Generation: …In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, the Supreme Court emphasized that property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate are determined by state law unless a federal interest dictates otherwise. In this case, we must determine the debtor’s obligations under Puerto Rican law and assess the applicability of interest on the debt owed to Nelson Torres Ruiz. Consistent with the principles outlined in 114 B.R. 326, the determination of whether the debtor has a legal or equitable interest in the obligation to return the $3,000 option money necessitates an analysis grounded in applicable nonbankruptcy state law. Article 1061 of the P.R. Civil Code, 31 Laws of P.R.Ann., Section 3025, establishes that where a debtor fails to perform an obligation, the creditor is entitled to interest as indemnification for damages and losses incurred. Debtor’s claim of impossibility of performance is addressed under Article 1138 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, but as established earlier, such a defense is unwarranted when the impossibility is not due to legal or physical barriers (31 Laws of P.R.Ann., Section 3193). Given the absence of such barriers, the return of the $3,000 is mandated. Furthermore, in alignment with 117 B.R. 15, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings does not alter the creditor’s right to claim interest at the legal rate. Should the contract fail to specify an interest rate, Article 1061 defaults to a legal interest rate of 6% per annum. Thus, Mr. Bonilla is obliged to reimburse the full amount of $3,000 plus the applicable legal interest rate of 6% from the expiration of the option contract until the filing of the bankruptcy petition. citations needed to make: [’440 U.S. 48’, ’114 B.R. 326’, ’117 B.R. 15’] Target: See generally, 3 Collier On Bankruptcy, (15th ed.) paragraph 502.02 (1990). See also, Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); In re MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326 (D.Mass. 1990); In re Milford Common J.V. Trust, 117 B.R. 15 (Bkrtcy.Mass., 1990). reference_case_1: 440 U.S. 48 506 F. 2d 1242, 1243 (CA4 1974). See generally 4A W. Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 70.16, pp. 157-165 (14th ed. 1975); Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1013 (1953). In some title States, the mortgagee’s right to rents and profits may be exercised even prior to default, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 33, § 502 (1964); in all events, the right at least attaches upon default, see Uvalda Naval Stores Co. v. Cullen, 165 Ga. 115, 117, 139 S. E. 810, 811 (1927). See generally R. Kratovil, Modern Mortgage Law and Practice § 294, p. 204 (1972); Comment, The Mortgagee’s Right to Rents and Profits Following a Petition in Bankruptcy, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 1388, 1390-1391 (1975). North Carolina has been classified as a “title” State, Comment, The Mortgagee’s Right to Rents After Default, 50 Yale L. J. 1424, 1425 n. 6 (1941), although it does not adhere to this theory in its purest form. Under its case law, a mortgagee is entitled to possession of the mortgaged property upon default, and need not await actual foreclosure. Such possession might be secured either with the consent of the mortgagor or by an action in ejectment. But so long as the mortgagor does remain in possession, even after default, he — not the mortgagee — appears to be entitled to the rents and profits. See Brannock v. Fletcher, 271 N. C. 65, 155 S. E. 2d 532 (1967); Gregg v. Williamson, 246 N. C. 356, 98 S. reference_case_2: 114 B.R. 326 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1). “Property of the estate” includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). It is “necessary to look to nonbankruptcy law, usually state law, to determine whether the debtor has any legal or equitable interest in any particular item.” 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 541.02[1] at 541-13 (15th ed. 1989). Since “property interests are created and defined by state law,” such interests are analyzed under state law in bankruptcy proceedings unless “some federal interest requires a different result.” Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979). See also In re Prichard Plaza Associates Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr.D.Mass.1988). This Court’s resolution of the dispute over the debtor’s interest in Spectrum Wire is grounded in state corporations law, and takes into account the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court. However, in light of the bankruptcy court decision under review, this Court’s analysis of the appellants’ ownership interest in the Spectrum Wire stock must begin with a discussion of the Massachusetts law of trusts. A. Stock as the Subject Matter of an Express Trust The bankruptcy court found that conduct and verbal agreements by the debtor’s father “manifested an intention to hold in trust for the Debtor the shares of Spectrum stock standing in the father’s name.” In re MacDonald, 101 B.R. at 841. This conclusion, that an express trust was created by the debtor’s father, reference_case_3: 117 B.R. 15 order against the debtor. The automatic stay prevented