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Computational Complexity of Standpoint LTL

Stéphane Demri    Przemysław Andrzej Wałęga Université Paris-Saclay, ENS Paris-Saclay, CNRS, LMF, 91190, Gif-sur-Yvette, France University of Oxford, Queen Mary University of London, United Kingdom
Abstract

Standpoint linear temporal logic 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} is a recent formalism able to model possibly conflicting commitments made by distinct agents, taking into account aspects of temporal reasoning. In this paper, we analyse the computational properties of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. First, we establish logarithmic-space reductions between the satisfiability problems for the multi-dimensional modal logic 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} and 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. This leads to the ExpSpace-completeness of the satisfiability problem in 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, which is a surprising result in view of previous investigations. Next, we present a method of restricting 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} so that the obtained fragment is a strict extension of both the (non-temporal) standpoint logic and linear-time temporal logic 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}, but the satisfiability problem is PSpace-complete in this fragment. Thus, we show how to combine standpoint logic with 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} so that the worst-case complexity of the obtained combination is not higher than of pure 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}.

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1 Introduction

Standpoint Logic.

Recently, a new framework based on modal logics was developed in order to interpret languages in the presence of vagueness [21]. The framework is called ‘standpoint logic’ where standpoints (a concept first introduced by Bennett [10] in a logical context, see also [11]) are used to interpret vague expressions. Logical reasoning about vagueness has a long tradition stemming from fuzzy logics [34, 35], to information logics based on rough sets [28, 27, 7]. In standpoint logic, each standpoint 𝚜\mathtt{s} is associated with modalities 𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}} and 𝚜\Box_{\mathtt{s}}, and with a set of interpretations (a.k.a. precisifications) corresponding to 𝚜\mathtt{s}. While 𝚜φ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi reads as “according to 𝚜\mathtt{s}, it is conceivable that φ\varphi”, dually, 𝚜φ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi reads as “according to 𝚜\mathtt{s}, it is unequivocal that φ\varphi”. The language of standpoint logic is equipped also with a binary operator \preceq between standpoints, such that 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} is interpreted as “the standpoint 𝚜\mathtt{s} is sharper than 𝚜\mathtt{s}^{\prime}” leading to the validity of the modal axiom 𝚜p𝚜p\Box_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}p\to\Box_{\mathtt{s}}p. This is reminiscent to partially-ordered (𝖲𝟦\mathsf{S4}) modal operators [1], role hierarchies in description logics [4], and more generally to grammar logics [17], for which computational properties are well studied [6, 14]. Originally, standpoint logic framework was developed for propositional calculus [21], then also for predicate logic and description logics [23, 24], and most recently for the temporal logic 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [20]. This framework has a potential for further combinations with logical formalisms dedicated to knowledge representation and reasoning, allowing us to perform logical reasoning about vagueness [18, 9, 11].

Standpoint 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}.

As evoked above, the recent paper [20] introduced a multi-perspective approach by combining standpoints and temporal reasoning expressed in the linear-time temporal logic 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [29], which is a very popular specification language, for instance used for model-checking [5], temporal planning [13, 2], and temporal reasoning with description logics [3]. This new formalism, called 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, handles both evolutions of systems and changes of standpoints. Gigante et al. [20] develop a tableau-based proof system to reason about 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, leading to a computational analysis for deciding the satisfiability status of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae. Within 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, each standpoint is interpreted as a set of 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} models (i.e. as a set of ω\omega-sequences of propositional valuations, also known as traces) and the logical formalism has the ability to model possibly conflicting commitments made by distinct agents. Hence, 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} significantly increases the modelling capabilities offered by 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}, and so, 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} can be seen as a non-trivial extension of 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}. Our initial motivation in this work is to understand the computational properties of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. We agree with Gigante et al. [20] that it is particularly desirable to be able to decide the satisfiability status of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae in polynomial-space, which is the best we can hope for in view of PSpace-completeness of 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [31]. However, in contrast to the results of Gigante et al. [20], we show that the PSpace membership can be guaranteed only for strict fragments of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} (see Section 4) and ExpSpace is required for the full 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} (see Section 3).

Our contributions.

We study the computational properties of the satisfiability problem for the standpoint linear temporal logic 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. We show that the problem is ExpSpace-complete (Theorem 5) by establishing logarithmic-space reductions between 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and the multi-dimensional modal logic 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} whose satisfiability problem is known to be ExpSpace-complete [19]. The obtained ExpSpace-completeness of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} contrasts with PSpace-membership claimed by Gigante et al. [20]. In Section 4.1, we provide examples of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae whose satisfiability is challenging to check as their models have an infinite set of traces and at every position, an exponential amount of valuations are witnessed on such traces (see Proposition 6). In Section 4.2, we identify a fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} which contains both 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} and propositional standpoint logic, but the satisfiability problem can be decided in polynomial-space. Since 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} is known to be PSpace-complete [31], we obtain the same tight complexity result for the newly introduced fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} (Theorem 11). To do so, we use the automata-based approach following the general principles for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [32], but with non-trivial modifications.

2 Logical Preliminaries

In this section, we briefly introduce the standpoint linear temporal logic 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, the propositional standpoint logic 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}, as well as the multi-dimensional modal logic 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}, which we exploit in Section 3. For motivations and detailed presentation of these logics, we refer a reader to [22, 20] and [19, Chapter 5].

