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Dynamic quantized consensus under DoS attacks:
Towards a tight zooming-out factor

Shuai Feng, Maopeng Ran, Hideaki Ishii, Shengyuan Xu Shuai Feng and Shengyuan Xu are with the School of Automation, Nanjing University of Science and Technology, Nanjing 210094, China ([email protected], [email protected]). Maopeng Ran is with the School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing, 100191, China and and also with the Zhongguancun Laboratory, Beijing, 100094, China ([email protected]). Hideaki Ishii is with the Department of Computer Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama 226-8502, Japan ([email protected]). Corresponding author: Shengyuan Xu.
Abstract

This paper deals with dynamic quantized consensus of dynamical agents in a general form under packet losses induced by Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. The communication channel has limited bandwidth and hence the transmitted signals over the network are subject to quantization. To deal with agent’s output, an observer is implemented at each node. The state of the observer is quantized by a finite-level quantizer and then transmitted over the network. To solve the problem of quantizer overflow under malicious packet losses, a zooming-in and out dynamic quantization mechanism is designed. By the new quantized controller proposed in the paper, the zooming-out factor is lower bounded by the spectral radius of the agent’s dynamic matrix. A sufficient condition of quantization range is provided under which the finite-level quantizer is free of overflow. A sufficient condition of tolerable DoS attacks for achieving consensus is also provided. At last, we study scalar dynamical agents as a special case and further tighten the zooming-out factor to a value smaller than the agent’s dynamic parameter. Under such a zooming-out factor, it is possible to recover the level of tolerable DoS attacks to that of unquantized consensus, and the quantizer is free of overflow.

I Introduction

Consensus of multi-agent systems has a variety of applications such as distributed computation, collaborative surveillance, sensor fusion and vehicle platoon [1]. Sophisticated devices such sensors, micro computers and wireless communication blocks are embedded in each agent, which can significantly promote the performance of consensus and make cooperation among agents possible. However, the challenges of malicious cyber attacks causing malfunctions also emerge, such as deceptive attacks and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks [2, 3]. Deceptive attacks influence the integrity of data and DoS attacks can induce malicious packet drops by radio-frequency interference and/or flooding the target with an overwhelming flux of packets to name a few.

In this paper, we are interested in a consensus problem of multi-agent systems under quantized data and malicious packet dropouts induced by DoS attacks. The quantizer has finite levels and quantization range. By controller design, we need to ensure that the quantizer should not saturate. Such problem is not trivial because, for example, if a dynamical agent’s measurements drift/diverge during packet-dropping intervals, some measurements may exceed the range of the quantizer.

The problems of packet dropouts have been well studied in the last two decades, e.g. in [4] for stochastic packet losses, and the case of DoS attacks inducing malicious packet dropouts has been investigated in [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. For multi-agent systems under malicious packet dropouts, there are some recent developments for consensus, output regulation and formation control [10, 11, 9, 12]. Single integrator multi-agent systems under DoS attacks were studied in the papers [10, 13]. The objective therein is practical state consensus. Specifically, in [10], by self-triggered control, the nodes can achieve practical consensus if the number of consecutive packet losses is finite. In [13], by proposing randomized transmissions, the nodes are shown to achieve practical consensus even under frequent DoS attacks. For dynamical agents in a general form, the work [11] is one of the early papers considering consensus problems under DoS attacks by event-triggered control. The authors in [14] propose a novel distributed resilient control method without the pre-knowledge of the leader to solve the practical cooperative output regulation problem for multi-agent systems under DoS attacks. In [12], formation control of nonlinear multi-agent systems in the presence of malicious packet dropouts induced by DoS attacks is investigated. In [15], the authors consider asynchronous DoS attacks, i.e., the attacker is able to launch independent DoS attacks on communication edges.

Wireless communication for data transmission is widely used in cyber-physical systems. Despite the advantages of wireless communication such as remote transmission and lower costs for mass devices, the “competition” among devices for bandwidth resources may become overwhelming. Such competition would induce problems (e.g., delay and packet losses) to those control systems with large amounts of data exchange, e.g., large-scale multi-agent systems and sensor networks. Under limited bandwidth, signals can be subject to coarse quantization, and the consequence of quantization on control/measurement signals needs to be taken into account at the design stage. Static and dynamic quantizations have been proposed for various control problems. Centralized control systems under quantized communication have been extensively studied in the last two decades, for example by the seminal papers [16, 17]. Dynamic quantization with zooming-in and out is necessary to ensure quantizer unsaturation and asymptotic stability [18], where in particular the zooming-out factor should be able to compensate the influence of state divergence during open-loop control intervals, e.g., it should be “larger” than the unstable eigenvalues in case of a discrete-time system [4]. Centralized systems under dynamic quantization and DoS-induced packet losses have been studied in [7, 19]. In general, it is difficult to make the zooming-out factor equal to or smaller than the unstable eigenvalues because the state or estimation error can diverge at the rate of the unstable eigenvalues under open-loop mode (due to packet losses or sampled data control).

Dynamic quantization has also been extended to multi-agent systems without packet losses [20, 21, 22, 23]. In such works, quantized systems are equipped with zooming-in capability to ensure finite data-rate quantization and asymptotic convergence. When multi-agent systems are subject to DoS attacks and limited data-rate quantization, the recent paper [24] provides a design of dynamic quantization with both zooming-in and out capabilities to ensure quantizer unsaturation and consensus.

For multi-agent systems, when dynamic quantization due to limited data rate and packet losses coexist, one may have a question: Can we make the zooming-out factor tight and directly link it to the agent dynamics, e.g., lower bounded by the unstable eigenvalues of the open-loop system dynamic matrix? As mentioned before, such a problem has been well addressed for centralized systems [16, 4], but it is still open for multi-agent systems. Moreover, a tight zooming-out factor is meaningful because it can promote the multi-agent systems’ resilience against DoS attacks [24, 25].

In this paper, we provide a new design of dynamic quantized controller for output feedback multi-agent systems under DoS attacks. In the following, we compare our paper with the relevant literature in order to clarify our contributions. Generally speaking, the most relevant paper is our previous work [24]. In [24], the connections of zooming-out factor to the spectral radius of the open-loop system dynamic matrix of the agent are not explicit during the computation, and its value is conservative. It is also computationally intense in the sense that it needs matrix calculations of “high” dimensions (i.e. multi-agent’s state dimension times the total number of agents) for as many rounds as the number of the maximum consecutive packet losses. This also implies that one needs to know that number before controller design. By contrast, by the new control design in this paper, to obtain the zooming-out parameter, one only needs to calculate the spectral radius of the agent system matrix, and chooses a value larger than it. The information about the maximum DoS-induced packet losses is not needed. Moreover, an observer is implemented in this paper for handling output feedback while [24] does not involve state observation. From the viewpoint of technical analysis by switched system theory, this paper is more involved for having four modes, while [24] has only two modes. Compared with [10], our paper additionally takes limited data rate and the induced quantizer overflow problem into consideration. Moreover, the model of multi-agent systems in [10] takes the form of a single integrator, in which consensus error does not diverge even in the presence of DoS attacks. In our paper, the model of multi-agent systems is more general, which can incorporate open-loop unstable dynamics. Technically, it is more challenging to achieve consensus for multi-agent systems with unstable dynamics under DoS, not to mention under finite-level quantization. Compared with [11], our paper additionally considers quantized control under DoS, though transmissions are periodic and not based on event-triggered control.

In view of the comparisons mentioned above, we summarize the main contributions of this paper:

a) We develop a new output feedback quantized controller design for multi-agent systems, in which the bound of zooming-out factor is tight and directly linked to the agent dynamics compared with [24]: it is lower bounded by the spectral radius of the agent’s system matrix. Sufficient conditions on quantization range for overflow prevention and DoS attack for consensus are provided.

b) For scalar multi-agent systems, beyond the results of general linear multi-agent systems in a), we provide an approach to find a tighter zooming-out factor smaller than the agent’s system dynamic parameter. Under such a zooming-out factor, the bound of tolerable DoS attacks under unquantized consensus is recovered, and the quantizer is not saturated.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the framework consisting of multi-agent systems and the class of DoS attacks. Section III contains two parts: general multi-agent systems as the main part and scalar multi-agent systems as a special case. A numerical example is presented in Section IV, and finally Section V ends the paper with concluding remarks and future research.

Notation. We denote by \mathbb{R} the set of reals. Given bb\in\mathbb{R}, b\mathbb{R}_{\geq b} and >b\mathbb{R}_{>b} denote the sets of reals no smaller than bb and reals greater than bb, respectively; b\mathbb{R}_{\leq b} and <b\mathbb{R}_{<b} represent the sets of reals no larger than bb and reals smaller than bb, respectively; \mathbb{Z} denotes the set of integers. For any cc\in\mathbb{Z}, we denote c:={c,c+1,}\mathbb{Z}_{\geq c}:=\{c,c+1,\cdots\}. Given a vector yy and a matrix Γ\Gamma, let y\|y\| and y\|y\|_{\infty} denote the 22- and \infty-norms of vector yy, respectively, and Γ\|\Gamma\| and Γ\|\Gamma\|_{\infty} represent the corresponding induced norms of matrix Γ\Gamma. Moreover, ρ(Γ)\rho(\Gamma) denotes the spectral radius of Γ\Gamma. Given an interval \mathcal{I}, |||\mathcal{I}| denotes its length. The Kronecker product is denoted by \otimes.

II Framework

Communication graph. We let graph 𝒢=(𝒩,)\mathcal{G}=(\mathcal{N},\mathcal{E}) denote the communication topology among NN agents, where 𝒩={1,2,,N}\mathcal{N}=\{1,2,\cdots,N\} denotes the set of agents and 𝒩×𝒩\mathcal{E}\subseteq\mathcal{N}\times\mathcal{N} denotes the set of edges. Let 𝒩i\mathcal{N}_{i} denote the set of the neighbors of agent ii, where i=1,2,,Ni=1,2,\cdots,N. In this paper, we assume that the graph 𝒢\mathcal{G} is undirected and connected, i.e. if j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i}, then i𝒩ji\in\mathcal{N}_{j}. Let A𝒢=[aij]N×NA_{\mathcal{G}}=[a_{ij}]\in\mathbb{R}^{N\times N} denote the adjacency matrix of the graph 𝒢\mathcal{G}, where aij>0a_{ij}>0 if and only if j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i} and aii=0a_{ii}=0. Define the Laplacian matrix L𝒢=[lij]N×NL_{\mathcal{G}}=[l_{ij}]\in\mathbb{R}^{N\times N}, in which lii=j=1Naijl_{ii}=\sum_{j=1}^{N}a_{ij} and lij=aijl_{ij}=-a_{ij} if iji\neq j. Let λi\lambda_{i} (i=1,2,,Ni=1,2,\cdots,N) denote the eigenvalues of L𝒢L_{\mathcal{G}} and in particular we have λ1=0\lambda_{1}=0 due to the graph being connected. Let INI_{N} denote an identity matrix with dimension NN.

II-A System description

The agents interacting over the network 𝒢\mathcal{G} are homogeneous linear multi-agent systems with sampling period Δ>0\Delta\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}:

xi(kΔ)\displaystyle x_{i}(k\Delta) =Axi((k1)Δ)+Bui((k1)Δ)\displaystyle=Ax_{i}((k-1)\Delta)+Bu_{i}((k-1)\Delta) (1a)
yi(kΔ)\displaystyle y_{i}(k\Delta) =Cxi(kΔ)\displaystyle=Cx_{i}(k\Delta) (1b)

where i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N}, k1k\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1}, An×nA\in\mathbb{R}^{n\times n}, Bn×wB\in\mathbb{R}^{n\times w} and Cv×nC\in\mathbb{R}^{v\times n}. We assume that (A,B)(A,B) is stabilizable and (A,C)(A,C) is observable. xi(kΔ)nx_{i}(k\Delta)\in\mathbb{R}^{n} denotes the state of agent ii and yi(kΔ)vy_{i}(k\Delta)\in\mathbb{R}^{v} denotes the output. We assume that an upper bound of the initial condition xi(0)nx_{i}(0)\in\mathbb{R}^{n} is known, i.e. xi(0)Cx0>0\|x_{i}(0)\|_{\infty}\leq C_{x_{0}}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} [20, 21, 22]. Here, Cx0C_{x_{0}} can be an arbitrarily large real as long as it satisfies this bound. This is for preventing the overflow of state quantization at the beginning. Let ui((k1)Δ)wu_{i}((k-1)\Delta)\in\mathbb{R}^{w} denote the control input, whose computation will be given in (12).

We introduce the control objective of this paper: State consensus. The average of the states is computed as x¯(kΔ)=1Ni=1Nxi(kΔ)\overline{x}(k\Delta)=\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}x_{i}(k\Delta) and state consensus is defined by

limkxi(kΔ)x¯(kΔ)=0,i=1,2,,N.\displaystyle\lim_{k\to\infty}x_{i}(k\Delta)-\overline{x}(k\Delta)=0,\,\,\,i=1,2,\cdots,N. (2)

It is trivial that (2) also implies the consensus of output yi(kΔ)y_{i}(k\Delta). We assume that the spectral radius ρ(A)1\rho(A)\geq 1. Otherwise, consensus (2) is trivially achieved by setting ui(kΔ)=0u_{i}(k\Delta)=0 for all kk.

In this paper, the communication channel for information exchange is bandwidth limited and subject to DoS. We assume that the transmission attempts of each agent take place periodically at time kΔk\Delta with k1k\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1} and free of delay. Agent i=1,2,,Ni=1,2,\cdots,N can only exchange quantized information with its neighbor agents j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i} over the network 𝒢\mathcal{G} due to bandwidth constraints. In the presence of DoS, transmission attempts fail. We let {sr}{kΔ}\{s_{r}\}\subseteq\{k\Delta\} represent the instants of successful transmissions. Note that s0Δs_{0}\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq\Delta} is the instant when the first successful transmission occurs. Also, we let s1s_{-1} denote the time instant 0. In the remainder of the paper, we let kk represent instant kΔk\Delta, and sr+ps_{r}+p represent instant sr+pΔs_{r}+p\Delta (p0p\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}) for the ease of notation.

Uniform quantizer. Let χ\chi\in\mathbb{R} be the original scalar value before quantization and qR()q_{R}(\cdot) be the quantization function for scalar input values as

qR(χ)={0σ<χ<σ2zσ(2z1)σχ<(2z+1)σ2Rσχ(2R+1)σqR(χ)χσ\displaystyle q_{R}(\chi)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{lll}0&-\sigma<\chi<\sigma&\\ 2z\sigma&(2z-1)\sigma\leq\chi<(2z+1)\sigma\\ 2R\sigma&\chi\geq(2R+1)\sigma&\\ -q_{R}(-\chi)&\chi\leq-\sigma&\end{array}\right. (7)

where R>0R\in\mathbb{Z}_{>0} is to be designed and z=1,2,,Rz=1,2,\cdots,R, and σ>0\sigma\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}. If the quantizer is unsaturated such that |χ|(2R+1)σ|\chi|\leq(2R+1)\sigma, then the error induced by quantization satisfies

|χqR(χ)|σ,if|χ|(2R+1)σ.\displaystyle|\chi-q_{R}(\chi)|\leq\sigma,\,\,\text{if}\,\,|\chi|\leq(2R+1)\sigma. (8)

Moreover, we define the vector version of the quantization function as QR(β)=[qR(β1)qR(β2)qR(βf)]TfQ_{R}(\beta)=[\,q_{R}(\beta_{1})\,\,q_{R}(\beta_{2})\,\,\cdots\,\,q_{R}(\beta_{f})\,]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{f}, where β=[β1β2βf]Tf\beta=[\beta_{1}\,\,\beta_{2}\,\,\cdots\beta_{f}]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{f} with f1f\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1}. It is clear that β\beta can be properly quantized if β(2R+1)σ\|\beta\|_{\infty}\leq(2R+1)\sigma. In the remainder of the paper, by quantizer overflow or saturation, we mean that at least a βi\beta_{i} exceeds the range of quantization, i.e., β>(2R+1)σ\|\beta\|_{\infty}>(2R+1)\sigma or equivalently |βi|>(2R+1)σ|\beta_{i}|>(2R+1)\sigma.

II-B Time-constrained DoS

In this paper, we refer to DoS as the event for which all the encoded signals cannot be received by the decoders and it affects all the agents. We consider a general DoS model developed in [5] that describes the attacker’s action by the frequency of DoS attacks and their duration. Let {hq}q0\{h_{q}\}_{q\in\mathbb{Z}_{0}} with h0Δh_{0}\geq\Delta denote the sequence of DoS off/on transitions, that is, the time instants at which DoS exhibits a transition from zero (transmissions are successful) to one (transmissions are not successful). Hence, Hq:={hq}[hq,hq+τq[H_{q}:=\{h_{q}\}\cup[h_{q},h_{q}+\tau_{q}[ represents the qq-th DoS time-interval, of a length τq0\tau_{q}\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}, over which the network is in DoS status. If τq=0\tau_{q}=0, then HqH_{q} takes the form of a single pulse at hqh_{q}. Given τ,t0\tau,t\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} with tτt\geq\tau, let n(τ,t)n(\tau,t) denote the number of DoS off/on transitions over [τ,t][\tau,t], and let Ξ(τ,t):=q0Hq[τ,t]\Xi(\tau,t):=\bigcup_{q\in\mathbb{Z}_{0}}H_{q}\,\cap\,[\tau,t] be the subset of [τ,t][\tau,t] where the network is in DoS status.

Assumption 1

(DoS frequency) [5]. There exist constants η0\eta\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} and τD>0\tau_{D}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} such that n(τ,t)η+tττDn(\tau,t)\,\leq\,\eta+\frac{t-\tau}{\tau_{D}} for all τ,tΔ\tau,t\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq\Delta} with tτt\geq\tau.  \blacksquare

Assumption 2

(DoS duration) [5]. There exist constants κ0\kappa\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} and T>1T\in\mathbb{R}_{>1} such that |Ξ(τ,t)|κ+tτT|\Xi(\tau,t)|\,\leq\,\kappa+\frac{t-\tau}{T} for all τ,tΔ\tau,t\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq\Delta} with tτt\geq\tau.  \blacksquare

Remark 1

Assumptions 1 and 2 do only constrain a given DoS signal in terms of its average frequency and duration. By [26], τD\tau_{D} can be considered as the average dwell-time between consecutive DoS off/on transitions, while η\eta is the chattering bound. Assumption 2 expresses a similar requirement with respect to the duration of DoS. It expresses the property that, on the average, the total duration over which communication is interrupted does not exceed a certain fraction of time specified by 1/T1/T. Like η\eta, the constant κ\kappa is a regularization term. It is needed because during a DoS interval, one has |Ξ(hq,hq+τq)|=τq>τq/T|\Xi(h_{q},h_{q}+\tau_{q})|=\tau_{q}>\tau_{q}/T. Thus κ\kappa serves to make Assumption 2 consistent. Conditions τD>0\tau_{D}>0 and T>1T>1 imply that DoS cannot occur at an infinitely fast rate and be always active.  \blacksquare

The lemma below presents the relation between the number of successful transmissions and the number of transmission attempts kk. Let TS(1,k)T_{S}(1,k) and TU(1,k)T_{U}(1,k) denote the numbers of successful and unsuccessful transmissions between steps 1 and kk, respectively.

Lemma 1

[7] Consider the DoS attacks in Assumptions 1 and 2 and the network sampling period Δ\Delta. If 1/T+Δ/τD<11/T+\Delta/\tau_{D}<1, then TS(1,k)(11/TΔ/τD)kκ+ηΔΔ.T_{S}(1,k)\geq\left(1-1/T-\Delta/\tau_{D}\right)k-\frac{\kappa+\eta\Delta}{\Delta}.  \blacksquare

III Main results

III-A Control architecture

To deal with output feedback, an observer estimating xi(k)x_{i}(k) from yi(k)y_{i}(k) is locally implemented at agent i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N} given by

x^i(k)\displaystyle\hat{x}_{i}(k) =Ax^i(k1)+Bui(k1)\displaystyle=A\hat{x}_{i}(k-1)+Bu_{i}(k-1)
+F(yi(k1)Cx^i(k1))\displaystyle\,\,\,+F(y_{i}(k-1)-C\hat{x}_{i}(k-1)) (9)

where x^i(k)n\hat{x}_{i}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n} denotes the observer state and x^i(0)=0\hat{x}_{i}(0)=0. Since (A,C)(A,C) is observable, there exists a matrix Fn×vF\in\mathbb{R}^{n\times v} such that the spectral radius ρ(AFC)<1\rho(A-FC)<1. Then, x^i(k)\hat{x}_{i}(k) is quantized and transmitted to the neighbors. Let x~ij(k)n\tilde{x}_{i}^{j}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n} denote the decoded value of x^i(t)\hat{x}_{i}(t) by agent j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i} and vice versa for x~ji(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k), whose computations will be given later.

For agent i𝒩i\in\mathcal{N}, the control input ui(k)u_{i}(k) has two modes aligned with the status of DoS:

ui(k)={Kj=1Naij(x~ji(k)x~ii(k))ifkHq0ifkHq\displaystyle u_{i}(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}K\sum_{j=1}^{N}a_{ij}(\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k)-\tilde{x}_{i}^{i}(k))&\text{if}\,\,k\notin H_{q}\\ 0&\text{if}\,\,k\in H_{q}\end{array}\right. (12)

for k=1,2,k=1,2,\cdots. Let ui(0)=0u_{i}(0)=0. Note that each agent is able to passively know the status of DoS at kk by whether receiving neighbors’ transmissions or not. We assume that there exists a feedback gain Kw×nK\in\mathbb{R}^{w\times n} such that the spectral radius of

J=diag(J2,,JN),Ji=AλiBK,i=2,,N\displaystyle J=\text{diag}(J_{2},\cdots,J_{N}),J_{i}=A-\lambda_{i}BK,\,\,\,i=2,...,N (13)

satisfies ρ(J)<1\rho(J)<1, where λi\lambda_{i} denotes the eigenvalues of L𝒢L_{\mathcal{G}}. Note that ρ(J)<1\rho(J)<1 is needed to achieve consensus even if DoS is absent. The assumption on the existence of KK is motivated by the consensusability of linear discrete-time multi-agent systems [20]. If DoS is absent and precise information is available, a sufficient condition to ensure the existence of KK is that (A,B)stabilizable andp|λpu(A)|<1+λ2/λN1λ2/λN,(A,B)~{}\textrm{stabilizable and}~{}\prod_{p}|\lambda_{p}^{u}(A)|<\frac{1+\lambda_{2}/\lambda_{N}}{1-\lambda_{2}/\lambda_{N}}, where λpu(A)\lambda_{p}^{u}(A) represents unstable eigenvalues of AA.

In our paper, the encoder and decoder for each state have the same structure. In the following, we first explain the decoding process. In (12), x~ji(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k) is the decoded value of x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) (j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i}) at the decoder of agent ii with initial condition x~ji(0)\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(0). Its computation is given by

x~ji(k)={Ax~ji(k1)+θ(k1)Q^ji(k)if kHq Ax~ji(k1)if kHq\displaystyle\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}A\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k-1)+\theta(k-1)\hat{Q}_{j}^{i}(k)&\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$ }\\ A\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k-1)&\text{if $k\in H_{q}$}\end{array}\right. (16)

in which k=1,2,k=1,2,\cdots, and Q^ji(k)\hat{Q}_{j}^{i}(k) is the value generated and transmitted by the encoder of agent jj given by

Q^ji(k)=QR(x^j(k)Ax~ji(k1)θ(k1)).\displaystyle\hat{Q}_{j}^{i}(k)=Q_{R}\left(\frac{\hat{x}_{j}(k)-A\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\right). (17)

The computation of x~ii(k)\tilde{x}_{i}^{i}(k) in the decoder of agent ii follows

x~ii(k)={Ax~ii(k1)+θ(k1)Q^ii(k)if kHq Ax~ii(k1)if kHq\displaystyle\tilde{x}_{i}^{i}(k)\!=\!\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}A\tilde{x}_{i}^{i}(k-1)+\theta(k-1)\hat{Q}_{i}^{i}(k)&\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$ }\\ A\tilde{x}_{i}^{i}(k-1)&\text{if $k\in H_{q}$}\end{array}\right. (20)
Q^ii(k)=QR(x^i(k)Ax~ii(k1)θ(k1)).\displaystyle\hat{Q}_{i}^{i}(k)=Q_{R}\left(\frac{\hat{x}_{i}(k)-A\tilde{x}_{i}^{i}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\right). (21)

Now we explain the synchronization of a decoded state among agents, that is, for i,l𝒩ji,l\in\mathcal{N}_{j}, the values of x~ji(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k), x~jl(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{l}(k) and x~jj(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{j}(k) are identical for all kk. This is because the decoders of agents i,ji,j and ll have the same initial condition (x~ji(0)=x~jl(0)=x~jj(0)=0\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(0)=\tilde{x}_{j}^{l}(0)=\tilde{x}_{j}^{j}(0)=0), have the same θ(k)\theta(k) and receive the same QR((x^j(k)Ax~ji,l,j(k1))/θ(k1))Q_{R}((\hat{x}_{j}(k)-A\tilde{x}_{j}^{i,l,j}(k-1))/\theta(k-1)) in Q^ji(k)\hat{Q}_{j}^{i}(k), Q^jl(k)\hat{Q}_{j}^{l}(k) and Q^jj(k)\hat{Q}_{j}^{j}(k) for all kk. The synchronization of θ(k)\theta(k) in the decoders and also in the encoders will be explained after (31). Thus, the superscripts of x~ji(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{i}(k), x~jl(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{l}(k) and x~jj(k)\tilde{x}_{j}^{j}(k) can be omitted, and it is enough to let x~j(k)\tilde{x}_{j}(k) represent the decoded value of x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) in the decoders. At last, we point out that the encoder is a copy of the decoder, and thus one has that x~j(k)\tilde{x}_{j}(k) in the encoder also has the same value as in the decoders.

Therefore (12) can be rewritten as

ui(k)={Kj=1Naij(x~j(k)x~i(k))ifkHq0ifkHq\displaystyle u_{i}(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}K\sum_{j=1}^{N}a_{ij}(\tilde{x}_{j}(k)-\tilde{x}_{i}(k))&\text{if}\,k\notin H_{q}\\ 0&\text{if}\,k\in H_{q}\end{array}\right. (24)

and (16) and (20) can be rewritten as

x~j(k)={Ax~j(k1)+θ(k1)Q^j(k)if kHq Ax~j(k1)if kHq\displaystyle\tilde{x}_{j}(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}A\tilde{x}_{j}(k-1)+\theta(k-1)\hat{Q}_{j}(k)&\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$ }\\ A\tilde{x}_{j}(k-1)&\text{if $k\in H_{q}$}\end{array}\right. (27)

in which k=1,2,k=1,2,\cdots, j{i}𝒩ij\in\{i\}\cup\mathcal{N}_{i} with x~j(0)=0\tilde{x}_{j}(0)=0. Similarly, (17) and (21) can be written as

Q^j(k)=QR(x^j(k)Ax~j(k1)θ(k1)),k=1,2,.\displaystyle\hat{Q}_{j}(k)=Q_{R}\left(\frac{\hat{x}_{j}(k)-A\tilde{x}_{j}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\right),\,\,k=1,2,\cdots. (28)

The switched-type estimator in (27) has the following motivations. The first equation in (27) is for acquiring the quantized information of x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) under successful transmissions, and then calculates x~j(k)\tilde{x}_{j}(k). This step is also necessary for the DoS-free case [20]. The second equation in (27) is an open loop estimation, and it together with the second equation in (24) can decouple the state of the agents and the quantization errors (see Case d) later).