any further action by the Bank, including service of the restraining order. The debtor has remained in physical possession and has continued to collect all of its rents. The Bank promptly filed with the bankruptcy court an emergency motion for relief from stay and for authority to continue with its possession and to collect the rents. The law was clarified by the United States Supreme Court in 1979 in the case of Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136, 4 B.C.D. 1259. The court held that: … Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law. Property interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding. Looking to Massachusetts law, an assignment of rent gives the mortgagee a valid security interest which becomes effective upon a default and an overt act by the mortgagee to take actual or constructive possession. Bankruptcy does not change the assignee/mortgagee’s right to the rent so long as possession was obtained pre-fil-ing, or a request is made to the bankruptcy-court for relief. The matter was further extensively analyzed by Bankruptcy Judge James F. Queenan, Jr. in the case of In re Prichard Plaza Associates Limited Partnership, 84 B.R. 289 (Bkrtcy.D.Mass.1988). For a (CONTINUED NEXT PAGE)

(CONTINUED FROM LAST PAGE) previous_text: OPINION AND ORDER SARA E. de JESUS, Bankruptcy Judge. The matter pending before the Court is whether creditors Nelson and Elizabeth Torres are entitled to the payment of interest on Claim # 13, and the applicable interest rate. Pursuant to Debtor’s request for a valuation of claim # 13, we held an evidentiary hearing. The parties have agreed to the following facts: “a. That on July 22, 1980, Nelson Torres Ruiz and Adrián Bonilla Montalvo signed an Option Contract for the purchase of a plot of land marked number twenty (20). b. The price of said plot of land was $7,250.00, of which at the signing of the Option Contract, Nelson Torres Ruiz paid Adrián Bonilla Montalvo the sum of $500.00 and later that same day paid him $2,500.00 for a total of $3,000.00. c. The Option Contract enumerated a period of two years from the date of signing within which the debtor, Adrián Bonilla Montalvo, was to execute the purchase deed or reimburse Nelson Torres Ruiz the sum of $3,000.00., d. That Mr. Nelson Torres Ruiz was single when he entered into an option agreement for certain lot of land on July 22, 1980. e. That Mr. Nelson Torres Ruiz gave Mr. Adrián Bonilla $3,000.00 as option money- f. That debtor according to clause # 6 of the option contract is obliged, and has accepted to do so, to return to this creditor the $3,000.00. g. That debtor has recognized the debt of $3,000.00 owed to Mr. Nelson Torres and has scheduled the same as $900.00 priority and $2,100.00 as general unsecured claim. h. Mrs. Elizabeth Hermida de Torres married Mr. Nelson Torres Ruiz after the option contract was signed. i. Mrs. Elizabeth Hermida de Torres was not a party to the option contract signed on July 22, 1980 by debtor and Mr. Nelson Torres. j. .That on January 12, 1984, Mrs. Elizabeth Hermida de Torres was deputy clerk of the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Courtroom of Mayaguez. k. That Banco Comercial de Mayaguez filed suit number 81-1138 against debtor and his ex-wife on the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Courtroom of Mayaguez. l. That on June 7, 1983 Attorney Jovino Martinez wrote a letter to debtor on behalf of Mr. Nelson Torres requesting the return of the option money given by him to debt- or. m. The plot of land where Mr. Nelson Torres had his option was sold after the filing for relief and with the authority of this Court.” Two Joint Exhibits were also admitted: the Option contract executed by the Debtor and Nelson Torres on July 22, 1980; and a letter dated June 7, 1983 from Attorney Jovino Martinez Ramirez to Attorney Adrián Bonilla Montalvo requesting the return of the money paid by Mr. Torres plus legal interest. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW In bankruptcy, issues as to the validity and legality of a claim are determined pursuant to applicable state law. Thus, we must decide the question at hand by applying the pertinent Articles of the Civil Code of P.R. The option contract executed by Debtor and Nelson Torres Ruiz, called for the execution of the deed of sale within two years from July 22, 1980. However, the contractual terms also required Mr. Bonilla to return the total price for the option, if he could not obtain the permits required by the local government allowing him to segregate and sell the optioned plot, within this same two year period. The contract does not mention interest payments. The Debtor raises the defense of impossibility of compliance with the obligation in order to release himself from the obligation and/or any liability. Mr. Bonilla claims a legal and physical impossibility based on events which occured almost six years after the Option contract had expired, and, in any event, these events concern his fiscal or monetary problems. Article 1138 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31 Laws of P.R.Ann., Section 3193, provides that, “In obligations to do, the debtor shall also be released when the prestation appears to be legally or physically