2.1 Standpoint linear temporal logic 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}

The 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae are built over a countably infinite set 𝒫\mathcal{P} of propositional variables and a countably infinite set 𝒮={𝚜,𝚜,}\mathcal{S}=\{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime},\ldots\} of standpoint symbols including the universal standpoint symbol *. The 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae φ\varphi are defined according to the grammar:

φ::=p𝚜𝚜¬φφφ𝚜φ𝚜φ𝖷φφ𝖴φ,\varphi::=p\mid\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\mid\neg\varphi\mid\varphi\wedge\varphi\mid\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi\mid\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi\mid\mathsf{X}\varphi\mid\varphi\mathsf{U}\varphi,

where p𝒫p\in\mathcal{P} and 𝚜,𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in\mathcal{S}; other Boolean connectives and 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} temporal operators (e.g. \to, \leftrightarrow, \vee, 𝖦\mathsf{G} for “always in the future”, and 𝖥\mathsf{F} for “sometime in the future”) are treated as standard abbreviations. In terms of expressivity, one modality among 𝚜,𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}},\Box_{\mathtt{s}} is sufficient. An 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model, \mathcal{M}, is a structure of the form =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) where,

  • Π\Pi\neq\emptyset is a set of 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} models (traces) of the form σ:2𝒫\sigma:\mathbb{N}\longrightarrow 2^{\mathcal{P}},

  • λ\lambda is a map of the form λ:𝒮(2Π{})\lambda:\mathcal{S}\longrightarrow(2^{\Pi}\setminus\{\emptyset\}) such that λ()=Π\lambda(*)=\Pi.

For example, Figure 1 presents an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model with six traces. The satisfaction relation, ,σ,iφ\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\varphi, for an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda), σΠ\sigma\in\Pi, ii\in\mathbb{N}, and an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formula φ\varphi is defined inductively as follows (we omit the standard clauses for Boolean connectives):

,σ,ip\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models p def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} pσ(i),\displaystyle p\in\sigma(i),
,σ,i𝚜𝚜\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} λ(𝚜)λ(𝚜),\displaystyle\lambda(\mathtt{s})\subseteq\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}),
,σ,i𝚜φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,σ,iφ, for some σλ(𝚜),\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},i\models\varphi,\text{ for some }\sigma^{\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}),
,σ,i𝚜φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,σ,iφ, for all σλ(𝚜),\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},i\models\varphi,\text{ for all }\sigma^{\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}),
,σ,i𝖷φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\mathsf{X}\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,σ,i+1φ,\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i+1\models\varphi,
,σ,iφ𝖴ψ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} there is ii such that ,σ,iψ\displaystyle\text{there is }i^{\prime}\geq i\text{ such that }\mathcal{M},\sigma,i^{\prime}\models\psi
and ,σ,i′′φ for all ii′′<i.\displaystyle\text{and }\mathcal{M},\sigma,i^{\prime\prime}\models\varphi\text{ for all }i\leq i^{\prime\prime}<i^{\prime}.

The satisfiability problem for 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} takes as input an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formula φ\varphi and asks whether there is a model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0φ\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi. By way of example, we provide an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formula below taken from the medical devices example [20, Section 2.1] (more elaborated examples can be found in [21, 22, 20]):

(𝖦¬𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝖨𝖳(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑎𝑓𝑒).\Box_{*}(\mathsf{G}\neg\mathit{Malf}\to\mathit{Test})\land\Box_{\mathsf{IT}}(\mathit{Comp}\vee\mathit{Test}\to\mathit{Safe}).

The first conjunct states that all countries agree in their standpoints that if a medical device never malfunctions, then it is safe according to testing. The second one states that Italy deems a device safe if it is safe according to testing or it has been found safe by comparison.

Regarding our definition of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, it is worth observing that, as far as we can judge, the satisfiability problem is not formally defined in [20, Section 2.2]. Only the validity problem is defined. In particular, non validity of the 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formula φ\varphi is defined as the existence of an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0¬φ\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\neg\varphi. So, our definition of satisfiability is dual to the notion of validity used by Gigante et al. [20].

Besides, it is worth noting that the above presentation of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} differs slightly with the definition of Gigante et al. [20, Section 2.2], but it has no impact on our results, as described next. 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae, as defined in [20], are in negation normal form and allow for using the “release” 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} operator. In our definition negation is unrestricted and we do not use the “release” operator, which makes no substantial difference. Gigante et al. [20] assumes also that the formulae 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} cannot be combined with other formulae, so the way we define 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae is slightly more expressive. However, our ExpSpace-hardness proof (reduction in Lemma 1) does not use formulae of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} (actually only the modalities \Box_{*}, 𝖷\mathsf{X}, and 𝖴\mathsf{U} are needed). The ExpSpace-membership (Corollary 4) for our, slightly richer language, clearly implies the same upper bound for the weaker language of Gigante et al. [20].

The change of standpoint performed with the modalities 𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}} and 𝚜\Box_{\mathtt{s}} is reminiscent to the change of observational power studied in [8] with the modalities Δo\Delta^{o}. In both cases, a modality explicitly performs a change in the way the forthcoming formulae are evaluated.

2.2 Propositional standpoint logic 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}

In the sequel, we also consider propositional standpoint logic [22] (herein, written 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}) understood as the fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} without temporal connectives. The grammar of formulae is restricted to

φ::=p𝚜𝚜¬φφφ𝚜φ𝚜φ,\varphi::=p\mid\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\mid\neg\varphi\mid\varphi\wedge\varphi\mid\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi\mid\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi,

and the models are of the form =(Π,V)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,V) where Π\Pi is a finite non-empty set of precisifications, V:𝒮𝒫2ΠV:\mathcal{S}\cup\mathcal{P}\longrightarrow 2^{\Pi} is a valuation such that for all 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}, we have V(𝚜)V(\mathtt{s})\neq\emptyset and V()=ΠV(*)=\Pi. The satisfaction relation is defined as follows (where πΠ\pi\in\Pi and we omit the obvious clauses for Boolean connectives):

,πp\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\pi\models p def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} πV(p),\displaystyle\pi\in V(p),
,π𝚜𝚜\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\pi\models\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} V(𝚜)V(𝚜),\displaystyle V(\mathtt{s})\subseteq V(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}),
,π𝚜φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\pi\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,πφ, for some πV(𝚜),\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\varphi,\text{ for some }\pi^{\prime}\in V(\mathtt{s}),
,π𝚜φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\pi\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,πφ, for all πV(𝚜).\displaystyle\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\varphi,\text{ for all }\pi^{\prime}\in V(\mathtt{s}).

