Determinacy and reflection principles in second-order arithmetic
Abstract
It is known that several variations of the axiom of determinacy play important roles in the study of reverse mathematics, and the relation between the hierarchy of determinacy and comprehension are revealed by Tanaka, Nemoto, Montalbán, Shore, and others. We prove variations of a result by Kołodziejczyk and Michalewski relating determinacy of arbitrary boolean combinations of sets and reflection in second-order arithmetic. Specifically, we prove that: over , - is equivalent to -; -- is equivalent to -; and -- is equivalent to -. We also restate results by Montalbán and Shore to show that - is equivalent to - over .
Keywords. reverse mathematics, determinacy, reflection principles, difference hierarchy
In this paper we characterize several determinacy axioms by reflection principles in second-order arithmetic. Consider axioms stating the determinacy of Gale–Stewart games whose payoff sets are finite (possibly nonstandard) differences of , and sets in Baire or Cantor space. We characterize these axioms by reflection principles - stating that “every -formula provable in is true”. We show that
Theorem 1.
For , let be the level of the difference hierarchy of . Denote by - the formula stating the determinacy of subsets of the Baire space in , and by - the formula stating the determinacy of subsets of the Cantor space in . Over :
-
1.
- is equivalent to -;
-
2.
-- is equivalent to -;
-
3.
-- is equivalent to -; and
-
4.
- is equivalent to -.
One of the first results of reverse mathematics was the equivalence of - and , proved by Steel [steel1977phdthesis]. Tanaka [tanaka1990weak] proved that - is equivalent to - over , for all ; Tanaka also proved the equivalence between and without using transfinite -induction. Nemoto et al. [nemoto2007infinite] proved that - is equivalent to over , for all . MedSalem and Tanaka studied the determinacy of differences of sets in [medsalem2007delta03, medsalem2008weak]. Montalbán and Shore [montalban2012limits] proved that proves - for all , and that the converse doesn’t hold. They also showed in [montalban2014limits] that - proves the existence of -models of - for . Kołodziejczyk and Michalewski [kolodziejczyk2016unprovable] proved item (3) of the theorem above with - as the base system. Their proof uses a result from Heinatsch and Möllerfeld [heinatsch2010determinacy] characterizing the -calculus in second-order arithmetic via proof-theoretic methods; while our proof uses work of MedSalem and Tanaka [medsalem2008weak] on the reverse mathematics of inductive definitions. See [yoshii2017survey] for further results on the reverse mathematics of determinacy.
In this paragraph and the next, we briefly survey existing results on reflection and second-order arithmetic. Our reflection principles - are equivalent to uniform reflection schemes -. These schemes have been thoroughly studied in the setting of first-order arithmetic [kreisel1968reflection, leivant1983optimality, beklemishev2005reflection]. The characterization of reflection schemes was extended to second-order arithmetic by Frittaion [frittaion2022uniformreflection]. He showed that if is a theory extending and axiomatizable by a sentence, then ; where is plus full induction and is transfinite induction up to for -formulas.
Other forms of reflection have also been studied in the literature. Pakhomov and Walsh [pakhomov2018reflection, pakhomov2021reducing, pakhomov2021infinitary] studied iterated reflection principles and their proof theoretic ordinals. Pakhomov and Walsh [pakhomov2021reducing] also related -model reflection and iterated syntactic reflection. Arai [arai1998someresults] characterized -transfinite induction as a reflection principle for -logic; Cordón-Franco [cordon2017predicativity] et al. did the same for , and Fernández-Duque [fernandez2022omegalogic] for -. For more results on reflection see Simpson’s book [simpson2009sosoa] or the first author’s survey [pacheco2021rims].
In section 1, we define the systems used in the paper, review existing results on determinacy, and prove that our reflection principles are equivalent to uniform reflection schemes. We also prove some folklore results on determinacy. In section 2 we prove the main lemma of the paper: the reflection principle - is equivalent to the existence of arbitrarily long chains of coded -models which are coded -submodels of the ground model. We also use this lemma to prove (1) and (2) of Theorem 1. In section 3, we prove the existence of sequences of -models using multiple -inductions; we then prove item (3) of Theorem 1. In section 4 we show item (4) of Theorem 1 using results from Montalbán and Shore [montalban2012limits, montalban2014limits].
