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Extending the Characterization of Maximum Nash Welfare

Sheung Man Yuen and Warut Suksompong National University of Singapore
Abstract

In the allocation of indivisible goods, the maximum Nash welfare rule has recently been characterized as the only rule within the class of additive welfarist rules that satisfies envy-freeness up to one good. We extend this characterization to the class of all welfarist rules.

1 Introduction

The fair allocation of indivisible goods—be it artwork, furniture, school supplies, or electronic devices—is a ubiquitous problem in society and has attracted significant interest in economics (Moulin, 2019). Among the plethora of methods that one may use to allocate indivisible goods fairly, the method that has arguably received the most attention in recent years is the maximum Nash welfare (MNW) rule. For instance, MNW is used to allocate goods on the popular fair division website Spliddit,111http://www.spliddit.org which has served hundreds of thousands of users since its launch in 2014.

MNW selects from each profile an allocation that maximizes the product of the agents’ utilities, or equivalently, the sum of their logarithms. In an influential work, Caragiannis et al. (2019) showed that every allocation output by MNW satisfies envy-freeness up to one good (EF1): given any two agents, if the first agent envies the second agent, then this envy can be eliminated by removing some good in the second agent’s bundle. Recently, Suksompong (2023) provided the first characterization of MNW by showing that it is the unique additive welfarist rule that guarantees EF1—an additive welfarist rule selects an allocation maximizing a welfare notion that can be expressed as the sum of some function of the agents’ utilities. Suksompong’s characterization raises an obvious question: Is MNW also the unique (not necessarily additive) welfarist rule that guarantees EF1, where a welfarist rule selects an allocation maximizing a welfare notion that can be expressed as some function of the agents’ utilities?

In this note, we answer the above question in the affirmative, by extending the characterization of Suksompong (2023) to the class of all welfarist rules (whether additive or not). This further solidifies the “unreasonable fairness” of MNW established by Caragiannis et al. (2019).

2 Preliminaries

Let N={1,,n}N=\{1,\ldots,n\} be the set of agents, and G={g1,,gm}G=\{g_{1},\ldots,g_{m}\} be the set of goods. Each agent iNi\in N has a utility function ui:2G0u_{i}:2^{G}\to\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}; for simplicity, we write ui(g)u_{i}(g) instead of ui({g})u_{i}(\{g\}) for a single good gGg\in G. We assume that the utility functions are additive, that is, ui(G)=gGui(g)u_{i}(G^{\prime})=\sum_{g\in G^{\prime}}u_{i}(g) for all iNi\in N and GGG^{\prime}\subseteq G. A profile consists of NN, GG and (ui)iN(u_{i})_{i\in N}.

An allocation A=(A1,,An)A=(A_{1},\ldots,A_{n}) is an ordered partition of GG into nn bundles such that bundle AiA_{i} is allocated to agent ii. An agent iNi\in N receives utility ui(Ai)u_{i}(A_{i}) from allocation AA. An allocation AA is EF1 if for every pair i,jNi,j\in N such that AjA_{j}\neq\emptyset, there exists a good gAjg\in A_{j} with the property that ui(Ai)ui(Aj{g})u_{i}(A_{i})\geq u_{i}(A_{j}\setminus\{g\}). A rule maps any given profile to an allocation.

Given n2n\geq 2, a welfare function is a non-decreasing function fn:[0,)n[,)f_{n}:[0,\infty)^{n}\to[-\infty,\infty). The welfarist rule with (welfare) function fnf_{n} chooses from each profile an allocation AA that maximizes the welfare fn(u1(A1),,un(An))f_{n}(u_{1}(A_{1}),\ldots,u_{n}(A_{n})); if there are multiple such allocations, the rule may choose one arbitrarily.

3 The Result

Before proceeding to our characterization, we first establish a technical lemma.

Lemma 1.

