exists a such that and . By the definition of , for each , and . That is, . By Monotonicity, we conclude .
: Assume . Suppose . Let be such that and , then there exists a such that and . By the assumption, . In particular, for each , and , and hence . We have shown . Therefore is valid in . โ
3.3 The axiom scheme
In this subsection, we discuss the axiom scheme .
-
.
As in the case of the axiom , we introduce the following new axiom schemata and which are stronger than .
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.
-
.
Proposition 3.11.
The logics and are deductively equivalent.
Proof.
: Since , we have by the rule . Then . Thus .
: Since , by the rule . Then . Therefore we conclude . โ
The axiom scheme is slightly stronger than . In fact, the following proposition shows that and are equivalent over the logic .
Proposition 3.12.
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1.
.
-
2.
.
Proof.
1. This is because .
2. Since by and , we have . โ
We proved in Corollary 3.5 that proves . Analogously, we prove that is stronger than over .
Proposition 3.13.
.
Corollary 3.14.
.
We prove that and have the same frame condition with respect to the -frames.
Proposition 3.15.
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
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2.
is valid in .
-
3.
is valid in and for any , is transitive.
Proof.
: By Proposition 3.12.1.
: This is proved in Visser [14].
: Assume that is valid in and for any , is transitive. Suppose . Let be any element such that and . Then there exists such that and . We shall show that there exists such that and . If , then this is done. If , then . Since , by our supposition, there exists such that and . By the transitivity of , we obtain .
Therefore we conclude . That is to say, is valid in . โ
We prove that and have different frame conditions with respect to -frames.
Proposition 3.16.
Let be an -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
is valid in and
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in . Then by Corollary 3.5, is valid in . Suppose and . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if , if and only if , and if and only if . Then and . By the validity of , . Since and , there exists a such that and . By the definition of , . By Monotonicity, .
: Assume that is valid in and . Suppose . Let be any element with and . Then there exists a such that and . Since is valid in , we have . Then for each , there exists such that and . By the assumption, because the set is non-empty. Also . We have shown . Hence is valid in . โ
The condition stated in Proposition 3.16 is required in the usual definition of -frames.
Proposition 3.17.
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
is valid in and
Proof.
: Assume is valid in . Since , is also valid in . Suppose and . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if , if and only if , and if and only if ( or ). Then and . By the validity of , . Since and , there exists a such that and . Then by the definition of , we have . By Monotonicity, .
: Assume that is valid in and . Let . Let be such that and , then there exists a such that and . Since is valid, we have . Let and , then . In particular, for each , there exists a such that and . By the assumption, we have because is non-empty. Since , we obtain . Therefore is valid in . โ
3.4 The axiom scheme
We investigate .
-
.
The following proposition is stated in Visser [14].
Proposition 3.18 (Visser [14]).
Let be any -frame. The following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
.
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose and . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if for some fixed propositional variable . Then and , and hence . Since and , there exists such that and . By the definition of , we have . Therefore .
: Assume that . Let be any satisfaction relation on . Let be any element such that and . Then there exists such that and . By the assumption, and hence we obtain . That is, is valid in . โ
Proposition 3.19.
Let be any -frame. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
is valid in .
-
2.
.
Proof.
: Assume that is valid in . Suppose and . Let be a satisfaction relation on such that for any , if and only if for some fixed propositional variable . Then and , and hence . Since and , there exists a such that and . By the definition of , we have . Therefore .
: Assume . Let be any element such that and . Then there exists such that and . By the assumption, . Since , we obtain . That is, is valid in . โ
The condition stated in the second clause in Proposition 3.19 is required in the original definition of -frames.
3.5 The logics and
In this subsection, we show that the logics and are exactly and , respectively. Since proves , and by Propositions 3.7, 3.12 and Corollary 3.14, our logics studied in this paper are actually sublogics of . The logic is plus , , and . Also the logic is plus .
Proposition 3.20.
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1.
.
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2.
.
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3.
.
Proof.
1. : Since , by .
: By , . Since , . That is, .
