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Flexibility Requirement when Tracking Renewable Power Fluctuation with Peer-to-Peer Energy Sharing

Yue Chen, Wei Wei, Mingxuan Li, Laijun Chen, and João P. S. Catalão This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible.Y. Chen is with the Department of Mechanical and Automation Engineering, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR, China. (e-mail: [email protected])W. Wei, M. Li, L. Chen are with the State Key Laboratory of Power Systems, Department of Electrical Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing. (e-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected])J. P. S. Catalão is with the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto and INESC TEC, Porto 4200-465, Portugal (e-mail: [email protected])
Abstract

Flexible load at the demand-side has been regarded as an effective measure to cope with volatile distributed renewable generations. To unlock the demand-side flexibility, this paper proposes a peer-to-peer energy sharing mechanism that facilitates energy exchange among users while preserving privacy. We prove the existence and partial uniqueness of the energy sharing market equilibrium and provide a centralized optimization to obtain the equilibrium. The centralized optimization is further linearized by a convex combination approach, turning into a multi-parametric linear program (MP-LP) with renewable output deviations being the parameters. The flexibility requirement of individual users is calculated based on this MP-LP. To be specific, an adaptive vertex generation algorithm is established to construct a piecewise linear estimator of the optimal total cost subject to a given error tolerance. Critical regions and optimal strategies are retrieved from the obtained approximate cost function to evaluate the flexibility requirement. The proposed algorithm does not rely on the exact characterization of optimal basis invariant sets and thus is not influenced by model degeneracy, a common difficulty faced by existing approaches. Case studies validate the theoretical results and show that the proposed method is scalable.

Index Terms:
critical region, distributed renewable energy, energy sharing, flexibility, multi-parametric program.

Nomenclature

-A Indices, Sets, and Functions

\mathcal{I}

Set of consumers.

𝒥\mathcal{J}

Set of prosumers.

ll\in\mathcal{L}

Line ll in set \mathcal{L}.

fk(.)f_{k}(.)

Disutility function of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

-B Parameters

II

Number of consumers.

JJ

Number of prosumers.

dkd_{k}

Contract demand of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

wkw_{k}

Forecast renewable output of prosumer k𝒥k\in\mathcal{J}.

Δwk\Delta w_{k}

Real-time renewable output deviation of prosumer k𝒥k\in\mathcal{J}.

τ\tau

Parameter in user’s objective function.

πkl\pi_{kl}

Line flow distribution factors.

FlF_{l}

Power flow limit of line ll\in\mathcal{L}.

αk,βk,ζk\alpha_{k},\beta_{k},\zeta_{k}

Parameters of the disutility function fk(.)f_{k}(.).

D¯k,D¯k\underline{D}_{k},\overline{D}_{k}

Lower/Upper bound of demand adjustable range.

-C Decision Variables

Δdk\Delta d_{k}

Demand adjustment of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

qkcq_{k}^{c}

Actual sharing amount of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

qkq_{k}

Expected sharing amount of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

δk\delta_{k}

The gap between actual and expected sharing amount of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

rkdr_{k}^{d}

Flexibility requirement of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

I Introduction

Exploiting distributed renewable generation is an effective remedy to reduce the dependence on fossil fuel energy and achieve a sustainable society [1]. Meanwhile, how to tackle the volatile and intermittent energy supply caused by renewable generation has become a major concern. Existing literature concentrates on two issues: 1) how to balance the real-time power in an optimal way facing the uncertainties; 2) how to quantify the system’s potential in accommodating uncertain renewable power.

For the first question, plenty of works develop effective scheduling methods for the bulk power system that runs in a centralized manner. Typical techniques are stochastic optimization (SO) [2], robust optimization (RO) [3], and distributionally robust optimization (DRO) [4]. In stochastic optimization, the uncertain factors are modeled by their empirical distribution, and then a stochastic programming or chance-constrained problem is built. Though historical data can provide some hints for the construction of empirical distributions, the exact distribution can be hardly obtained. This inaccuracy leads to a sub-optimal scheduling strategy. Robust optimization utilizes an uncertainty set that contains all possible scenarios of the renewable output. The worst-case performance is optimized via Benders Decomposition [5] or Column & Constraint Generation (C&CG) [6] algorithms. Despite its convenience, the RO method can be too conservative since it treats all possible outputs with equal probability and neglects the fact that severe events rarely happen. Distributionally robust optimization is in-between SO and RO, where uncertainty is described by a family of inexact probability distributions restricted in an ambiguity set.

As the renewable energy generations change from large-capacity centralized units at the transmission level to small-capacity distributed units at the distribution level, various researchers seek to balance the real-time power with the help of peer-to-peer energy trading [7]. Existing energy sharing mechanisms can be categorized into cooperative-game-based ones, noncooperative-game-based ones, and optimization-based ones [8]. For the first category, allocation rules are designed so that all agents have the incentive to form coalitions and together acting towards the social optimum. A coalition formation game for peer-to-peer energy trading was established with proof of several nice properties [9]. Network constraint [10] and sustainable user participation [11] were further taken into account. Though high social efficiency can be achieved, private information is needed to design the allocation rules. For the second category, two typical models are Stackelberg games and (generalized) Nash games. In Stackelberg games, the operator moves first to determine the market prices and then the users follow as price-takers. The energy sharing among prosumers was modeled as a Stackelberg game [12] and the existence of a unique and stable equilibrium was proved [13]. A hybrid approach using stochastic optimization and Stackelberg game was developed for energy trading across the day-ahead and real-time periods [14, 15]. User’s flexibility can be limited as they are price-takers under this setting. Moreover, it is hard to decide on an effective energy price especially with a large number of users, since private information may be needed and each user’s capacity is too small to be observed. In (generalized) Nash games, the users first submit their bids and then the operator clears the market. The energy trading was modeled as a two-stage stochastic Nash game [16]. A generalized demand function based energy sharing mechanism was proposed [17], and a practical bidding process as well as its convergence condition was established [18]. The above models are for node-level sharing and how to incorporate network constraints remains to be investigated. For the third category, references [19] and [20] established two-stage energy sharing schemes based on alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) algorithms. They require the help of dual variables and the economic intuition behind is hard to explain. This paper aims to develop an energy sharing mechanism based on generalized Nash game, which can protect users’ privacy, take into account network constraints, has a clear economic interpretation, and enlarge users’ flexibility by letting them be price-makers instead of price-takers. In this way, the flexibility of users is enhanced and it can facilitate the energy exchange among a wider area while network constraint is non-negligible.

For the second question, methods to quantify the flexibility of a system are based either on regions or metrics. For regions, the do-not-exceed limit (DNEL) region [21] and the dispatchable region [22] are two well-known concepts. The DNEL region is a hypercube of uncertain parameters that will not cause infeasibility of the scheduling problem, whose size is also optimized by the problem itself. Vast literature improves the DNEL region by considering the historical data [23], inexact probability distribution [24], and corrective topology control [25]. Projecting the feasible set of the scheduling problem on the uncertainty subspace, we can get the dispatchable region. In general, the DNEL region is an inner box approximation of the dispatchable region. For metrics, the flexibility envelope [26], the power/energy capacity [27], etc. were proposed. A method providing both region and metric was proposed [28]. The above works focus on centralized operation and cannot be directly applied to the energy sharing market. Reference [29] proposed the concept of absorbable region, but only region information is given and it viewed flexibility from a system level. This paper quantifies the flexibility requirement of individual users under peer-to-peer energy sharing by offering both region and metric information.

Quantifying the flexibility requirement of individual users involves solving a multi-parametric linear programming (MP-LP). In the majority of the current works, multi-parametric programming algorithms rely on the computation of critical regions where degeneracy is a key challenge. To overcome this difficulty, reference [30] resorted to developing an approximate algorithm, which was then generalized to multi-parametric convex programs [31]. A prominent feature of the approximation methods is that the critical region is represented by simplices in the pp-dimensional parameter space with p+1p+1 extreme points. Such a partition may hide the impact of parameters on the optimal bases characterized by the exact critical regions which are not simplices in general. This paper proposes an alternative approximate algorithm for solving MP-LP. The basic idea is similar to [30] but no simplex is needed. The main contributions are two-fold:

1) Energy Sharing Mechanism. A peer-to-peer energy sharing mechanism that coordinates the energy exchange among users is presented. Each user bids the quantity it would like to share aiming to minimize its disutility and match the operator’s sharing profile. The operator decides on the optimal sharing profile according to users’ bids and the physical constraints. Compared to existing works, our mechanism is easy to implement without requiring private information; can incorporate the coupling network constraints; enlarges users’ flexibility by letting them be price-makers instead of price-takers; and have several nice provable properties. Under the proposed mechanism, all users play a generalized Nash game. We prove the existence and partial uniqueness of the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) theoretically. The equilibrium can be retrieved from a quadratic optimization problem parameterized in the renewable output deviation, which is then turned into a multi-parametric linear program.