The satisfiability problem, for an input formula φ\varphi, consists in checking whether there is some pair ,π\mathcal{M},\pi such that ,πφ\mathcal{M},\pi\models\varphi. This problem is NP-complete. To show NP-membership,  Gómez Álvarez [21, Section 4.4.2] proved that if a satisfiable formula φ\varphi contains N1N_{1} many standpoint symbols and N2N_{2} many diamond modal operators, then φ\varphi is satisfied in a model =(Π,V)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,V) such that ΠN1+N2+1{\mid\!{\Pi}\!\mid}\leq N_{1}+N_{2}+1. An alternative way to get the NP-membership is to translate φ\varphi into a formula 𝚜𝚜𝔱(φ)\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}}\Diamond\mathtt{s}\wedge\mathfrak{t}(\varphi) of the modal logic 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} [12], where 𝔱\mathfrak{t} turns standpoint operators into modal operators in the following manner: 𝔱(𝚜𝚜)=(𝚜𝚜)\mathfrak{t}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})=\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathtt{s}^{\prime}), 𝔱(𝚜φ)=(𝚜\mathfrak{t}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi)=\Diamond(\mathtt{s}\wedge\mathfrak{t}(\varphi)), and 𝔱(𝚜φ)=(𝚜𝔱(φ))\mathfrak{t}(\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\varphi)=\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathfrak{t}(\varphi)). The correctness of such a reduction relies naturally on the Kripke-style semantics for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}. We will refine complexity analysis of 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} in Section 4.2, which will be essential to establish complexity of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} fragments.

2.3 Multi-dimensional modal logic 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}

Another logic that is useful herein is the multi-dimensional modal logic 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} [19, Chapter 5] defined as the product of 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} and 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5}. 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} formulae are generated from the grammar

φ::=p¬φφφφφ𝖷φφ𝖴φ,\varphi::=p\mid\neg\varphi\mid\varphi\wedge\varphi\mid\Diamond\varphi\mid\Box\varphi\mid\mathsf{X}\varphi\mid\varphi\mathsf{U}\varphi,

where p𝒫p\in\mathcal{P} is a propositional variable. As in 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, we use standard abbreviations for other Boolean connectives and 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} operators (\to, \vee, 𝖦\mathsf{G}, 𝖥\mathsf{F}, etc.). The models for 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} are of the form =(×W,R,L)\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,R,L) where (W,R)(W,R) is an 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5}-frame (i.e. RR is an equivalence relation on WW) and L:×W2𝒫L:\mathbb{N}\times W\longrightarrow 2^{\mathcal{P}}. The satisfaction relation for 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} is defined as follows (again, we omit the standard clauses for Boolean connectives):

,(n,w)p\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models p def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} pL(n,w),\displaystyle p\in L(n,w),
,(n,w)φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models\Diamond\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,(n,w)φ, for some wR(w),\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\varphi,\text{ for some }w^{\prime}\in R(w),
,(n,w)φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models\Box\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,(n,w)φ, for all wR(w),\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\varphi,\text{ for all }w^{\prime}\in R(w),
,(n,w)𝖷φ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models\mathsf{X}\varphi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,(n+1,w)𝖷φ,\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n+1,w)\models\mathsf{X}\varphi,
,(n,w)φ𝖴ψ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} there is nn such that ,(n,w)ψ\displaystyle\text{there is }n^{\prime}\geq n\text{ such that }\mathcal{M},(n^{\prime},w)\models\psi
and ,(n,w)φ for all nn<n.\displaystyle\text{and }\mathcal{M},(n^{\prime\prime},w)\models\varphi\text{ for all }n\leq n^{\prime\prime}<n^{\prime}.

Therefore, the modalities \Diamond and \Box allow us to move within the (W,R)(W,R) dimension whereas the temporal connectives 𝖷\mathsf{X} and 𝖴\mathsf{U} allow us to move along the (,)(\mathbb{N},\leq) dimension. The satisfiability problem for 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} takes as input a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} formula φ\varphi and asks whether there is a model =(×W,R,L)\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,R,L) and (n,w)×W(n,w)\in\mathbb{N}\times W such that ,(n,w)φ\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models\varphi. It is known, that satisfaction of a formula can be always witnessed by a model =(×W,R,L)\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,R,L) with R=W×WR=W\times W and by a pair (0,w)(0,w) (i.e. its first component is the origin position 0). In the sequel we will use this assumption; in particular, we will assume that R=W×WR=W\times W, and for simplicity of presentation we will drop the component RR from 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} models.

It is worth noting that the above presentation of 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} differs slightly from the definitions by Gabbay et al. [19, Section 2.1], but it has no impact on our results. Indeed, Gabbay et al. [19] use only the strict “until” operator, which we denote by 𝖴<\mathsf{U}_{<} (and no next-time operator 𝖷\mathsf{X}) and whose semantics is as follows:

,(n,w)φ𝖴<ψ\displaystyle\mathcal{M},(n,w)\models\varphi\mathsf{U}_{<}\psi def\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} there is n>n with ,(n,w)ψ\displaystyle\text{there is }n^{\prime}>n\text{ with }\mathcal{M},(n^{\prime},w)\models\psi
and ,(n,w)φ for all n<n<n.\displaystyle\text{and }\mathcal{M},(n^{\prime\prime},w)\models\varphi\text{ for all }n<n^{\prime\prime}<n^{\prime}.