2. This is because by and by .
3. This is because by and by . โ
Proposition 3.21.
The logics and are deductively equivalent.
Corollary 3.22.
The logics and are deductively equivalent.
Then de Jongh and Veltmanโs and Ignatievโs theorems are restated as follows:
Theorem 3.23 (de Jongh and Veltman [3]).
For any formula , the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all finite -frames where all axioms of are valid.
Theorem 3.24 (Ignatiev [6]).
For any formula , the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all finite -frames where all axioms of are valid.
In the following, we identify with , and with .
4 Lemmas for proofs of modal completeness theorems
In this section, we prepare some definitions and lemmas for our proofs of the modal completeness theorems of several logics. In this section, let be any consistent logic containing . For a set of formulas, define there exists a formula such that either or . For each formula , let . We say a finite set of formulas is -consistent if , where is a conjunction of all elements of . Also we say is -maximally -consistent if is -consistent and for any , either or . Notice that if is -maximally -consistent and for , then .
Definition 4.1.
A set of formulas is said to be adequate if it satisfies the following conditions:
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1.
is closed under taking subformulas and applying ;
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2.
;
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3.
If , then ;
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4.
If , then ;
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5.
If , then .
Note that is in our language as a symbol, and is not an abbreviation for . Then the following proposition holds.
Proposition 4.2.
Every finite set of formulas is contained in some finite adequate set.
Until the end of this section, we fix some finite adequate set . Let is -maximally -consistent. Then is also a finite set.
Definition 4.3.
Let and .
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1.
1. for any , if , then and 2. there exists such that and .
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2.
and for any , if , then .
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3.
and for any , if , then .
The relation was introduced by de Jongh and Veltman [3], and is read as โ is a -critical successor of โ111For every set of formulas, more general notion of assuring successor was introduced and investigated in Goris et al.ย [4]. Then is exactly . However, in this paper, and are sufficient for our purpose. . The relation was introduced by Ingatiev [6]. Obviously, implies .
Lemma 4.4.
For , if , then .
Proof.
Suppose . If , then by . Then . This means . โ
Lemma 4.5.
Let and . If and , then .
Proof.
Suppose and . If , then . Then . Therefore . โ
Lemma 4.6.
Let and . If , then there exists such that and . Moreover:
-
a.
If contains , then we can find such that in addition holds.
-
b.
If contains and , then we can find such that in addition and hold.
Proof.
Suppose . Let . Then . By , we have .
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โข
Suppose, for the contradiction, that . Then by Proposition 2.5.2. Hence , and thus . This contradicts our supposition. Therefore .
Let
then . Suppose that the set were -inconsistent. Then for some ,
Thus , and this is a contradiction. We have shown that is -consistent.
Let be such that . Then . Since , . Moreover, if , then , and hence . This means .
-
โข
a. Assume that contains . Let . Then . If , then . Since and by , we obtain . Thus and . This is a contradiction. Therefore .
Let
Then it can be proved that is also an -consistent subset of as above. Let be such that . Then satisfies the required conditions.
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โข
b. Assume that contains and . Let . Then . For each , we have by . Then by , . Therefore we obtain . Since we also have and , we get . This implies .
Let
Then is also an -consistent subset of , and any with is a desired set.
โ
Lemma 4.7.
Let and . If , and , then there exists such that and . Moreover:
-
a.
If contains , then we can find such that in addition holds.
-
b.
If contains , then we can find such that in addition holds.
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c.
If contains and , then we can find such that in addition and hold.
Proof.
Suppose , and .
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โข
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that the set is -inconsistent. Then . By the rule , we have , and hence . Since , we have . This contradicts the -consistency of . Therefore is -consistent. Let be such that , and then satisfies the required conditions.
-
โข
a. Assume that contains . If , then by , . Since , we obtain . Then because , and this is a contradiction. Therefore .
Suppose were -inconsistent. Then there would be such that
Then , and this is a contradiction. Thus is -consistent. Let be such that . Then , and hence we conclude .