2) Flexibility Characterization. We characterize the flexibility under energy sharing based on the multi-parametric linear program derived above. To be specific, we develop an adaptive vertex generation (AVG) algorithm to partition the set of renewable output deviations into critical regions, so that in each region the demand adjustment of a user at equilibrium is shown to be a piecewise affine function in the deviation. Based on this unique feature, the flexibility requirement of individual users can be calculated. Compared to existing works, our method can provide both geometry information (critical region) and metric (flexibility requirement) about flexibility. The proposed AVG algorithm does not rely on the exact characterization of optimal basis invariant sets and thus is not influenced by model degeneracy, a common difficulty encountered by solving multi-parametric linear programs.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the energy sharing mechanism and the multi-parametric linear program to calculate the equilibrium. An adaptive vertex generation algorithm is developed in Section III to solve the multi-parametric program model; based on the explicit demand adjustment policy, the flexibility requirement of individual users can be obtained. Case studies in Section IV validate the proposed models and methods. Conclusions are drawn in Section V.

II Peer-to-Peer Energy Sharing Model

We consider a microgrid of II consumers (indexed by k={1,,I}k\in\mathcal{I}=\{1,...,I\}) and JJ prosumers (indexed by k𝒥={1,,J}k\in\mathcal{J}=\{1,...,J\}). All users k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} have demand while the prosumers are also equipped with renewable generators. We focus on the energy balancing at the real-time stage [C7]. At the day-ahead stage, there is renewable output predictions wk,kw_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I} based on which the users decide on their contract demands dk,k𝒥d_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}. Then at the real-time stage, the actual renewable generator outputs may deviate from their predictions by Δwk,k𝒥\Delta w_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{J}. To maintain energy balancing, the users k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} can adjust their real-time demands by Δdk\Delta d_{k} and exchange qkcq_{k}^{c} with each other via an energy sharing market. The disutility caused by demand adjustment can be represented as a quadratic function fk(Δdk):=αk(Δdk)2+βkΔdk+ζkf_{k}(\Delta d_{k}):=\alpha_{k}(\Delta d_{k})^{2}+\beta_{k}\Delta d_{k}+\zeta_{k}, where αk\alpha_{k}, βk\beta_{k}, and ζk\zeta_{k} are given parameters. This paper aims to quantify how much flexibility of individual users will be needed so that the real-time renewable generator output deviations can be balanced.

In the conventional electricity market, the penalty mechanism is implemented to encourage the participants to reveal their true production/consumption capacities and to fulfill the contract energy. This mechanism works well when the participants can accurately predict their capacities. However, considering the uncertain nature of DERs, implementing such a mechanism could lead to a huge financial loss in small prosumers and discourage them from participating in energy markets [32]. One solution to this problem is to mitigate the overall uncertainty via local energy exchange among a group of prosumers and responsive consumers, which is what the proposed energy sharing market intends to do.

II-A Energy sharing mechanism

Refer to caption
Figure 1: Market structure of peer-to-peer energy sharing. Each consumer/ prosumer offers a bid qkq_{k} to the operator; the operator clears the market and returns the sharing profile qkcq_{k}^{c} with the gap δk\delta_{k}. The users and operators are coordinated iteratively.

The structure of the proposed energy sharing mechanism is shown in Fig. 1. First, each user enters its private information into the smart meter it links to, including its disutility function fk(Δdk)f_{k}(\Delta d_{k}), the contract demand dkd_{k}, the demand adjustable range [D¯k,D¯k][\underline{D}_{k},\overline{D}_{k}], and the predicted output of renewable generators wkw_{k} if it is a prosumer. Then the smart meter will determine the optimal bid qkq_{k} by solving (2) or (3) and submit the bid to the operator. Upon receiving all the bids, the operator decides on the optimal sharing schedule to meet users’ expectation as much as possible while satisfying the physical constraints by solving (1). Then the obtained optimal schedule qkcq_{k}^{c} and unfulfilled quantity δk:=qkcqk\delta_{k}:=q_{k}^{c}-q_{k} are returned to the smart meter. The smart meter will adjust its bid and submit it to the operator again. This happens until the optimal schedule qkc,k𝒥q_{k}^{c},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} changes little between the last two iterations. Finally, the users will execute the sharing schedule qkc,k𝒥q_{k}^{c},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}. If qkc>0q_{k}^{c}>0, user kk is a buyer; if qkc<0q_{k}^{c}<0, user kk is a seller; if qkc=0q_{k}^{c}=0, it does not take part in sharing. The key of the energy sharing mechanism design lies in how each user chooses the optimal bid qkq_{k} and how the operator decides on the optimal sharing schedule qkc,k𝒥q^{c}_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

For the operator, given users’ bids qk,k𝒥q_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}, it solves problem (1) to set the optimal sharing schedule qkc,k𝒥q_{k}^{c},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}:

minqkc,δk,k𝒥\displaystyle\mathop{\min}_{q_{k}^{c},\delta_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}~{} k𝒥δk2\displaystyle\sum\nolimits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}\delta_{k}^{2} (1a)
s.t. δk=qkcqk,k𝒥\displaystyle\delta_{k}=q_{k}^{c}-q_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} (1b)
k𝒥qkc=0\displaystyle\sum\nolimits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}q_{k}^{c}=0 (1c)
FlπklqkcFl,l\displaystyle-F_{l}\leq\pi_{kl}q_{k}^{c}\leq F_{l},\forall l\in\mathcal{L} (1d)

The objective function (1a) minimizes the gap between the actual and expected sharing amount. Constraint (1c) means the energy sold equals the energy bought. The exchanged energy is transmitted via the power network limited by constraint (1d).

The smart meter decides on its optimal bid qkq_{k} by solving

For consumer kk\in\mathcal{I}:

minΔdk,qk\displaystyle\mathop{\min}_{\Delta d_{k},q_{k}}~{} fk(Δdk)+τ2(qkcqk)2\displaystyle f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})+\frac{\tau}{2}(q_{k}^{c}-q_{k})^{2} (2a)
s.t. qk+δk=dk+Δdk\displaystyle q_{k}+\delta_{k}=d_{k}+\Delta d_{k} (2b)
D¯kdk+ΔdkD¯k\displaystyle\underline{D}_{k}\leq d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}\leq\overline{D}_{k} (2c)

For prosumer k𝒥k\in\mathcal{J}:

minΔdk,qk\displaystyle\mathop{\min}_{\Delta d_{k},q_{k}}~{} fk(Δdk)+τ2(qkcqk)2\displaystyle f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})+\frac{\tau}{2}(q_{k}^{c}-q_{k})^{2} (3a)
s.t. wk+Δwk+qk+δk=dk+Δdk\displaystyle w_{k}+\Delta w_{k}+q_{k}+\delta_{k}=d_{k}+\Delta d_{k} (3b)
D¯kdk+ΔdkD¯k\displaystyle\underline{D}_{k}\leq d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}\leq\overline{D}_{k} (3c)

The objective of each user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} consists of two parts: its disutility fk(Δdk)f_{k}(\Delta d_{k}) and the gap between its bid qkq_{k} and operator’s schedule qkcq_{k}^{c}. Parameter τ\tau indicates the trade-off between the above two parts and help evaluate the gap in monetary terms. Constraints include the power balance conditions for consumers (2b) and for prosumers (3b), and the demand adjustable range limits (2c) and (3c).