It is easy to see that φ𝖴<ψ\varphi\mathsf{U}_{<}\psi can be encoded by 𝖷(φ𝖴ψ)\mathsf{X}(\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi) and therefore the ExpSpace-hardness for 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} proved by Gabbay et al. [19, Theorem 5.43] applies also to our version of 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}. As far as the ExpSpace-membership is concerned, the satisfiability problem for our version of 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} is in ExpSpace using the approach of Gabbay et al. [19, Theorem 6.65] dedicated to 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} with strict “until” and using a standard renaming technique [19, Proposition 2.10]. Note that a naive translation 𝔱\mathfrak{t} from our language to a formula with strict “until” exploiting 𝔱(φ𝖴ψ)=𝔱(ψ)(𝔱(φ)𝔱(φ)𝖴<𝔱(ψ))\mathfrak{t}(\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi)=\mathfrak{t}(\psi)\vee(\mathfrak{t}(\varphi)\wedge\mathfrak{t}(\varphi)\mathsf{U}_{<}\mathfrak{t}(\psi)), would cause an exponential blow-up. However, we can get a logarithmic-space reduction using the renaming technique, where any subformula χ\chi is associated with a fresh propositional variable pχp_{\chi}. For instance, to capture the meaning of φ𝖴ψ\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi we introduce an additional formula 𝖦(pφ𝖴ψpψ(pφpφ𝖴<pψ)).\Box\mathsf{G}\big{(}p_{\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi}\leftrightarrow p_{\psi}\vee(p_{\varphi}\wedge p_{\varphi}\mathsf{U}_{<}p_{\psi})\big{)}. This additional formula (propagating an equivalence all over the model), if asserted in any world of the form (0,w)(0,w), allows us to state that pφ𝖴ψp_{\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi} is equivalent with ψ(φφ𝖴<ψ)\psi\vee(\varphi\wedge\varphi\mathsf{U}_{<}\psi), in all elements in ×W\mathbb{N}\times W. The propagation is over the model because of the modality 𝖦\Box\mathsf{G} and we can always assume that a world satisfying our formula is of the form (0,w)(0,w). As a conclusion, the version of 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} involved in this paper admits also an ExpSpace-complete satisfiability problem (ExpSpace-hardness follows from the fact that φ𝖴<ψ\varphi\mathsf{U}_{<}\psi can be encoded by 𝖷(φ𝖴ψ)\mathsf{X}(\varphi\mathsf{U}\psi)).

Let us conclude this section by evoking the relationships between 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and the well-known modal logic 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} [12]. The logic 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} contains a modality \Box_{*} where * can be understood as the universal standpoint interpreted by the total set of traces and therefore \Box_{*} behaves naturally as an 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} modality, whence the component 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} in 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}. The presence of 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} is not our finding as it has been already observed that quantification over precisifications leads to 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} modalities, see e.g., the works of Bennett [9, Section 2.1] and Bennett [10, page 43], as well as the presence of 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} modalities for modelling standpoints in [21, Section 3.5] and in [21, Chapter 4]. Furthermore, the relationship with multi-dimensional modal logics is already briefly evoked in [21, Section 7.3.3]. More importantly, an early introduction of some multi-dimensional modal logic is performed by Bennett [9, Section 2.1] where first-order logic and propositional modal logic 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} are mixed. Hence, the fact that we use 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} is not a total surprise, and the need for multi-dimensional modal logics was in the air for some time. Our contribution consists in establishing a formal result involving multi-dimensional modal logics and in designing simple logarithmic-space reductions between 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}, proving ExpSpace-hardness of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, despite the complexity result claimed in [20, Theorem 28]. The design of a PSpace fragment completes our analysis and provides us with a fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} which is a strict extension of both 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} and standpoint logic, but its computational complexity is not higher than the complexity of pure 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}.

3 Satisfiability for 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} is ExpSpace-complete

In this section we design logarithmic-space translations from 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} to 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} formulae, and vice versa. As a result, we will obtain that the computational complexity of satisfiability for 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae is the same as for 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} formulae, namely ExpSpace-complete. Both of our translations exploit similarities between 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} models. More specifically, we will consider an element wWw\in W in an 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} model (×W,L)(\mathbb{N}\times W,L) as a name for an 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi from an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model (Π,λ)(\Pi,\lambda).

3.1 Translation from 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} to 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}

Let φ\varphi be a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} formula and 𝔱1(φ)\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi) be its translation obtained from φ\varphi by replacing every occurrence of \Diamond by \Diamond_{*} and every occurrence \Box by \Box_{*} (an alternative translation consists in using 𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}} and and 𝚜\Box_{\mathtt{s}} for some fixed 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}). We show that this simple translation preserves satisfiability.

Lemma 1.

φ\varphi is 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}-satisfiable iff 𝔱1(φ)\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi) is 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiable.

Proof sketch.

Assume that there is a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} model =(×W,L)\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,L) and (0,w)×W(0,w)\in\mathbb{N}\times W such that ,(0,w)φ\mathcal{M},(0,w)\models\varphi. Let us build an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0𝔱1(φ)\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi). To this end, we let Π\Pi consist of all traces of the form

σw=defL((0,w)),L((1,w)),L((2,w)),L((3,w)),\sigma_{w^{\prime}}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}L((0,w^{\prime})),L((1,w^{\prime})),L((2,w^{\prime})),L((3,w^{\prime})),\ldots

with wWw^{\prime}\in W; note that we represent a trace σ:2𝒫\sigma^{\prime}:\mathbb{N}\longrightarrow 2^{\mathcal{P}} as an ω\omega-sequence σ(0),σ(1),σ(2),\sigma^{\prime}(0),\sigma^{\prime}(1),\sigma^{\prime}(2),\ldots. We let λ(𝚜)=defΠ\lambda(\mathtt{s})\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Pi, for each 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S} (for the construction it is only important that λ()=Π\lambda(*)=\Pi as no other standpoint symbol occurs in 𝔱1(φ)\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi)). We can prove by structural induction that, for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi and for all (n,w)×W(n,w^{\prime})\in\mathbb{N}\times W, we have ,(n,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\psi iff ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi). By way of example we handle below the case when the subformula is of the form ψ\Box\psi. It suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:

  • ,(n,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\Box\psi

  • ,(n,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime\prime})\models\psi for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) for all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi (by definition of Π\Pi)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\Box_{*}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\Box\psi) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

Therefore, we can show that ,σw,0𝔱1(φ)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{w},0\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi).