impossible.” However, Debtor’s reliance on this Article of the Civil Code is unwarranted inasmuch as the legal and physical impossibility contemplated by law are not present in this contested matter. Article 1061 of the P.R.Civil Code, 31 Laws of P.R.Ann., Section 3025, provides that when the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the person incurs in default, the creditor is entitled to be indemnified for damages and losses suffered, which will consist in the payment of interest. If the parties failed to agree upon the payment of interest and or the interest rate, then the interest to be paid will be the legal interest at the applicable rate. Furthermore, “Until another rate is fixed by the Government, interest at the rate of six percent per annum shall be considered as legal.” Under these circumstances, Mr. Bonilla must reimburse the full amount of the option contract paid by Mr. Torres, plus interest at the legal rate of 6% per year, from the date the option contract expired to the date this petition was filed, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 502(b)(2). . During the hearing, Nelson Torres Ruiz and his wife Elizabeth waived their claims for damages other than interest discussed herein. . 11 U.S.C. Section 502(c)(2). . It was also undisputed that Debtor was not able to secure the government permits needed to segregate and sell the plot to the Optionee, and the deed of sale was never executed. . The Court takes judicial notice that the petition for bankruptcy pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Code was entered on February 19, 1987; and that Nelson and Elizabeth Torres, filed proof of claim no. 13 in the amount of $25,-000.00. Attached thereto are the copies of the following documents: the option contract entered into by the debtor Adrián Bonilla Montal-vo and Nelson Torres Ruiz on July 22, 1980; the complaint filed by Mr. Torres Ruiz against the debtor before the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez Part, Civil No. CS-88-896, for collection of money and damages; and a copy of a sworn statement of Nelson Torres Ruiz dated June 22, 1988. .During the hearing the parties testified this suit was stayed by the filing of this petition.   Output a valid JSON object with the fields of "label": [(one or more integers from 0-3 indicating the gap categories, expressed in a list)], "explanation": a short explanation justifying the label.. Do not output anything else such as ’json’ or newline characters or redundant spaces. Answer after output: output: Label: [2] Explanation: The generated text provides detailed context and elaboration for each citation, whereas the target text chain cites them without additional detail. This indicates a target mismatch.

Generation: …The court’s action was an error in law. In a recent case, the court held that Rule 25(a) (1) “is not designed to require a plaintiff to take affirmative action to locate the representative of the deceased party. Rather, it is designed to provide a mechanism for the court to manage the case in the event the deceased party has not been substituted.” 359 F.2d 292, 294 (C.A. 4, 1966). In another case, the court held that the Rule “does not require a plaintiff to institute machinery in order to produce a representative of the estate ad litem, pending appointment of the representative contemplated by law of the domicile of the deceased.” 379 F.2d 94, 96 (C.A. 7, 1967). In that case, the court noted that the “plaintiff’s attorney did not know whether probate of the will might be contested, or who would be appointed representative of the estate.” Id. at 96. The court held that the suggestion of death was ineffective to trigger the 90-day period under Rule 25(a) (1) where the suggestion did not identify a successor or representative of the deceased party. Id. at 96. See also, 4A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d, 2451 (1969). The court’s action was an error in law. The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. (Emphasis added.) citations needed to make: [’379 F.2d 94’, ’359 F.2d 292’] Target: The amendment to Rule 25(a) (1) was intended to dispel unwarranted rigidity and allow more flexibility in substitution. “It was intended that liberal effect be given to the 1963 amendment.” Roscoe v. Roscoe, 126 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 322, 379 F.2d 94, 99 (1967). “[T]he 90 day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious actions.” Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966). reference_case_1: 379 F.2d 94 the proper parties. ⁢ ⁢ ⁢ Unless the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party.” Here not only had the 90-day period not expired when the court entered summary judgment, the appellant by her motion for reconsideration had specifically invoked the discretion of the court. Rule 6(b) provides pertinently that when “by these rules * * * an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed * * Originally the Rule had precluded an extension of time for taking action under Rule 25(a) (1), but by purposeful amendment, it was sought to relieve against the hardship of the Court’s holding in Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 67 S.Ct. 428, 91 L.Ed. 436 (1947). It was