Continuous time approximation of Nash equilibria
Abstract
We consider the problem of approximating Nash equilibria of functions of variables. In particular, we deduce conditions under which systems of the form
are well posed and in which the large time limits of their solutions are Nash equilibria for . To this end, we will invoke the theory of maximal monotone operators. We will also identify an application of these ideas in game theory and show how to approximate equilibria in some game theoretic problems in function spaces.
1 Introduction
Let us first recall the notion of a Nash equilibrium. Consider a collection of sets and define
For a given , , and , we will use the notation for the point in in which replaces in the coordinates of . That is,
A collection of functions has a Nash equilibrium at provided
for all and .
Nash recognized that an equilibrium is a fixed point of the set valued mapping
In particular, he applied Kakutani’s fixed point theorem [19] to show that if are nonempty, convex, compact subsets of Euclidean space and each is multilinear, then has a Nash equilibrium at some [24, 25]. Nash was interested in multilinear as they correspond to the expected cost of players assuming mixed strategies in noncooperative games. More generally, his existence theorem holds if each is continuous and
(1.1) |
As the existence of a Nash equilibrium is due to a nonconstructive fixed point theorem, it seems unlikely that there are good ways to approximate these points. Indeed, it has been established that the approximation of Nash equilibria is computationally challenging [9, 10, 21]. Nevertheless, we contend that there is a nontrivial class of functions for which the approximation of Nash equilibria is at least theoretically feasible. We will explain below that a sufficient condition for the approximation of Nash equilibria is that satisfy
(1.2) |
for each . Here we are considering each as a subset of a Euclidean space and use ‘’ to denote the dot products on any of these spaces.
Our approach starts with the observation that if (1.1) holds and are convex, then is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
(1.3) |
for each . As a result, it is natural to consider the differential inequalities
(1.4) |
for and . Here
is the unknown. We will below argue that for appropriately chosen initial condition , the Cesàro mean of
(1.5) |
will converge to a Nash equilibrium of as provided that (1.2) holds.
1.1 A few concrete examples
An elementary example which illustrates this approach may be observed when , ,
It is not hard to check that the origin is the unique Nash equilibrium of and that satisfy (1.2) (with equality holding) for each . We now seek an absolutely continuous path
such that
(1.6) |
holds for almost every and each .
It turns out that if
then the unique solution of these differential inequalities is
This solution simply parametrizes the circle of radius . In particular,
For general initial conditions , it can be shown that in a finite time . Refer to Figure 1 for a schematic. It then follows that the same limit above holds for this solution.

The method we present can be extended in certain cases when are not compact. For example, suppose ,
It is easy to check that satisfy (1.2). Furthermore,
provided
As a result, this is the unique Nash equilibrium of .
We note that the solution of
is given by
It is now clear that
In particular, we do not need to employ the Cesàro mean of in order to approximate the Nash equilibrium of .
1.2 A general setting
It just so happens that our method does not rely on the spaces being finite dimensional. Consequently, we will consider the following version of our approximation problem. Let be a reflexive Banach space over with norm and continuous dual . We further suppose
(1.7) |
and consider functions
(1.8) |
which satisfy
(1.9) |
In the last condition listed above, we mean
for each
and for .
When is finite dimensional, we naturally identify and with Euclidean space of the same dimension. Alternatively, when is infinite dimensional, we will suppose there is a real Hilbert space for which
and is continuously embedded. It is with respect to this space in which we consider the following initial value problem: for a given , find an absolutely continuous such that
(1.10) |
Our central result involving this initial value problem is as follows. In this statement, we will make use of the set
(1.11) |
Here is the normal cone of defined as
(1.12) |
for .
Theorem 1.1.
We note that if , then . In this case
(1.14) |
and the initial value problem reduces to
(1.15) |
We will also explain that if in addition is single-valued, everywhere-defined, monotone, and hemicontinuous we can obtain the same result as above without assuming (1.9). This follows directly from a theorem of Browder and Minty.
We will phrase our initial value problem (1.10) as the evolution generated by a monotone operator on with domain . According to pioneering work of Brézis [5], the crucial task will be to verify the maximality of this operator. Regarding the large time behavior of solutions, the convergence to equilibria of maximal monotone operators by the Cesàro means of semigroups they generate originates in the work of Brézis and Baillon [3]. We also refer the reader to Chapter 3 of [2] which gives a detailed discussion of this phenomenon.
Of course, the asymptotic statements we made above are predicated on the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This is only guaranteed to be the case if is weakly compact or if there is some such that
(1.16) |
for each . When such coercivity holds, has a unique Nash equilibrium and solutions of the initial value problem (1.10) converge exponentially fast in to this equilibrium point.
We will prove Theorem 1.1 in the following section. Then we will apply this result to flows in Euclidean spaces of the form (1.4) in section 3. Finally, we will consider examples in Lebesgue and Sobolev spaces in section 4. A prototypical collection of functionals we will study is
(1.17) |
for , where and is a bounded domain. For this particular example, we will argue that if satisfy suitable growth and monotonicity conditions, then has a unique Nash equilibrium which can be approximated by solutions of the parabolic initial/boundary value problem
(1.18) |
for appropriately chosen initial conditions .
We also remark that in finite dimensions, similar results were known to Flåm [15]. In particular, Flåm seems to be the first author to identify the important role of the monotonicity condition (1.2) in approximating Nash equilibrium. However, Rosen appears to be the first to consider using equations such as (1.4) to approximate equilibrium points [26]. In addition, we would like to point out that the finite dimensional variational inequality (1.3) and its relation to Nash equilibrium is studied in depth in the monograph by Facchinei and Pang [13]. In infinite dimensions, there have also been several recent works which discuss discrete time approximations for variational inequalities that correspond to Nash equilibrium [7, 6, 1, 11, 18].
Acknowledgements: This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants DMS-1440140, DMS-1554130, and HRD-1700236, the National Security Agency under Grant No. H98230-20-1-0015, and the Sloan Foundation under Grant No. G-2020-12602 while the authors participated in a program hosted by the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute in Berkeley, California, during the summer of 2020.
2 Approximation theorem
In this section, we will briefly recall the notion of a maximal monotone operator on a Hilbert space and state a few key results for these operators. Then we will apply these results to prove Theorem 1.1 and a few related corollaries.
2.1 Maximal monotone operators on a Hilbert space
Let be Hilbert space with inner product and norm . We will denote as the power set or collection of all subsets of . We recall that is monotone if
for all , , and . Moreover, is maximally monotone if the only monotone such that for all is . Minty’s well known maximality criterion is as follows [22].
Theorem (Minty’s Lemma).
A monotone operator is maximal if and only if for each , there is a unique such that
Let us now recall a fundamental theorem for the initial value problem
(2.1) |
As discussed in Chapter II of [5] and Chapter 3 of [2], the initial value problem is well-posed provided that is maximally monotone and is an element of the domain of
Theorem (Brézis’s Theorem).
Suppose is maximally monotone and . Then there is a unique Lipschitz continuous
solution of (2.1) such that for all . Moreover,
(2.2) |
for almost every .
Remark 2.1.
The full statement of Brézis’s Theorem (Theorem 3.1 of [2]) is more extensive than what is written above.
Remark 2.2.
We note that the right hand side of (2.2) is finite as the images of maximal monotone operators are closed and convex subsets of .
We also note that the operator generates a contraction. Let be a path as described in Brézis’ Theorem, and suppose is any other Lipschitz continuous path with for and
Then
(2.3) |
If, in addition, there is some such that
(2.4) |
for all , , and , then (2.3) can be improved to
(2.5) |
Remarkably, it is also possible to use solutions of the initial value problem (as described in Brézis’s Theorem) to approximate equilibria of . These are points such that
The following theorem was proved in [3].
Theorem (The Baillon-Brézis Theorem).
Suppose has an equilibrium point and is a solution of the initial value problem (2.1). Then
converges weakly in to some equilibrium point of .