For the opposite implication, assume that there are an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0𝔱1(φ)\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi). Let us build a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} model =(×W,L)\mathcal{M}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,L) and (0,w)×W(0,w)\in\mathbb{N}\times W such that ,(0,w)φ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,w)\models\varphi. We let W=defΠW\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Pi and L((n,σ))=defσ(n)L((n,\sigma^{\prime}))\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\sigma^{\prime}(n), for all (n,σ)×W(n,\sigma^{\prime})\in\mathbb{N}\times W. We can show by structural induction that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi, all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi, and all nn\in\mathbb{N}, we have ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) iff ,(n,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime})\models\psi. By way of example, we handle below the case when the subformula is of the form ψ1𝖴ψ2\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}. To this end, we observe that the below statements are equivalent:

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ1𝖴ψ2)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2})

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ1)𝖴𝔱1(ψ2)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{1})\mathsf{U}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{2}) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

  • There is nnn^{\prime}\geq n such that ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ2)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n^{\prime}\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{2}) and for all nn<nn\leq n^{\prime\prime}<n^{\prime}, we have ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ1)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n^{\prime\prime}\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{1}) (by definition of \models)

  • There is nnn^{\prime}\geq n such that ,(n,σ)ψ2\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n^{\prime},\sigma^{\prime})\models\psi_{2} and for all nn<nn\leq n^{\prime\prime}<n^{\prime}, we have ,(n,σ)ψ1\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n^{\prime\prime},\sigma^{\prime})\models\psi_{1} (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,(n,σ)ψ1𝖴ψ2\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime})\models\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2} (by definition of \models)

This allows us to show that ,(0,σ)φ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,\sigma)\models\varphi. ∎

As 𝔱1(φ)\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi) is computed in logarithmic-space, we get the following.

Corollary 2.

𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiability is ExpSpace-hard.

Note that this result contradicts the PSpace upper bound shown by Gigante et al. [20, Theorem 28], as PSpace and ExpSpace are known to be distinct complexity classes.

3.2 Translation from 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} to 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}

The translation from 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} to 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} is (slightly) more complex since 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} models interpret standpoint symbols, which have no natural counterpart in 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} models. As we will show, however, standpoints can be simulated in 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} with fresh propositional variables. This, in particular, requires an additional formula (called χn\chi_{n} below) simulating the requirements that each standpoint in an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model has at least one associated trace and that if a trace is assigned to a standpoint, it is so throughout the entire timeline. As we show, such requirements can be easily expressed in 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}.

Given an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formula φ\varphi, we construct a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} formula 𝔱2(φ)\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi), by applying the translation map 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2} such that 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2} is the identity map for propositional variables, it is homomorphic for Boolean and temporal connectives, and the following hold for all 𝚜,𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in\mathcal{S}:

𝔱2(ψ)\displaystyle\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Diamond_{*}\psi) =def𝔱2(ψ),\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Diamond\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi), 𝔱2(𝚜ψ)\displaystyle\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi) =def(𝚜𝔱2(ψ)),\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Diamond(\mathtt{s}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi)),
𝔱2(ψ)\displaystyle\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Box_{*}\psi) =def𝔱2(ψ),\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Box\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi), 𝔱2(𝚜ψ)\displaystyle\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi) =def(𝚜𝔱2(ψ)),\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi)),
𝔱2(𝚜𝚜)\displaystyle\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) =def(𝚜𝚜).\displaystyle\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathtt{s}^{\prime}).

Assuming that the standpoint symbols in φ\varphi are 𝚜1,,𝚜n\mathtt{s}_{1},\ldots,\mathtt{s}_{n}, we let

χn=def1in(𝚜i)1in(𝖦𝚜𝚒𝖦¬𝚜i).\chi_{n}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\bigwedge_{1\leq i\leq n}(\Diamond\mathtt{s}_{i})\wedge\Box\bigwedge_{1\leq i\leq n}(\mathsf{G}\mathtt{s_{i}}\vee\mathsf{G}\neg\mathtt{s}_{i}).

As we show next, checking satisfiability of φ\varphi in 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} reduces to checking satisfiability of χn𝔱2(φ)\chi_{n}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi) in 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}.

Lemma 3.

φ\varphi is 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiable iff χn𝔱2(φ)\chi_{n}\!\wedge\!\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi) is 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}-satisfiable.

Proof sketch.

Assume that φ\varphi is 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satifiable, so there are an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0φ\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi. Let us build a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} model =(×W,L)\mathcal{M}^{\prime}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,L) such that W=defΠW\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Pi and L((n,σ))=defσ(n){𝚜σλ(𝚜)}L((n,\sigma^{\prime}))\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\sigma^{\prime}(n)\cup\{\mathtt{s}\mid\sigma^{\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s})\} for all (n,σ)×W(n,\sigma^{\prime})\in\mathbb{N}\times W. We show that ,(0,σ)χn𝔱2(φ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,\sigma)\models\chi_{n}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi). First, we observe that ,(0,σ)χn\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,\sigma)\models\chi_{n}. This follows from the definition of χn\chi_{n} and the fact that for all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi and for all j0j\geq 0, we have 𝚜iL((j,σ))\mathtt{s}_{i}\in L((j,\sigma^{\prime})) iff σλ(𝚜i)\sigma^{\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{i}). Second, by structural induction, we can show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi, all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi, and all jj\in\mathbb{N}, we get ,σ,jψ\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},j\models\psi iff ,(j,σ)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi). Hence ,(0,σ)χn𝔱2(φ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,\sigma)\models\chi_{n}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi).