intended that liberal effect be given to the 1963 amendment. Graham v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 335, 342 F.2d 914 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904, 85 S.Ct. 1446, 14 L.Ed.2d 286 (1965). We are constrained to reverse for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed. The only “party” then reference_case_2: 359 F.2d 292 insertion of a “reasonable time” standard. In 1963, the Advisory Committee suggested the present rule and noted: “Present Rule 25(a) (1), together with present Rule 6(b), results in an inflexible requirement that an action be dismissed as to a deceased party if substitution is not carried out within a fixed period measured from the time of the death. The hardships and inequities of this unyielding requirement plainly appear from the cases. * * * The amended rulé establishes a time limit for the motion to substitute based not upon the time of the death, but rather upon the time information of the death is provided by means of a suggestion of death upon the record, i. e. service of a statement of the fact of the death.” See Notes of Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, 28 U.S.C. Rule 25 (1964). Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was also amended in 1963 and the prohibition against extending the time for taking action under Rule 25 was eliminated. The Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules noted: “It is intended that the court shall have discretion to enlarge that period.” The amendments of Rules 6(b) and 25(a) (1) provided needed flexibility. It was assumed that discretionary extensions would be liberally granted. Movants under Rule 25 can ordinarily control when a death is “suggested upon the record” and appellants’ attorney was under no obligation to file his affidavit of Staggers’ death on the date he did. He could have filed previous_text: LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge: The District Court held that Rule 25(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required dismissal of the plaintiffs’ tort action because defendant’s counsel had filed a suggestion of death of the defendant yet plaintiff had not made any substitution of parties within 90 days. We reverse on the ground that the suggestion of death, which was neither filed by nor identified a successor or representative of the deceased, such as an executor or administrator, was ineffective to trigger the running of the 90-day period provided by the Rule. Mr. and Mrs. John Rende filed an action in the District Court individually and on behalf of their infant son who had been struck and injured by Alfred S. Kay while driving his car. On August 27, 1967, defendant Kay died. … In our opinion the Rule, as amended, cannot fairly be construed, as the de fendant’s attorney argues, to make his suggestion of death operative to trigger the 90-day period even though he was neither a successor nor representative of the deceased, and gave no indication of what person was available to be named in substitution as a representative of the deceased. Counsel’s construction would open the door to a tactical maneuver to place upon the plaintiff the burden of locating the representative of the estate within 90 days. We can conceive of cases wherein even the lawyer retained to represent a defendant might know the defendant had died, yet not readily know where his estate would be administered. In the present case, plaintiff’s attorney did know the court of probate, but he did not know whether probate of the will might be contested, or who would be appointed representative of the estate. The tactic of the defendant’s attorney would place on plaintiff the burden, where no conventional representative was appointed for the estate in probate court, of instituting machinery in order to produce some representative of the estate ad litem, pending appointment of the representative contemplated by law of the domicile of the deceased. (GAP CATEGORIES AND EXPLANATION INCLUDED NEXT PAGE)

(CONTINUED FROM LAST PAGE) Gap Categories:
Redundancy ($G^{5}$), Structural Mismatch ($G^{8}$), Claim Hallucination ($G^{9}$), Citation Hallucination ($G^{10}$), and Retrieval Inaccuracy ($G^{11}$). Explanation:
1. The generation has redundancy because it repeats "The court’s action was an error in law" verbatim twice and also repeats "Reversed" multiple times. 2. The generation has structural mismatch because it prematurely concludes the case with "Reversed", which is structurally inappropriate. 3. It contains claim hallucination, as when it elaborates case 379 F.2d 94, it should focus on the aspects related to "It was intended that liberal effect be given to the 1963 amendment." as this is the relevant claim. However, it talks about "does not require a plaintiff to institute machinery in order to produce a representative of the estate ad litem, pending appointment of the representative contemplated by law of the domicile of the deceased", which is rather irrelevant. 4. The generation also suffers from retrieval inaccuracy. The generation should retrieve the salient chunk from case 359 F.2d 292 centering on "T]he 90 day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious actions.", yet the retrieved chunk is not so relevant.