-
โข
b. Assume that contains . Let . If , then , and hence by Proposition 2.5.2. Since , we have . Since , by . Thus . Then because , and this is a contradiction. Hence .
Let
then is -consistent. Let be such that . Then , and hence . Moreover, .
-
โข
c. Assume that contains and . Let and . Then . For each , by . Then by . Since and , we obtain .
Suppose, towards a contradiction, . Then , and thus by Proposition 2.5.2. Hence . Since , by , we have . Thus . Then because . This is a contradiction. Hence we obtain .
Let
then we can prove that is -consistent. Let be such that . Then , and hence . Moreover, .
โ
Lemma 4.8.
Assume that contains . Let and . If , and , then there exists such that and .
Proof.
Since , by . If , then . Since , we have , a contradiction. Thus .
Let , then it is proved that is -consistent. Thus for some , . Since , we obtain . โ
Lemma 4.9.
Assume that contains . Let and . If , and , then there exists such that and . Moreover:
-
a.
If contains , then we can find such that in addition and hold.
Proof.
Let . Suppose, towards a contradiction, that . Then by Proposition 2.5.2, . Since , . Also since , we obtain by . Thus . Since , and hence this contradicts the -consistency of . Therefore .
Let , then is -consistent. Let be such that . Then is a desired set.
a. Assume that contains . Let . If , then as in the proof of Lemma 4.6.b. Since , we have by applying . This contradicts and . Therefore is not in . Let . Then is -consistent. Let be such that . โ
|
||||||||
Lemma 4.7 | ||||||||
Lemma 4.8 | ||||||||
Lemma 4.7.a | ||||||||
Lemma 4.9 | ||||||||
, | Lemma 4.9.a | |||||||
Lemma 4.7.b | ||||||||
, | Lemma 4.7.c |
Lemmas 4.7 and 4.9 state that if , and , then there exists having several properties depending on each logic . The statement of Lemma 4.8 is similar except that is assumed instead of . To compare the properties that is assured to have, we summarize conclusions of these lemmas in Table 1. For example, the fifth line of the table shows that if contains , then such a set satisfying and is obtained by Lemma 4.9. Note that the assumptions of each lemma are omitted in the table for the sake of simplicity.
5 Modal completeness with respect to -frames
In the previous sections, we dealt with the additional axioms , , , , and . From Corollary 3.5 and Propositions 3.7, 3.12 and 3.13, we know that there are twenty different logics obtained by adding some of these axioms to . In this section, we prove modal completeness theorems with respect to -frames for twelve of them. Figure 1 represents the interrelations between these twelve logics. In the figure, each line segment shows that the logic on the right side is a proper extension of the logic on the left side, where properness comes from our investigations in Section 3. It follows that no more line segments can be drawn in the figure. The remaining eight logics are investigated in Sections 6 and 7.
First, we prove the completeness theorem for logics in Figure 1 other than and . Secondly, we prove the completeness theorem for logics and . Our proof technique of the second completeness theorem is essentially same as in the proof of de Jongh and Veltman [3]. However, the detail of our proof is different from that of proofs presented in [3] and [8]. Furthermore, our proof of the first completeness theorem admits a simpler technique than that of the second theorem. More precisely, in the proof of the second theorem, the universe of a countermodel is defined as a set of tuples where is a -maximal -consistent subset of a finite adequate set and is a finite sequence of formulas in . On the other hand, in our proof of the first theorem, we simply consider tuples where is a formula in to define a countermodel. As a consequence, our proof of the completeness theorem of the logic is simpler than Ignatievโs proof in [6].
First, we prove the completeness theorem for logics other than and .
Theorem 5.1.
Let be one of the logics , , , , , , , , and . Then for any formula , the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all (finite) -frames where all axioms of are valid.
Proof.
: Obvious.
: Suppose . Let be a finite adequate set of formulas with . The existence of such a set is guaranteed by Proposition 4.2. By the supposition, there exists such that .
Let be a model satisfying the following clauses:
-
1.
and ;
-
2.
;
-
3.
and the condition which is defined below holds;
-
4.
.
The condition depends on as follows:
-
โข
: If , then .
-
โข
: and if , then .
-
โข
: and if , then , and .
-
โข
: If and , then .
-
โข
: and if and , then .
Here means that formulas and are identical. Since , we have and therefore is non-empty. Also is finite and is a transitive and conversely well-founded binary relation on . Thus is an -frame.
Lemma 5.2.
Every axiom of is valid in the frame of .
Proof.
We distinguish the following several cases:
-
โข
: Suppose . If , then because . Thus by the definition of . Therefore is valid in by Proposition 3.2.
-
โข
: If , then . By Proposition 3.8, is valid in .
-
โข
: As in the case of , is valid in . Suppose and . Then . If , then and . Since and , we have , and . Thus we obtain . Therefore is valid in by Proposition 3.15.
-
โข
: Suppose and . If and , then because . Thus holds. Then by Proposition 3.18, is valid in .
-
โข
For other cases, the lemma is proved in a similar way as above.
โ
Lemma 5.3 (Truth Lemma).
For any formula and any , if and only if .
Proof.
We prove by induction on the construction of . We only give a proof of the case .
: Assume . Let be any element of such that and . Then by induction hypothesis, . We distinguish the following two cases.
In either case, we have . Also and . Then by induction hypothesis, . Therefore we conclude .
: Assume . By Lemma 4.6, there exists such that and . Moreover, if contains , then also holds. Since , by induction hypothesis. Let be any element of with . By the definitions of the relations and the condition , we have in all cases of . By induction hypothesis, . Therefore we obtain . โ
Since and , by Truth Lemma. Therefore is not valid in the frame of . โ
Our proof of Theorem 5.1 cannot be applied to logics containing both and . For example, for , the condition which is used to define the relations might be as follows: and if and , then , and . Then is no longer valid in the resulting frame . To avoid this obstacle, as mentioned above, for the modal completeness of such logics, we consider tuples as members of the universe of our countermodel, where is a finite sequence of formulas.
For finite sequences and of formulas, denotes that is an initial segment of . Also denotes that is a proper initial segment of , that is, and , where is the length of . Let be the sequence obtained from by concatenating as the last element.
Theorem 5.4.
Let be one of the logics and . Then for any formula , the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all (finite) -frames where all axioms of are valid.
Proof.
: Obvious.
: Suppose . Let be any finite adequate set with . Let be such that .
For each , we define the rank of (write ) as follows: , where . This is well-defined because is conversely well-founded.
Let be a model satisfying the following clauses:
-
1.
and is a finite sequence of elements of with ;
-
2.
and ;
-
3.
, and if , and , then , and ;
-
4.
.
Let be the empty sequence. Then , and hence . Therefore is a non-empty set. Also is finite because of the condition . Then is an -frame.
Lemma 5.5.
Every axiom of is valid in the frame of .
Proof.
: By the definition of , is obviously valid in . Assume and . Suppose , and . Then , and because . Then also , and because . Thus we obtain . Therefore is valid in by Proposition 3.17.
: Assume that and . Suppose , and . Since , we have . Since and , by Lemma 4.5. Also we have because . Therefore we obtain . By Proposition 3.18, is valid in .
At last, we assume and show that is valid in . Suppose , and . Since , . Thus we have . By Proposition 3.2, is valid in . โ
Lemma 5.6 (Truth Lemma).
For any formula and any , if and only if .
Proof.
This is proved by induction on the construction of , and we prove only for .
: Assume . Let be any element of such that and . Then by induction hypothesis, . We distinguish the following two cases.
In either case, we have and . Then we obtain
It follows . By the definition of , we have . Also by induction hypothesis, . Therefore we conclude .
: Assume . By Lemma 4.6, there exists such that , and . Let , then it is proved that is an element of as above. Then by induction hypothesis.
Let be any element of with . Since , and , we have by the definition of . By induction hypothesis, . Therefore we conclude . โ
Since and , by Truth Lemma. Therefore is not valid in the frame of . โ
Corollary 5.7.