Now, assume that there is a 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} model =(×W,L)\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N}\times W,L) and (0,w)×W(0,w)\in\mathbb{N}\times W such that ,(0,w)χn𝔱2(φ)\mathcal{M},(0,w)\models\chi_{n}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi). Let us build an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0φ\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi. As in the proof of Lemma 1, let Π\Pi consist of all traces

σw=defL((0,w)),L((1,w)),L((2,w)),L((3,w)),\sigma_{w^{\prime}}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}L((0,w^{\prime})),L((1,w^{\prime})),L((2,w^{\prime})),L((3,w^{\prime})),\ldots

with wWw^{\prime}\in W. This time, the definition of λ\lambda exploits the assumption that ,(0,w)χn\mathcal{M},(0,w)\models\chi_{n}. In particular, to define λ\lambda we let σwλ(𝚜i)\sigma_{w^{\prime}}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{i}) def\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{\;\Leftrightarrow\;}} ,(0,w)𝖦𝚜i\mathcal{M},(0,w^{\prime})\models\mathsf{G}\mathtt{s}_{i}, for all i[1,n]i\in[1,n] and wWw^{\prime}\in W. By the definition of λ\lambda and the form of χn\chi_{n}, for each 𝚜i\mathtt{s}_{i} we have λ(𝚜i)\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{i})\neq\emptyset. This guarantees that \mathcal{M} is an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model. By structural induction, we can show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi and for all (j,w)×W(j,w^{\prime})\in\mathbb{N}\times W, we have ,(j,w)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) iff ,σw,jψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},j\models\psi. Hence, ,σw,0φ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w},0\models\varphi and so φ\varphi is satisfiable in 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. ∎

As the construction of χn𝔱2(φ)\chi_{n}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi) is feasible in logarithmic-space, we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 4.

𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiability is in ExpSpace.

Together with Corollary 2 we obtain tight complexity bounds for 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, which is the main result of this section:

Theorem 5.

𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiability is ExpSpace-complete.

Logarithmic-space reductions between 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5} emphasize how close are these formalisms, a property that remained unnoticed so far. This allows us to establish the ExpSpace-completeness of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiability in a transparent way. Therefore, the analysis of the properties of the tableau-style calculus for 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} designed by Gigante et al. [20] needs, in the best case, lead to the ExpSpace upper bound.

4 PSpace Fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}

Corollary 2 can be viewed as a negative result for the usability of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} (it is of course positive in terms of knowledge about 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} properties), but as shown below, there is some room to find interesting fragments that include both 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} and 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}, but can be decided in polynomial-space. Before presenting a fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} in which satisfiability is PSpace-complete, however, we provide more intuitions behind ExpSpace-hardness of full 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. This is helpful to discard syntactic features that lead to high complexity.

4.1 Computationally challenging behaviour of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}

To obtain a better understanding of the ExpSpace-hardness of full 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and of the mismatch between our result in Section 3.1 and the PSpace bound stated by Gigante et al. [20, Theorem 28], we present a specific 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formula φC\varphi_{C} whose satisfiability is particularly hard to decide. This will also prove useful for constructing PSpace fragments of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, as they should disallow features expressing the computationally challenging behaviour of φC\varphi_{C}.

Our construction of φC\varphi_{C} exploits the following 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} formula CnC_{n}, encoding a binary counter from 0 to 2n12^{n}-1, where the propositional variables p1,,pnp_{1},\dots,p_{n} correspond to consecutive bits of the counter with p1p_{1} being the most significant bit:

(¬p1¬pn)𝖦(p1pn𝖷(¬p1¬pn))1in𝖦((¬pii<inpi)(i<in(𝖷¬pi)𝖷pi1i<i(pi𝖷pi))).(\neg p_{1}\wedge\cdots\wedge\neg p_{n})\wedge\mathsf{G}(p_{1}\wedge\cdots\wedge p_{n}\to\mathsf{X}(\neg p_{1}\wedge\cdots\wedge\neg p_{n}))\\ \wedge\bigwedge_{1\leq i\leq n}\mathsf{G}\Big{(}(\neg p_{i}\wedge\bigwedge_{i<i^{\prime}\leq n}p_{i^{\prime}})\to\big{(}\bigwedge_{i<i^{\prime}\leq n}(\mathsf{X}\neg p_{i^{\prime}})\wedge\mathsf{X}p_{i}\\ \wedge\bigwedge_{1\leq i^{\prime}<i}(p_{i^{\prime}}\leftrightarrow\mathsf{X}p_{i^{\prime}})\big{)}\Big{)}.

In every position ii of an 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} trace σ\sigma, the propositional variables p1,,pnp_{1},\dots,p_{n} encode the bits b1,,bnb_{1},\dots,b_{n} (with b1b_{1} being the most significant bit) such that bj=1b_{j}=1 iff pjσ(i)p_{j}\in\sigma(i). We write σ,i𝙲=m\sigma,i\models\mathtt{C}=m if the counter has value mm in the position ii, that is b1bnb_{1}\dots b_{n} represents the number mm. It is easy to see that if σ,iCn\sigma,i\models C_{n}, then the counter has value 0 in the position ii and in every next position this value increases by 1 until the counter reaches the value 2n12^{n}-1. If this is the case, in the next position the value is 0 and the process of counting (modulo 2n2^{n}) repeats. Hence, σ,i𝙲=0\sigma,i\models\mathtt{C}=0 and for any jij\geq i, we have σ,j𝙲=m\sigma,j\models\mathtt{C}=m^{\prime} where mji(𝗆𝗈𝖽 2n)m^{\prime}\equiv j-i\;(\mathsf{mod}\;{2^{n}}).

We use CnC_{n} to define φC=def𝖦(𝚜(Cnp𝖷𝖦¬p))\varphi_{C}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\mathsf{G}\big{(}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}(C_{n}\wedge p\wedge\mathsf{X}\mathsf{G}\neg p)\big{)} (of polynomial-size in nn). As we show next, if ,σ,0φC\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{C} for some 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda), then Π\Pi must contain infinitely many traces and for every position i>2ni>2^{n} there are exponentially many (at least 2n2^{n}) traces in Π\Pi which are pairwise different with respect to the valuation of p1,,pnp_{1},\dots,p_{n} at the position ii. The latter, in particular, seems to contradict the first paragraph of the proof of [20, Lemma 27] used to argue for PSpace satisfiability of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}.

Proposition 6.

The formula φC\varphi_{C} is 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} satisfiable. Moreover, for each 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0φC\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{C}, the following hold: (1) λ(𝚜)\lambda(\mathtt{s}) is infinite, (2) for each i>2ni>2^{n} and m{0,,2n1}m\in\{0,\dots,2^{n}-1\}, there is σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,i𝙲=m\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\mathtt{C}=m, and (3) for all positions i>2ni>2^{n}, there are σ1\sigma_{1}, …, σ2n\sigma_{2^{n}} in Π\Pi such that {σj(i){p1,,pn}j{1,,2n}}=2n.{\mid\!{\{\sigma_{j}(i)\cap\{p_{1},\ldots,p_{n}\}\mid j\in\{1,\dots,2^{n}\}\}}\!\mid}=2^{n}.

Proof.

Assume that ,σ,0φC\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{C}. Firstly, let us show that λ(𝚜)\lambda(\mathtt{s}) is necessarily infinite. Since ,σ,0𝖦(𝚜(Cnp𝖷𝖦¬p))\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\mathsf{G}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}(C_{n}\wedge p\wedge\mathsf{X}\mathsf{G}\neg p)), for each i0i\geq 0, there is a witness trace σiλ(𝚜)\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{i}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) such that ,σi,iCnp𝖷𝖦¬p\mathcal{M},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{i},i\models C_{n}\wedge p\wedge\mathsf{X}\mathsf{G}\neg p. Hence, for all i>ii^{\prime}>i, we have ,σi,i¬p\mathcal{M},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{i},i^{\prime}\models\neg p and ,σi,ip\mathcal{M},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{i^{\prime}},i^{\prime}\models p, and so, σi\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{i} is distinct from σi\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{i^{\prime}}. Consequently, {σ0,σ1,}\{\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{0},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{1},\ldots\} is an infinite set of distinct traces, all belonging to λ(𝚜)\lambda(\mathtt{s}).

To show the second item in the proposition, let i>2ni>2^{n} and let σ1,,σ2n\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{1},\ldots,\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{2^{n}} be 2n2^{n} witness traces as defined above. So, for all j{1,,2n}j\in\{1,\dots,2^{n}\}, we have ,σj,jCn\mathcal{M},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{j},j\models C_{n}. Assuming that ,σ1,i𝙲=m1\mathcal{M},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{1},i\models\mathtt{C=}m_{1} for some m1{0,,2n1}m_{1}\in\{0,\dots,2^{n}-1\}, for all j{1,,2n}j\in\{1,\dots,2^{n}\} we have ,σj,i𝙲=mj\mathcal{M},\sigma^{{\dagger}}_{j},i\models\mathtt{C=}m_{j} with mjm1+(j1)(𝗆𝗈𝖽 2n)m_{j}\equiv m_{1}+(j-1)\;(\mathsf{mod}\;{2^{n}}). Since m1,,m2nm_{1},\ldots,m_{2^{n}} are pairwise distinct, we obtain also that {σj(i){p1,,pn}j{1,,2n}}=2n{\mid\!{\{\sigma_{j}^{{\dagger}}(i)\cap\{p_{1},\ldots,p_{n}\}\mid j\in\{1,\dots,2^{n}\}\}}\!\mid}=2^{n}, and so, the third item from the proposition holds.

Let us conclude by showing that φC\varphi_{C} is satisfiable, as stated in the proposition. For this we can construct a model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) with infinitely many traces Π=def{σ0,σ1,}\Pi\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\{\sigma_{0},\sigma_{1},\ldots\} and with λ(𝚜)=defΠ\lambda(\mathtt{s})\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Pi. Each trace σjΠ\sigma_{j}\in\Pi is such that ,σj,jCnp𝖷𝖦¬p\mathcal{M},\sigma_{j},j\models C_{n}\wedge p\wedge\mathsf{X}\mathsf{G}\neg p. Note that such σj\sigma_{j} needs to exist and has a uniquely determined valuation of p,p1,,pnp,p_{1},\dots,p_{n} in all positions not smaller than jj, whereas their valuation in positions smaller than jj is irrelevant for our construction. Then, by the form of φC\varphi_{C}, we get ,σ,0φC\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{C}. ∎

Proposition 6 specifies the types of computationally hard formulae of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. In forthcoming Section 4.2, we introduce a way of restricting 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}, in which the behaviour of φC\varphi_{C} cannot be reconstructed, and which yields a PSpace-complete satisfiability problem.

4.2 Limiting the interplay between connectives

In this section we show that a PSpace upper bound for the satisfiability problem in 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} can be obtained by limiting the interplay between standpoint and temporal operators. To this end, we focus on 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} formulae which do not allow for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives occurring in the scope of standpoint modal operators; in the sequel we call this fragment 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]}. By way of example, the formula (𝖦¬𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑓𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡)\Box_{*}(\mathsf{G}\neg\mathit{Malf}\to\mathit{Test}) from Section 2.1 does not belong to 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]}. However the following is already an 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} formula: 𝖦(¬𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑓)𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡\mathsf{G}(\Box_{*}\neg\mathit{Malf})\to\Box_{*}\mathit{Test}, which states that if always in future all countries agree that a medical device does not malfunction, then all these countries agree that this device is safe according to testing. It is worth observing that the formula φC\varphi_{C} from Section 4.1, illustrating computationally challenging behaviour, does not belong to 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} (because of 𝖷𝖦\mathsf{X}\mathsf{G} in the scope of 𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}). In contrast, any formula of the form 𝖦φ1𝖦(φ2𝖷φ3)\mathsf{G}\Box_{*}\varphi_{1}\wedge\mathsf{G}(\varphi_{2}\rightarrow\mathsf{X}\varphi_{3}) where φ1,φ2,φ3\varphi_{1},\varphi_{2},\varphi_{3} are 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formulae (see Section 2.2) are in 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]}.

As we show in the remaining part of this section, we can check satisfiability of 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} formulae in PSpace by adapting the Büchi automaton construction developed for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [5, 15] and by performing model-theoretical constructions based on a refinement of the finite model property for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} (see Theorem 9).