Generation: …This case presents the question whether an employee welfare benefits plan creates an entitlement to lifetime benefits or just to benefits that can be terminated by an amendment to the plan. The plan administrator, Motorola, amended the plan to place a two-year limit on benefits for disability resulting from certain mental conditions, including the plaintiff’s condition. The plaintiff, Marrs, argues that the plan’s provision stating that no amendment shall adversely affect the rights of any participant to receive benefits with respect to periods of disability prior to the adoption date of the amendment is violated. He interprets "periods of disability prior to the adoption date" to mean one or more periods of disability that began before the plan was amended but may not have ended before then. However, the plan administrator’s interpretation is reasonable, and we are inclined to stop with that observation. The Supreme Court’s decision in Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008)) is relevant in this case. The Court held that a conflict of interest by the plan administrator should be given weight in judicial review of the denial of benefits. However, the weight to be given to the conflict of interest depends on the circumstances of the case. In this case, the plan administrator had an incentive to resolve a close case in favor of a denial of benefits, but this incentive may be outweighed by other incentives, such as an employer’s interest in maintaining a reputation among current and prospective employees for fair dealing. The employees who actually decide benefits claims at the plan- administrator level may not be acutely concerned with the financial implications of a benefits award for their employer. We conclude that the plan administrator’s decision to deny benefits is reasonable and that the conflict of interest does not render the decision unreasonable. The judgment of the district court is Affirmed. References: 1. Glenn v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 128 S.Ct. 2343, 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008) 2. Marrs v. Motorola, 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990) 3. Rogers v. Department of Health & Environmental Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 1999) 4. Kahane v. UNUM Life Ins. Co., 563 F.3d 1210, 1212 (11th Cir. citations needed to make: [’564 F.3d 856’, ’576 F.3d 240’, ’560 F.3d 620’, ’504 F.3d 665’, ’908 F.2d 1385’, ’855 F.2d 394’] Target: There are two ways to read the majority opinion. One, which tracks its language and has been echoed in opinions in this and other circuits, e.g., Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 861-62 (7th Cir.2009); Holland v. Int’l Paper Co. Retirement Plan, 576 F.3d 240, 246-49 (5th Cir.2009), makes the existence of a conflict of interest one factor out of many in determining reasonableness. That sounds like a balancing test in which unweighted factors mysteriously are weighed. Such a test is not conducive to providing guidance to courts or plan administrators. “Multifactor tests with no weight assigned to any factor are bad enough from the standpoint of providing an objective basis for a judicial decision; multifactor tests when none of the factors is concrete are worse.” Menard, Inc. v. Commissioner, 560 F.3d 620, 622-23 (7th Cir.2009) (citations omitted); see also Sullivan v. William A. Randolph, Inc., 504 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir.2007); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385, 1394 (7th Cir.1990) (concurring opin ion); Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394, 399-400 (7th Cir.1988). previous_text: POSNER, Circuit Judge. This suit under ERISA for disability payments presents the recurring question whether an employee welfare benefits plan creates an entitlement to lifetime benefits rather than just to benefits that can be terminated by an amendment to the plan. In 1997 Michael Marrs, an employee of Motorola, ceased working because of a psychiatric condition and began drawing disability benefits under Motorola’s Disability Income Plan. Six years later Motorola amended the plan to place a two-year limit on benefits for disability resulting from certain “Mental, Nervous, Alcohol, [or] Drug-Related” (MNAD) conditions, including Marrs’s. Such limitations on MNAD conditions are common in employee disability plans. Then too, the employees who actually decide benefits claims at the plan-administrator level may not be acutely concerned with the financial implications of a benefits award for their employer. Id. at 821; Perlman v. Swiss Bank Corp. Comprehen sive Disability Protection Plan, 195 F.3d 975, 981 (7th Cir.1999). But especially when a firm is struggling (which may or may not be the case here — there is nothing in the record bearing on the question), an opportunity for short-run economies may dominate decision making by benefits officers. In any event, a majority of the Supreme Court Justices consider the potential conflict of interest of a plan administrator (or its staff) serious enough to be given weight in judicial review of the denial of benefits. But how much weight should it be given? The nub of the Glenn opinion is the following passage: [W]hen judges review the lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often take account of several different considerations of which a conflict of interest is one. This kind of review is no stranger to the judicial system. Not only trust law, but also administrative law, can ask judges to determine lawfulness by taking account of several different, often case-specific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together. In such instances, any one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are closely balanced, the degree of closeness necessary depending upon the tiebreaking factor’s inherent or case-specific importance. The conflict of interest at issue here, for example, should prove more important (perhaps of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to, cases where an insurance company administrator has a history of biased claims administration. It should prove less important (perhaps to the vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off claims administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by imposing management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits. 128 S.Ct. at 2351 (citations omitted). A dissent by Justice Scalia argued that a conflict of interest should prompt an inquiry only into the existence of improper motive that would render the plan administrator’s decision unreasonable. If the decision is reasonable, he argued, in the sense in which “a reasonable decision is one over which reasonable minds seeking the ‘best’ or ‘right’ answer could disagree,” the fact that the administrator had a conflict of interest is irrelevant, id. at 2360, “unless the conflict actually and improperly motivates the decision.” Id. at 2357 (emphasis in original). (GAP CATEGORIES AND EXPLANATION ARE INCLUDED IN THE NEXT PAGE).