A key parameter in (28) is the scaling parameter θ(k1)\theta(k-1). By adjusting its value dynamically, the variable to be quantized will be kept within the bounded quantization range without saturation. The scaling parameter θ(k)>0\theta(k)\in\mathbb{R}_{>0} is updated as

θ(k)={γ1θ(k1)if kHqγ2θ(k1)if kHq k=1,2,\displaystyle\theta(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}\gamma_{1}\theta(k-1)&\quad\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$}\\ \gamma_{2}\theta(k-1)&\quad\text{if $k\in H_{q}$ }\end{array}\right.\,\,\,k=1,2,\cdots (31)

with θ(0)=θ0>0\theta(0)=\theta_{0}\in\mathbb{R}_{>0}. The parameters γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} are the so-called zooming-in and out factors in dynamic quantization, respectively. Since θ(k)\theta(k) in the encoders and decoders has the same initial condition θ(0)\theta(0), and kHqk\in H_{q} or kHqk\notin H_{q} is passively known as mentioned before, one can see that θ(k)\theta(k) is synchronized in all the encoders and decoders. The zooming-in and out mechanism in (31) is majorly inspired by [4, 7] studying centralized systems. The scaling parameter is a dynamic sequence whose increasing and decreasing depend on DoS attacks in order to mitigate the influence of DoS-induced packet losses. If one assumes that each agent is aware of its own JiJ_{i} and their neighbors’ JjJ_{j} (j𝒩ij\in\mathcal{N}_{i}), it is possible to design distributed zooming-in factors, namely γ1i\gamma_{1}^{i}. Then the new θ(k)\theta(k) and γ1\gamma_{1} are complicated and will be a vector and a matrix, respectively. This case will be left for future research. The design of zooming-out factor may not change since it is dependent on AA (see Lemma 2 later).

During DoS intervals, x^j(k)Ax~j(k1)\hat{x}_{j}(k)-A\tilde{x}_{j}(k-1) in (28) may diverge. Therefore, the scaling parameter θ(k1)\theta(k-1) must increase using γ2\gamma_{2} so that QR()Q_{R}(\cdot) is not saturated. If the transmissions succeed, the quantizers zoom in and θ(k)\theta(k) decreases by using γ1\gamma_{1}. The selections of γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} will be specified later, and one of the objectives of this paper is to find a γ2\gamma_{2} as tight as possible. If one assumes that the communication network is free from any DoS-induced or random packet losses, then the zooming-out mechanism is not necessary since x^j(k)Ax~j(k1)\hat{x}_{j}(k)-A\tilde{x}_{j}(k-1) in QR()Q_{R}(\cdot) does not diverge. In this case, one only needs the zooming-in mechanism to ensure the property of asymptotic convergence [20, 22].

By defining vectors x~(k)=[x~1T(k)x~NT(k)]T,x^(k)=[x^1T(k)x^NT(k)]T,Q(k)=[Q^1T(k)Q^NT(k)]TnN\tilde{x}(k)=[\tilde{x}_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots\tilde{x}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T},\hat{x}(k)=[\hat{x}_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots\hat{x}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T},Q(k)=[\hat{Q}_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots\hat{Q}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{nN}, one can obtain the compact form of (27) as

x~(k)={ANx~(k1)+θ(k1)Q(k)if kHqANx~(k1)if kHq\displaystyle\tilde{x}(k)=\left\{\begin{array}[]{ll}A_{N}\tilde{x}(k-1)+\theta(k-1)Q(k)&\text{if $k\notin H_{q}$}\\ A_{N}\tilde{x}(k-1)&\text{if $k\in H_{q}$}\end{array}\right. (34)

for k=1,2,k=1,2,\cdots. The compact form of the observer in (III-A) is

x^(k)=\displaystyle\hat{x}(k)= ANx^(k1)+BNu(k1)\displaystyle A_{N}\hat{x}(k-1)+B_{N}u(k-1)
+FN(y(k1)CNx^(k1))\displaystyle+F_{N}(y(k-1)-C_{N}\hat{x}(k-1)) (35)

in which AN:=INAA_{N}:=I_{N}\otimes A, BN:=INBB_{N}:=I_{N}\otimes B, CN:=INCC_{N}:=I_{N}\otimes C, FN:=INFF_{N}:=I_{N}\otimes F, u(k)=[u1T(k)uNT(k)]TNwu(k)=[u_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots u_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{Nw} and y(k)=[y1T(k)yNT(k)]TNvy(k)=[y_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots y_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{Nv}. Let x(k)=[x1T(k)xNT(k)]TnNx(k)=[x_{1}^{T}(k)\cdots x_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{nN}. With the vectors x(k),x~(k)x(k),\tilde{x}(k) and x^(k)\hat{x}(k), we define the following errors in vector form

ec(k)=x^(k)x~(k)=[x^1T(k)x~1T(k)x^NT(k)x~NT(k)]T\displaystyle\!\!\!\!e_{c}(k)\!=\!\hat{x}(k)\!-\!\tilde{x}(k)\!=\![\hat{x}_{1}^{T}(k)\!-\!\tilde{x}_{1}^{T}(k)\!\cdots\!\hat{x}_{N}^{T}(k)\!-\!\tilde{x}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}
eo(k)=x(k)x^(k)=[x1T(k)x^1T(k)xNT(k)x^NT(k)]T\displaystyle\!\!\!\!e_{o}(k)\!=\!x(k)\!-\!\hat{x}(k)\!=\![x_{1}^{T}(k)\!-\!\hat{x}_{1}^{T}(k)\!\cdots\!x_{N}^{T}(k)\!-\!\hat{x}_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}

in which ec(k)e_{c}(k) denotes the error due to signal coding and eo(k)e_{o}(k) denotes the observer error. From (1), one can see that the update of x(k)x(k) is independent on kHqk\in H_{q} or kHqk\notin H_{q}. However, the update of x(k)x(k) depends on k1Hqk-1\in H_{q} or k1Hqk-1\notin H_{q}, due to the control law ui(k1)u_{i}(k-1) in (24). Note that such dependence does not exist in [24]. One can obtain the compact form of the closed-loop dynamics of x(k)x(k) as

x(k)=\displaystyle x(k)=
{Gx(k1)+L(eo(k1)+ec(k1))ifk1HqANx(k1)ifk1Hq\displaystyle\left\{\!\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}Gx(k-1)\!+\!L(e_{o}(k-1)\!+\!e_{c}(k-1))&\!\!\!\!\text{if}\,k\!-\!1\!\notin\!H_{q}\\ A_{N}x(k-1)&\!\!\!\!\text{if}\,k\!-\!1\!\in\!H_{q}\end{array}\right. (38)

where G:=ANL𝒢BKG:=A_{N}-L_{\mathcal{G}}\otimes BK and L:=L𝒢BK.L:=L_{\mathcal{G}}\otimes BK. Let the discrepancy between the state of agent ii and x¯(k)\overline{x}(k) be δi(k):=xi(k)x¯(k)n\delta_{i}(k):=x_{i}(k)-\overline{x}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n} and let δ(k)=[δ1T(k)δNT(k)]TnN\delta(k)=[\delta_{1}^{T}(k)\,\,\cdots\,\,\delta_{N}^{T}(k)]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{nN}. Then one can obtain the compact dynamics of δ(k)\delta(k):

δ(k)=\displaystyle\delta(k)=
{Gδ(k1)+L(eo(k1)+ec(k1))ifk1HqANδ(k1)ifk1Hq.\displaystyle\left\{\!\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}G\delta(k-1)\!+\!L(e_{o}(k-1)\!+\!e_{c}(k-1))&\!\!\!\!\text{if}\,k\!-\!1\!\notin\!H_{q}\\ A_{N}\delta(k-1)&\!\!\!\!\text{if}\,k\!-\!1\!\in\!H_{q}.\end{array}\right.\!\!\!\! (41)

It is clear that if δ(k)0\delta(k)\to 0 as kk\to\infty, consensus of the multi-agent system is achieved as in (2). If the multi-agent system is subject to DoS, δ(k)\delta(k) has a diverging mode by the second equation in (III-A), and the dynamics of ec(k)e_{c}(k) and eo(k)e_{o}(k) are not clear, which implies that consensus may not be achieved.

Note that the control system in this paper looks similar but different from the common “to zero” static controller, i.e., the control input ui(k)u_{i}(k) is set to zero under DoS attacks, see [10]. The controller design in our paper is also different from the “pure” prediction based controller in lossy networks (i.e., ui(k)u_{i}(k) is always computed based on the state prediction) in [24, 11]. In our paper, the decoder (27) generates x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) (j{i}𝒩ij\in\{i\}\cup\mathcal{N}_{i}) regardless of the presence of DoS. Meanwhile, the input ui(k)u_{i}(k) is set to zero and does not depend on the estimated state x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) when kHqk\in H_{q}, though x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) is available. However, computing x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) under DoS is necessary since its value is useful when DoS is over. Consequently, as will be shown later, the technical analysis involves four modes by expressing the overall system as a switched system. By contrast, the analysis in [24] needs to consider only two modes.

III-B Dynamics of the multi-agent systems

Though the update of δ(k)\delta(k) in (III-A) depends on the previous step, i.e., k1Hqk-1\notin H_{q} or k1Hqk-1\in H_{q}, the update of ec(k)e_{c}(k) is affected by both the k1k-1 and kk-th steps. This is because x(k)x(k) in (III-A) depends on k1Hqk-1\notin H_{q} or k1Hqk-1\in H_{q}, and x^(k)\hat{x}(k) in (34) depends on kHqk\notin H_{q} or kHqk\in H_{q}. To make the technical analysis approachable, we conduct the analysis by four cases:

a)kHq and k1Hqb)kHq and k1Hqc)kHq and k1Hqd)kHq and k1Hq.\displaystyle\begin{array}[]{ll}\text{a})\,k\notin H_{q}$ and $k-1\notin H_{q}&\text{b})\,k\notin H_{q}$ and $k-1\in H_{q}\\ \text{c})\,k\in H_{q}$ and $k-1\notin H_{q}&\text{d})\,k\in H_{q}$ and $k-1\in H_{q}.\end{array}

Case a) In view of x~(k)\tilde{x}(k) in the first equation of (34) and x^(k)\hat{x}(k) in (III-A), one can obtain ec(k)=x^(k)ANx~(k1)θ(k1)QR(x^(k)ANx~(k1)θ(k1))e_{c}(k)=\hat{x}(k)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(k-1)-\theta(k-1)Q_{R}\left(\frac{\hat{x}(k)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\right), in which we have

x^(k)ANx~(k1)\displaystyle\hat{x}(k)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(k-1)
=ANec(k1)+BNu(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)\displaystyle=A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+B_{N}u(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)
=Hec(k1)Lδ(k1)+Peo(k1)\displaystyle=He_{c}(k-1)-L\delta(k-1)+Pe_{o}(k-1) (42)

with H:=AN+L𝒢BKH:=A_{N}+L_{\mathcal{G}}\otimes BK and P:=LFNCNP:=L-F_{N}C_{N}. One can also compute the estimation error in the observer

eo(k)=(ANFNCN)eo(k1)\displaystyle e_{o}(k)=(A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})e_{o}(k-1) (43)

in which the spectral radius ρ(ANFNCN)<1\rho(A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})<1 due to ρ(AFC)<1\rho(A-FC)<1. Recall the update of δ(k)\delta(k) for k1Hqk-1\notin H_{q} in (III-A). Then by (III-A)–(43), one obtains the dynamics of δ(k)\delta(k), ec(k)e_{c}(k) and eo(k)e_{o}(k) as follows:

δ(k)=Gδ(k1)+L(eo(k1)+ec(k1))\displaystyle\delta(k)=G\delta(k-1)+L(e_{o}(k-1)+e_{c}(k-1)) (44a)
ec(k)=Hec(k1)Lδ(k1)+Peo(k1)\displaystyle e_{c}(k)=\,He_{c}(k-1)-L\delta(k-1)+Pe_{o}(k-1)
θ(k1)QR(Hec(k1)Lδ(k1)+Peo(k1)θ(k1))\displaystyle\!\!-\!\theta(k\!-\!1)Q_{R}\!\left(\!\!\frac{He_{c}(k-1)\!-\!L\delta(k-1)\!+\!Pe_{o}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\!\!\right) (44b)
eo(k)=(ANFNCN)eo(k1).\displaystyle e_{o}(k)=(A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})e_{o}(k-1). (44c)

Case b) In view of x~(k)\tilde{x}(k) in the first equation in (34) and x^(k)\hat{x}(k) in (III-A), where u(k1)=0u(k-1)=0 due to k1Hqk-1\in H_{q}, one can obtain that ec(k)=ANec(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)θ(k1)QR(ANec(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)θ(k1)).e_{c}(k)=A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)-\theta(k-1)Q_{R}\left(\frac{A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\right). The dynamics of δ(k)\delta(k) for Case b) follows from the second equation in (III-A). The control input applied to the observer is also u(k1)=0u(k-1)=0 due to k1Hqk-1\in H_{q}, which implies that (44c) still holds. With ec(k)e_{c}(k) above, one obtains the dynamics of δ(k)\delta(k), ec(k)e_{c}(k) and eo(k)e_{o}(k) as

δ(k)=ANδ(k1)\displaystyle\delta(k)=A_{N}\delta(k-1) (45a)
ec(k)=ANec(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)\displaystyle e_{c}(k)=A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)
θ(k1)QR(ANec(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)θ(k1))\displaystyle\,\,-\theta(k-1)Q_{R}\left(\frac{A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)}{\theta(k-1)}\right) (45b)
eo(k)=(ANFNCN)eo(k1).\displaystyle e_{o}(k)=(A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})e_{o}(k-1). (45c)

Case c) By substituting the dynamics of x~(k)\tilde{x}(k) in the second equation of (34), one has the evolution of ec(k)e_{c}(k) as ec(k)=ANec(k1)+BNu(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)=Hec(k1)Lδ(k1)+Peo(k1).e_{c}(k)=A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+B_{N}u(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)=He_{c}(k-1)-L\delta(k-1)+Pe_{o}(k-1). The dynamics of eo(k)e_{o}(k) in (43) also holds in this case. In view of the dynamics of δ(k)\delta(k) in the first equation of (III-A), overall one can obtain that

δ(k)\displaystyle\delta(k) =Gδ(k1)+L(eo(k1)+ec(k1))\displaystyle=G\delta(k-1)+L(e_{o}(k-1)+e_{c}(k-1)) (46a)
ec(k)\displaystyle e_{c}(k) =Hec(k1)Lδ(k1)+Peo(k1)\displaystyle=He_{c}(k-1)-L\delta(k-1)+Pe_{o}(k-1) (46b)
eo(k)\displaystyle e_{o}(k) =(ANFNCN)eo(k1).\displaystyle=(A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})e_{o}(k-1). (46c)

Case d) For computing ec(k)e_{c}(k), by x~(k)\tilde{x}(k) in the second equation of (34) and x^(k)\hat{x}(k) in (III-A) with u(k1)=0u(k-1)=0 due to k1Hqk-1\in H_{q}, one can have ec(k)=ANx^(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)ANx~(k1)=ANec(k1)+FNCNeo(k1).e_{c}(k)=A_{N}\hat{x}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(k-1)=A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1). The dynamics of eo(k)e_{o}(k) in (43) still holds in this case. Then, by combining the dynamics of δ(k)\delta(k) in the second equation of (III-A), we can obtain that

δ(k)\displaystyle\delta(k) =ANδ(k1)\displaystyle=A_{N}\delta(k-1) (47a)
ec(k)\displaystyle e_{c}(k) =ANec(k1)+FNCNeo(k1)\displaystyle=A_{N}e_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}e_{o}(k-1) (47b)
eo(k)\displaystyle e_{o}(k) =(ANFNCN)eo(k1).\displaystyle=(A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})e_{o}(k-1). (47c)

To further facilitate the analysis, we define three new variables:

α(k):=δ(k)θ(k),ξc(k):=ec(k)θ(k),ξo(k):=eo(k)θ(k)\displaystyle\alpha(k):=\frac{\delta(k)}{\theta(k)},\,\xi_{c}(k):=\frac{e_{c}(k)}{\theta(k)},\,\xi_{o}(k):=\frac{e_{o}(k)}{\theta(k)} (48)

where θ(k)\theta(k) has been given in (31). The dynamics of α(k)\alpha(k), ξc(k)\xi_{c}(k) and ξo(k)\xi_{o}(k) corresponding to the four cases above, respectively, are presented in the following:

Case a)

α(k)=Gγ1α(k1)+Lγ1(ξo(k1)+ξc(k1))\displaystyle\alpha(k)=\frac{G}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k-1)+\frac{L}{\gamma_{1}}(\xi_{o}(k-1)+\xi_{c}(k-1)) (49a)
ξc(k)=Hγ1ξc(k1)Lγ1α(k1)+Pγ1ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{c}(k)=\,\frac{H}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{c}(k-1)-\frac{L}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k-1)+\frac{P}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{o}(k-1)
QR(Hξc(k1)Lα(k1)+Pξo(k1))γ1\displaystyle\,\,\,-\frac{Q_{R}\left(H\xi_{c}(k-1)-L\alpha(k-1)+P\xi_{o}(k-1)\right)}{\gamma_{1}} (49b)
ξo(k)=ANFNCNγ1ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{o}(k)=\frac{A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{o}(k-1) (49c)

Case b)

α(k)=ANγ1α(k1)\displaystyle\alpha(k)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k-1) (50a)
ξc(k)=ANγ1ξc(k1)+FNCNγ1ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{c}(k)=\,\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{c}(k-1)+\frac{F_{N}C_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{o}(k-1)
QR(ANξc(k1)+FNCNξo(k1))γ1\displaystyle\quad\quad\quad\,\,\,-\frac{Q_{R}\left(A_{N}\xi_{c}(k-1)+F_{N}C_{N}\xi_{o}(k-1)\right)}{\gamma_{1}} (50b)
ξo(k)=ANFNCNγ1ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{o}(k)=\frac{A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{o}(k-1) (50c)

Case c)

α(k)=Gγ2α(k1)+Lγ2(ξo(k1)+ξc(k1))\displaystyle\alpha(k)=\frac{G}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k-1)+\frac{L}{\gamma_{2}}(\xi_{o}(k-1)+\xi_{c}(k-1)) (51a)
ξc(k)=Hγ2ξc(k1)Lγ2α(k1)+Pγ2ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{c}(k)=\frac{H}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{c}(k-1)-\frac{L}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k-1)+\frac{P}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{o}(k-1) (51b)
ξo(k)=ANFNCNγ2ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{o}(k)=\frac{A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{o}(k-1) (51c)

Case d)

α(k)=ANγ2α(k1)\displaystyle\alpha(k)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k-1) (52a)
ξc(k)=ANγ2ξc(k1)+FNCNγ2ξo(k1)\displaystyle\xi_{c}(k)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{c}(k-1)+\frac{F_{N}C_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{o}(k-1) (52b)
ξo(k)=ANFNCNγ2ξo(k1).\displaystyle\xi_{o}(k)=\frac{A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{o}(k-1). (52c)

III-C Quantized consensus

Since (A,C)(A,C) is observable by assumption, we can choose an observer gain FF such that ρ(AFC)ρ(J)\rho(A-FC)\leq\rho(J). Now we present a technical lemma concerning the upper bound of α(sr)\|\alpha(s_{r})\|.

Lemma 2

In view of the scaling parameter (31), select

ρ(J)<γ1<1,γ2>ρ(A)\displaystyle\rho(J)<\gamma_{1}<1,\quad\gamma_{2}>\rho(A) (53)

and let γ0:=max{ρ(J)/γ1,ρ(A)/γ2}\gamma_{0}:=\max\{\rho(J)/\gamma_{1},\rho(A)/\gamma_{2}\}. Suppose that the quantizer (7) does not saturate at successful transmission instants such that ξc(sp)σ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{p})\|_{\infty}\leq\sigma/\gamma_{1} for p=0,,rp=0,\cdots,r. If Δ\Delta and τD\tau_{D} regulating DoS frequency satisfy

ΔτD<lnγ0lnCACJ\displaystyle\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}<-\frac{\ln\gamma_{0}}{\ln C_{A}C_{J}} (54)

where CA,CJ1C_{A},C_{J}\in\mathbb{R}_{\geq 1} satisfy (A/γ2)kCA(ρ(A)/γ2)k\|(A/\gamma_{2})^{k}\|\leq C_{A}(\rho(A)/\gamma_{2})^{k} and (J/γ1)kCJ(ρ(J)/γ1)k\|\left(J/\gamma_{1}\right)^{k}\|\leq C_{J}\left(\rho(J)/\gamma_{1}\right)^{k} (k0k\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}), respectively, then

α(sr)C3Nn,\displaystyle\|\alpha(s_{r})\|\leq C_{3}\sqrt{Nn}, (55)

in which

C3:=max{2C1Cx0θ0,C1CAL1γ3(σγ12+C2Cx0γ1θ0)}.\displaystyle C_{3}:=\max\left\{2C_{1}\frac{C_{x_{0}}}{\theta_{0}},\frac{C_{1}C_{A}\|L\|}{1-\gamma_{3}}\left(\frac{\sigma}{\gamma_{1}^{2}}+\frac{C_{2}C_{x_{0}}}{\gamma_{1}\theta_{0}}\right)\right\}. (56)

with C1C_{1} and γ3\gamma_{3} in (III-C), and C2C_{2} below (III-C).

Proof. We start the analysis from a successful transmission instant k1=sr1k-1=s_{r-1} (k1Hqk-1\notin H_{q}). If the next instant kHqk\in H_{q} (corrupted by DoS), one can see that this scenario (k1Hqk-1\notin H_{q} and kHqk\in H_{q}) corresponds to Case c), and one can obtain α(k)\alpha(k) by (51a). If k+1Hqk+1\in H_{q} as well, this scenario (kHqk\in H_{q} and k+1Hqk+1\in H_{q}) corresponds to Case d). Then according to (52a), one can obtain α(k+1)=ANγ2α(k)\alpha(k+1)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k). By iteration, it is straightforward that if all the transmissions at k+1,,k+mk+1,\cdots,k+m fail, then

α(k+m)=(ANγ2)mα(k)\displaystyle\alpha(k+m)=\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m}\alpha(k)
=(ANγ2)m(Gγ2α(k1)+Lγ2(ξo(k1)+ξc(k1)))\displaystyle\!\!\!\!\!\!=\left(\!\!\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\!\!\right)^{m}\!\!\!\left(\!\!\frac{G}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k-1)\!+\!\frac{L}{\gamma_{2}}\left(\xi_{o}(k-1)+\xi_{c}(k-1)\right)\!\!\right) (57)

where the last equality is obtained by substituting α(k)\alpha(k) in (51a). If k+m+1Hqk+m+1\notin H_{q} is an instant of successful transmissions, namely k+m+1=srk+m+1=s_{r}, then by (50a) in Case b) and (III-C), one has that α(k+m+1)=ANγ1α(k+m)=ANγ1(ANγ2)m(Gγ2α(k1)+Lγ2(ξo(k1)ξc(k1)))\alpha(k+m+1)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(k+m)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{1}}\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m}\left(\frac{G}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(k-1)+\frac{L}{\gamma_{2}}\left(\xi_{o}(k-1)-\xi_{c}(k-1)\right)\right). By switching the γ1\gamma_{1} in AN/γ1A_{N}/\gamma_{1} with the γ2\gamma_{2} in G/γ2G/\gamma_{2} and L/γ2L/\gamma_{2}, and recalling that k1=sr1k-1=s_{r-1} and k+m+1=srk+m+1=s_{r}, one has

α(sr)\displaystyle\alpha(s_{r}) =(ANγ2)mr1Gγ1α(sr1)\displaystyle=\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}\frac{G}{\gamma_{1}}\alpha(s_{r-1})
+(ANγ2)mr1Lγ1(ξo(sr1)+ξc(sr1))\displaystyle\quad+\left(\!\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\!\!\right)^{m_{r-1}}\!\!\frac{L}{\gamma_{1}}\left(\xi_{o}(s_{r-1})+\xi_{c}(s_{r-1})\right) (58)

where mr10m_{r-1}\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} denotes the number of consecutive unsuccessful transmissions between sr1s_{r-1} and srs_{r}. If there is no DoS attack between sr1s_{r-1} and srs_{r}, i.e., mr1=0m_{r-1}=0, then (III-C) is recovered to (49a).

There exists a unitary matrix UU given by

U=[𝟏/Nϕ2ϕN]N×N\displaystyle U=[\mathbf{1}/\sqrt{N}\,\,\phi_{2}\,\,\cdots\,\,\phi_{N}]\in\mathbb{R}^{N\times N} (59)

where ϕiN\phi_{i}\in\mathbb{R}^{N} with i=2,3,,Ni=2,3,\cdots,N satisfies ϕiTL𝒢=λiϕiT\phi^{T}_{i}L_{\mathcal{G}}=\lambda_{i}\phi_{i}^{T} and UTL𝒢U=diag(0,λ2,,λN)U^{T}L_{\mathcal{G}}U=\text{diag}(0,\lambda_{2},\cdots,\lambda_{N}). With such UU, we let

α¯(k):=(UIn)Tα(k)=[α¯1T(k)α¯2T(k)]TnN\displaystyle\overline{\alpha}(k):=(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}\alpha(k)=\left[\overline{\alpha}_{1}^{T}(k)\,\,\overline{\alpha}_{2}^{T}(k)\right]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{nN}
ξ¯c(k):=(UIn)TLγ1ξc(k)=[ξ¯c1T(k)ξ¯c2T(k)]TnN\displaystyle\bar{\xi}_{c}(k):=(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}\frac{L}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{c}(k)=\left[\bar{\xi}_{c1}^{T}(k)\,\,\bar{\xi}_{c2}^{T}(k)\right]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{nN}
ξ¯o(k):=(UIn)TLγ1ξo(k)=[ξ¯o1T(k)ξ¯o2T(k)]TnN\displaystyle\bar{\xi}_{o}(k):=(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}\frac{L}{\gamma_{1}}\xi_{o}(k)=\left[\bar{\xi}_{o1}^{T}(k)\,\,\bar{\xi}_{o2}^{T}(k)\right]^{T}\in\mathbb{R}^{nN}

in which α¯1(k)\bar{\alpha}_{1}(k), ξ¯c1(k)\bar{\xi}_{c1}(k) and ξ¯o1(k)n\bar{\xi}_{o1}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{n} denote vectors composed by the first nn elements in α¯(k)\bar{\alpha}(k), ξ¯c(k)\bar{\xi}_{c}(k) and ξ¯o(k)\bar{\xi}_{o}(k), respectively. Then, by (III-C), one can obtain

α¯(sr)\displaystyle\bar{\alpha}(s_{r}) =(UIn)T(ANγ2)mr1Gγ1(UIn)α¯(sr1)\displaystyle=(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}\frac{G}{\gamma_{1}}(U\otimes I_{n})\bar{\alpha}(s_{r-1})
+(UIn)T(ANγ2)mr1Lγ1(ξo(sr1)+ξc(sr1))\displaystyle\quad+(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}\frac{L}{\gamma_{1}}(\xi_{o}(s_{r-1})+\xi_{c}(s_{r-1}))
=(ANγ2)mr1(UIn)TGγ1(UIn)α¯(sr1)\displaystyle=\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}\frac{G}{\gamma_{1}}(U\otimes I_{n})\bar{\alpha}(s_{r-1})
+(ANγ2)mr1(ξ¯o(sr1)+ξ¯c(sr1))\displaystyle\quad+\left(\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}(\bar{\xi}_{o}(s_{r-1})+\bar{\xi}_{c}(s_{r-1})) (60)

in which the last equality is obtained by the fact that (UIn)T(U\otimes I_{n})^{T} and INAmr1=ANmr1I_{N}\otimes A^{m_{r}-1}=A_{N}^{m_{r}-1} are commuting matrices: (UIn)T(INAmr1)=UTAmr1=(INAmr1)(UIn)T.(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}(I_{N}\otimes A^{m_{r}-1})=U^{T}\otimes A^{m_{r}-1}=(I_{N}\otimes A^{m_{r}-1})(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}. One can verify that α¯1(k)=0\overline{\alpha}_{1}(k)=0 for all kk. It is also easy to verify that (UIn)TG(UIn)=diag(A,Aλ2BK,,AλNBK)(U\otimes I_{n})^{T}G(U\otimes I_{n})=\,\text{diag}(A,A-\lambda_{2}BK,\cdots,A-\lambda_{N}BK). Note that ANA_{N} and GG are block diagonal matrices, thus, from (III-C), one can obtain the dynamics of α¯2(sr)\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r}) as

α¯2(sr)\displaystyle\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r}) =(AN1γ2)mr1Jγ1α¯2(sr1)\displaystyle=\left(\frac{A_{N-1}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}\frac{J}{\gamma_{1}}\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r-1})
+(AN1γ2)mr1(ξ¯o2(sr1)+ξ¯c2(sr1))\displaystyle\quad+\left(\frac{A_{N-1}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{r-1}}(\bar{\xi}_{o2}(s_{r-1})+\bar{\xi}_{c2}(s_{r-1})) (61)

in which AN1:=IN1AA_{N-1}:=I_{N-1}\otimes A. One can verify that (III-C) also holds for r=0r=0. By the iteration of (III-C), one can obtain

α¯2(sr)\displaystyle\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r}) =k=1r1((AN1γ2)mkJγ1)α¯2(s1)\displaystyle=\prod_{k=-1}^{r-1}\left(\left(\frac{A_{N-1}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{k}}\frac{J}{\gamma_{1}}\right)\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{-1})
+k=1r1p=kr2((Aγ2)mp+1Jγ1)\displaystyle\,\,\,+\sum_{k=-1}^{r-1}\prod_{p=k}^{r-2}\left(\left(\frac{A}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{p+1}}\frac{J}{\gamma_{1}}\right)
×(AN1γ2)mk(ξ¯o2(sk)+ξ¯c2(sk))\displaystyle\quad\quad\times\left(\frac{A_{N-1}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{k}}(\bar{\xi}_{o2}(s_{k})+\bar{\xi}_{c2}(s_{k})) (62)

where we let p=kr2()=In(N1)\prod_{p=k}^{r-2}(\cdot)=I_{n(N-1)} when p=r1p=r-1 in the second line.

Let TS(sr,sp)T_{S}(s_{r},s_{p}) and TU(sr,sp)T_{U}(s_{r},s_{p}) (sp>srs_{p}>s_{r}) denote the numbers of successful and unsuccessful transmissions within the interval [sr,sp)[s_{r},s_{p}), respectively. Note that CJC_{J} and CAC_{A} as defined after (54) always exist. Then, in view of the first line in (III-C), one can obtain

k=1r1((AN1γ2)mkJγ1)(CACJ)η+srs1τD\displaystyle\left\|\prod_{k=-1}^{r-1}\left(\left(\frac{A_{N-1}}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{m_{k}}\frac{J}{\gamma_{1}}\right)\right\|\leq(C_{A}C_{J})^{\eta+\frac{s_{r}-s_{-1}}{\tau_{D}}}
×(ρ(A)γ2)TU(s1,sr)(ρ(J)γ1)TS(s1,sr)\displaystyle\quad\times\left(\frac{\rho(A)}{\gamma_{2}}\right)^{T_{U}(s_{-1},s_{r})}\left(\frac{\rho(J)}{\gamma_{1}}\right)^{T_{S}(s_{-1},s_{r})}
=(CACJ)ηC1((CACJ)ΔτDγ0γ3)srs1Δ\displaystyle=\underbrace{(C_{A}C_{J})^{\eta}}_{C_{1}}(\underbrace{(C_{A}C_{J})^{\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}}\gamma_{0}}_{\gamma_{3}})^{\frac{s_{r}-s_{-1}}{\Delta}} (63)

in which γ0=max{ρ(A)/γ2,ρ(J)/γ1}<1\gamma_{0}=\max\{\rho(A)/\gamma_{2},\rho(J)/\gamma_{1}\}<1 by the selections of γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2}, and γ3<1\gamma_{3}<1 by (54). Hence, by (III-C), we have

α¯2(sr)\displaystyle\|\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r})\| C1γ3srs1Δα¯2(s1)\displaystyle\leq C_{1}\gamma_{3}^{\frac{s_{r}-s_{-1}}{\Delta}}\|\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{-1})\|
+C1p=1r1γ3sr1spΔCAξ¯o2(sp)+ξ¯c2(sp)\displaystyle+C_{1}\sum_{p=-1}^{r-1}\gamma_{3}^{\frac{s_{r-1}-s_{p}}{\Delta}}C_{A}\|\bar{\xi}_{o2}(s_{p})+\bar{\xi}_{c2}(s_{p})\| (64)

in which α¯2(s1)2NnCx0/θ0\|\overline{\alpha}_{2}(s_{-1})\|\leq 2\sqrt{Nn}C_{x_{0}}/\theta_{0} by (75) in [24]. Note that ξc(s1)=ξc(0)(x~(0)x^(0))/θ0=0/θ0=0.\|\xi_{c}(s_{-1})\|_{\infty}=\|\xi_{c}(0)\|_{\infty}\leq\left\|(\tilde{x}(0)-\hat{x}(0))/\theta_{0}\right\|_{\infty}=\left\|0/\theta_{0}\right\|_{\infty}=0. By assumption, we have ξc(sp)σ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{p})\|_{\infty}\leq\sigma/\gamma_{1} for p=0,1,,rp=0,1,\cdots,r. Incorporating ξc(s1)\|\xi_{c}(s_{-1})\|_{\infty}, overall for p=1,0,,rp=-1,0,\cdots,r, one has ξc(sp)σ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{p})\|_{\infty}\leq\sigma/\gamma_{1} and hence

ξ¯c2(sp)ξ¯c(sp)Lξc(sp)/γ1\displaystyle\|\bar{\xi}_{c2}(s_{p})\|\leq\|\bar{\xi}_{c}(s_{p})\|\leq\|L\|\|\xi_{c}(s_{p})\|/\gamma_{1}
LNnξc(sp)/γ1LNnσ/γ12.\displaystyle\quad\leq\|L\|\sqrt{Nn}\|\xi_{c}(s_{p})\|_{\infty}/\gamma_{1}\leq\|L\|\sqrt{Nn}\sigma/\gamma_{1}^{2}. (65)

By the dynamics of ξo(k)\xi_{o}(k) in Cases a)–d), we have

ξo(k)\displaystyle\|\xi_{o}(k)\| C2(ρ(AFC)/γ1)kξo(0)\displaystyle\leq C_{2}(\rho(A-FC)/\gamma_{1})^{k}\|\xi_{o}(0)\|
<C2ξo(0)NnC2Cx0/θ0,\displaystyle<C_{2}\|\xi_{o}(0)\|\leq\sqrt{Nn}C_{2}C_{x_{0}}/\theta_{0}, (66)

in which C21C_{2}\geq 1, ρ(AFC)/γ1ρ(J)/γ1<1\rho(A-FC)/\gamma_{1}\leq\rho(J)/\gamma_{1}<1 by the selection of FF and ξo(0)=x(0)x^(0)θ0=x(0)θ0NnCx0/θ0\|\xi_{o}(0)\|=\|\frac{x(0)-\hat{x}(0)}{\theta_{0}}\|=\|\frac{x(0)}{\theta_{0}}\|\leq\sqrt{Nn}C_{x_{0}}/\theta_{0}. By (III-C), one has

ξ¯o2(sp)\displaystyle\|\bar{\xi}_{o2}(s_{p})\| ξ¯o(sp)Lξo(sp)/γ1\displaystyle\leq\|\bar{\xi}_{o}(s_{p})\|\leq\|L\|\|\xi_{o}(s_{p})\|/\gamma_{1}
LNnC2Cx0/(θ0γ1).\displaystyle\leq\|L\|\sqrt{Nn}C_{2}C_{x_{0}}/(\theta_{0}\gamma_{1}). (67)

Note that in (III-C), (srs1)/Δr(s_{r}-s_{-1})/\Delta\geq r and (srsk+1)/Δrk(s_{r}-s_{k+1})/\Delta\geq r-k with k=1,,rk=-1,\cdots,r. Substituting (III-C) and (III-C) into (III-C), we have

α¯2(sr)C1γ3r2NnCx0θ0\displaystyle\|\overline{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r})\|\leq C_{1}\gamma_{3}^{r}2\sqrt{Nn}\frac{C_{x_{0}}}{\theta_{0}}
+C1CA1γ3r1γ3LNn(σγ12+C2Cx0γ1θ0)\displaystyle\quad\quad\quad\quad\,\,+C_{1}C_{A}\frac{1-\gamma_{3}^{r}}{1-\gamma_{3}}\|L\|\sqrt{Nn}\left(\frac{\sigma}{\gamma_{1}^{2}}+\frac{C_{2}C_{x_{0}}}{\gamma_{1}\theta_{0}}\right)
max{2C1Cx0θ0,C1CAL1γ3(σγ12+C2Cx0γ1θ0)}C3Nn.\displaystyle\!\leq\underbrace{\max\left\{\!2C_{1}\frac{C_{x_{0}}}{\theta_{0}},\frac{C_{1}C_{A}\|L\|}{1-\gamma_{3}}\left(\!\frac{\sigma}{\gamma_{1}^{2}}+\frac{C_{2}C_{x_{0}}}{\gamma_{1}\theta_{0}}\right)\!\right\}}_{C_{3}}\sqrt{Nn}. (68)

Then, one has α(sr)(UT)1α¯(sr)=α¯2(sr)C3Nn\|\alpha(s_{r})\|\leq\|(U^{T})^{-1}\|\|\overline{\alpha}(s_{r})\|=\|\overline{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r})\|\leq C_{3}\sqrt{Nn}. Trivially, (III-C) also holds for r=1r=-1.  \blacksquare

Remark 2

The upper bound of α(sr)\alpha(s_{r}) is influenced by the frequency of DoS attacks shown by (54), and therefore influences [αT(sr)ξcT(sr)ξoT(sr)]T[\alpha^{T}(s_{r})\,\,\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r})\,\,\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r})]^{T}, which determines the necessary data rate (see Theorem 1 later). DoS frequency influences α(sr)\alpha(s_{r}) due to the nature of switching in the system, e.g., α(sr)\alpha(s_{r}) can diverge under fast switches among Cases a)-d) due to fast off/on of DoS attacks. As will be shown later, in case of scalar multi-agent systems, DoS-frequency constraint in (54) does not influence the problem any more.  \blacksquare

Remark 3

We emphasize that γ2\gamma_{2} in Lemma 2 is lower bounded by ρ(A)\rho(A), and it is tighter than that in [24]. We explain how the new controller can attain this. One of the major functions of the new controller is to obtain Case d), in which α(k)\alpha(k) and ξc(k)\xi_{c}(k) in (52) are decoupled under DoS and regulated by ANA_{N}. If one adopts the controller in [24], α(k)\alpha(k) and ξc(k)\xi_{c}(k) are coupled under DoS attacks. This implies that one can not simply multiply α(k)\alpha(k) by (AN/γ2)m(A_{N}/\gamma_{2})^{m} in (III-C). Instead, one needs to simultaneously consider α(k+m)\alpha(k+m) and ξc(k+m)\xi_{c}(k+m) due to the couplings, and obtains a form similar to (III-C) but (AN/γ2)mr1(A_{N}/\gamma_{2})^{m_{r}-1} should be replaced by a matrix derived from the combinations of G,LG,L, HH and γ2\gamma_{2}. Then, to obtain α¯2(sr)\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r}) from α¯(sr)\bar{\alpha}(s_{r}), one needs to remove some lines and rows of the matrix [24], and hence γ2\gamma_{2} loses its connections to AA. Eventually, in order to obtain a γ2\gamma_{2} realizing zooming-out, one needs to take the worst-case analysis (i.e., consider all the possible scenarios of consecutive packet losses and compute the corresponding γ2\gamma_{2}, then select the largest γ2\gamma_{2}), and this is the major reason of conservative and inexplicit γ2\gamma_{2} in [24]. This is also computationally intense.  \blacksquare

Remark 4

Compared with the results in [24], the parameters γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} in this paper can be directly selected when JJ and AA are known, respectively. In contrast, the choices of γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} in [24] need complex calculations including matrix multiplication and taking their norms for as many rounds as the number of maximum consecutive packet losses (see Lemma 3, [24]). That is to say, one needs to know the maximum number of consecutive packet drops in order to compute γ2\gamma_{2}. By contrast, to obtain γ2\gamma_{2} in this paper, such information is not needed and one only needs to compute ρ(A)\rho(A) and then selects a tight value provided that (54) holds. To attain the above merits of the new controller over those in [24], one needs to deal with a stabilization problem of a switched system of four modes (i.e, Cases a)-d)) in the technical analysis, instead of two modes in [24]. As will be shown later in the proof of Theorem 1, the four-mode switched system also complicates the calculation of data rate.  \blacksquare

In general, it is difficult to tighten the zooming-out factor beyond the eigenvalues of open-loop systems. This aspect can be more clearly discussed for centralized systems. For example, in the paper [4] considering a discrete-time system, the quantization needs to zoom out with the factor of |λiu(A)||\lambda^{u}_{i}(A)| (the ii-th unstable eigenvalue of AA) for each failed transmission in order to “catch” the diverging estimation error. Similarly, for a continuous-time system, the zooming-out factor is continuous eReλiu(A)te^{\text{Re}\lambda^{u}_{i}(A)t} (real part of λiu(A)\lambda^{u}_{i}(A): Reλiu(A)>0\lambda^{u}_{i}(A)>0) during open-loop intervals [7]. For multi-agent systems, the lack of global state is another challenge. The results mentioned for centralized systems significantly depend on designing a fine predictor having access to the entire state. However, such a predictor is not applicable to multi-agent systems because of the distributed system structure where the agents are constrained to have only local information of their direct neighbors. Therefore, in [24], the authors attempt to predict the state by an open-loop estimator and feed the estimations to the feedback controller. However, due to matrix manipulations, the zooming-out factor eventually loses its connections to the eigenvalues of AA.

In the following, we present the main result of the paper.

Theorem 1

Consider the multi-agent system (1) with control inputs (III-A) to (31), where γ1\gamma_{1} and γ2\gamma_{2} are selected as in Lemma 2. Suppose that the DoS attacks characterized in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfy (54). If 2R+12R+1 in the quantizer (7) satisfies

(2R+1)σζC5Nn\displaystyle(2R+1)\sigma\geq\zeta C_{5}\sqrt{Nn} (69)

where C5:=((C3L+Hσ/γ1+PC2Cx0/θ0)2+AFC2C22Cx02/θ02)12C_{5}:=((C_{3}\|L\|+\|H\|\sigma/\gamma_{1}+\|P\|C_{2}C_{x_{0}}/\theta_{0})^{2}+\|A-FC\|^{2}C_{2}^{2}C_{x_{0}}^{2}/\theta_{0}^{2})^{\frac{1}{2}} and ζ:=max{1,C4AFC/γ2}\zeta:=\max\{1,C_{4}\|A\,\,\,FC\|_{\infty}/\gamma_{2}\}, then quantizer (7) is not overflowed. Moreover, if DoS attacks satisfy

1T+ΔτD<lnγ1lnγ2lnγ1\displaystyle\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}<\frac{-\ln\gamma_{1}}{\ln\gamma_{2}-\ln\gamma_{1}} (70)

then consensus of xi(k)x_{i}(k) is achieved as in (2). The parameter C41C_{4}\geq 1 in ζ\zeta is chosen such that (S/γ2)m1C4ρ(S/γ2)m1C4\|(S/\gamma_{2})^{m-1}\|\leq C_{4}\rho(S/\gamma_{2})^{m-1}\leq C_{4} (m1m\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 1}), where

S:=[ANFNCN0ANFNCN].\displaystyle S:=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}A_{N}&F_{N}C_{N}\\ 0&A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N}\end{array}\right]. (73)

Proof. The unsaturation of quantizer is proved by induction: if the quantizer satisfying (69) is not overflowed such that ξc(sp)σ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{p})\|_{\infty}\leq\sigma/\gamma_{1} for p=0,,rp=0,\cdots,r and recall that ξc(s1)=0σ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{-1})\|_{\infty}=0\leq\sigma/\gamma_{1}, then the quantizer will not saturate at the transmission attempts within the interval (sr,sr+1](s_{r},s_{r+1}] and hence ξc(sr+1)σ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{r+1})\|_{\infty}\leq\sigma/\gamma_{1}.

a) In the proof, srs_{r} represents an instant of successful transmission (r0r\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}) or the initial time s1s_{-1}. At sr+1s_{r}+1, the quantized information of x^(sr+1)\hat{x}(s_{r}+1) attempts to transmit through the network, i.e., QR((x^(sr+1)ANx~(sr))/θ(sr)).Q_{R}\left((\hat{x}(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r}))/\theta(s_{r})\right). In order to prevent quantizer overflow, (x^(sr+1)ANx~(sr))/θ(sr)\|(\hat{x}(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r}))/\theta(s_{r})\|_{\infty} must be upper bounded by the maximum quantization range, i.e., (2R+1)σ(2R+1)\sigma. By (III-B), one has

x^(sr+1)ANx~(sr)θ(sr)=Hec(sr)Lδ(sr)+Peo(sr)θ(sr)\displaystyle\frac{\hat{x}(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r})}{\theta(s_{r})}=\frac{He_{c}(s_{r})-L\delta(s_{r})+Pe_{o}(s_{r})}{\theta(s_{r})}
=Hξc(sr)Lα(sr)+Pξo(sr).\displaystyle=H\xi_{c}(s_{r})-L\alpha(s_{r})+P\xi_{o}(s_{r}). (74)

One can verify that the quantizer at sr+1s_{r}+1 is not saturated since [LHP][αT(sr)ξcT(sr)ξoT(sr)]T(2R+1)σ\left\|[-L\,\,H\,\,P][\alpha^{T}(s_{r})\,\,\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r})\,\,\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r})]^{T}\right\|_{\infty}\leq(2R+1)\sigma in (69), where α(sr)C3Nn\|\alpha(s_{r})\|\leq C_{3}\sqrt{Nn} by Lemma 2, ξc(sr)Nnσ/γ1\|\xi_{c}(s_{r})\|\leq\sqrt{Nn}\sigma/\gamma_{1} and ξo(sr)NnC2Cx0/θ0\|\xi_{o}(s_{r})\|\leq\sqrt{Nn}C_{2}C_{x_{0}}/\theta_{0} in (III-C).

b) At sr+2s_{r}+2, quantized signals of x^(sr+2)\hat{x}(s_{r}+2) attempt to be transmitted to the decoders, and one needs to compute (x^(sr+2)ANx~(sr+1))/θ(sr+1).\|(\hat{x}(s_{r}+2)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r}+1))/\theta(s_{r}+1)\|_{\infty}. However, one cannot compute it directly as in a) because x^(sr+2)\hat{x}(s_{r}+2) has two cases: the transmission attempts at sr+1s_{r}+1 in a) are successful or corrupted by DoS. b-1) If sr+1Hqs_{r}+1\notin H_{q}, then one can apply the similar analysis in a) and concludes that QR()Q_{R}(\cdot) does not saturate at sr+2s_{r}+2. b-2) If the transmission attempts at sr+1s_{r}+1 in a) are not received by the decoders, then at sr+2s_{r}+2, by (III-B) with u(sr+1)=0u(s_{r}+1)=0, one can compute that

(x^(sr+2)ANx~(sr+1))/θ(sr+1)\displaystyle(\hat{x}(s_{r}+2)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r}+1))/\theta(s_{r}+1)
=ANξc(sr+1)+FNCNξo(sr+1)\displaystyle=A_{N}\xi_{c}(s_{r}+1)+F_{N}C_{N}\xi_{o}(s_{r}+1)
=[ANFNCN][ξcT(sr+1)ξoT(sr+1)]T\displaystyle=\left[A_{N}\,\,F_{N}C_{N}\right]\left[\begin{array}[]{ll}\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r}+1)&\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r}+1)\end{array}\right]^{T} (76)

in which by (51) one has

[ξcT(sr+1)ξoT(sr+1)]T\displaystyle\left[\begin{array}[]{ll}\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r}+1)&\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r}+1)\end{array}\right]^{T} (78)
=1γ2[LHP00ANFNCN][α(sr)ξc(sr)ξo(sr)].\displaystyle=\frac{1}{\gamma_{2}}\left[\begin{array}[]{ccc}-L&H&P\\ 0&0&A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N}\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}[]{l}\alpha(s_{r})\\ \xi_{c}(s_{r})\\ \xi_{o}(s_{r})\end{array}\right]. (84)

By (III-C), (78) and the upper bounds of α(sr),ξc(sr)\|\alpha(s_{r})\|,\|\xi_{c}(s_{r})\| and ξo(sr)\|\xi_{o}(s_{r})\| in a), one can verify that (x^(sr+2)ANx~(sr+1))/θ(sr+1)(2R+1)σ\|(\hat{x}(s_{r}+2)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r}+1))/\theta(s_{r}+1)\|_{\infty}\leq(2R+1)\sigma in (69).

c) By b-1), if the previous step is not under DoS, one can always follow a) to verify quantizer unsaturation. Hence, we omit this case and analyze consecutive packet losses {sr+1sr+m}Hq\{s_{r}+1\cdots s_{r}+m\}\in H_{q} until sr+m+1=sr+1s_{r}+m+1=s_{r+1}. At sr+m+1s_{r}+m+1, one should focus (x^(sr+m+1)ANx~(sr+m))/θ(sr+m)=[ANFNCN][ξcT(sr+m)ξoT(sr+m)]T(\hat{x}(s_{r}+m+1)-A_{N}\tilde{x}(s_{r}+m))/\theta(s_{r}+m)=[A_{N}\,\,F_{N}C_{N}][\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r}+m)\,\,\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r}+m)]^{T}, in which by (52) one can obtain

[ξc(sr+m)ξo(sr+m)]=Sm1γ2m1[ξc(sr+1)ξo(sr+1)]\displaystyle\left[\!\begin{array}[]{ll}\xi_{c}(s_{r}+m)\\ \xi_{o}(s_{r}+m)\end{array}\!\right]\!=\!\frac{S^{m-1}}{\gamma_{2}^{m-1}}\left[\!\begin{array}[]{ll}\xi_{c}(s_{r}+1)\\ \xi_{o}(s_{r}+1)\end{array}\!\right] (89)

with [ξcT(sr+1)ξoT(sr+1)]T[\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r}+1)\,\,\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r}+1)]^{T} in (78). Substituting (78) and (89) into [ANFNCN][ξcT(sr+m)ξoT(sr+m)]T[A_{N}\,\,F_{N}C_{N}][\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r}+m)\,\,\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r}+m)]^{T}, one can verify that quantizer is not saturated at sr+m+1=sr+1s_{r}+m+1=s_{r+1} by

[ANFNCN][ξcT(sr+m)ξoT(sr+m)]T\displaystyle\|[A_{N}\,F_{N}C_{N}][\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r}+m)\,\,\xi_{o}^{T}(s_{r}+m)]^{T}\|_{\infty}
C4[ANFNCN]γ2[Lα(sr)+Hξc(sr)+Pξo(sr)(ANFNCN)ξo(sr)]\displaystyle\leq\frac{C_{4}\|[A_{N}\,\,F_{N}C_{N}]\|_{\infty}}{\gamma_{2}}\left\|\left[\!\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{c}-L\alpha(s_{r})+H\xi_{c}(s_{r})+P\xi_{o}(s_{r})\\ (A_{N}-F_{N}C_{N})\xi_{o}(s_{r})\end{array}\!\!\!\!\right]\right\| (92)
C4[ANFNCN]γ2((Lα(sr)+Hξc(sr)\displaystyle\leq\frac{C_{4}\|[A_{N}\,\,F_{N}C_{N}]\|_{\infty}}{\gamma_{2}}((\|L\|\|\alpha(s_{r})\|+\|H\|\|\xi_{c}(s_{r})\|
+Pξo(sr))2+ACFNCN2ξo(sr)2)1/2\displaystyle\quad+\|P\|\|\xi_{o}(s_{r})\|)^{2}+\|A_{C}-F_{N}C_{N}\|^{2}\|\xi_{o}(s_{r})\|^{2})^{1/2}
ζC5Nn(2R+1)σ\displaystyle\leq\zeta C_{5}\sqrt{Nn}\leq(2R+1)\sigma (93)

where C41C_{4}\geq 1 defined below (70) exists since ρ(S/γ2)<1\rho(S/\gamma_{2})<1.