The proposed energy sharing mechanism well fits the practice in that the users do not need to know the network constraint (1d) available only to the operator, and the operator does not require local constraint (2c) and (3c) private to each user. Compared to centralized dispatch, our mechanism has two advantages: 1) Regarding privacy. Centralized dispatch needs to gather information from all users to make the central decision. However, the users may be unwilling to provide this sort of private information. In the proposed peer-to-peer energy sharing, each user only needs to submit a bid to the operator with its private data input only to its own smart meter, so privacy can be preserved. 2) Less communication burden. Under peer-to-peer energy sharing, the only information exchanged will be the bid, which is a scalar. However, under centralized dispatch, the operator needs to collect information such as cost coefficients, demands, and demand adjustable boundaries, from all users, which incurs a high communication burden overhead. Meanwhile, this mechanism can achieve a social optimal outcome (proved in Proposition 1 later).

Remark 1: Our proposed energy sharing mechanism focuses on the real-time market [33], which will be conducted hourly. In real-time, when the uncertainty is realized, we resort to a mechanism similar to the economic dispatch [34] (happens every several mins or an hour) to balance the system. Specially, instead of balancing the real-time power via centralized dispatch, we develop an energy sharing mechanism that allows the users to adjust their elastic demands and exchange energy with each other. AGC that happens at a smaller time resolution and usually at the transmission level is not considered in this paper as most of the economic dispatch works [34, 4].

Remark 2: In this paper, deciding on the optimal bids and finally the sharing quantities involve solving optimization problems (2) or (3) and two-way communication with the operator. With the current technology, advanced smart meters have certain data processing abilities and enable two-way communication between the meter and the central system [35]. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that with the assist of a smart meter, the user would be able to decide on the optimal bids. When taking into account various kinds of appliances and facilities, the decision-making may become more complex. In that case, we may need a more sophisticated energy management system to handle all the devices.

II-B Market equilibrium

TABLE I: Element of the energy sharing game
Players 𝒦\mathcal{K} Actions 𝒳\mathcal{X} Cost functions Π\Pi
consumer k=1,,Ik=1,\cdots,I 𝒳k(qkc,δk):={(Δdk,qk)|(2b) and (2c) are met.}\mathcal{X}_{k}(q_{k}^{c},\delta_{k}):=\{(\Delta d_{k},q_{k})~{}|~{}\mbox{\eqref{eq:consumer.2} and \eqref{eq:consumer.3} are met.}\} Πk(qkc,δk):=fk(Δdk)+τ/2(qkcqk)2\Pi_{k}(q_{k}^{c},\delta_{k}):=f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})+\tau/2(q_{k}^{c}-q_{k})^{2}
prosumer k=(I+1),,(I+J)k=(I+1),\cdots,(I+J) 𝒳k(qkc,δk):={(Δdk,qk)|(3b) and (3c) are met.}\mathcal{X}_{k}(q_{k}^{c},\delta_{k}):=\{(\Delta d_{k},q_{k})~{}|~{}\mbox{\eqref{eq:prosumer.2} and \eqref{eq:prosumer.3} are met.}\} Πk(qkc,δk):=fk(Δdk)+τ/2(qkcqk)2\Pi_{k}(q_{k}^{c},\delta_{k}):=f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})+\tau/2(q_{k}^{c}-q_{k})^{2}
operator k=I+J+1k=I+J+1 𝒳k(Δd,q):={(qc,δ)|(1b) and (1c) are met.}\mathcal{X}_{k}(\Delta d,q):=\{(q^{c},\delta)~{}|~{}\mbox{\eqref{eq:operator.2} and \eqref{eq:operator.3} are met.}\} ΠI+J+1:=k𝒥δk2\Pi_{I+J+1}:=\sum\nolimits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}\delta_{k}^{2}

The above peer-to-peer energy sharing market can be regarded as a generalized Nash game [36] with its elements summarized in TABLE I. For simplicity, we use 𝒢={𝒦,𝒳,Π}\mathcal{G}=\{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X},\Pi\} to denote the sharing game in an abstract form, where 𝒦\mathcal{K} is the set of players, 𝒳\mathcal{X} the action set, and Π\Pi the collection of cost functions. It’s worth noting that, the action sets of users depend on the strategies of the operator (the qkc,δk,k𝒥q_{k}^{c},\delta_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}); the action sets of the operator depends on the strategies of the users (the Δdk,qk,k𝒥\Delta d_{k},q_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}). Therefore, it constitutes a generalized Nash game, whose equilibrium is harder to analyze than the standard Nash game due to the complex coupling [37]. The equilibrium of the generalized Nash game, from which every player has no incentive to deviate, is defined below.

Definition 1.

(Generalized Nash Equilibrium) A profile (Δd,q,qc,δ)𝒳(\Delta d^{*},q^{*},q^{c*},\delta^{*})\in\mathcal{X} is a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the energy sharing game 𝒢={𝒦,𝒳,Π}\mathcal{G}=\{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X},\Pi\} if k=1,,(I+J)\forall k=1,...,(I+J)

(Δdk,qk)=\displaystyle(\Delta d_{k}^{*},q_{k}^{*})=~{} argminΔdk,qkΠk(qkc,δk)\displaystyle\mbox{argmin}_{\Delta d_{k},q_{k}}\Pi_{k}(q_{k}^{c*},\delta_{k}^{*})
s.t.(Δdk,qk)𝒳k(qkc,δk)\displaystyle\mbox{s.t.}~{}~{}(\Delta d_{k},q_{k})\in\mathcal{X}_{k}(q_{k}^{c*},\delta_{k}^{*}) (4)

and

(qc,δ)=\displaystyle(q^{c*},\delta^{*})=~{} argminqc,δΠI+J+1\displaystyle\mbox{argmin}_{q^{c},\delta}\Pi_{I+J+1}
s.t.(qc,δ)𝒳I+J+1(Δd,q)\displaystyle\mbox{s.t.}~{}~{}(q^{c},\delta)\in\mathcal{X}_{I+J+1}(\Delta d^{*},q^{*}) (5)

In the following proposition, we prove the existence of the equilibrium and offer a centralized optimization problem to compute it, which casts down to multi-parametric program parameterized in the renewable output deviations. Denote 𝒬:={qc|(1c) and (1d) are met}\mathcal{Q}:=\{q^{c}~{}|~{}\mbox{\eqref{eq:operator.3} and \eqref{eq:operator.4} are met}\}, 𝒟k:={Δdk|D¯kdk+ΔdkD¯k}\mathcal{D}_{k}:=\{\Delta d_{k}~{}|~{}\underline{D}_{k}\leq d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}\leq\overline{D}_{k}\} for all k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}.

Proposition 1.

The energy sharing game 𝒢={𝒦,𝒳,Π}\mathcal{G}=\{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X},\Pi\} has at least one GNE if (6) is feasible, and (Δd,q,qc,δ)(\Delta d^{*},q^{*},q^{c*},\delta^{*}) is an GNE if and only if Δd\Delta d^{*} is the unique optimal solution of

minΔdk,k𝒥\displaystyle\mathop{\min}_{\Delta d_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}~{} k𝒥fk(Δdk)\displaystyle\sum\nolimits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}f_{k}(\Delta d_{k}) (6a)
s.t. qkc={dk+Δdk,kdk+ΔdkwkΔwk,k𝒥:ηk\displaystyle q_{k}^{c}=\left\{\begin{aligned} &d_{k}+\Delta d_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\\ &d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}-w_{k}-\Delta w_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{J}\end{aligned}\right.:\eta_{k} (6b)
Δdk𝒟k,k𝒥\displaystyle\Delta d_{k}\in\mathcal{D}_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} (6c)
qc𝒬\displaystyle q^{c}\in\mathcal{Q} (6d)

with δk=η^k/τ\delta^{*}_{k}=-\hat{\eta}_{k}/\tau for all k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}, where η^\hat{\eta} is the value of dual variable at optimum, and qkc=qk+δkq_{k}^{c*}=q_{k}^{*}+\delta^{*}_{k} with

qk={dk+Δdkδk,kdk+ΔdkwkΔwkδk,k𝒥\displaystyle q_{k}^{*}=\left\{\begin{aligned} &d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}^{*}-\delta^{*}_{k}~{},~{}\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\\ &d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}^{*}-w_{k}-\Delta w_{k}-\delta^{*}_{k}~{},~{}\forall k\in\mathcal{J}\\ \end{aligned}\right. (7)

The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix -A. It offers a more convenient way to calculate and analyze the energy sharing game equilibrium by solving (6). As problem (6) minimizes the total disutility of all users, Δd\Delta d^{*} is social optimal. Take the real-time renewable output deviation Δw\Delta w as parameters, problem (6) can be regarded as a quadratic multi-parametric optimization problem.

II-C Linearization and compact form

For the sake of analysis, the objective function is linearized via a convex combination approach [38]. Take a univariate convex function z=g(ξ)z=g(\xi), ξlξξu\xi_{l}\leq\xi\leq\xi_{u} for example. The function is evaluated at some discrete points ξ1,,ξK\xi_{1},\cdots,\xi_{K}, and z1=g(ξ1),,zK=g(ξK)z_{1}=g(\xi_{1}),\cdots,z_{K}=g(\xi_{K}). By introducing variables σ1,,σK0\sigma_{1},\cdots,\sigma_{K}\geq 0 and k=1Kσk=1\sum_{k=1}^{K}\sigma_{k}=1, ξ\xi and g(ξ)g(\xi) in the optimization problem can be replaced with linear functions k=1Kσkξk\sum_{k=1}^{K}\sigma_{k}\xi_{k} and k=1Kσkzk\sum_{k=1}^{K}\sigma_{k}z_{k} in σ\sigma, respectively. Applying this technique to (6a), problem (6) turns into a multi-parametric linear program (MP-LP) with the compact form as:

v(θ)=minx\displaystyle v(\theta)=\mathop{\min}_{x}{}{} cx\displaystyle c^{\top}x (8)
s.t. Axt+Bθ\displaystyle Ax\leq t+B\theta

where xnx\in\mathbb{R}^{n} and θp\theta\in\mathbb{R}^{p} are vectors of decision variables and parameters, respectively; Am×nA\in\mathbb{R}^{m\times n}, tmt\in\mathbb{R}^{m}, Bm×pB\in\mathbb{R}^{m\times p} and cnc\in\mathbb{R}^{n} are input data. The decision variables xx is bounded due to the lower and upper bound constraints. Denote v(θ)v(\theta) and x(θ)x^{*}(\theta) as the optimal value and optimal solution associated with given parameter θ\theta, respectively.

Based on the above MP-LP (8), in the following, we develop an adaptive vertex generation (AVG) algorithm to approximate the optimal cost and the demand adjustment at equilibrium under different renewable output deviations and quantify the flexibility requirements of individual users.

III Flexibility Characterization

In this section, we first define the flexibility requirement of individual users under energy sharing; then, an adaptive vertex generation algorithm is developed to construct a piecewise linear estimator of the optimal total cost and the demand adjustment at equilibrium subject to a given error tolerance, based on which we calculate the flexibility requirement. The processing framework of the algorithms is shown in Fig. 2.

Refer to caption
Figure 2: A linear program (8) for computing the market equilibrium is derived based on Proposition 1 and linearization techniques. Then AVG algorithm is applied to calculate the flexibility requirement.

III-A Definition of flexibility requirement

Let Θ¯\bar{\Theta} be the maximum set of θ\theta such that problem (8) has at least one feasible solution xx, known as the dispatchable region [22]. We assume θΘ\theta\in\Theta, a bounded polyhedral subset of Θ¯\bar{\Theta}. The flexibility requirement of each user is defined below.

Definition 2.

(Flexibility Requirement) Suppose Δdk(θ),k𝒥\Delta d_{k}^{*}(\theta),\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} are users’ demand adjustment at equilibrium under renewable deviation θ\theta. The flexibility requirement of user k𝒥k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} is defined as a region [r¯kd,r¯kd][\underline{r}_{k}^{d},\overline{r}_{k}^{d}] with

r¯kd=min{Δdk(θ),θΘ}\displaystyle\underline{r}_{k}^{d}=\min\{\Delta d_{k}^{*}(\theta),\forall\theta\in\Theta\} (9)

and

r¯kd=max{Δdk(θ),θΘ}\displaystyle\overline{r}_{k}^{d}=\max\{\Delta d_{k}^{*}(\theta),\forall\theta\in\Theta\} (10)

The flexibility in this paper is a kind of reserve capacity [34]. It defines the backup adjustable capacity the demand can provide in the occurrence of renewable generation output deviations due to uncertainty. Since Δd(θ)\Delta d^{*}(\theta) involves solving problem (6), getting [r¯kd,r¯kd][\underline{r}_{k}^{d},\overline{r}_{k}^{d}] directly by definition can be difficult. In this paper, an MP-LP based approach is proposed to obtain the flexibility requirement. To be specific, we divide Θ\Theta into non-overlapping critical regions CR1, \cdots, CRN such that in each region CRi, the optimal value v(θ)v(\theta) and optimal solution x(θ)x^{*}(\theta) are linear functions in the parameter vector θ\theta. Then (9)-(10) is equivalent to finding the maximum/minimum point of a piecewise linear function, which is easier to solve.

III-B Adaptive vertex generation algorithm

The majority of current MP-LP related works identifies the critical regions by leveraging the graph of optimal bases based on which the expression of x(θ)x^{\star}(\theta) and v(θ)v(\theta) are obtained [28]. However, degeneracy that indicates the existence of multiple primal or dual optimal solutions may cause difficulties in building the critical regions [39]. In this paper, we develop an adaptive vertex generation algorithm to approximate v(θ)v(\theta) via dual variables without the information of critical regions first, and then retrieve the critical region and x(θ)x^{*}(\theta) accordingly. In this way, the impact of degeneracy can be avoided. The details of the algorithm are as follows:

1) Lower bound of v(θ)v(\theta) from dual problem

Suppose the optimal value function v(θ)v(\theta) can be represented by a piecewise linear function

v(θ)={m1+n1θ,θCR1m2+n2θ,θCR2mN+nNθ,θCRNv(\theta)=\begin{cases}m_{1}+n_{1}^{\top}\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{1}\\ m_{2}+n_{2}^{\top}\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{2}\\ \qquad\vdots\\ m_{N}+n_{N}^{\top}\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{N}\\ \end{cases} (11)

where m1,,mNm_{1},\cdots,m_{N} are constant scalars; n1,,nNn_{1},\cdots,n_{N} are constant vectors. For any fixed θ\theta, the dual problem of (8) is

v(θ)=maxγ\displaystyle v(\theta)=\mathop{\max}_{\gamma}{}{} γ(t+Bθ)\displaystyle\gamma^{\top}(t+B\theta) (12)
s.t. Aγ=c,γ0\displaystyle A^{\top}\gamma=c,~{}\gamma\leq 0

where γ\gamma is the dual variable, and its feasible region is denoted by Γ={γ|Aγ=c,γ0}\Gamma=\left\{\gamma\middle|A^{\top}\gamma=c,\gamma\leq 0\right\}. According to strong duality, the optimal value of (12) is bounded and equals to v(θ)v(\theta) for any given θ\theta. Since v(θ)v(\theta) is finite, the dual optimal solution γ\gamma must belong to the set of extreme points of Γ\Gamma [vert(Γ\Gamma) for short], although Γ\Gamma may be unbounded and contain extreme rays. In this regard, by enumerating the vertices of Γ\Gamma, v(θ)v(\theta) can be equivalently expressed as

v(θ)=maxi{γit+γiBθ}{γ1,γ2,}vert(Γ)\begin{gathered}v(\theta)=\max_{i}\left\{\gamma^{\top}_{i}t+\gamma^{\top}_{i}B\theta\right\}\\ \{\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},\cdots\}\in\mbox{vert}(\Gamma)\end{gathered} (13)

Comparing (13) and (11), coefficients mim_{i} and nin_{i} and dual variable γi\gamma_{i} have the following relation

mi=γit,ni=γiBm_{i}=\gamma^{\top}_{i}t,~{}n_{i}=\gamma^{\top}_{i}B (14)

Nevertheless, vertex enumeration is an exhaustive task, and only a small fraction of vertices correspond to valid pieces in (11) and (13), but we do not know which one in vert(Γ)\mbox{one in vert}(\Gamma) appears in (13) in advance. Let Γ¯\underline{\Gamma} be a subset of vert(Γ),\mbox{vert}(\Gamma), and

v¯(θ)=maxi{γit+γiBθ},{γ1,γ2,}Γ¯\underline{v}(\theta)=\max_{i}\left\{\gamma^{\top}_{i}t+\gamma^{\top}_{i}B\theta\right\},\{\gamma_{1},\gamma_{2},\cdots\}\in\underline{\Gamma} (15)

Hence, v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) is an underestimator of v(θ)v(\theta). The approximation quality depends on the choice of Γ¯\underline{\Gamma}. In the following, an adaptive vertex generation algorithm is developed to construct Γ¯\underline{\Gamma} so that the gap between v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) and v(θ)v(\theta) can be small.

2) Recover the critical regions

Suppose (15) is a non-redundant representation. Intuitively, if the value of any piece γit+γiBθ\gamma^{\top}_{i}t+\gamma^{\top}_{i}B\theta can reach maximum for some θΘ\theta\in\Theta, (15) is non-redundant. The exact definition and redundancy elimination methods are in Appendix -B. Then the critical region associated with each piece can be retrieved from (15). Recall the original piecewise linear form (11) and the point-wise maximum form (15), the value of mi+niθm_{i}+n_{i}^{\top}\theta achieves maximum in CRi, i.e.:

CRi={θ|mi+niθm[i]+n[i]θ}\mbox{CR}_{i}=\left\{\theta\middle|m_{i}+n_{i}^{\top}\theta\geq m_{[-i]}+n_{[-i]}^{\top}\theta\right\} (16)

where [i]={1,,i1,i+1,,n}[-i]=\{1,\cdots,i-1,i+1,\cdots,n\} stands for the set of complementary indexes of ii, so CRi is described by n1n-1 inequalities in (16). It can be represented in a matrix form (17), where H(n1)×pH\in\mathbb{R}^{(n-1)\times p}, hph\in\mathbb{R}^{p}.

CRi={θ|Hθh}\mbox{CR}_{i}=\left\{\theta\middle|H\theta\leq h\right\} (17)

For notation conciseness, index ii of critical region for matrix HH and vector hh are omitted; HjθhjH_{j}\theta\leq h_{j}, j=1,,(n1)j=1,\cdots,(n-1) represent the individual constraints in CRi.

3) Overall algorithm

Suppose we already have an approximation (15) for the optimal value function, as well as critical regions retrieved from (16), then we have to investigate the quality of this approximation in each CRi. The task comes down to evaluate the maximal approximation error through

εi=max\displaystyle\varepsilon_{i}=\max{} v(θ)v¯(θ)\displaystyle v(\theta)-\underline{v}(\theta) (18)
s.t. θCRi\displaystyle\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{i}

where v(θ)v(\theta) is the true optimal value function of problem (8), which is unknown. εi\varepsilon_{i} must be nonnegative because v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) is an underestimator. First, due to strong duality, we have

v(θ)v¯(θ)\displaystyle\qquad v(\theta)-\underline{v}(\theta) (19)
=maxθCRi{maxγΓγ(t+Bθ)(γit+γiBθ)}\displaystyle=\max_{\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{i}}\left\{\max_{\gamma\in\Gamma}\gamma^{\top}(t+B\theta)-(\gamma^{\top}_{i}t+\gamma^{\top}_{i}B\theta)\right\}

Problem (19) is nonconvex due to the product term γBθ\gamma^{\top}B\theta in the objective function. Since the parameter space has a low dimension, we can solve (19) by numerating the vertex of CRi={θ|Hθh}\mbox{CR}_{i}=\{\theta|H\theta\leq h\}, which is

ϵi=maximaxγ\displaystyle\epsilon_{i}=\max_{i}\max_{\gamma}{} (γγi)(t+Bθi)\displaystyle(\gamma-\gamma_{i})^{\top}(t+B\theta_{i}) (20)
s.t. {θ1,θ2,}vert(CRi)\displaystyle\{\theta_{1},\theta_{2},...\}\in\mbox{vert(CR}_{i})
Aγ=c,γ0\displaystyle A^{\top}\gamma=c,~{}\gamma\leq 0

Another approach to solve (19) is the big-M method [40], but our approach is more robust since it avoids the difficulty of choosing a proper MM. The proposed adaptive vertex generation algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1. The output is a ε\varepsilon-optimal underestimator of the true optimal value function.

Algorithm 1 : Adaptive Vertex Generation Algorithm
1:  Initiation: Error tolerance ε>0\varepsilon>0; parameter set Θ\Theta; initial sampled parameters θ1,,θn\theta_{1},\cdots,\theta_{n};
2:  Underestimation For i=1:ni=1:n   Solve LP (12) with θi\theta_{i} and the solution is γi\gamma^{*}_{i}.   Update Γ¯Γ¯γi\underline{\Gamma}\leftarrow\underline{\Gamma}\cup\gamma^{*}_{i} if γiΓ¯\gamma^{*}_{i}\notin\underline{\Gamma}. end Construct v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) by (15); retrieve CR1, \cdots, CRn by (16).
3:  Check approximation error For each critical region ii   Solve LP (20) with CRi. Record εi\varepsilon^{*}_{i}, γ\gamma^{*}.   If εi>ε\varepsilon^{*}_{i}>\varepsilon, update Γ¯Γ¯γ\underline{\Gamma}\leftarrow\underline{\Gamma}\cup\gamma^{*}. end If εiε\varepsilon^{*}_{i}\leq\varepsilon, i\forall i, terminate.
4:  Update v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) by (15) with the current Γ¯\underline{\Gamma}, and remove redundant pieces (see Appendix -B).
5:  Retrieve critical regions from the current v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta); remove redundant constraints (Appendix -B), and go step 3.

Remark: Because the set vert(Γ)\mbox{vert}(\Gamma) has finite elements, Algorithm 1 must terminate in a finite number of steps. Nonetheless, as only a small fraction of elements in vert(Γ)\mbox{vert}(\Gamma) corresponds to the pieces in the optimal value function, Algorithm 1 is efficient in practice. In contrast to the existing approaches where critical regions are obtained from the analysis of optimal bases invariancy, in Algorithm 1, critical regions are retrieved from the optimal value function. Therefore, model degeneracy does not affected the proposed algorithm.

III-C Calculation of flexibility requirement

To obtain the flexibility requirement of individual users, we need to recover an approximate optimizer x(θ)x(\theta) as a function of θ\theta. In CRi, the optimal value is v(θ)=γit+γiBθv(\theta)=\gamma^{\top}_{i}t+\gamma^{\top}_{i}B\theta, the complementarity and slackness condition of (8) implies

γij<0(AxBθt)j=0\gamma^{*}_{ij}<0\to(Ax-B\theta-t)_{j}=0 (21)

Let Ai/Bi/tiA^{\prime}_{i}/B^{\prime}_{i}/t^{\prime}_{i} denote the rows of A/B/tA/B/t corresponding to the indexes of nonzero elements in γi\gamma_{i}^{*}, we obtain a set of linear equations:

Aix=ti+Biθ,θCRiA_{i}^{\prime}x=t_{i}^{\prime}+B_{i}^{\prime}\theta,~{}\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{i} (22)

If AiA_{i}^{\prime} is invertible, the optimizer is obtained by

x(θ)=(Ai)1(ti+Biθ),θCRix(\theta)=(A_{i}^{\prime})^{-1}(t_{i}^{\prime}+B_{i}^{\prime}\theta),~{}\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{i} (23)

Otherwise, we can calculate the flexibility requirement [r¯ikd,r¯ikd][\underline{r}_{ik}^{d},~{}\overline{r}_{ik}^{d}] by the following optimization problems. Without loss of generality, suppose the first I+JI+J terms in xx correspond to the decision variables Δdk,k=1,,(I+J)\Delta d_{k},\forall k=1,...,(I+J).

r¯ikd=minθCRi\displaystyle\underline{r}_{ik}^{d}=\mathop{\min}_{\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{i}}~{} xk\displaystyle x_{k} (24a)
s.t. Aix=ti+Biθ\displaystyle A_{i}^{\prime}x=t_{i}^{\prime}+B_{i}^{\prime}\theta (24b)
D¯kdk+xkD¯k,k=1,,(I+J)\displaystyle\underline{D}_{k}\leq d_{k}+x_{k}\leq\overline{D}_{k},\forall k=1,...,(I+J) (24c)

and

r¯ikd=maxθCRi\displaystyle\overline{r}_{ik}^{d}=\mathop{\max}_{\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{i}}~{} xk\displaystyle x_{k} (25a)
s.t. Aix=ti+Biθ\displaystyle A_{i}^{\prime}x=t_{i}^{\prime}+B_{i}^{\prime}\theta (25b)
D¯kdk+xkD¯k,k=1,,(I+J)\displaystyle\underline{D}_{k}\leq d_{k}+x_{k}\leq\overline{D}_{k},\forall k=1,...,(I+J) (25c)

Therefore, the flexibility requirement of user kk over the entire parameter set θ\theta is [r¯kd,r¯kd][\underline{r}_{k}^{d},\overline{r}_{k}^{d}], where

r¯kd=mini{rikd},r¯kd=maxi{rikd}\displaystyle\underline{r}_{k}^{d}=\mathop{\min}_{i}\{r_{ik}^{d}\},~{}\overline{r}_{k}^{d}=\mathop{\max}_{i}\{r_{ik}^{d}\} (26)

In general, the obtained critical regions CR,ii{}_{i},\forall i can provide geometry information of how uncertainty be handled under energy sharing, while the flexibility requirement [r¯kd,r¯kd],k[\underline{r}_{k}^{d},\overline{r}_{k}^{d}],\forall k offers a quantitative metric.

IV Case Studies

We first use a 5-bus system for illustration; and then a 69-bus microgrid system is tested to show the scalability of the proposed model and algorithm. Data is available in [41].

Refer to caption
Figure 3: Topology and parameters of the 5-bus system. The adjustable ranges of elastic demands are in red, the line flow limits are in blue, and the fixed demands are in dark green.

IV-A 5-bus system

TABLE II: System Parameter of the 5-bus System
From To XX FlF_{l}
A B 0.0281 600
A D 0.0304 300
A E 0.0064 200
B C 0.0108 100
C D 0.0297 401
D E 0.0297 300
TABLE III: Demand Data of the 5-bus System222Wind farms locate at bus 3, 5 with w1=220w_{1}=220 kW, w2=450w_{2}=450 kW.
Node dkd_{k} (kW) Bound αk\alpha_{k} ($/kW2\mbox{kW}^{2}) βk\beta_{k} ($/kW) ζk\zeta_{k} ($)
A 230 [200, 300] 0.003 1.80 255.30
B 35 - - - -
C 25 - - - -
D 185 333170 kW elastic demand and 15 kW inelastic demand. [150, 350] 0.006 2.76 295.80
E 200 [100, 250] 0.005 2.56 312.00

The topology of the 5-bus system is given in Fig. 3 with other parameters in TABLE II-2. There are three users with elastic demands and two renewable generators at nodes C and E, respectively, so θ=[Δw1,Δw2]\theta=[\Delta w_{1},\Delta w_{2}]^{\top}. The maximum set of parameters Θ¯\bar{\Theta} is the dispatchable region [22], the grey region in Fig. 4. The θ\theta can vary within the rectangle subregion Θ\Theta. Applying Algorithm 1, we can obtain six critical regions as in Fig. 5. Note that the quadratic objective function (6) is linearized by 5 segments. The approximate optimal cost function v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) in each critical region is as follows.

Refer to caption
Figure 4: Dispatchable region Θ¯\bar{\Theta} (maximum set of θ\theta such that problem (8) has at least one feasible solution) and parameter range Θ\Theta (we assume θΘ\theta\in\Theta) of the 5-bus system.
Refer to caption
Figure 5: Critical Regions of the 5-bus system. The parameter range is divided into six critical regions and within each region, the optimal cost is a linear function in θ\theta given in (27).
v(θ)={814.92+4.00Δw1+2.81Δw2,θCR1835.39+2.13Δw1+2.81Δw2,θCR2810.04+4.50Δw1+2.31Δw2,θCR3837.26+2.01Δw1+2.31Δw2,θCR4819.08+1.92Δw1+1.92Δw2,θCR5780.51+5.07Δw1+1.93Δw2,θCR6v(\theta)=\begin{cases}814.92+4.00\Delta w_{1}+2.81\Delta w_{2},&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{1}\\ 835.39+2.13\Delta w_{1}+2.81\Delta w_{2},&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{2}\\ 810.04+4.50\Delta w_{1}+2.31\Delta w_{2},&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{3}\\ 837.26+2.01\Delta w_{1}+2.31\Delta w_{2},&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{4}\\ 819.08+1.92\Delta w_{1}+1.92\Delta w_{2},&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{5}\\ 780.51+5.07\Delta w_{1}+1.93\Delta w_{2},&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{6}\\ \end{cases} (27)

Following the procedure in Section III-C, we can get the demand adjustment at equilibrium in each critical region as well. Take CR4\mbox{CR}_{4} as an example, we have [Δw1,Δw2]CR4\forall[\Delta w_{1},\Delta w_{2}]^{\top}\in\mbox{CR}_{4}:

Δd1\displaystyle\Delta d_{1}^{*}~{} =18.75+0.76Δw1\displaystyle=18.75+0.76\Delta w_{1}
Δd2\displaystyle\Delta d_{2}^{*}~{} =20.00\displaystyle=-20.00
Δd3\displaystyle\Delta d_{3}^{*}~{} =3.75+0.24Δw1+Δw2\displaystyle=-3.75+0.24\Delta w_{1}+\Delta w_{2} (28)

If we choose a scenario inside CR4\mbox{CR}_{4}, say [Δw1,Δw2]=[10,20][\Delta w_{1},\Delta w_{2}]=[-10,-20]^{\top}kW, then according to (27), the approximate optimal cost is $770.96 (=837.262.01×102.31×20=837.26-2.01\times 10-2.31\times 20); according to (IV-A), the approximate demand adjustments at equilibrium are Δd1=11.10\Delta d_{1}^{*}=11.10 kW, Δd2=20\Delta d_{2}^{*}=-20 kW, Δd3=26.10\Delta d_{3}^{*}=-26.10 kW. Both the optimal cost and demand adjustments are the same as the one we get by solving problem (8) directly with given parameters θ=[Δw1,Δw2]=[10,20]\theta=[\Delta w_{1},\Delta w_{2}]=[-10,-20]^{\top}kW. This validates the effectiveness of our algorithm. The optimal cost of the original quadratic problem (6) is $767.24, so the relative error is only 0.48%, showing the linearization is accurate enough. Moreover, the obtained Δdk,k=1,2,3\Delta d_{k}^{*},\forall k=1,2,3 are the same as well. We calculate the flexibility requirement of each user, shown in TABLE IV. To accommodate the volatile renewable generation, all users need to have the ability to both increase and decrease their demand. User 3 requires the most flexibility since the value of r¯3dr¯3d\overline{r}_{3}^{d}-\underline{r}_{3}^{d} is the largest.

TABLE IV: Flexibility requirement of 5-bus system
Elastic demand 1 2 3
dkd_{k} (kW) 230 170 200
r¯kd\underline{r}_{k}^{d} (kW) -8.16 -20.00 -70.24
r¯kd\overline{r}_{k}^{d} (kW) 27.11 36.75 48.83
r¯kdr¯kd\overline{r}_{k}^{d}-\underline{r}_{k}^{d} (kW) 35.27 56.75 119.07

Given [Δw1,Δw2]=[10,20][\Delta w_{1},\Delta w_{2}]=[-10,-20]^{\top}kW, the equilibrium of the energy sharing game (1)-(1) can be reached via a best-response algorithm. The change of Δd\Delta d and δ\delta during iterations are shown in Fig.6 and Fig. 7, respectively. We can find that the demand adjustments converge to the above approximate values. The value of dual variables of problem (6) at optimum can be retrieved by γi\gamma_{i} in CRi\mbox{CR}_{i}, i.e. η1=1.92\eta_{1}^{*}=-1.92, η2=2.08\eta_{2}^{*}=-2.08, η3=2.31\eta_{3}^{*}=-2.31, which are very close to the value of δ/τ-\delta/\tau plotted in Fig. 7. The above analysis validates Proposition 1.

Refer to caption
Figure 6: Change of Δd\Delta d during iterations and the energy sharing market reaches an equilibrium after about 20 iterations.
Refer to caption
Figure 7: Change of δ\delta during iterations and δτ=η\frac{\delta^{*}}{\tau}=-\eta^{*} validates Proposition 1.

IV-B 69-bus system

A larger case with a modified 69-bus microgrid [42] is tested with topology in Fig. 8. There are three renewable generators connected to node 9, 30, and 60, respectively. Suppose their real-time output may deviate within [30,30][-30,30] kW. Applying Algorithm 1, the change of the maximum approximation error (defined in (18)) during iterations is shown in Fig. 9. The error decreases fast and the algorithm can output 10 critical regions (as in Fig. 10) after three iterations. The approximate optimal cost function v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) in each critical region is

Refer to caption
Figure 8: Topology of the 69-bus system. Three wind farms are connected to nodes 9, 30, and 60; six elastic demands are located at nodes 12, 23, 32, 42, 53, and 62.
Refer to caption
Figure 9: The maximum approximation error of the AVG algorithm during iterations. The algorithm can output the critical regions after three iterations.
Refer to caption
Figure 10: Critical region of 69-bus system. The parameter range is divided into ten critical regions and within each region, the optimal cost is a linear function in θ\theta given in (29).
v(θ)={353.05+[2.90,2.90,2.90]θ,θCR1489.83+[4.58,4.58,4.58]θ,θCR2527.73+[5.21,5.21,5.21]θ,θCR3538.89+[5.52,5.52,5.52]θ,θCR4549.33+[6.00,6.00,6.00]θ,θCR5560.98+[8.09,8.09,8.09]θ,θCR6548.24+[9.52,9.52,9.52]θ,θCR7485.84+[11.47,11.47,11.47]θ,θCR8361.11+[13.32,13.32,13.32]θ,θCR99.46+[17.81,17.81,17.81]θ,θCR10v(\theta)=\begin{cases}353.05+[2.90,2.90,2.90]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{1}\\ 489.83+[4.58,4.58,4.58]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{2}\\ 527.73+[5.21,5.21,5.21]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{3}\\ 538.89+[5.52,5.52,5.52]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{4}\\ 549.33+[6.00,6.00,6.00]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{5}\\ 560.98+[8.09,8.09,8.09]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{6}\\ 548.24+[9.52,9.52,9.52]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{7}\\ 485.84+[11.47,11.47,11.47]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{8}\\ 361.11+[13.32,13.32,13.32]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{9}\\ -9.46+[17.81,17.81,17.81]\theta,&\theta\in\mbox{CR}_{10}\\ \end{cases} (29)

To examine the accuracy of the approximation, let’s take CR4\mbox{CR}_{4} as an example. Following the procedure in Section III-C, the demand adjustments at equilibrium are:

Δd1=17,Δd2=9,Δd3=4,Δd4=8\displaystyle\Delta d_{1}^{*}=-17,~{}\Delta d_{2}^{*}=-9,~{}\Delta d_{3}^{*}=-4,~{}\Delta d_{4}^{*}=8
Δd5=5,Δd6=6+Δw1+Δw2+Δw3\displaystyle\Delta d_{5}^{*}=5,\Delta d_{6}^{*}=6+\Delta w_{1}+\Delta w_{2}+\Delta w_{3} (30)

For scenario θ=[30,30,30]\theta=[-30,-30,30] kW CR4\in\mbox{CR}_{4}, according to (29) and (IV-B), the optimal cost is $373.29 and Δd1=17\Delta d_{1}^{*}=-17 kW, Δd2=9\Delta d_{2}^{*}=-9 kW, Δd3=4\Delta d_{3}^{*}=-4 kW, Δd4=8\Delta d_{4}^{*}=8 kW, Δd5=5\Delta d_{5}^{*}=5 kW, Δd6=24\Delta d_{6}^{*}=-24 kW, which are the same as the one obtained by solving problem (6). Similarly, we can calculate the flexibility requirement for each elastic demand as in TABLE V. We notice that while elastic demands 2, 3, 4 still have some redundancy, the adjustable ability of elastic demands 1, 5, 6 has been fully exploited as dk+r¯kd=D¯kd_{k}+\underline{r}_{k}^{d}=\underline{D}_{k} and dk+r¯kd=D¯kd_{k}+\overline{r}_{k}^{d}=\overline{D}_{k}, for k=1,5,6k=1,5,6. Therefore, in long-term planning, we may put more emphasis on increasing the flexibility of demands 1, 5, 6.

TABLE V: Flexibility requirement of 69-bus system
Elastic demand dkd_{k} (kW) r¯kd\underline{r}_{k}^{d} (kW) r¯kd\overline{r}_{k}^{d} (kW) Range
1 40 -30 10 [10, 50]
2 20 -10.09 15 [0, 35]
3 30 -25 24 [5, 70]
4 10 -2 10 [0, 20]
5 10 -5 10 [5, 20]
6 40 -30 10 [10, 50]

To show the applicability and scalability of the proposed algorithm, we test its performance under different numbers of renewable generators and users in TABLE VI; and under different settings in TABLE VII. The impact of the number of users on the computational time is marginal. The time needed increases with the number of RGs, but in this paper, we only consider the distributed renewable generators with a relatively large scale (say about 500kW) while the uncertainties from small-scale units are neglected. Usually, in a residential community, there are few such relatively large-scale units so our proposed method can still be applied.

TABLE VI: Computational time of AVG algorithm under different settings
Cases 3 RGs,69 users 3 RGs,345 users 3 RGs,690 users
Time (s) 103.28 122.34 92.37
Cases 6 RGs,69 users 6 RGs,345 users 6 RGs,690 users
Time (s) 1507.94 1314.58 1644.23
TABLE VII: Computational time
Setting 5-bus with FlF_{l} 5-bus with 2Fl2F_{l} 5-bus with 4Fl4F_{l}
Time (s) 22.09 13.89 10.31
Setting 69-bus with FlF_{l} 69-bus with 2Fl2F_{l} 69-bus with 4Fl4F_{l}
Time (s) 103.28 60.32 64.19

To test the practicability of the proposed mechanism, we compare the computational time under different numbers of users in TABLE VIII. The computational time does not change much when the number of users increases since the decision-making for each user can be done in parallel. Our algorithm can handle a large number of users.

TABLE VIII: Computational time of the energy sharing mechanism
Number of users 69 345 690
Time (s) 29.74 30.06 30.21

V Conclusion

The prosperity of distributed renewable generators calls for effective management of end-users to hedge against uncertainty. In this paper, an innovative energy sharing mechanism is proposed that can facilitate the energy exchange among end-users with local information. The interaction among users and the operator is formulated as a generalized Nash game, whose equilibrium is proved to exist and can be obtained by a multi-parametric program parameterized in the renewable output deviations. To quantify the flexibility requirement of individual users, an alternative vertex generation algorithm is developed to output a piecewise linear estimator of both the optimal cost function and demand adjustment strategies at equilibrium via dual problem. It can avoid the impact of degeneracy since it does not require visiting the graph of degenerate base. Case studies validate the accuracy and scalability of our method.

Future research may further polish the proposed energy sharing mechanism by considering more realistic situations: 1) Bounded rationality of users. In this paper, the users are assumed to be fully rational while in practice they may have bounded rationality. This can be analyzed with the prospect theory [43]. 2) AC power flow model. Lossless DC power flow model is adopted in this paper for simplification, which shall be extended to incorporate AC power flow model with the help of convex relaxation [44] or linearization techniques [45]. 3) Diversity of devices. Different types of flexible devices such as energy storage shall be integrated by changing the proposed model to a multiple time step version. More future research directions can be found in [8].

-A Proof of Proposition 1

Problem (1) can be equivalently written as

minqkc,k𝒥\displaystyle\mathcal{\min}_{q_{k}^{c},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}~{} k𝒥(qkcqk)2\displaystyle\sum\nolimits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}(q_{k}^{c}-q_{k})^{2}
s.t. qc𝒬\displaystyle q^{c}\in\mathcal{Q} (A.1)

Suppose (Δd,q,qc,δ)(\Delta d^{*},q^{*},q^{c*},\delta^{*}) is an GNE of the sharing game, then qcq^{c*} is the optimal solution of (-A). Therefore, we have

k𝒥(qkcqkc)(qkcqk)0,qc𝒬\displaystyle\sum\limits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}(q_{k}^{c}-q_{k}^{c*})(q_{k}^{c*}-q_{k}^{*})\geq 0,\forall q^{c}\in\mathcal{Q} (A.2)