(CONTINUED FROM LAST PAGE) Gap Categories:
Citation Format Mismatch ($G^{6}$), Stylistic Mismatch ($G^{7}$), Structural Mismatch ($G^{8}$), and Citation Hallucination ($G^{10}$). Explanation:
1. The generation has citation format mismatch because it includes inappropriate citation formats (underlined) to legal writing. 2. The generation has stylistic mismatch because it should not use language like "This case" when it should be continuing the generation, and using a third-person pronoun makes it appear like analyzing a separate piece of text rather than continuing it. 3. The generation has structural mismatch, since it "conclude(s)" the case, which is inappropriate structurally. 4. The generation contains citation hallucination as it fails to cite most of the citations needed to make.

Generation:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (continued) In Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55, the Supreme Court emphasized that property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate are determined by state law unless a federal interest dictates otherwise. In this case, we must determine the debtor’s obligations under Puerto Rican law and assess the applicability of interest on the debt owed to Nelson Torres Ruiz. Consistent with the principles outlined in 114 B.R. 326, the determination of whether the debtor has a legal or equitable interest in the obligation to return the $3,000 option money necessitates an analysis grounded in applicable nonbankruptcy state law. Article 1061 of the P.R. Civil Code, 31 Laws of P.R.Ann., Section 3025, establishes that where a debtor fails to perform an obligation, the creditor is entitled to interest as indemnification for damages and losses incurred. Debtor’s claim of impossibility of performance is addressed under Article 1138 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, but as established earlier, such a defense is unwarranted when the impossibility is not due to legal or physical barriers (31 Laws of P.R.Ann., Section 3193). Given the absence of such barriers, the return of the $3,000 is mandated. Furthermore, in alignment with 117 B.R. 15, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings does not alter the creditor’s right to claim interest at the legal rate. Should the contract fail to specify an interest rate, Article 1061 defaults to a legal interest rate of 6% per annum. Thus, Mr. Bonilla is obliged to reimburse the full amount of $3,000 plus the applicable legal interest rate of 6% from the expiration of the option contract until the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Target:
See generally, 3 Collier On Bankruptcy, (15th ed.) paragraph 502.02 (1990). See also, Butner v. U.S., 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979); In re MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326 (D.Mass. 1990); In re Milford Common J.V. Trust, 117 B.R. 15 (Bkrtcy.Mass., 1990). Gap Categories:
Chain vs. Parallel ($G^{12}$) Explanation:
The target text does not elaborate any of the cases cited whereas the generation chooses to elaborate each citation.

Generation:
In Reference case 47 M.J. 370, the court held that the automatic total-forfeiture rule and the 14-day provision of Article 57(a)(1) violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Similarly, in Reference case 45 M.J. 567, the court found that the Article 57 amendment does not violate the ex post facto prohibition, as it does not increase the duration of the punishment. Target:
Appellant’s ex post facto arguments were resolved by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in United States v. Gorsky 47 M.J. 370 (1997). We intend to apply that decision despite appellate government counsel’s argument that we should ignore our superior Court’s opinion and adhere to our decision in United States v. Pedrazoli, 45 M.J. 567(A.F.Ct.Crim.App.1997), which Gorski essentially reversed. See United States v. Plumb, 47 M.J. 771 (A.F.Ct.Crim. App.1997). Gap Categories:
Agree vs. Disagree ($G^{13}$) and Citation Hallucination ($G^{10}$) Explanation:
In the target text, case 47 M.J. 370 reversed the ruling of case 45 M.J. 567 (highlighted in bold). However, the generation illustrates the two cases in a parallel manner, as shown by the conjuctive adverb "Similarly". Moreover, the generation also does not mention case 47 M.J. 771, which is cited in the target.