Fix n2n\geq 2. Let fn:[0,)n[,)f_{n}:[0,\infty)^{n}\to[-\infty,\infty) be a function that is continuous on (0,)n(0,\infty)^{n}. Suppose that

fn((k+1)x1,x2,,xi1,kxi,xi+1,,xn)=fn(kx1,x2,,xi1,(k+1)xi,xi+1,,xn)\displaystyle f_{n}((k+1)x_{1},x_{2},\ldots,x_{i-1},kx_{i},x_{i+1},\ldots,x_{n})=f_{n}(kx_{1},x_{2},\ldots,x_{i-1},(k+1)x_{i},x_{i+1},\ldots,x_{n}) (1)

for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0, positive integers kk, and iN{1}i\in N\setminus\{1\}. Then, there exists a continuous function q:(0,)[,)q:(0,\infty)\to[-\infty,\infty) such that fn(x1,x2,,xn)=q(x1x2xn)f_{n}(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots,x_{n})=q(x_{1}x_{2}\cdots x_{n}) for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0.

Proof.

Suppose that fnf_{n} fulfills assumption (1). First, we show that fnf_{n} satisfies

fn(x,x2,,xi1,z/x,xi+1,,xn)=fn(y,x2,,xi1,z/y,xi+1,,xn)\displaystyle f_{n}(x,x_{2},\ldots,x_{i-1},z/x,x_{i+1},\ldots,x_{n})=f_{n}(y,x_{2},\ldots,x_{i-1},z/y,x_{i+1},\ldots,x_{n}) (2)

for all iN{1}i\in N\setminus\{1\} and x2,,xi1,xi+1,,xn,x,y,z>0x_{2},\ldots,x_{i-1},x_{i+1},\ldots,x_{n},x,y,z>0. Assume without loss of generality that i=2i=2; the proof for any other i{3,,n}i\in\{3,\ldots,n\} is analogous. Let x3,,xn,z>0x_{3},\ldots,x_{n},z>0 be fixed throughout. Define h:(0,)[,)h:(0,\infty)\to[-\infty,\infty) by h(x):=fn(x,z/x,x3,,xn)h(x):=f_{n}(x,z/x,x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}) for all x>0x>0. Note that hh is continuous due to the continuity of fnf_{n} on (0,)n(0,\infty)^{n}. For any positive integer kk and any x>0x>0, we have

h(k+1kx)\displaystyle h\left(\frac{k+1}{k}\cdot x\right) =fn((k+1)xk,kz(k+1)x,x3,,xn)\displaystyle=f_{n}\left((k+1)\cdot\frac{x}{k},\,k\cdot\frac{z}{(k+1)x},\,x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}\right)
=fn(kxk,(k+1)z(k+1)x,x3,,xn)\displaystyle=f_{n}\left(k\cdot\frac{x}{k},\,(k+1)\cdot\frac{z}{(k+1)x},\,x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}\right) (by (1))
=fn(x,z/x,x3,,xn)\displaystyle=f_{n}(x,z/x,x_{3},\ldots,x_{n})
=h(x),\displaystyle=h(x),

so for any rational number r=a/b>1r=a/b>1, we have

h(rx)=h(aa1a1a2b+1bx)=h(a1a2b+1bx)==h(x).\displaystyle h(rx)=h\left(\frac{a}{a-1}\cdot\frac{a-1}{a-2}\cdot\;\cdots\;\cdot\frac{b+1}{b}\cdot x\right)=h\left(\frac{a-1}{a-2}\cdot\;\cdots\;\cdot\frac{b+1}{b}\cdot x\right)=\cdots=h(x).

Similarly, we have h(rx)=h(x)h(rx)=h(x) for any rational number 0<r<10<r<1, hence the same equation is true for all positive rational numbers rr. Since hh is continuous and the positive rational numbers are dense in (0,)(0,\infty), we can conclude that hh is constant, and thus, fn(x,z/x,x3,,xn)=fn(y,z/y,x3,,xn)f_{n}(x,z/x,x_{3},\ldots,x_{n})=f_{n}(y,z/y,x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}) for all x,y>0x,y>0. Hence, (2) is true for all iN{1}i\in N\setminus\{1\} and x2,,xi1,xi+1,,xn,x,y,z>0x_{2},\ldots,x_{i-1},x_{i+1},\ldots,x_{n},x,y,z>0.