Also, (Δd,q)(\Delta d^{*},q^{*}) is the optimal solution of problem (2) or (3), which is equivalent to

minΔdk,bk\displaystyle\mathop{\min}_{\Delta d_{k},b_{k}}~{} {fk(Δdk)+τ/2(qkc+δkdkΔdk)2,kfk(Δdk)+τ/2(qkc+δkdkΔdk+wk+Δwk)2,k𝒥\displaystyle\left\{\begin{aligned} &f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})+\tau/2(q_{k}^{c*}+\delta_{k}^{*}-d_{k}-\Delta d_{k})^{2},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\\ &f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})+\tau/2(q_{k}^{c*}+\delta_{k}^{*}-d_{k}-\Delta d_{k}+w_{k}+\Delta w_{k})^{2},\forall k\in\mathcal{J}\end{aligned}\right.
s.t. Δdk𝒟k\displaystyle\Delta d_{k}\in\mathcal{D}_{k} (A.3)

where 𝒟k:={Δdk|D¯kdk+ΔdkD¯k}\mathcal{D}_{k}:=\{\Delta d_{k}~{}|~{}\underline{D}_{k}\leq d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}\leq\overline{D}_{k}\}. Therefore,

fk(Δdk)fk(Δdk)τ(ΔdkΔdk)δk0,k𝒥\displaystyle f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})-f_{k}(\Delta d_{k}^{*})-\tau(\Delta d_{k}-\Delta d_{k}^{*})\delta_{k}^{*}\geq 0,\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J} (A.4)

Similarly, let (Δd^,q^c)(\Delta\hat{d},\hat{q}^{c}) be the optimal solution of problem (6) and η^\hat{\eta} the value of the dual variable. Then, we have (Δd,qc,η)k𝒥𝒟k×𝒬×(I+J)\forall(\Delta d,q^{c},\eta)\in\prod_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}\mathcal{D}_{k}\times\mathcal{Q}\times\mathbb{R}^{(I+J)}:

[fk(Δdk)fk(Δd^k)+(ΔdkΔd^k)η^k]\displaystyle\left[f_{k}(\Delta d_{k})-f_{k}(\Delta\hat{d}_{k})+(\Delta d_{k}-\Delta\hat{d}_{k})\hat{\eta}_{k}\right] 0,k𝒥\displaystyle~{}\geq 0,\forall k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}
k𝒥(qkcq^kc)(η^k)\displaystyle-\sum\limits_{k\in\mathcal{I}\cup\mathcal{J}}(q_{k}^{c}-\hat{q}_{k}^{c})(\hat{\eta}_{k}) 0\displaystyle~{}\geq 0
k(ηkη^k)(dk+Δd^kq^kc)\displaystyle\sum\limits_{k\in\mathcal{I}}(\eta_{k}-\hat{\eta}_{k})(d_{k}+\Delta\hat{d}_{k}-\hat{q}_{k}^{c})
+k𝒥(ηkη^k)(dk+Δd^kwkΔwkq^kc)\displaystyle+\sum\limits_{k\in\mathcal{J}}(\eta_{k}-\hat{\eta}_{k})(d_{k}+\Delta\hat{d}_{k}-w_{k}-\Delta w_{k}-\hat{q}_{k}^{c}) 0\displaystyle~{}\leq 0 (A.5)

Based on the above optimality conditions, we can analyze the existence and uniqueness of the GNE of the game 𝒢={𝒦,𝒳,Π}\mathcal{G}=\{\mathcal{K},\mathcal{X},\Pi\} as follows.

Existence. When problem (6) is feasible, since the objective function (6a) is strictly convex and the constraints constitute a close convex set, problem (6) has a unique optimal solution (Δd^,q^c,η^)(\Delta\hat{d},\hat{q}^{c},\hat{\eta}). Let Δd=Δd^\Delta d^{*}=\Delta\hat{d}, δ=η^/τ\delta^{*}=-\hat{\eta}/\tau, qc=q^cq^{c*}=\hat{q}^{c}, q=q^cδq^{*}=\hat{q}^{c}-\delta^{*}. It is easy to check that condition (A.2)-(A.4) are satisfied so that (Δd,q,qc,δ)(\Delta d^{*},q^{*},q^{c*},\delta^{*}) is an GNE of the game 𝒢\mathcal{G}.

Uniqueness. Suppose (Δd,q,qc,δ)(\Delta d^{*},q^{*},q^{c*},\delta^{*}) is an GNE of the game 𝒢\mathcal{G}, we have qkc=dk+Δdk,kq_{k}^{c*}=d_{k}+\Delta d^{*}_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{I}, qkc=dk+ΔdkwkΔwk,k𝒥q_{k}^{c*}=d_{k}+\Delta d_{k}^{*}-w_{k}-\Delta w_{k},\forall k\in\mathcal{J} due to constraint (2b), (3b) and qc=δ+qq^{c*}=\delta^{*}+q^{*}. Let Δd^=Δd\Delta\hat{d}=\Delta d^{*}, q^c=qc\hat{q}^{c}=q^{c*}, η^=τδ\hat{\eta}=-\tau\delta^{*}, then condition (-A) is met. Therefore, Δd\Delta d^{*} is the optimal solution of (6) and is unique.

-B Redundancy Elimination

Before introducing methods to eliminate redundancy, we first give the following definitions:

Definition B1. (Redundant Constraint) A constraint is said to be redundant if removing the constraint does not change the critical region.

Definition B2. (Minimal Representation) Polyhedron (17) is said to be a minimal representation of CRi if all constraints are non-redundant.

To remove redundant constraints to construct a minimal representation of CRi, a method based on Nonhomogeneous Farkas Lemma is proposed.

Lemma B1. (Nonhomogeneous Farkas Lemma [46]) In the following two sets

𝒫1={u|Aut,au>t}𝒫2={v|Av=a,tvt,v0}\begin{lgathered}\mathcal{P}_{1}=\{u|Au\leq t,~{}a^{\top}u>t^{\prime}\}\\ \mathcal{P}_{2}=\{v|A^{\top}v=a,~{}t^{\prime}\geq v^{\top}t,~{}v\geq 0\}\end{lgathered}\mathcal{P}_{1}=\{u|Au\leq t,~{}a^{\top}u>t^{\prime}\}\\ \mathcal{P}_{2}=\{v|A^{\top}v=a,~{}t^{\prime}\geq v^{\top}t,~{}v\geq 0\}

Matrix multiplication is compatible in dimension. Then 𝒫1\mathcal{P}_{1} is empty if and only if 𝒫2\mathcal{P}_{2} is non-empty.

Consider constraint HjθhjH_{j}\theta\leq h_{j}, if it is redundant, the polyhedron {θ|H[j]h[j]}\{\theta|H_{[-j]}\leq h_{[-j]}\} defined by the remaining constraints must be a subset of {θ|Hjθhj}\{\theta|H_{j}\theta\leq h_{j}\}. In other words, {θ|H[j]h[j]}{θ|Hjθ>hj}=\{\theta|H_{[-j]}\leq h_{[-j]}\}\cap\{\theta|H_{j}\theta>h_{j}\}=\emptyset. So we have

Theorem B1. Constraint HjθhjH_{j}\theta\leq h_{j} in Polyhedron (17) is redundant if the following LP has a feasible solution

vH[j]=Hj,hjvh[j],v0v^{\top}H_{[-j]}=H_{j},~{}h_{j}^{\prime}\geq v^{\top}h_{[-j]},~{}v\geq 0 (B.1)

If all constraints in polyhedron (17) are screened, and redundant ones are removed, then the remaining constraints constitute a minimal representation of CRi. Similarly, we can define and eliminate redundancy in v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) as follows.

Definition B3. (Redundant Piece) In the piecewise linear function (15), a piece γib+γiBθ\gamma^{\top}_{i}b+\gamma^{\top}_{i}B\theta is said to be redundant if it never reaches maximum for all θΘ\theta\in\Theta.

Claim B1. The jj-th piece in v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) is redundant if the jj-th constraint in the polyhedron epi[v¯(θ)]\mbox{epi}[\underline{v}(\theta)] is redundant. The epigraph of the piecewise linear function (15) is the following polyhedron

epi[v¯(θ)]={(θ,κ)p+1|κγ1t+γ1Bθκγnt+γnBθ}\mbox{epi}[\underline{v}(\theta)]=\left\{(\theta,\kappa)\in\mathbb{R}^{p+1}\middle|\begin{gathered}\kappa\geq\gamma^{\top}_{1}t+\gamma^{\top}_{1}B\theta\\ \vdots\\ \kappa\geq\gamma^{\top}_{n}t+\gamma^{\top}_{n}B\theta\end{gathered}\right\} (B.2)

Similarly, according to Theorem B1, the redundancy in v¯(θ)\underline{v}(\theta) can be removed.

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