Generation:
This dismissal might be an error. According to established precedents, an action can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) only if it is beyond doubt that the petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief (699 F.2d 434; 741 F.2d 209). Target:
A district court may dismiss an action as frivolous only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Smith v. Bacon, 699 F.2d 434, 436 (8th Cir.1983). A complaint which is good against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may not be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). Horsey v. Asher, 741 F.2d 209, 212 (8th Cir.1984). Gap Categories:
Compound Cite ($G^{14}$) Explanation:
The target text cites two cases to illustrate two claims ("A district court may dismiss an action as frivolous only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." and "A complaint which is good against a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may not be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).") However, the generation combines the two claims ("an action can be dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) only if it is beyond doubt that the petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief ") and cites the two cases together.

Instructions for annotators: Task Overview You are tasked to classify categories of gaps between machine-generated and human-written legal analysis. Definitions: generation: machine-generated legal analysis. target: human-written legal analysis. Note that the target is only one form of acceptable legal analysis. There are other acceptable legal analysis. It is possible for a generation to not match with the target but still considered acceptable.
previous_context: we set the goal of LLM to generate a paragraph of legal analysis and feed in the previous context to this paragraph as the input. cited_paragraphs: in addition to the previous context, we also feed in the other paragraphs that are supposed to be cited in this generation. citation: citation refers to the special string which points to a legal case, with style and format specified by the Bluebook. claim: the sentence which is supported by the citation, i.e. the case referred to. Claim usually appears in the vicinity of the citation. Intrinsic Gaps: the presence of intrinsic gaps signals that the machine-generated legal analysis is an unacceptable form. We can tell intrinsic gaps exist by only looking at the previous context and the generation itself. Extrinsic Gaps: extrinsic gaps, as its name suggests, can be discovered by comparing the generation with external texts, i.e. the cited paragraphs or the target paragraph that can be seen as the "answer". Extrinsic gaps contain two kinds: citation content mismatch and target mismatch. Target mismatch does not indicate that the generated legal analysis is necessarily wrong. Annotation Instructions: Receiving the following prompt, a language model will generate a paragraph of legal analysis, but often times they make different kinds of errors and mismatches. User prompt:
Here are some reference articles for legal cases:
# Reference case {case_key_1}
{text of cited case 1}
# Reference case {case_key_2}
{text of cited case 2}
$\dots$
# Reference case {case_key_N}
{text of cited case N}

Here is the text I’ve written so far:
# Paragrah
{previous_text}

Continue to write it following the style of my writeup. Your answer contains 100 to 400 words. You must explicitly use the reference cases and mention their reference ids, i.e. {case_key_1}, {case_key_2} …{case_key_N}. Wrap your answer with <answer></answer>. Make your answer concise and avoid redundant languages.