Next, we prove by backward induction that for all integers 1kn1\leq k\leq n, there exists a continuous function qk:(0,)k[,)q_{k}:(0,\infty)^{k}\to[-\infty,\infty) such that fn(x1,,xn)=qk(x1xk+1xn,x2,,xk)f_{n}(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n})=q_{k}(x_{1}x_{k+1}\cdots x_{n},x_{2},\ldots,x_{k}) for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0. Then, q:=q1q:=q_{1} gives the desired conclusion.

For the base case k=nk=n, we have qn:=fn|(0,)nq_{n}:=f_{n}|_{(0,\infty)^{n}}. For the inductive step, let 2kn2\leq k\leq n be given, and assume that such a function qkq_{k} exists; we shall prove that qk1q_{k-1} exists as well. Define qk1q_{k-1} by qk1(y1,,yk1):=qk(y1,,yk1,1)q_{k-1}(y_{1},\ldots,y_{k-1}):=q_{k}(y_{1},\ldots,y_{k-1},1) for all y1,,yk1>0y_{1},\ldots,y_{k-1}>0. Note that qk1q_{k-1} is continuous on (0,)k1(0,\infty)^{k-1} due to the continuity of qkq_{k} on (0,)k(0,\infty)^{k}. Let x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0 be given. Then, by setting x:=x1x:=x_{1} and y:=z:=x1xky:=z:=x_{1}x_{k}, we have

fn(x1,,xn)\displaystyle f_{n}(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}) =fn(x,x2,,xk1,z/x,xk+1,,xn)\displaystyle=f_{n}(x,x_{2},\ldots,x_{k-1},z/x,x_{k+1},\ldots,x_{n})
=fn(y,x2,,xk1,z/y,xk+1,,xn)\displaystyle=f_{n}(y,x_{2},\ldots,x_{k-1},z/y,x_{k+1},\ldots,x_{n}) (by (2))
=fn(x1xk,x2,,xk1,1,xk+1,,xn)\displaystyle=f_{n}(x_{1}x_{k},x_{2},\ldots,x_{k-1},1,x_{k+1},\ldots,x_{n})
=qk(x1xkxk+1xn,x2,,xk1,1)\displaystyle=q_{k}(x_{1}x_{k}x_{k+1}\cdots x_{n},x_{2},\ldots,x_{k-1},1) (by the inductive hypothesis)
=qk1(x1xkxn,x2,,xk1),\displaystyle=q_{k-1}(x_{1}x_{k}\cdots x_{n},x_{2},\ldots,x_{k-1}),

establishing the inductive step and therefore the lemma. ∎

We now state our characterization. Recall from Section 2 that a welfare function is assumed to be non-decreasing on [0,)n[0,\infty)^{n}.

Theorem 2.

Fix n2n\geq 2. Let fnf_{n} be a welfare function that is continuous222In the prior characterization of additive welfarist rules, Suksompong (2023) made the stronger assumption that the welfare function is differentiable. Here, we only assume that the function is continuous. and strictly increasing333The theorem does not hold without the assumption that fnf_{n} is strictly increasing on (0,)n(0,\infty)^{n}: for example, if fnf_{n} is a constant function, then statement (b) holds but (a) does not. on (0,)n(0,\infty)^{n}. Then, the following three statements are equivalent:

  1. (a)

    For every profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, every allocation that can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function fnf_{n} is EF1.

  2. (b)

    For every profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, there exists an EF1 allocation that can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function fnf_{n}.

  3. (c)

    The following two statements hold for fnf_{n}:

    1. (i)

      There exists a strictly increasing and continuous function q:(0,)(,)q:(0,\infty)\to(-\infty,\infty) such that fn(x1,x2,,xn)=q(x1x2xn)f_{n}(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots,x_{n})=q(x_{1}x_{2}\cdots x_{n}) for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0.

    2. (ii)

      The inequality fn(x1,x2,,xn)>fn(y1,y2,,yn)f_{n}(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots,x_{n})>f_{n}(y_{1},y_{2},\ldots,y_{n}) holds for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0 and y1,,yn0y_{1},\ldots,y_{n}\geq 0 satisfying i=1nyi=0\prod_{i=1}^{n}y_{i}=0.