2.2 Proof of Theorem 1.1
Let us now suppose the spaces , , and are as described in the subsection 1.2 of the introduction. We will further assume are given functions which satisfy (1.9). An elementary but important observation we will use is that a given induces a linear form in by the formula
That this linear form is continuous is due to the continuity of the embedding . For convenience, we will use to denote both the norm on and the associated norm on . Namely, we’ll write
for . We will also use this convention for the inner product and norm on and on and the induced norm on and on .
Lemma 2.4.
The domain of is , and is monotone. Moreover, an absolutely continuous solves
(2.7) |
if and only it solves (1.10).
Proof.
By definition, the domain of is . Suppose ,
for . In view of the last condition listed in (1.9) and the fact that each is monotone,
(2.8) |
Thus, is monotone.
In view of Brézis’ Theorem and the Baillon-Brézis Theorem, we can conclude Theorem 1.1 once we verify that is maximal. To this end, we will verify the hypotheses of Minty’s Lemma.
Proof of Theorem 1.1.
For a given , it suffices to show there is such that
(2.9) |
for each . In this case, and
for so that and .
In order to solve (2.9), we will employ the auxiliary functions defined by
for and . In view of (1.9),
(2.10) |
Note that is a Nash equilibrium of if and only if solves (2.9). Since we are assuming that each has nonempty interior, this follows from the Pshenichnii–Rockafellar conditions for the minimum of a proper, lowersemicontinuous, convex function on a closed subset of a Banach space (Theorem 4.3.6 of [4]). Consequently, we now aim to show that has a Nash equilibrium.
For each , set
It is clear that is convex and weakly closed. And as each is nonempty, is nonempty for all greater or equal to some fixed . Let us consider the map specified as
for .
The first and second properties of listed in (2.10) imply that and convex for any and ; and the first and third properties imply that the graph of is weakly closed. Indeed let us suppose , , , and
for each with and all . We can then send to get
Corollary 2.5.
If is weakly compact, then has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof.
If is weakly compact, we can repeat the argument given in the proof above used to show has a Nash equilibrium. All we would need to do is to replace with and with . ∎
Corollary 2.6.
Suppose there is such that
(2.12) |
for each . Then has a unique Nash equilibrium . Moreover, if is a solution of the initial value problem as described in Theorem 1.1, there is such that
(2.13) |
for each .
Proof.
We can repeat the argument given in the proof of Theorem 1.1 that shows has a Nash equilibrium to conclude that has a Nash equilibrium.
If is a Nash equilibrium of , then
for each . Likewise,
for each if is another Nash equilibrium. Choosing and and adding these inequalities give
We now consider the special case mentioned in the introduction. In the statement below, we will suppose that and are as above. However, we will not assume satisfy (1.9). We also note that the proof essentially follows from an observation made by Brézis in Remark 2.3.7 of [5].
Theorem 2.7.
Suppose satisfy
(2.14) |
and define
Then for each , there is a unique Lipschitz continuous such that for each and
(2.15) |
Proof.
It suffices to show that defined via
(2.16) |
() is maximal. To this end, we first consider the operator defined via
for . Notice that
and
for all .
Remark 2.8.
3 Finite dimensional flows
In this section, we will study a few implications of Theorem 1.1 in the particular case
equipped with the standard Euclidean dot product and norm. As there is just one topology to consider, the statements we’ll make will be simpler than in the infinite dimensional setting. We will also identify a potential application to noncooperative games.
3.1 Compact domains
Let , where are convex, compact subsets with nonempty interior. Further assume
(3.1) |
As before we set
where
). Theorem 1.1 implies the following.
Proposition 3.1.
For each , there is a unique Lipschitz continuous with for and which satisfies
(3.2) |
Furthermore, the limit
exists and equals a Nash equilibrium of .
Remark 3.2.
In view of Corollary 2.6, if
for , has a unique Nash equilibrium and the solution in the proposition above converges exponentially fast to this equilibrium point.
3.2 An application to game theory
Again suppose are convex, compact subsets with nonempty interior. Another interesting case to consider is when are each -linear. That is,
(3.3) |
for each and . These are precisely the types of functions Nash considered in his celebrated work on noncooperative games [24, 25]. Note that (3.3) implies
(3.4) |
for , , and . Consequently,
(3.5) |
if and only if
(3.6) |
With these assumptions, Theorem 1.1 implies the following statement.
Proposition 3.3.
Suppose are -linear and satisfy (3.6). Then for each , there is a unique Lipschitz such that
(3.7) |
Moreover,
converges as to a Nash equilibrium of .
3.3 The whole space
Finally, we consider the case where are defined on the whole space . We will assume
(3.8) |
Let us also set
Theorem 1.1 gives us the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.
For each , there is a unique Lipschitz continuous such that for each and which satisfies
(3.9) |
If has a Nash equilibrium, then
exists and is also Nash equilibrium.
Remark 3.6.
If
for all and some , then has a unique Nash equilibrium at some and
Remark 3.7.
A basic example we had in mind when considering Proposition 3.5 was
for and . Here are symmetric matrices which additionally satisfy
. The required monotonicity condition on is satisfied provided
(3.10) |
for each .
4 Examples in function spaces
In this final section, we will apply the ideas we have developed to consider functionals defined on Lebesgue and Sobolev spaces. As we have done above, we will consider both the existence of Nash equilibria and their approximation by continuous time flows. Throughout, we will assume is a bounded domain with smooth boundary. We will also change notation by using for the variables in which our functionals are defined. This allows us to reserve for points in . Finally, we will use for any norm on a finite dimensional space.
4.1 A few remarks on Sobolev spaces
Before discussing examples, let us recall a few facts about Sobolev spaces and establish some notation. A good reference for this material is Chapter 5 and 6 of [12]. First we note
where each inclusion is compact. Here is the space of Lebesgue measurable functions on which are square integrable equipped with the standard inner product. The space is the closure of all smooth functions having compact support in in the norm
The topological dual of is denoted . Recall that the Dirichlet Laplacian is defined via
for . Here we are using as the natural pairing between and . Moreover, is an isometry; in particular, this map is invertible. This allows us to define the following inner product on
We also note that if , the inner product between and simplifies to
(4.1) |
In addition, we will consider the space consisting of functions for which . This is a Hilbert space endowed with the inner product
4.2
For , define
(4.2) |
for . Here each , and is assumed to be smooth and satisfy
(4.3) |
for all and some . We’ll also suppose are smooth,
(4.4) |
for , and there is such that
(4.5) |
for and .
Using these assumptions, it is straightforward to verify that fulfills (1.9) with The following lemma also follows by routine computations.
Lemma 4.1.
For each and ,
with
and
Moreover, is a Nash equilibrium of if and only if it is a weak solution of
(4.6) |
.
Remark 4.2.
In this statement, denotes the natural pairing between and .
We now can state a result involving the approximation of Nash equilibrium for .
Proposition 4.3.
Let . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
such that for each and
(4.7) |
. Furthermore, there is such that
(4.8) |
for . Here is the unique Nash equilibrium of .
Remark 4.4.
For almost every , the PDE in (4.7) holds almost everywhere in ; the boundary condition holds in the trace sense; and as functions.
4.3 Another example with
Define
for . Here and each is smooth with
(4.11) |
for all and some . We’ll also assume there is such that
(4.12) |
for each and .
Direct computation gives the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.
For each and ,
with
(4.13) |
and
Moreover,
as , and is a Nash equilibrium of if and only if it is a weak solution of
(4.14) |
.
With this lemma, we can now establish the subsequent assertion about the Nash equilibrium of .
Proposition 4.6.
Let . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
such that for each and
(4.15) |
). Furthermore, there is such that
(4.16) |
for . Here is the unique Nash equilibrium of .
4.4
For a given , set
for . Here , and denotes the inner product in . We will assume are smooth and satisfy (4.5) and
(4.19) |
for , , and some . For convenience, we will also assume
(4.20) |
for .
The following observations can be verified by routine computations.
Lemma 4.7.
For each and ,
with
(4.21) |
Moreover, is a Nash equilibrium of if and only if it is a weak solution of
(4.22) |
.