The instructions for you to classify these errors and mismatches are as follows: 1. Intrinsic gap: This category refers to generation that is unacceptable, due to the language model has fundamentally failed to follow the instruction, or make a lot of redundancy, or generate something that does not look like legal text (structural mismatch). More specificially, if it makes one or more of the following: • Redundancy (sentence-level, appearing as neural degeneration): the generation appears to make repetitive statements that do not add more meaning to the analysis. For example, multiple occurences of an exact sentence or phrase. • Citation Format Mismatch: the generation appears not matching with the citation format of the standard Bluebook. – Please be aware that, for example, 440 U.S. 48, 55’ is a proper format. Although its full citation should be ’Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)’, the format ’440 U.S. 48, 55’ is still acceptable as a concise form. • Structural Mismatch: the generation appears to generate the document from scratch (like containing words such as "ORDER" which only appear in the beginning). • Stylistic Mismatch: contain sentences that do not match the styles of legalese. If this type of gaps is present, add the label ‘1‘. Continue to item 2. Side note: You should be able to classify this purely based on the generation itself, without having to look at cited examples. 2.Target mismatch: While language model’s generated text may be obviously wrong and substantively different from the target (i.e. the original/target text from the case), the claims it makes are still logically and factually sound and can be seen as acceptable. This could be because (CONTINUED IN NEXT PAGE)

(CONTINUED FROM LAST PAGE) • Chain cite: the citations appear in a chain cite but the generation cites them parallely, or the other way around. – Clarification: "The rule that certain acts of a creditor in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding and during the statutory period for filing proof of claim, may give rise to something equivalent to a proof of claim and afford a sufficient basis for allowing an amendment after the statutory period for filing, was recognized and applied in many cases decided before the 1938 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act. See In re Atlantic Gulf & Pacific S. S. Corporation, D.C., 26 F.2d 751; In re Fant, D.C., 21 F.2d 182; Globe Indemnity Co. of Newark, N. J., v. Keeble, 4 Cir., 20 F.2d 84; In re Coleman & Titus Corporation, D.C., 286 F. 303; In re Roeber, 2 Cir., 127 F. 122." would be a chain cite because all of these citations support the previous claim "The rule that certain acts of a creditor in the course of a bankruptcy proceeding and during the statutory period for filing proof of claim, may give rise to something equivalent to a proof of claim and afford a sufficient basis for allowing an amendment after the statutory period for filing, was recognized and applied in many cases decided before the 1938 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act." • Agree versus disagree: the citations reverse the ruling in each other but the generation cites them parallely, or the other way around. • Compound cite: the citations of different cases are cited together, separated by semicolons, or the other way around. Although it does not match with the target, it is still considered somewhat acceptable, but we should label it out. If this type of mismatch is present add the label "2". Continue to item 3. 3. Citation Mismatch: The language model’s generated text does not align with the content of the citation it points to. This might be because one or more of the following: • Claim Hallucination: the claim supported by the citation is not truthful or not related to the context or from cited paragraphs or the previous context. The generated text makes different and possibly (although not necessarily) contradictory claims about one or more citations, which you can check from comparing to the reference case. Or, the generated text attributes information from one citation to a different citation. • Retrieval Inaccuracy: the claims supported by the citation is not relevant because the cited paragraph looks irrelevant compared to the target paragraph. • Citation Hallucination: the citation is non-existent or pulled from a citation in the cited paragraphs or the previous context, or there misses a citation (the generated text fails to use one of the citations that were given to it). If this type of mismatch is present, add the label "3" and move on to the next example. If none of the above errors are present, label "0". Note that where an example falls into multiple categories, you should include both labels, separated by a comma.

System Prompt:
You are a trained lawyer from Silicon Valley with a computer science background. Now, you are asked to annotate legal analysis generated by large language models and classify the errors and mismatch made by these models. To produce these legal analysis, a language model will receive the following prompt: Here are some reference articles for legal cases: # Reference case {case_key_1} {text of cited case 1} # Reference case {case_key_2} {text of cited case 2} … # Reference case case_key_N {text of cited case N} Here is the text I’ve written so far: # Paragraph {previous_text} Continue to write it following the style of my writeup. Your answer contains 100 to 400 words. You must explicitly use the reference cases and mention their reference ids, i.e. {case_key_1}, {case_key_2} . . . {case_key_N}. Wrap your answer with <answer></answer>. Make your answer concise and avoid redundant languages. Receiving the prompt above, a language model will generate a paragraph of legal analysis, but often times they make different kinds of errors and mismatches. The instructions for you to classify these errors and mismatches are as follows: You should classify the LLM-generated legal analysis to these categories: {Summary of the gap categories, same from the instructions to human annotators.} Here are some examples for demonstration: {Example annotation 1} {Example annotation 2} ⋮ {Example annotation k} ———————————————————————————————– –End Demonstration– Now, we will give you more instances and have you annotate 1, 2, 3, or 0. Output a json object containing the label and explanation for each example. If you label a 3, please elaborate the explanation for it a bit more.   User Prompt: Generation: {generation} citations needed to make: {[citation_1, …, citation_N]} Target:{target} reference_case_1: {case_key_1} {reference_case_1} ⋮ reference_case_N: {case_key_N} {reference_case_N} previous_text: {previous_text} Output a valid JSON object with the fields of "label": [(one or more integers from 0-3 indicating the gap categories, expressed in a list)], "explanation": a short explanation justifying the label.. Do not output anything else such as ’json’ or newline characters or redundant spaces. Answer after output: output: