Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare
Abstract
In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization to the class of all welfarist rules.
1 Introduction
The fair allocation of indivisible goods—be it artwork, furniture, school supplies, or electronic devices—is a ubiquitous problem in society and has attracted significant interest in economics (Moulin, 2019). Among the plethora of methods that one may use to allocate indivisible goods fairly, the method that has arguably received the most attention in recent years is the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule. For instance, MNW is used to allocate goods on the popular fair division website Spliddit,111http://www.spliddit.org which has served hundreds of thousands of users since its launch in 2014.
MNW selects from each profile an allocation that maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities, or equivalently, the sum of their logarithms. In an influential work, Caragiannis et al. (2019) showed that every allocation output by MNW satisfies envy-freeness up to one good (EF1): given any two agents, if the first agent envies the second agent, then this envy can be eliminated by removing some good in the second agent’s bundle. Recently, Suksompong (2023) provided the first characterization of MNW by showing that it is the unique additive welfarist rule that guarantees EF1—an additive welfarist rule selects an allocation maximizing a welfare notion that can be expressed as the sum of some function of the agents’ utilities. Suksompong’s characterization raises an obvious question: Is MNW also the unique (not necessarily additive) welfarist rule that guarantees EF1, where a welfarist rule selects an allocation maximizing a welfare notion that can be expressed as some function of the agents’ utilities?
2 Preliminaries
Let be the set of agents, and be the set of goods. Each agent has a utility function ; for simplicity, we write instead of for a single good . We assume that the utility functions are additive, that is, for all and . A profile consists of , and .
An allocation is an ordered partition of into bundles such that bundle is allocated to agent . An agent receives utility from allocation . An allocation is EF1 if for every pair such that , there exists a good with the property that . A rule maps any given profile to an allocation.
Given , a welfare function is a non-decreasing function . The welfarist rule with (welfare) function chooses from each profile an allocation that maximizes the welfare ; if there are multiple such allocations, the rule may choose one arbitrarily.
3 The Result
Before proceeding to our characterization, we first establish a technical lemma.
Lemma 1.
Fix . Let be a function that is continuous on . Suppose that
(1) |
for all , positive integers , and . Then, there exists a continuous function such that for all .
Proof.
Suppose that fulfills assumption (1). First, we show that satisfies
(2) |
for all and . Assume without loss of generality that ; the proof for any other is analogous. Let be fixed throughout. Define by for all . Note that is continuous due to the continuity of on . For any positive integer and any , we have
(by (1)) | ||||
so for any rational number , we have
Similarly, we have for any rational number , hence the same equation is true for all positive rational numbers . Since is continuous and the positive rational numbers are dense in , we can conclude that is constant, and thus, for all . Hence, (2) is true for all and .
Next, we prove by backward induction that for all integers , there exists a continuous function such that for all . Then, gives the desired conclusion.
For the base case , we have . For the inductive step, let be given, and assume that such a function exists; we shall prove that exists as well. Define by for all . Note that is continuous on due to the continuity of on . Let be given. Then, by setting and , we have
(by (2)) | ||||
(by the inductive hypothesis) | ||||
establishing the inductive step and therefore the lemma. ∎
We now state our characterization. Recall from Section 2 that a welfare function is assumed to be non-decreasing on .
Theorem 2.
Fix . Let be a welfare function that is continuous222In the prior characterization of additive welfarist rules, Suksompong (2023) made the stronger assumption that the welfare function is differentiable. Here, we only assume that the function is continuous. and strictly increasing333The theorem does not hold without the assumption that is strictly increasing on : for example, if is a constant function, then statement (b) holds but (a) does not. on . Then, the following three statements are equivalent:
-
(a)
For every profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, every allocation that can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function is EF1.
-
(b)
For every profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, there exists an EF1 allocation that can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function .
-
(c)
The following two statements hold for :
-
(i)
There exists a strictly increasing and continuous function such that for all .
-
(ii)
The inequality holds for all and satisfying .
-
(i)
Note that if satisfies (c), then given any profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, an allocation can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function if and only if it can be chosen by MNW, so the two rules are effectively equivalent.444For profiles that do not admit an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, MNW requires an additional tie-breaking specification in order to ensure EF1 (Caragiannis et al., 2019). Hence, Theorem 2 provides a characterization of MNW among all welfarist rules.
Proof of Theorem 2.
The implication (a) (b) is trivial. For the implication (c) (a), if satisfies (c), then given a profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, every allocation that can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function is also an allocation that can be chosen by MNW, which is known to be EF1 (Caragiannis et al., 2019); hence, also satisfies (a). It therefore remains to prove the implication (b) (c). Assume that satisfies (b); we will show that both statements (i) and (ii) of (c) hold.
To prove (i), it suffices to show that satisfies (1) for all , positive integers , and . Indeed, once this is shown, Lemma 1 provides a continuous function satisfying for all . Note that must be strictly increasing because is strictly increasing on , and cannot be in the range of since is strictly increasing and its domain is an open set in .
To show (1), suppose on the contrary that (1) is false for some , positive integer , and ; assume without loss of generality that , which means that
Suppose that
the case where the inequality goes in the opposite direction can be handled similarly. By the continuity of , there exists such that
(3) |
Consider a profile with goods, where , such that
-
•
for each , we have for and for ;
-
•
, and for .
Clearly, this profile admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility. Let be an EF1 allocation chosen by the welfarist rule with function on this profile. Regardless of whom is allocated to, each agent receives at most goods from in —otherwise, if some agent receives more than goods from , then some other agent receives fewer than goods from by the pigeonhole principle and therefore envies by more than one good, meaning that is not EF1. Since , every agent receives exactly goods from . Furthermore, must be allocated to agent ; otherwise, the allocation where is allocated to agent (and all other goods are allocated as in ) has a higher welfare than , contradicting the fact that is chosen by the welfarist rule with function . The welfare of must not be smaller than that of another allocation where agent receives along with goods from , agent receives goods from , and every other agent receives goods from each. This means that
contradicting (3). This establishes (i).
It remains to prove (ii). Consider any and satisfying . Let . Without loss of generality, assume that and for some (if , the empty product is taken to be ). Define by for all and for all . Then,
(since is non-decreasing) | ||||
(by (i) and since all ’s are positive) | ||||
(since is strictly increasing) | ||||
(by (i) and since all ’s are positive) |
completing the proof of the theorem. ∎
Acknowledgments
This work was partially supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education under grant number MOE-T2EP20221-0001 and by an NUS Start-up Grant. We thank Pakawut Jiradilok for helpful discussions.
References
- Caragiannis et al. [2019] Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang. The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(3):12:1–12:32, 2019.
- Moulin [2019] Hervé Moulin. Fair division in the internet age. Annual Review of Economics, 11:407–441, 2019.
- Suksompong [2023] Warut Suksompong. A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods. Economics Letters, 222:110956, 2023.