Note that if fnf_{n} satisfies (c), then given any profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, an allocation can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function fnf_{n} if and only if it can be chosen by MNW, so the two rules are effectively equivalent.444For profiles that do not admit an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, MNW requires an additional tie-breaking specification in order to ensure EF1 (Caragiannis et al., 2019). Hence, Theorem 2 provides a characterization of MNW among all welfarist rules.

Proof of Theorem 2.

The implication (a) \Rightarrow (b) is trivial. For the implication (c) \Rightarrow (a), if fnf_{n} satisfies (c), then given a profile that admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility, every allocation that can be chosen by the welfarist rule with function fnf_{n} is also an allocation that can be chosen by MNW, which is known to be EF1 (Caragiannis et al., 2019); hence, fnf_{n} also satisfies (a). It therefore remains to prove the implication (b) \Rightarrow (c). Assume that fnf_{n} satisfies (b); we will show that both statements (i) and (ii) of (c) hold.

To prove (i), it suffices to show that fnf_{n} satisfies (1) for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0, positive integers kk, and iN{1}i\in N\setminus\{1\}. Indeed, once this is shown, Lemma 1 provides a continuous function q:(0,)[,)q:(0,\infty)\to[-\infty,\infty) satisfying fn(x1,x2,,xn)=q(x1x2xn)f_{n}(x_{1},x_{2},\ldots,x_{n})=q(x_{1}x_{2}\cdots x_{n}) for all x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0. Note that qq must be strictly increasing because fnf_{n} is strictly increasing on (0,)n(0,\infty)^{n}, and -\infty cannot be in the range of qq since qq is strictly increasing and its domain is an open set in \mathbb{R}.

To show (1), suppose on the contrary that (1) is false for some x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0, positive integer kk, and iN{1}i\in N\setminus\{1\}; assume without loss of generality that i=2i=2, which means that

fn((k+1)x1,kx2,x3,,xn)fn(kx1,(k+1)x2,x3,,xn).\displaystyle f_{n}((k+1)x_{1},kx_{2},x_{3},\ldots,x_{n})\neq f_{n}(kx_{1},(k+1)x_{2},x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}).

Suppose that

fn((k+1)x1,kx2,x3,,xn)<fn(kx1,(k+1)x2,x3,,xn);\displaystyle f_{n}((k+1)x_{1},kx_{2},x_{3},\ldots,x_{n})<f_{n}(kx_{1},(k+1)x_{2},x_{3},\ldots,x_{n});

the case where the inequality goes in the opposite direction can be handled similarly. By the continuity of fnf_{n}, there exists ϵ(0,x1)\epsilon\in(0,x_{1}) such that

fn((k+1)x1ϵ,kx2,x3,xn)<fn(kx1ϵ,(k+1)x2,x3,,xn).\displaystyle f_{n}((k+1)x_{1}-\epsilon,kx_{2},x_{3}\ldots,x_{n})<f_{n}(kx_{1}-\epsilon,(k+1)x_{2},x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}). (3)

Consider a profile with m=kn+1m=kn+1 goods, where G:={g1,,gkn}=G{gm}G^{\prime}:=\{g_{1},\ldots,g_{kn}\}=G\setminus\{g_{m}\}, such that

  • for each gGg\in G^{\prime}, we have uj(g)=xju_{j}(g)=x_{j} for j{1,2}j\in\{1,2\} and uj(g)=xj/ku_{j}(g)=x_{j}/k for jN{1,2}j\in N\setminus\{1,2\};

  • u1(gm)=x1ϵu_{1}(g_{m})=x_{1}-\epsilon, and uj(gm)=0u_{j}(g_{m})=0 for jN{1}j\in N\setminus\{1\}.