Every logic shown in Figure 1 is decidable.
Since every -frame can be transformed into an -frame, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.8.
Let be one of twelve logics in Figure 1 and let be any formula. Then the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all (finite) -frames in which all axioms of are valid.
6 Modal incompleteness with respect to -frames
In this section, we prove the modal incompleteness of eight logics shown in Figure 2 with respect to -frames. As in Figure 1, no more line segments can be drawn in the figure.
First, we prove incompleteness of the logics , , and .
Proposition 6.1.
.
Proof.
Let be the -frame defined as follows:
-
1.
;
-
2.
;
-
3.
;
;
.
By Monotonicity of , is actually an -frame. First, we prove that , and are valid in .
-
โข
: If , then . By the definition of , we have . Thus . By Proposition 3.10, is valid in .
-
โข
: Since , is also valid in . Suppose and . Then if is either , or . Also since , there exists such that . By the definition of , . Thus . Then we have if is either , or . Therefore is valid in by Proposition 3.16.
-
โข
: Since there are no such that and , by Proposition 3.19, is trivially valid in .
It suffices to show that is not valid in . Let and , then . Also let , then . On the other hand, since , does not hold. Therefore is not valid in by Proposition 3.17. โ
Corollary 6.2.
Let be any logic with . Then is not complete with respect to -frames.
Proof.
Secondly, we prove incompleteness of the logics , , and .
Proposition 6.3.
.
Proof.
We define the -frame as follows:
-
1.
;
-
2.
;
-
3.
or ;
.
Indeed, is an -frame. We show , and are valid in .
Then we show that is not valid in . Let , then . On the other hand, since , does not hold. Therefore is not valid in by Proposition 3.10. โ
Corollary 6.4.
Let be any logic with . Then is incomplete with respect to -frames.
7 Modal completeness with respect to -frames
In this section, we prove eight logics shown in Figure 2 are complete with respect to -frames. As in Section 5, at first we prove the completeness theorem of logics other than and .
Theorem 7.1.
Let be one of the logics , , , , and . Then for any formula , the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all (finite) -frames where all axioms of are valid.
Proof.
: Obvious.
: Assume . Let be any finite adequate set of formulas containing . Let be such that .
We define a model as follows:
-
1.
and ;
-
2.
;
-
3.
-
(a)
;
-
(b)
For some , ;
-
(c)
The condition holds.
-
(a)
-
4.
.
The condition depends on as follows:
-
โข
: If , then there exists such that .
-
โข
: If and , then there exists such that .
-
โข
: If , then there exist such that and .
-
โข
: If , then there exist such that , and .
Since , . Therefore is non-empty. The set is finite and the relation is transitive and conversely well-founded. Moreover, by Monotonicity of , is an -frame.
Lemma 7.2.
Every axiom of is valid in .
Proof.
If , then for some , . Thus is valid in by Proposition 3.9.
We distinguish the following five cases:
-
โข
: Suppose . If , then because . Hence . We conclude that is valid in by Proposition 3.3.
-
โข
: Assume that and for any , . We distinguish the following two cases:
-
โ
If , then for some , we have . Then . Since and , there exist such that and by the definition of . Therefore .
-
โ
If , then for some , , and hence . Then there exists such that . Therefore, we have .
In either case, we obtain by Monotonicity. Thus we conclude that is valid in by Proposition 3.16.
-
โ
-
โข
: As in the case of , is valid in .
Suppose . We distinguish the following two cases:
-
โ
If , then there exist such that , and . Let .
-
โ
If , then for some with , let .
In either case, we have . Also we have . Then by Monotonicity. Therefore is valid in by Proposition 3.10.
-
โ
-
โข
: Suppose and . Let , then . If and , then because . Thus . By Proposition 3.19, is valid in .
-
โข
: As in the cases of and , the axiom schemata , and are valid in .
โ
Lemma 7.3 (Truth Lemma).
For any and any , if and only if .
Proof.
We prove by induction on , and we only give a proof of the case .