By the analysis in a)c), one can conclude that the quantizer does not saturate during [s1+1,s0](sr,sr+1][s_{-1}+1,s_{0}]\bigcup\,(s_{r},s_{r+1}] with r0r\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}. This implies that the quantizer does not saturate at all kk.

d) Now we show state consensus. We first need to prove that α(k)\|\alpha(k)\| is finite for all kk. For this, it is sufficient to show α(k)\|\alpha(k)\| is bounded during (sr,sr+1](s_{r},s_{r+1}]. We have proved that α(sr)\|\alpha(s_{r})\| and α(sr+1)\|\alpha(s_{r+1})\| are upper bounded by Lemma 2. Then, we only need to show α()\|\alpha(\cdot)\| is bounded for sr<sr+1,,sr+m<sr+m+1=sr+1s_{r}<s_{r}+1,\cdots,s_{r}+m<s_{r}+m+1=s_{r+1}. If sr+1s_{r}+1 is a failed transmission instant, by (51a), one can infer that α(sr+1)\|\alpha(s_{r}+1)\| is upper bounded. One can also infer that α(sr+m)\|\alpha(s_{r}+m)\| is also upper bounded in view of α(sr+m)=(AN/γ2)m1α(sr+1)\alpha(s_{r}+m)=(A_{N}/\gamma_{2})^{m-1}\alpha(s_{r}+1) by (52a) with m2m\in\mathbb{N}_{\geq 2} and ρ(AN/γ2)<1\rho(A_{N}/\gamma_{2})<1. By the analysis above, we conclude that all the α(k)\|\alpha(k)\| during (sr,sr+1](s_{r},s_{r+1}] is upper bounded and hence α(k)\alpha(k) is finite for all kk. Recall the definitions of TS(1,k)T_{S}(1,k) and TU(1,k)T_{U}(1,k) before Lemma 1. In view of δ(k)=θ(k)α(k)=γ1TS(1,k)γ2TU(1,k)θ0α(k)\delta(k)=\theta(k)\alpha(k)=\gamma_{1}^{T_{S}(1,k)}\gamma_{2}^{T_{U}(1,k)}\theta_{0}\alpha(k), one has δ(k)C3γkθ0α(k)\|\delta(k)\|\leq C_{3}\gamma^{k}\theta_{0}\|\alpha(k)\| where C3=(γ2/γ1)(κ+ηΔ)/ΔC_{3}=\left(\gamma_{2}/\gamma_{1}\right)^{(\kappa+\eta\Delta)/\Delta} and γ=γ111TΔτDγ21T+ΔτD<1\gamma=\gamma_{1}^{1-\frac{1}{T}-\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}}\gamma_{2}^{\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}}<1 by (70). Thus, we have δ(k)0\|\delta(k)\|\to 0 as kk\to\infty, which implies state consensus.  \blacksquare

Remark 5

In principle, one can select γ1\gamma_{1} arbitrarily close to ρ(J)\rho(J) and γ2\gamma_{2} close to ρ(A)\rho(A) in order to improve the system resilience for reaching consensus in view of (70). Such choices are effective especially under long time but less frequent DoS attacks. However, such choices may also lead to larger CAC_{A} and CJC_{J}, respectively, and a smaller γ0\gamma_{0} in (54). This implies that α(sr)\alpha(s_{r}) may diverge under frequent DoS attacks due to fast switches in a switched control system (see Remark 2). It is clear that a small Δ\Delta can always relax the constraints in (54) and (70), but can increase the communication burden.  \blacksquare

III-D Scalar multi-agent systems

If An×nA\in\mathbb{R}^{n\times n}, one sees that overflow problem of quantizer is subject to dwell time constraint in (54). As mentioned before, the system is not subject to the constraint in case AA\in\mathbb{R}, i.e. a scalar multi-agent system. More importantly, in case AA\in\mathbb{R}, we are able to further tighten the zooming-out factor, i.e., smaller than |A||A| and therefore recover the robustness result of unquantized control, i.e., if DoS attacks satisfy

1T+ΔτD<lnρ(J)lnρ(A)lnρ(J),\displaystyle\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}<\frac{-\ln\rho(J)}{\ln\rho(A)-\ln\rho(J)}, (94)

consensus of xi(k)x_{i}(k) is achieved and the quantizer is not saturated. We briefly present the proof of unquantized case obtaining (94) in the Appendix. In the following, we present the result of quantizer unsaturation and consensus for scalar multi-agent systems. We assume that |A|>1|A|>1 and xi(k)x_{i}(k) is directly known, since one can always obtain xi(k)=yi(k)/Cx_{i}(k)=y_{i}(k)/C.

The controller in (24) to (31) is still applicable, and x^j(k)\hat{x}_{j}(k) in (28) should be replaced by xj(k)x_{j}(k). Consequently, eo(k)=0e_{o}(k)=0 and ξo(k)=0\xi_{o}(k)=0 for all kk.

Proposition 1

Consider the multi-agent system (1) with AA\in\mathbb{R} and the control inputs (24) to (31). Suppose that the DoS attacks characterized in Assumptions 1 and 2 satisfy 1/T+Δ/τD<11/T+\Delta/\tau_{D}<1. For any ρ(J)<γ1<1\rho(J)<\gamma_{1}<1, the choice of γ2\gamma_{2} should satisfy

lnγ2=lnγ1lnA/lnρ(J),\displaystyle\ln\gamma_{2}=\ln\gamma_{1}\ln A/\ln\rho(J), (95)

then the followings hold:

  • (1)

    the quantizer does not saturate if (2R+1)σζLHC7N(2R+1)\sigma\geq\zeta\|L\,\,H\|_{\infty}C_{7}\sqrt{N} (C7C_{7} and ζ\zeta are positive given in proof);

  • (2)

    Moreover, if (94) holds, consensus of xi(k)x_{i}(k) is achieved.

Proof. Note that in order to prove consensus by showing δ(k)0\|\delta(k)\|\to 0, one can follow the analysis in Lemma 2 and conclude α(sr)=α¯2(sr)\|\alpha(s_{r})\|=\|\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r})\| is finite. One can obtain the dynamics of α¯2(sr)\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r}) similar to (III-C), in which ξ¯o2(sr1)=0\bar{\xi}_{o2}(s_{r-1})=0 for all sr1s_{r-1}. Then the counterpart of (III-C) is given by

(AN1/γ2)TU(s1,sr)(J/γ1)TS(s1,sr)\displaystyle\left\|(A_{N-1}/\gamma_{2})^{T_{U}(s_{-1},s_{r})}(J/\gamma_{1})^{T_{S}(s_{-1},s_{r})}\right\|
(ρ(A)γ1ρ(J)γ2)κ+ηΔΔC6((ρ(A)γ1ρ(J)γ2)1T+ΔτDρ(J)γ1γ4)srsr1Δ\displaystyle\leq\underbrace{\left(\frac{\rho(A)\gamma_{1}}{\rho(J)\gamma_{2}}\right)^{\frac{\kappa+\eta\Delta}{\Delta}}}_{C_{6}}\bigg{(}\underbrace{\left(\frac{\rho(A)\gamma_{1}}{\rho(J)\gamma_{2}}\right)^{\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}}\frac{\rho(J)}{\gamma_{1}}}_{\gamma_{4}}\bigg{)}^{\frac{s_{r}-s_{r-1}}{\Delta}}\!\!\!\! (96)

and the counterpart of (III-C) is given by α¯2(sr)C6γ4srs1Δα¯2(s1)+C6k=0rγ4srsk1Δξ¯c2(sk1).\|\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{r})\|\leq C_{6}\gamma_{4}^{\frac{s_{r}-s_{-1}}{\Delta}}\|\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{-1})\|+C_{6}\sum_{k=0}^{r}\gamma_{4}^{\frac{s_{r}-s_{k-1}}{\Delta}}\|\bar{\xi}_{c2}(s_{k-1})\|. As AN1A_{N-1} and JJ are diagonal matrices, the stability of the switched system is free from the dwell time constraint in (54). In order to ensure the boundedness of α¯2(k)\bar{\alpha}_{2}(k), γ4\gamma_{4} needs to be smaller than 1, which is implied by

1T+ΔτD<ln(ρ(J)/γ1ln(A/γ2)ln(ρ(J)/γ1).\displaystyle\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}<\frac{-\ln(\rho(J)/\gamma_{1}}{\ln(A/\gamma_{2})-\ln(\rho(J)/\gamma_{1})}. (97)

The bounds of α¯2(s1)\|\bar{\alpha}_{2}(s_{-1})\| and ξ¯c2(sk1)\|\bar{\xi}_{c2}(s_{k-1})\| obtained in the proof of Lemma 2 still hold. Then, one can obtain α(sr)NC7\|\alpha(s_{r})\|\leq\sqrt{N}C_{7} with C7:=max{2C6Cx0/θ0,C6σ/(γ12(1γ4))}C_{7}:=\max\{2C_{6}C_{x_{0}}/\theta_{0},C_{6}\sigma/(\gamma_{1}^{2}(1-\gamma_{4}))\}.

At sr+1s_{r}+1, the quantized information of x(sr+1)x(s_{r}+1) attempts to transmit QR((x(sr+1)ANx^(sr))/θ(sr))Q_{R}\left((x(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}))/\theta(s_{r})\right), and hence (x(sr+1)ANx^(sr))/θ(sr)\|(x(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}))/\theta(s_{r})\|_{\infty} must be upper bounded by the maximum quantization range. Specifically, one has (x(sr+1)ANx^(sr))/θ(sr)=(Hec(sr)Lδ(sr))/θ(sr)=Hξc(sr)Lα(sr),\!\!(x(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}))/\theta(s_{r})=(He_{c}(s_{r})-L\delta(s_{r}))/\theta(s_{r})\\ =H\xi_{c}(s_{r})-L\alpha(s_{r}), and the quantizer at sr+1s_{r}+1 is not saturated since [LH][αT(sr)ξcT(sr)]T(2R+1)σ.\|[-L\quad H\,]\left[\begin{array}[]{ll}\alpha^{T}(s_{r})\xi^{T}_{c}(s_{r})\end{array}\right]^{T}\|_{\infty}\leq(2R+1)\sigma.

At sr+2s_{r}+2, the quantized signals of x(sr+2)x(s_{r}+2) needs to be transmitted to the decoders, and one needs to compute (x(sr+2)ANx^(sr+1))/θ(sr+1).\|(x(s_{r}+2)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}+1))/\theta(s_{r}+1)\|_{\infty}. If the transmission attempts at sr+1s_{r}+1 are successfully received by the decoders, then one can apply the similar analysis in the former paragraph and then concludes that QR()Q_{R}(\cdot) does not encounter the overflow problem at sr+2s_{r}+2. If the transmission attempts at sr+1s_{r}+1 are not received by the decoders, then at sr+2s_{r}+2, one can obtain

x(sr+2)ANx^(sr+1)θ(sr+1)\displaystyle\frac{x(s_{r}+2)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}+1)}{\theta(s_{r}+1)}
=ANx(sr+1)ANx^(sr+1)θ(sr+1)=ANec(sr+1)θ(sr+1)\displaystyle=\frac{A_{N}x(s_{r}+1)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}+1)}{\theta(s_{r}+1)}=\frac{A_{N}e_{c}(s_{r}+1)}{\theta(s_{r}+1)}
=ANξc(sr+1)=ANγ2[LH][αT(sr)ξcT(sr)]T\displaystyle=A_{N}\xi_{c}(s_{r}+1)=\frac{A_{N}}{\gamma_{2}}\left[-L\,\,H\right][\alpha^{T}(s_{r})\,\,\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r})]^{T} (98)

where the last equality is due to ξc(sr+1)=Hγ2ξc(sr)Lγ2α(sr)\xi_{c}(s_{r}+1)=\frac{H}{\gamma_{2}}\xi_{c}(s_{r})-\frac{L}{\gamma_{2}}\alpha(s_{r}) according to (51b), in which ξo(k1)=0\xi_{o}(k-1)=0. By induction, if all the transmission attempts at sr+1,,sr+ms_{r}+1,\cdots,s_{r}+m fail, then one can obtain that at sr+m+1=sr+1Hqs_{r}+m+1=s_{r+1}\notin H_{q}, the quantizer does not saturate since

(x(sr+m+1)ANx^(sr+m))/θ(sr+m)\displaystyle\|(x(s_{r}+m+1)-A_{N}\hat{x}(s_{r}+m))/\theta(s_{r}+m)\|_{\infty}
=(AN/γ2)m[LH][αT(sr)ξcT(sr)]T\displaystyle=\left\|(A_{N}/\gamma_{2})^{m}[-L\,\,H][\alpha^{T}(s_{r})\,\,\,\xi_{c}^{T}(s_{r})]^{T}\right\|_{\infty}
(2R+1)σ\displaystyle\leq(2R+1)\sigma (99)

in which (AN/γ2)m(max{1,A/γ2})M=:ζ\|(A_{N}/\gamma_{2})^{m}\|\leq(\max\{1,A/\gamma_{2}\})^{M}=:\zeta. Here, M0M\in\mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0} denotes the maximum number of consecutive packet losses, and can be calculated by Lemma 2 in [24].

For showing consensus, one needs to prove δ(k)=θ(k)α(k)0\|\delta(k)\|=\theta(k)\|\alpha(k)\|\to 0 as kk\to\infty, in which α(k)\|\alpha(k)\| can be shown upper bounded by following an analysis similar to that in Theorem 1. By (70), it holds that θ(k)0\theta(k)\to 0 as kk\to\infty. Overall, in order to achieve consensus and quantizer unsaturation simultaneously, DoS attacks need to satisfy

1T+ΔτD<min{lnγ1lnγ2lnγ1,lnρ(J)/γ1lnA/γ2lnρ(J)/γ1}\displaystyle\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}<\min\left\{\frac{-\ln\gamma_{1}}{\ln\gamma_{2}-\ln\gamma_{1}},\frac{-\ln\rho(J)/\gamma_{1}}{\ln A/\gamma_{2}-\ln\rho(J)/\gamma_{1}}\right\} (100)

where the second term in min{}\min\{\cdot\} is obtained by imposing γ4<1\gamma_{4}<1 in (97). One can verify that since ρ(J)<γ1<1\rho(J)<\gamma_{1}<1 and γ2\gamma_{2} satisfy (95), it holds lnγ1lnγ2lnγ1=lnρ(J)γ1lnAγ2lnρ(J)γ1=lnρ(J)lnAlnρ(J)\frac{-\ln\gamma_{1}}{\ln\gamma_{2}-\ln\gamma_{1}}=\frac{-\ln\frac{\rho(J)}{\gamma_{1}}}{\ln\frac{A}{\gamma_{2}}-\ln\frac{\rho(J)}{\gamma_{1}}}=\frac{-\ln\rho(J)}{\ln A-\ln\rho(J)} which leads to (94).  \blacksquare

Remark 6

In order to preserve (94), given a γ1\gamma_{1}, one needs to compute γ2\gamma_{2} by (95). Otherwise, (94) cannot be preserved. One should notice that γ2\gamma_{2} obtained by (95) is smaller than AA since lnγ1/lnρ(J)>1\ln\gamma_{1}/\ln\rho(J)>1. As a result, to obtain Proposition 1, we need the information of the maximum consecutive packet drops (MM) in order to compute ζ\zeta and therefore the necessary data rate by (III-D). However, if one lets γ2=A\gamma_{2}=A, then the information of MM is not needed, while one could not recover (94), which implies a less robust system. One can verify that the right-hand side of (94) is always larger than that of (70), which implies a better robustness of a scalar multi-agent system than a general linear multi-agent system.  \blacksquare

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Figure 1: Time responses of δi1(k)\delta_{i}^{1}(k) (first plot), δi2(k)\delta_{i}^{2}(k) (second plot), θ(k)\theta(k) (third plot) and Q^i(k)\hat{Q}_{i}(k) (last plot). Note δi(k)=[δi1(k)δi2(k)]T\delta_{i}(k)=[\delta_{i}^{1}(k)\,\,\delta_{i}^{2}(k)]^{T} (i=1,2,3,4i=1,2,3,4).