By Proposition A.1 in the appendix, there are smooth functions such that
(4.23) |
for all , and some constant . Notice that in view of (4.20)
(4.24) |
for . Thus, it is possible to solve (4.22) by choosing
for and then setting
for . In particular, we have just shown that has a Nash equilibrium, and it is not hard to see it is unique.
Let us now see how to approximate this Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4.8.
Let . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
such that for each and
(4.25) |
). Furthermore, there is such that
(4.26) |
for . Here denotes the norm on and is the Nash equilibrium of .
Proof.
Define as
for . We note that , and if and only if is a Nash equilibrium for . By the second inequality listed in (4.19),
(4.27) | ||||
(4.28) | ||||
(4.29) |
for and some .
As a result, it suffices to check that is maximal. This amounts to finding a weak solution of
(4.30) |
for a given . To this end, we consider the auxiliary problem of finding such that
(4.31) |
If we can find , then defined by
is a solution of (4.30).
4.5
Set
for and . Here and
We will suppose are smooth and satisfy (4.19) and (4.20). A few key observations regarding are as follows.
Lemma 4.9.
For each and ,
with
Moreover, is a Nash equilibrium of if and only if it is a solution of
(4.33) |
.
Remark 4.10.
Above, denotes the natural pairing between and .
Using the functions from the previous subsection, we can solve
(4.34) |
for to obtain a solution of (4.33). It follows that has a unique Nash equilibrium , which belongs to the space
As with our previous examples, we can approximate this Nash equilibrium with a continuous time flow.
Proposition 4.11.
Let . There is a unique Lipschitz continuous
such that for each and
(4.35) |
). Furthermore, there is such that
(4.36) |
for . Here is the unique Nash equilibrium of .
Proof.
Define by
(4.37) |
for . Note that , and if and only if is a Nash equilibrium for . In view of (4.19),
(4.38) | ||||
(4.39) | ||||
(4.40) |
for and some .
Therefore, it suffices to show
(4.41) |
has a solution for a given . We note that any such solution will automatically belong to . Moreover, this is equivalent to finding a weak solution of
(4.42) |
We emphasize that elliptic regularity implies that any such weak solution actually belongs to .
Appendix A Dual functions
In this appendix, we will verify a technical assertion that was used to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a few of the examples we considered above.
Proposition A.1.
Suppose are smooth and satisfy
(A.1) |
for and and
(A.2) |
for and some . There are smooth functions with the following properties.
-
(i)
if and only if .
-
(ii)
For all and ,
(A.3) -
(iii)
For each ,
(A.4) -
(iv)
There is a constant such that
(A.5) for and .
Proof.
First we note that the mapping of
(A.6) |
is invertible. This follows from the theorem due to Browder [8] and Minty [23] as (A.2) implies that this map is both monotone and coercive; invertibility is a consequence of Hadamard’s global invertibility theorem (Theorem A of [17]), as well. The condition (A.2) also gives
(A.7) |
for each .
Now fix and let be the unique Nash equilibrium of
(A.8) |
. Such a Nash equilibrium exists for these functions by Corollary 2.6. As a result,
(A.9) |
Since (A.6) is invertible and smooth, (A.9) determines as a smooth function of . Let us now define
(A.10) |
for . Differentiating with respect to and using (A.9), we find
This proves and that
(A.11) |
is the inverse mapping of (A.6).
It follows from part and the inverse function theorem that whenever and for , the matrices
are inverses. Consequently, for a given , we can choose defined as
in (A.7) to get
(A.12) | ||||
(A.13) | ||||
(A.14) |
As a result,
(A.15) |
Upon selecting , the th standard unit vector in , we find
for . We conclude assertion .
Part follows directly from (A). Indeed, for any , we can use the fundamental theorem of calculus to derive
(A.16) | |||
(A.17) | |||
(A.18) |
We are left to verify assertion . First note that by part ,
(A.19) | ||||
(A.20) | ||||
(A.21) | ||||
(A.22) | ||||
(A.23) |
for some independent of and .
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