Clearly, this profile admits an allocation where every agent receives positive utility. Let AA be an EF1 allocation chosen by the welfarist rule with function fnf_{n} on this profile. Regardless of whom gmg_{m} is allocated to, each agent receives at most kk goods from GG^{\prime} in AA—otherwise, if some agent jj receives more than kk goods from GG^{\prime}, then some other agent receives fewer than kk goods from GG^{\prime} by the pigeonhole principle and therefore envies jj by more than one good, meaning that AA is not EF1. Since |G|=kn|G^{\prime}|=kn, every agent receives exactly kk goods from GG^{\prime}. Furthermore, gmg_{m} must be allocated to agent 11; otherwise, the allocation where gmg_{m} is allocated to agent 11 (and all other goods are allocated as in AA) has a higher welfare than AA, contradicting the fact that AA is chosen by the welfarist rule with function fnf_{n}. The welfare of AA must not be smaller than that of another allocation where agent 11 receives gmg_{m} along with k1k-1 goods from GG^{\prime}, agent 22 receives k+1k+1 goods from GG^{\prime}, and every other agent receives kk goods from GG^{\prime} each. This means that

fn((k+1)x1ϵ,kx2,x3,xn)fn(kx1ϵ,(k+1)x2,x3,,xn),\displaystyle f_{n}((k+1)x_{1}-\epsilon,kx_{2},x_{3}\ldots,x_{n})\geq f_{n}(kx_{1}-\epsilon,(k+1)x_{2},x_{3},\ldots,x_{n}),

contradicting (3). This establishes (i).

It remains to prove (ii). Consider any x1,,xn>0x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}>0 and y1,,yn0y_{1},\ldots,y_{n}\geq 0 satisfying i=1nyi=0\prod_{i=1}^{n}y_{i}=0. Let X:=i=1nxi>0X:=\prod_{i=1}^{n}x_{i}>0. Without loss of generality, assume that y1==yk=0y_{1}=\cdots=y_{k}=0 and Y:=i=k+1nyi>0Y:=\prod_{i=k+1}^{n}y_{i}>0 for some k{1,,n}k\in\{1,\ldots,n\} (if k=nk=n, the empty product i=k+1nyi\prod_{i=k+1}^{n}y_{i} is taken to be 11). Define z1,,znz_{1},\ldots,z_{n} by zi:=(X/2Y)1/kz_{i}:=(X/2Y)^{1/k} for all i{1,,k}i\in\{1,\ldots,k\} and zi:=yiz_{i}:=y_{i} for all i{k+1,,n}i\in\{k+1,\ldots,n\}. Then,

fn(y1,,yn)\displaystyle f_{n}(y_{1},\ldots,y_{n}) fn(z1,,zn)\displaystyle\leq f_{n}(z_{1},\ldots,z_{n}) (since fnf_{n} is non-decreasing)
=q(z1zkzk+1zn)\displaystyle=q(z_{1}\cdots z_{k}\cdot z_{k+1}\cdots z_{n}) (by (i) and since all ziz_{i}’s are positive)
=q((X/2Y)yk+1yn)\displaystyle=q((X/2Y)\cdot y_{k+1}\cdots y_{n})
=q(X/2)\displaystyle=q(X/2)
<q(X)\displaystyle<q(X) (since qq is strictly increasing)
=q(x1xn)\displaystyle=q(x_{1}\cdots x_{n})
=fn(x1,,xn),\displaystyle=f_{n}(x_{1},\ldots,x_{n}), (by (i) and since all xix_{i}’s are positive)

completing the proof of the theorem. ∎

Acknowledgments

This work was partially supported by the Singapore Ministry of Education under grant number MOE-T2EP20221-0001 and by an NUS Start-up Grant. We thank Pakawut Jiradilok for helpful discussions.

References

  • Caragiannis et al. [2019] Ioannis Caragiannis, David Kurokawa, Hervé Moulin, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Junxing Wang. The unreasonable fairness of maximum Nash welfare. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 7(3):12:1–12:32, 2019.
  • Moulin [2019] Hervé Moulin. Fair division in the internet age. Annual Review of Economics, 11:407–441, 2019.
  • Suksompong [2023] Warut Suksompong. A characterization of maximum Nash welfare for indivisible goods. Economics Letters, 222:110956, 2023.