IV Numerical example

In the simulation example, we consider a multi-agent system of N=4N=4 with

A=[1.11620.11090.22181.1162],B=[0.10520.005300.1052],\displaystyle A=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}1.1162&0.1109\\ 0.2218&1.1162\end{array}\right],\,B=\left[\begin{array}[]{cc}0.1052&0.0053\\ 0&0.1052\end{array}\right], (105)

C=[1    2]C=[1\,\,\,\,2] and Δ=0.1\Delta=0.1s. The Laplacian matrix of the undirected and connected communication graph follows that in [27]. We select a feedback gain K=diag(4.2,4.2)K=\text{diag}(4.2,4.2).

We consider a sustained DoS attack with variable period and duty cycle, generated randomly. Over a simulation horizon of 1010s, the DoS signal yields |Ξ(0,10)|=1.9|\Xi(0,10)|=1.9s and n(0,10)=15n(0,10)=15. This corresponds to values (averaged over 1010s) of τD0.6667\tau_{D}\approx 0.6667 and 1/T0.191/T\approx 0.19, and hence Δ/τD0.15\Delta/\tau_{D}\approx 0.15 and Δ/τD+1/T0.34\Delta/\tau_{D}+1/T\approx 0.34.

Under this setting, one can obtain ρ(J)=0.8146\rho(J)=0.8146, ρ(A)=1.2731\rho(A)=1.2731, CJ=1.1070C_{J}=1.1070 and CA=1.0607C_{A}=1.0607. Then we select γ1=0.85>ρ(J)\gamma_{1}=0.85>\rho(J) and γ2=1.4>ρ(A)\gamma_{2}=1.4>\rho(A) according to Lemma 2. For the observer gain, we select F=[0.2757  0.2134]TF=[0.2757\,\,0.2134]^{T} with ρ(AFC)=0.81<ρ(J)\rho(A-FC)=0.81<\rho(J). One can verify that γ0=0.9583\gamma_{0}=0.9583 (in (III-C)). One can also see that (54) holds in view of Δ/τD0.15\Delta/\tau_{D}\approx 0.15 and lnγ0/lnCACJ=0.3257-\ln\gamma_{0}/\ln C_{A}C_{J}=0.3257. By Theorem 1, we obtain the right-hand side of (69) being 301920.

Simulation plots are presented in Figure 1. We point out that the DoS frequency constraint (54) is satisfied in the simulation example, but the level of DoS attacks characterized by Δ/τD+1/T0.34\Delta/\tau_{D}+1/T\approx 0.34 is stronger than the theoretical sufficient bound computed by (70), which is 0.32570.3257. Since our result regarding tolerable DoS attacks is a sufficient condition, one can see from the first and second plots in Figure 1 that state consensus is still achieved. When one increases Δ/τD+1/T\Delta/\tau_{D}+1/T to about 0.40.4, then the states δi1(k)\delta_{i}^{1}(k) and δi2(k)\delta_{i}^{2}(k) diverge. By the third plot in Figure 1, one can see that θ(k)\theta(k) is a decreasing and increasing sequence during DoS-free and DoS time, respectively. Thanks to the dynamical θ(k)\theta(k), the quantizer is not overflowed, which can be seen from the last plot in Figure 1. Specifically, the quantization range provided by the theoretical value [301920,301920][-301920,301920] is much larger than the utilized quantization range [5,5][-5,5] in simulation. One could see that our sufficient condition for quantizer unsaturation is quite conservative. One of the reasons is that we have frequently used “\leq” and ``max{}"``\max\{\cdot\}" in (III-C) for instance and \|\cdot\|_{\infty} for matrices and vectors in (III-C) for instance. Moreover, a small γ1\gamma_{1} can also lead to a large data rate as discussed in [24]. Without DoS, such a conservativeness also exists in consensus under data rate limitation in [20, 21] for instance.

Scalar multi-agent systems: We consider the multi-agent system in the numerical example in [20], in which A=1.1A=1.1, B=1B=1 and N=4N=4. The Laplacian matrix of the undirected and connected communication graph follows that in the previous example. We select K=0.44K=0.44 and Δ=0.1\Delta=0.1s. One has ρ(J)=0.66\rho(J)=0.66. According to Proposition 1, we choose γ1=0.67\gamma_{1}=0.67 and γ2=1.0962\gamma_{2}=1.0962, and quantizer parameter (2R+1)σ(2R+1)\sigma should be no smaller than 183890183890. Besides, the sufficient DoS condition for consensus is

1/T+Δ/τD\displaystyle\!\!\!1/T+\Delta/\tau_{D} <lnγ1lnγ2lnγ1=ln(ρ(J)/γ1)ln(A/γ2)ln(ρ(J)/γ1)\displaystyle<\frac{-\ln\gamma_{1}}{\ln\gamma_{2}\!-\!\ln\gamma_{1}}=\!\frac{-\ln(\rho(J)/\gamma_{1})}{\ln(A/\gamma_{2})-\ln(\rho(J)/\gamma_{1})}
=lnρ(J)lnAlnρ(J)=0.8134.\displaystyle\!=\!\frac{-\ln\rho(J)}{\ln A-\ln\rho(J)}=0.8134. (106)

Similar to the previous simulation example, the randomly generated DoS over a simulation horizon of 2525s (gray stripes in Figure 2) yields |Ξ(0,25)|=20.5|\Xi(0,25)|=20.5s and n(0,25)=28n(0,25)=28. This corresponds to values (averaged over 2525s) of τD0.8929\tau_{D}\approx 0.8929 and T1.2195T\approx 1.2195, and the DoS attacks in this example yield Δ/τD+1/T0.9320\Delta/\tau_{D}+1/T\approx 0.9320.

The simulation results are presented in Figure 2. The convergence of |δi(k)||\delta_{i}(k)| (k=1,2,3,4k=1,2,3,4) is presented in the first plot of Figure 2, in which one can see |δi(k)||\delta_{i}(k)| increases during DoS intervals (gray areas) and decreases when DoS is not present (white areas). Note that |δi(k)|0|\delta_{i}(k)|\to 0 implies the state consensus. The zooming-in and zooming-out mechanism can be observed by the second plot in Figure 2, in which θ(k)\theta(k) increases and decreases during DoS present and absent intervals, respectively. The effectiveness of zooming-in and out mechanism is shown by the third plot of Figure 2. Though the state increases during DoS present intervals, with the zooming out of θ(k)\theta(k) for mitigating the influence of DoS, one can see that the actual value of Q^i(k)\hat{Q}_{i}(k) does not diverge under DoS. Importantly, compared with the γ2=4.0333\gamma_{2}=4.0333 and the DoS bound 0.2037 in [27], one can see that the zooming-out factor 1.0962<A1.0962<A in this paper and the bound for tolerable DoS 0.8134 in (IV) are indeed much improved.

Conservativeness also exists in the case of scalar multi-agent systems, which can be seen by the gaps of DoS level between 0.8134 (theoretical sufficient bound in (IV)) and 0.9320 (actual DoS in the simulation), and the gaps between the theoretical quantization range [183890,183890][-183890,183890] and the utilized range [19,19][-19,19] shown in the third plot of Figure 2.

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Figure 2: Time responses of |δi(k)||\delta_{i}(k)| (top), θ(k)\theta(k) (middle) and Q^i(k)\hat{Q}_{i}(k) (bottom).

V Conclusions and future research

We have presented the results for quantized consensus of output feedback multi-agent systems. The design of dynamic quantized controller including the observer and the zooming-in and zooming-out parameters has been presented. The calculation of zooming-out factor is tight, whose lower bound is the spectral radius of the agent’s dynamic matrix. Moreover, the approach of this paper shows the explicit relations between the zooming-out factor and the agent dynamic matrix. We have also provided the bounds of quantizer range and tolerable DoS attacks. It has been shown that the quantizer is free of overflow during DoS intervals and the state consensus can be achieved. At last, as a special case of scalar multi-agent systems, we have shown that it is possible to further tighten the zooming-out factor and make it smaller than the agent’s system parameter without causing quantizer overflow. The resilience is also improved by such a zooming-out factor, i.e., recover to that of unquantized consensus under DoS.

Our work can be extended to various directions. Following [28], one can consider the control structure in which each agent directly exchanges output information with the neighbors by implementing a modified observer in the decoder. It is possible to extend our results to a directed graph of the communication topology, in which the analysis after Section III-C will need to be adapted [29]. Last but not least, it is meaningful to consider the case in which the decoded values of a state are different due to communication noise or parameter uncertainties for instance.

Proof for (94). In case AA\in\mathbb{R} and CC\in\mathbb{R}, it is easy to obtain xi(k)x_{i}(k) directly from yi(k)=Cxi(k)y_{i}(k)=Cx_{i}(k) and an observer is not necessary. Hence, we assume that yi(k)=xi(k)y_{i}(k)=x_{i}(k). In case of infinite data rate, one can obtain that δ(k)={Gδ(k1)ifk1HqANδ(k1)ifk1Hq.\delta(k)=\left\{\!\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}G\delta(k-1)&\text{if}\,k-1\notin H_{q}\\ A_{N}\delta(k-1)&\text{if}\,k-1\in H_{q}\end{array}\right.\!\!\!\!\!. With the unitary matrix UU in (59) and by δ~(k)=UTδ(k)\tilde{\delta}(k)=U^{T}\delta(k), one can obtain that δ~(k)={Dδ~(k1)ifk1HqANδ~(k1)ifk1Hq,\tilde{\delta}(k)\!\!=\!\!\left\{\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}D\tilde{\delta}(k-1)&\text{if}\,k-1\notin H_{q}\\ A_{N}\tilde{\delta}(k-1)&\text{if}\,k-1\in H_{q}\end{array}\right.\!\!\!\!\!, in which D:=diag(A,Aλ2BK,,AλNBK)D:=\text{diag}(A,A-\lambda_{2}BK,...,A-\lambda_{N}BK). Partition the vector δ~(k)=[δ~1(k)δ~2T(k)]T\tilde{\delta}(k)=[\tilde{\delta}_{1}(k)\,\,\tilde{\delta}_{2}^{T}(k)]^{T}, in which δ~1(k)\tilde{\delta}_{1}(k)\in\mathbb{R} is the first component in the vector and δ~2(k)N1\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k)\in\mathbb{R}^{N-1} is composed by the rest. Then we obtain the dynamics of δ~2(k)\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k) as δ~2(k)={Jδ~2(k1)ifk1HqAN1δ~2(k1)ifk1Hq\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k)\!\!=\!\!\left\{\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}J\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k-1)&\text{if}\,k-1\notin H_{q}\\ A_{N-1}\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k-1)&\text{if}\,k-1\in H_{q}\end{array}\right.\!\!\!\! and therefore δ~2(k){ρ(J)δ~2(k1)ifk1HqAδ~2(k1)ifk1Hq.\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k)\|\!\!\leq\!\!\left\{\!\!\!\!\begin{array}[]{ll}\rho(J)\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k-1)\|&\text{if}\,\,k-1\notin H_{q}\\ A\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k-1)\|&\text{if}\,\,k-1\in H_{q}\end{array}\right.\!\!\!. By the iteration of δ~2(k)\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k)\|, one can obtain δ~2(k)ATU(1,k)ρ(J)TS(1,k)δ~2(1)\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k)\|\leq A^{T_{U}(1,k)}\rho(J)^{T_{S}(1,k)}\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(1)\|. Note that δ~1(k)=0\tilde{\delta}_{1}(k)=0 for all kk. Then one can obtain δ~2(k)=δ~(k)\|\tilde{\delta}_{2}(k)\|=\|\tilde{\delta}(k)\| and δ(k)=Uδ~(k)=δ~(k)\|\delta(k)\|=\|U\tilde{\delta}(k)\|=\|\tilde{\delta}(k)\|. By substituting the bound in Lemma 1 into TS(1,k)T_{S}(1,k) and TU(1,k)=kTS(1,k)T_{U}(1,k)=k-T_{S}(1,k), one can obtain that δ(k)CUγUkδ(1)\|\delta(k)\|\leq C_{U}\gamma_{U}^{k}\|\delta(1)\| where CU=(A/ρ(J))(κ+ηΔ)/ΔC_{U}=\left(A/\rho(J)\right)^{(\kappa+\eta\Delta)/\Delta}. If the level of DoS attacks satisfy (94), then γU:=ρ(J)11TΔτDA1T+ΔτD<1.\gamma_{U}:=\rho(J)^{1-\frac{1}{T}-\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}}A^{\frac{1}{T}+\frac{\Delta}{\tau_{D}}}<1. As kk\to\infty, one has δ(k)0\|\delta(k)\|\to 0, which implies the consensus of xi(k)x_{i}(k).  \blacksquare

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