: Assume . Let be any element of such that and . By induction hypothesis, . Since contains , by Lemma 4.8, there exists such that and .
- โข
-
โข
If , then let .
In either case, . By induction hypothesis, and . We conclude .
: Assume . Then by Lemma 4.6, there exists such that and . Moreover if contains , then also holds. We have by induction hypothesis. Let be any subset of such that . By the definition of , there exists such that . Then by induction hypothesis, . Thus we obtain . โ
Since and , it follows from Truth Lemma that . Thus is not valid in the frame of . โ
At last, we prove the completeness of the logics and with respect to -frames.
Theorem 7.4.
Let be one of and . Then for any formula , the following are equivalent:
-
1.
.
-
2.
is valid in all (finite) -frames where all axioms of are valid.
Proof.
: Straightforward.
: Suppose . Let be any finite adequate set containing . Let be such that . For each , is defined as in the proof of Theorem 5.4. Let .
We define the model as follows:
-
1.
and is a finite sequence of elements of with ;
-
2.
and ;
-
3.
-
(a)
;
-
(b)
For some , ;
-
(c)
If , and , then the condition holds.
-
(a)
-
4.
.
The condition depends on as follows:
-
โข
: There exist such that , , and .
-
โข
: There exist such that , , , , and .
Let be the empty sequence. Then , and hence . Therefore is a non-empty set. Then is a finite -frame.
Lemma 7.5.
Every axiom of is valid in the frame of .
Proof.
: It is easy to show that is valid in (see Proposition 3.9). Suppose and for any , .
-
โข
If , and , then there exists such that , and . Since , we have . Since , and , by the definition of , the set satisfies the condition . Thus we obtain .
-
โข
If not, then let be such that . We have because . In particular, .
In either case, by Monotonicity, . Therefore is valid in by Proposition 3.16.
: Suppose and . If there exists such that , and , then because . Since and , we have by Lemma 4.5. Also because . Therefore we obtain . By Proposition 3.19, is valid in .
At last, when , we prove that is valid in . Suppose . Then there exists such that , and hence . If , and for some , then there exist such that , , , , and . In particular, . Thus we obtain . By Proposition 3.10, is valid in . โ
Lemma 7.6 (Truth Lemma).
For any formula and any , if and only if .
Proof.
We prove the lemma by induction on the construction of , and we give a proof only for .
: Assume . Let be any element of such that and . Then by induction hypothesis, . We distinguish the following two cases.
- โข
-
โข
If not, then there exists such that and by Lemma 4.8. Let , then . By induction hypothesis, . Let , then . We conclude .
: Assume . By Lemma 4.6, there exists such that , and . Let , then . We have by induction hypothesis.
Let be any subset of with . Since , and , there exists such that by the definition of . By induction hypothesis, . Therefore we conclude . โ
Since and , we obtain by Truth Lemma. Therefore is not valid in the frame of . โ
Corollary 7.7.
Every logic shown in Figure 2 is decidable.
8 Concluding Remarks
In the previous sections, we investigated the twenty natural sublogics of shown in Figures 1 and 2. We proved that twelve of them are complete with respect to -frames, but the remaining eight are not. Finally, in Section 7, we proved that these eight logics are also complete with respect to -frames. Consequently, all these twenty logics are also complete with respect to -frames. In this situation, one of the referees proposed the following interesting problem.
Problem 8.1.
Does there exist an extension of incomplete with respect to -frames?
We introduced these twenty logics to investigate -frames in detail. As a result of our research in the present paper, it can be said that our understanding of the fine structure of has improved in terms of semantical and syntactical aspects. Our framework would be useful for finer investigations of some known results of and its extensions. In addition, investigating whether these newly introduced logics satisfy natural logical properties is an interesting subject in itself. Along these lines, a research following the present paper is proceeding by the authors (see [7]).
Acknowledgement
The authors are grateful to Joost J. Joosten for his helpful comments. The author would like to thank the anonymous referees for careful reading and valuable comments. The work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP19K14586.
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