Acknowledgements. We would like to thank Leszek Kołodziejczyk and Yudai Suzuki for their comments on this paper. The work of the second author is partially supported by JSPS KAKENHI grant numbers 19K03601 and 21KK0045. We would also like to thank the support from the JSPS–RFBR Bilateral Joint Research Project JSPSBP120204809.
1 Preliminaries
1.1 Reverse Mathematics
In this subsection we review some basic definitions for reverse mathematics in second-order arithmetic. The standard reference for reverse mathematics is [simpson2009sosoa]. Reserve for the set of natural numbers in second-order arithmetic and for the “real” set of natural numbers.
We consider formulas in the language of second-order arithmetic. A formula is iff it has only bounded number quantifiers; if it is equivalent to some formula of the form with ; if it is equivalent to the negation of a formula; and if it is for some . Put . A formula is iff it is equivalent to a formula of the form , with for some ; if it is equivalent to the negation of some -formula. A formula is iff its only set parameter is .
Fix and . Let be a -formula with exactly as free number variables and as free set variables. is a universal lightface -formula iff for each formula with the same free variables as , proves
We list the set-existence axiom systems used in this paper:
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•
contains the axioms for discrete ordered semirings, -induction, and -comprehension.
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•
is obtained by adding arithmetical comprehension to . We can alternatively characterize by the axiom “for all , the Turing jump of exists”.
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•
is obtained by adding “for all and , there is a sequence such that and for all ” to . This axiom is read as “for all and , the iterated Turing jump of exists”.
-
•
is obtained by adding -comprehension to . Alternatively, we can add “for all , the hyperjump of exists” to .
-
•
is obtained by adding “for all and , there is a sequence of coded -models such that and, for all , and ” to . An alternative formulation is to add to the statement “for all and , the iterated hyperjump of exists” to .
-
•
is plus the following scheme:
where is a -formula in which does not occur, , and .
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•
states the existence of the sets inductively definable by combinations of -many -transfinite induction operators.
As far as we know, does not appear in the literature. Its naming is in parallel to .
Let , then is a (coded) -model iff every -sentence with parameters in is true in iff it is true in the ground model. For , is equivalent to “for all , there is a -model such that ”. If , then is equivalent to . Furthermore, if we assume , then is equivalent to for any . We denote the ground model by . Given a coded model and an -sentence with parameters in , write to mean that satisfies . See Section VII.2 of [simpson2009sosoa] for the definition of the satisfaction relation in second order arithmetic.
Let be coded models. The sets of are defined by . is a submodel of iff every set in is also in , that is, for each there is such that . Given two coded models and , is a -submodel of iff for all -formula with parameters in , . When is a -submodel of , we write .
1.2 Reflection Principles
Let be a finitely axiomatizable theory. Let be a standard provability predicate for and be a truth predicate for -sentences. (Here, we only consider -sentences whose arithmetical parts are or obtained by the normal form theorem. With , we may also consider -sentences with nonstandard length arithmetical parts, but we do not need to use them in our discussion.) The reflection principle is the sentence
Note that we consider all -sentences inside our system, including ‘nonstandard’ sentences. It is also common to consider reflection schemes. Our principle is equivalent to the uniform reflection scheme , which consists of the formulas
for all (standard) -formulas. In general,
Proposition 2.
Let be a finitely axiomatizable theory extending . and are equivalent over .
Proof.
Work inside a model of . First suppose that the reflection principle holds. Fix a standard formula . Let be such that . is a sentence inside the model, so we can use the reflection principle, so is true.
Now, suppose the reflection scheme holds. Let be a sentence inside the model such that holds. For a contradiction, suppose that is false. Fix a standard universal lightface -formula . For some , holds. Therefore . The reflection instance for implies that is true.
Note that we may take the arithmetical parts of and to be . That is, is . Fix such that holds. We can use to construct an -model which satisfies and includes . Since , we have , and so . Since the arithmetical part of is , we can show that also holds. We conclude that is true. ∎
1.3 Determinacy Axioms
Let be some set and . In a Gale–Stewart game, two players and alternate picking elements of . The player wins a run of the game iff . A Gale–Stewart game is determined iff there is a winning strategy for one of the players. We consider here Gale–Stewart games on and . The axiom - states that every game on whose payoff is -definable is determined; and - states the same for games on . For an introduction to determinacy in second-order arithmetic, see Sections V.8 and VI.5 of [simpson2009sosoa]. Yoshii [yoshii2017survey] surveys results on the reverse mathematics of determinacy.
The difference hierarchy of captures all boolean combinations of sets. It is usually defined by induction: a set is iff is ; and is iff is the difference of a set and a set. To state the determinacy axioms studied in this paper we need a formalized version of the difference hierarchy. Fix . Let be a number variable and be a distinguished second-order variable. is a formula iff there is a formula (possibly with other free variables) such that: always holds; if then implies ; and holds iff the least such that holds is even. Intuitively, we think of as the disjunction .
Given , is the statement
where is a -formula. Here, is the play obtained when uses the strategy and uses the strategy . The definition for is obtained by restricting the players to playing in the Cantor space.
We now prove a few folklore results. As far as we are aware, there results are not published, but their proofs are similar to other existing proofs. We first look at determinacy on Cantor space: Nemoto et al. [nemoto2007infinite] proved that the - and - are equivalent to , and - is equivalent to . Furthermore, is equivalent to for all . On the other hand, determinacy of arbitrary finite differences of open sets is equivalent to .
Proposition 3.
Over , implies .
Proof.
Fix and . We prove the existence of a sequence of sets such that and , for . Let be a fixed universal lightface -formula. The Turing Jump of is the set of such that holds.
We claim that there is a set computing universal winning strategies for all games on Cantor space with only as a parameter, for all . Consider the following game: chooses an index for the payoff of a game, coded as a sequence of -many s followed by a ; answers with their choice of role in the game with index ; then and play the game with index ; whoever wins the subgame wins the whole game. The payoff of this game has complexity . As we have , the game above is determined. Since cannot win, has a winning strategy ; this computes winning strategies for all games.
Since we have , we also have , and so is true. Let be a strict -model including and a universal winning strategy for . The strict -model satisfies and induction. Since , every game on Cantor space with only as a parameter is determined in .
We consider the following two player game inside . starts the game by playing , with , to ask whether . then plays to answer ‘yes’, or to answer ‘no’. If answers , they must show that ; if answers , must show that . Denote by (verifier) the player who is trying to show and by (refuter) the other player.
Suppose . wants to show . So they play a finite sequence witnessing so. is intended to be an initial segment of . Then, plays , to state that . If , is stating that , so and exchange roles. Otherwise, is asking to show that , and the roles stay the same. Either way, and proceed to argue whether .
Now suppose and are arguing whether . wins (automatically) iff .
Before we consider the descriptive complexity of the payoffs of these games, consider the following example:
Note that in this game and play both roles and .
Since we want a game with payoff in Cantor space, the players cannot directly play natural numbers. Code a play of a natural number by a sequence of plays consisting of many zeroes and ending with a one. We identify finite sequences of natural numbers with their codes. As the players must alternate playing, when it is a player’s turn to play a natural number (i.e, a sequence of zeroes ending with a one), the other player is on stand-by, and must plays only zeroes. In particular, the example play above becomes:
We can describe the restrictions on each move using a set or a set, depending on which player must follow the rule. Also, we can check if the witnesses given by are right with a condition. Therefore we can write the game above as a finite difference of open sets on Cantor space, and it is determined. (The complexity bound of the game need not be strict, as we assume .)
We claim that cannot have a winning strategy inside . Suppose is a winning strategy for . Now, after plays , must try to show that or ask to do so; for either choice the subsequent game is symmetric, only changing who is going to play and . Therefore if wins as , then can also win as , using essentially the same strategy. Therefore can use a (slightly modified variant of) to defeat . And so cannot be winning.
Let be a winning strategy for inside and define . We can show that and for by induction inside . As is a strict -model and is a statement, we also have that and hold outside of . We conclude that holds. ∎
Proposition 4.
Over , implies . Therefore, is equivalent to a sentence.
Proof.
We proved that implies in Proposition 3. We show that the converse holds by a generalization of Theorem 3.7 of [nemoto2007infinite]. As is a -sentence, we will have the proposition.
Fix a difference of many formulas with set parameter . can be thought as a formula
where the are -formulas and the are -formulas, for all . Define the sets:
-
•
; and
-
•
.
Define the game . By Theorem 3.6 of [nemoto2007infinite], is and each is in as a parameter. By bounded induction on , we can compute from the th jump of . Analogously to Claim 3.7.1, from a strategy for in we can compute a strategy for in the game with payoff , and the same holds with in place of . As is a game on Cantor space, it is determined. Therefore the game with payoff is also determined. As this argument holds for any , is true. ∎
We do not explicitly consider the differences of sets on Cantor space. Nemoto et al. [nemoto2007infinite] proved that, for , - and - are equivalent over . We can adapt their proof to show:
Proposition 5.
- and - are equivalent over .
Proof.
Every game on Cantor space can be seen as a game on Baire space by adding a condition: and play only zeroes and ones. Therefore a game in Cantor space which payoff is in is still a game in Baire space. So - implies -.
By Lemma 4.2 of [nemoto2007infinite], if a game on Baire space has payoff , then there is a game on Cantor space with payoff such that () has a winning strategy in iff () has a winning strategy in . Therefore - implies -. ∎
For determinacy on Baire space the following results are known: Steel [steel1977phdthesis] proved that and are equivalent to over ; and, Tanaka [tanaka1990weak] proved that is equivalent to over . Similar to finite differences of open sets on Cantor space, where proves , we can use the determinacy of arbitrary finite differences of open sets in Baire space to prove .
Proposition 6.
Over , implies .
Proof.
We first prove that is equivalent to “for all and , the iterated hyperjump of exists”. The proof of this equivalence is essentially the proof of Theorem VII.2.9 of [simpson2009sosoa]. Fix a sequence of coded -models with . We can define arithmetically using as a parameter, so exists. Since . Again, we can define arithmetically using as a parameter. Repeating this process boundedly many times, we can define . On the other hand, suppose the hyperjumps exist. From we can define a -model . By bounded induction, given and , we can define with and . Therefore there is a sequence with .
Suppose holds and fix and . We prove the existence of the sequence .
Similar to Proposition 3, we claim that there is a set computing winning strategies for all games on Baire space with only as a parameter, for all . Consider the following game: chooses an index for the payoff of a game; answers with their choice of role in the game with index ; then and play the game with index ; whoever wins the subgame wins the whole game. The payoff of this game has complexity . As we have , the game above is determined. Since cannot win, has a winning strategy ; this computes winning strategies for all games.
Since we have , we also have , and so holds. Let be a -model including and a universal winning strategy for games with as the only parameter. The -model satisfies and induction.
We consider games similar to the ones in the proof of Proposition 3. Player starts by playing with , asking whether . Then plays 1 to answer ‘yes’ and 0 to answer ‘no’. If play 1, then they play the role of (Verifier), otherwise they play the role of (Refuter).
If , must now play the characteristic function of and a function witnessing that . While is playing, may contest ’s choice of some . If stated that , then the players exchange roles; otherwise the roles stay the same. The players then proceed to discuss whether . In case never contests, wins iff holds. If , wins iff . This game can be described by a boolean combination of -many -formulas, and so it is determined. (The complexity bound of the game need not be strict, as we assume .)
We claim that cannot have a winning strategy inside . As in Proposition 3, cannot have a winning strategy. Let be a winning strategy for . Define . We can show that and for by induction inside . As is a -model, the same holds outside of . We conclude that holds. ∎
MedSalem and Tanaka [medsalem2008weak] proved that and are equivalent over , for .
Proposition 7.
Over , implies .
Proof.
Fix and . Suppose is true. Let be a sequence of (indices of) -inductive operators. We show that the set inductively defined by exists.
As in Propositions 3 and 6, we claim that there is a set computing universal winning strategies for all games with only as a parameter, for all . Consider the following game: chooses an index for the payoff of a game; answers with their choice of role in the game with index ; then and play the game with index ; whoever wins the subgame wins the whole game. The payoff of this game has complexity . As we have , the game above is determined. Since cannot win, has a winning strategy ; this computes winning strategies for all games.
Since we have , we also have , and so is true. Let be a -model including and a universal winning strategy for games. The -model satisfies and induction.
We use an unfolded version of a proof by MedSalem and Tanaka [medsalem2008weak]*Theorem 3.3 to show that the set inductively defined by exists inside . They prove that, for all , follows from using and induction on . We sketch how to unfold their proof to show that follows from . Here, denotes the set of formulas whose only set parameter is . Let be the set inductively defined by , for . To show the existence of the set , we use the set and a game. Unfolding the definitions of , we can show the existence of using and a game. Repeatedly unfolding the , we an prove the existence of using a game. Furthermore, we can show that the payoff of this game is . (The complexity bound of the game need not be strict, as we assume .)
Furthermore, the statement “ is the set inductively defined by ” is a boolean combination of -sentences with as the only parameters. As is a -models, if is the set inductively defined by inside , then is also the set inductively defined by outside , as we wanted to show. Since the argument above holds for any , and , we have that holds. ∎
2 Sequences of models and reflection
We define now a formula which states that there are sequences with length of increasing coded models which are -submodels of each other and where the last model is a -submodel of the ground model :
For each , we define by
Note that each is a -formula. The following is an immediate consequence of our definition: is downwards closed, i.e., if holds and then also holds.
In this section, we prove:
Theorem 8.
Over , if then is equivalent to -.
We justify our choice of variables by noting that stands for ‘internal’ and for ‘external’, on both sides of the theorem above.
Lemma 9.
Over , - proves when .
Proof.
In this proof we denote by . We have and . So holds for each . By reflection, holds for any . Thus holds. As is downwards closed, holds when . ∎
Lemma 10.
Over , proves - when .
Proof.
Assume that - is false. That is, there is an -formula such that holds but is false. Therefore, there is such that holds.
Let be the language of first-order arithmetic plus a unary predicate symbol . Denote the domain of an structure by . In the definition below, is , for . Define the -theory by the following axioms:
-
1.
is a discrete ordered semiring;
-
2.
for all ;
-
3.
, formally:
-
4.
for all :
where is a universal lightface -formula;
-
5.
satisfies ; and
-
6.
, that is, for all , if and only if .
Fix a finite subtheory of . Let be the greatest index of a coded model occurring in formulas of . implies that there is a sequence
of many coded models. Setting for and for , we have a model witnessing the consistency of . By compactness, is also consistent, so there is a model of .
Now consider the model . satisfies as it is closed under taking models: if then is in some -model which is also in . So is a model of . On the other hand, each is a -submodel of since for all . As is , it can be written as with . Let , then there is such that . Since holds in , also holds in . As , and , we have that also holds in . Since the argument above holds for arbitrary , we have that holds in . That is, holds in . Therefore both and hold in , a contradiction. ∎
Corollary 11.
Over ,
-
1.
is equivalent to --; and
-
2.
is equivalent to --.
Proof.
By Theorem VII.6.9 of [simpson2009sosoa], is equivalent -, and is equivalent - (over ). ∎
We can now prove:
Theorem 12.
Over , -, --, and are pairwise equivalent.
Proof.
We modify the to get a similar result for . Let be defined by
One can show that:
Lemma 13.
Over , is equivalent to .
Proof sketch..
Fix . First suppose . Given , we can compute the first jumps of . For , let be the collection of sets computable from . Then satisfy . Now, suppose holds. We can extract from if witness . ∎
Similar to Theorem 8, we have:
Theorem 14.
Over , is equivalent to -.
Proof.
As proves that the Turing jump of any set exists, - proves and .
Now, let be an formula such that and there is such that holds. Let the language be as in the proof of Lemma 10 and define an -theory by:
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1.
is a discrete ordered semiring;
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2.
for all ;
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3.
for all ;
-
4.
for all ;
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5.
for all ; and
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6.
, that is, for all , if and only if .
Again, is .
Now, supplies a model for any finite subtheory of . By compactness, there is a model of . Define the coded model by . Since is closed under Turing jumps, it is a model of , and thus . But by the definition of , . This is a contradiction. Therefore if holds, so must . ∎
Theorem 15.
Over , -, - and are pairwise equivalent.
During the RIMS 2021 Proof Theory Workshop, Toshiyasu Arai asked about the characterization of the existence of sequences of coded models of transfinite length.
3 The - Case
In this section, we prove:
Theorem 16.
Over , -, --, and are pairwise equivalent.
Like in the - and - cases, one half of this theorem has a straight proof:
Lemma 17.
Over , -- proves -.
Proof.
proves - and, for all , . Formalizing these proofs inside , we have that
and
By -induction, we have
In particular, for any , . So -- implies . ∎
We will use multiple -inductive definitions to show the other half of Theorem 16. Before doing so, we review the idea behind -. Let be -inductive operators. Note that we do not require that our operators are monotone. Starting from the empty set, apply until we obtain a fixed-point of :
Apply once, and then generate another fixed-point for :
Repeat this process until we obtain a fixed-point for both and . In case we are combining three operators , we apply whenever we get a fixed-point for and , and repeat until we get a fixed-point for all three operators. The general case with operators follows the same idea.
Lemma 18.
Over , - proves .
For the proof of Lemma 18 we need only the existence of the fixed-points. Therefore we use a simpler to state variation of -: For , - asserts that for any sequence , there exists a smallest set which satisfies for all .
Lemma 19.
- implies - over .
Proof.
When obtaining the least simultaneous fixed-point of the operators by - we also register when each point enters the fixed-point. We only need to forget this information. ∎
3.1 Warm-up
As a warm up, we show that - implies , that is, we can use three operators to define coded models such that:
The full version of Lemma 18 is on the next section. As above, is the fixed ground model.
A first rough idea of what , and do is:
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•
makes and -submodels of the ground model.
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makes a -submodel of .
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•
puts inside as an element.
If we can define all of these operators, we are done. The hardest operator to define correctly is . In order to do so, we will define auxiliary sets of ‘recipes’ for making the sets in and , and a copy of at convenient stages. is a technical artifice used to guarantee .
We will have three kinds of recipes:
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Recipes for applications of comprehension will have the form where is an index number and are set parameters.
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Recipes where we copy an element of to will have the form where is the index of some set in such that , and is some arithmetical formula.
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Recipes for putting inside are of the form where is some index.
Each of and are arbitrarily choosen (pairwise different) natural numbers. Each recipe will be the label for the set that it constructs, i.e., the recipe instructs us how to define the set .
We now describe the recipes one application of each operator constructs:
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: if and is a finite sequence of elements of , then is an recipe for .
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•
: if is an arithmetic formula with parameters , and is the least such that , then is an recipe for .
-
•
: if is the least such and , then is an recipe for .
These recipes will guarantee that and have the closures we want.
Now we describe how follows the recipes to create our sets:
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If is a recipe for , then iff , where is a universal lightface -formula.
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If is a recipe for , then iff .
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If is a recipe for , then iff .
We will also require that the set made by each recipe is made only once. Note that at the same time creates and follows recipes. is a -operator.
is a -operator which adds new recipes for copying members of into . At last, is a -operator which copies the current into the candidate and creates a recipe for copying the new into . This only adds elements to the old copy, so this is not problematic.
Let , then:
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if is a fixed-point of , then ;
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•
if a fixed-point of , then ; and
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•
if is a fixed-point of , then .
3.2 Multiple Induction
In this section we show that - implies . Fix and such that . We define a sequence of sets
using -inductive operators .
Write , and for , and , respectively. A tuple of natural numbers is a recipe iff there is a natural number and a natural number such that
-
•
; or
-
•
; or
-
•
.
recipes are for closure under -comprehension, recipes are for making each model be a -submodel of the next model, and recipes are for putting a copy of each model into the next model. From now on write for , for and for . Given a set , we write for .
The operator creates the recipes of the form , with being the index of some non-empty set in the respective model. also makes al the currently not-made-yet recipes. As both creates and makes the recipes for closure under -comprehension, we can show that the models defined by a fixed-point of are coded -models.
Definition 20.
is the -inductive operator defined by:
Here is a universal lightface formula.
Lemma 21.
If is a fixed-point of and , then is a coded -model and .
Proof.
Suppose that is a fixed-point of . Fix and . The hyperjump of is , which is relative to ( is a universal lightface formula). So we can define a recipe for . Therefore and . But , so . Therefore is closed under hyperjumps, and thus is a coded -model.
As is with parameter , we can similarly show that . ∎
creates recipes to copy sets to from , so that the former can become a -submodel of the latter after one application of . If , does nothing.
Definition 22.
is the -inductive operator defined below:
Lemma 23.
Let . If is a fixed-point of , then .
Proof.
Let be a fixed-point of and be a sentence with parameters in . If then , as otherwise would not be a fixed-point of . ∎
checks if there is any difference between and , and adds a new recipe for if that is the case. simultaneously copies over . After one application of and one of , we get that is an element of .
Definition 24.
is the -inductive operator defined below:
Lemma 25.
For any fixed-point of , .
Proof.
Fix and . Then either or . If , there is a recipe and as is a fixed-point of , . If , then there is such that . We also have . Therefore . ∎
4 Determinacy of differences of sets and -reflection for
In [montalban2012limits], Montalbán and Shore showed that proves the determinacy of differences of (standard) finitely many sets:
Theorem 26 ([montalban2012limits]*Theorem 1.1).
For every , - proves -.
A reversal is not possible, as MedSalem and Tanaka [medsalem2007delta03] showed that - does not prove -. Monalbán and Shore showed the following:
Theorem 27 ([montalban2014limits]*Theorem 1.10.5).
Let and , then - proves the existence of a -model of - with .
While these two theorems have long and involved proofs, both can be formalized in a straightforward manner. Denote by the sentence which states that for every there is a -model of - with .
Corollary 28.
Formalizing in the two theorems of Montalbán and Shore above, we have:
-
1.
proves ; and
-
2.
proves .
This corollary implies:
Theorem 29.
Over , - is equivalent to -.
Proof.
First suppose -. Let . By Corollary 28.1, , so . By reflection, holds. As this argument holds for any , holds.
Now, assume . Suppose is a sentence such that and is false. Let be such that . We write as with arithmetical. As is false, there is such that holds. By Corollary 28.2, there is a -model of such that . As is a model of - and , . Also, is true, so . This is a contradiction, and so is true. We conclude that - holds. ∎
For any , - proves , by Theorem 1.1 of Hachtman [hachtman2017calibrating]. To prove reflection from determinacy, one possible approach is to generalize [montalban2014limits]*Theorem 1.10 to -order arithmetic. Along with definitions for subsystems of , we would also need workable definitions for -models of higher-order arithmetic.
Question.
Let be an axiomatization of -order arithmetic.
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1.
Is equivalent to - for any ?
-
2.
Is equivalent to -.
References
- \bibselectref_determinacy_and_reflection