Let us fix an 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} formula φ\varphi and let 𝒫(φ)\mathcal{P}(\varphi) be the set of propositional variables occurring in it. Let II (for ‘inequality’) be the set of subformulae of φ\varphi of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}. To check satisfiability of φ\varphi, our procedure considers all possible partitions D=(I+,I)D=(I^{+},I^{-}) of II into sets I+I^{+} and II^{-}; intuitively such a partition states that formulae in I+I^{+} are true and those in II^{-} are false. Since 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} is a global statement (either it is satisfied in all traces and all positions of a model, or it is not satisfied in any of them), its truth value can be non-deterministically guessed from the very beginning. Moreover, such a guess is feasible in PSpace since NPSpace = PSpace [30]. Given D=(I+,I)D=(I^{+},I^{-}), we encode the above intuition with the formula

χD=def𝖦((𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)(𝚜𝚜)I(𝚜p𝚜,𝚜¬𝚜p𝚜,𝚜))\chi_{D}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\mathsf{G}\left(\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\land\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\wedge\neg\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}})\right)

where each p𝚜,𝚜p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}} is a fresh propositional variable. This can be done as 𝒫\mathcal{P} is countably infinite. Note that χD\chi_{D} encodes that each 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s^{\prime}} in I+I^{+} holds true always in future and that each 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s^{\prime}} in II^{-} is always false. We also define φD=defφ[I+,I]χD\varphi_{D}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot]\wedge\chi_{D}, where φ[I+,I]\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot] is the formula obtained from φ\varphi by replacing each (𝚜𝚜)I+(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+} with \top and each (𝚜𝚜)I(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-} with \bot. Note that χD\chi_{D} is an 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} formula.

The purpose of the construction of φD\varphi_{D}, leading to Lemma 7, is to nondeterministically choose which inequalities 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} hold, and in particular to enforce the non-satisfaction of some 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} by the existence of two traces, see the formula χD\chi_{D}. Notice that 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} occurs only positively in χD\chi_{D}. In forthcoming Theorem 9, we show how to construct 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} models based on φ1\varphi_{1}, defined as a conjunction of inequalities of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}. This step is therefore instrumental to handle the inequalities 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}.

Lemma 7.

Satisfiability of φ\varphi reduces to checking if there exists a partition D=(I+,I)D=(I^{+},I^{-}) of II such that φD\varphi_{D} is satisfiable.

Therefore, in what follows we will consider an arbitrary partition D=(I+,I)D=(I^{+},I^{-}) of II, and focus on checking satisfiability of φD\varphi_{D}.

We write 𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) to denote the closure set of φD\varphi_{D} defined as the smallest set containing all the subformulae ψ\psi of φD\varphi_{D} as well as \perp and \top, which is closed under taking negations (as usually, we do not allow for double negations by identifying ¬¬ψ\neg\neg\psi with ψ\psi) and such that ψ𝖴ψ𝖼𝗅(φD)\psi\mathsf{U}\psi^{\prime}\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) implies 𝖷(ψ𝖴ψ)𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{X}(\psi\mathsf{U}\psi^{\prime})\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}). We can observe that 𝖼𝗅(φD)4φD{\mid\!{\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D})}\!\mid}\leq 4\cdot{\mid\!{\varphi_{D}}\!\mid} and the number of formulae in the set 𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}), whose outermost connective is a modality of the form 𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}} or 𝚜\Box_{\mathtt{s}}, is bounded by φD{\mid\!{\varphi_{D}}\!\mid}.

As in the standard automaton construction for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [5, 15, 16], we call a set B𝖼𝗅(φ)B\subseteq\mathsf{cl}(\varphi) maximally consistent if it satisfies the properties:

  • B\top\in B and B\perp\not\in B; ψB\psi\in B iff ¬ψB\neg\psi\notin B, for all ¬ψ𝖼𝗅(φD)\neg\psi\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}),

  • ψ1ψ2B\psi_{1}\land\psi_{2}\in B iff ψ1B\psi_{1}\in B and ψ2B\psi_{2}\in B, for all ψ1ψ2𝖼𝗅(φD)\psi_{1}\land\psi_{2}\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}),

  • ψ1𝖴ψ2B\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}\in B iff ψ2B\psi_{2}\in B or {ψ1,𝖷(ψ1𝖴ψ2)}B\{\psi_{1},\mathsf{X}(\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2})\}\subseteq B, for all ψ1𝖴ψ2𝖼𝗅(φD)\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}).

Moreover, we introduce an additional property specific to 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}; we say that BB is standpoint-consistent if the 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formula ψB𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi (we treat here 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} as the set of all well-formed 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formulae) is satisfiable in standpoint logic 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}. It is worth noting that checking standpoint-consistency is decidable and, in particular, NP-complete [22, Corollary 3] as we have discussed in Section 2.1 (see also the forthcoming Theorem 9).

We call B𝖼𝗅(φD)B\subseteq\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) s-elementary if it is maximally consistent and standpoint-consistent. We will use s-elementary sets as states of an automaton.

We are ready now to define an automaton 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} which we use for checking satisfiability of φD\varphi_{D}. We let 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} be a generalised nondeterministic Büchi automaton 𝒜φD=(𝒬,2𝒫(φD),δ,𝒬0,),\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}}=(\mathcal{Q},2^{\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D})},\delta,\mathcal{Q}_{0},\mathcal{F}), whose components are as follows:

  • the set of states, 𝒬\mathcal{Q}, consists of all s-elementary sets B𝖼𝗅(φD)B\subseteq\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}),

  • the automaton alphabet is the powerset 2𝒫(φD)2^{\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D})},

  • the set of initial states is 𝒬0={B𝒬φDB}\mathcal{Q}_{0}=\{B\in\mathcal{Q}\mid\varphi_{D}\in B\},

  • the set of accepting sets, \mathcal{F}, is the family containing for each ψ1𝖴ψ2𝖼𝗅(φD)\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) the set {B𝒬ψ1𝖴ψ2B or ψ2B},\{B\in\mathcal{Q}\mid\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}\notin B\text{ or }\psi_{2}\in B\},

  • the transition relation δ:𝒬×2𝒫(φD)2𝒬\delta:\mathcal{Q}\times 2^{\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D})}\longrightarrow 2^{\mathcal{Q}} is such that δ(B,A)=\delta(B,A)=\emptyset if AB𝒫(φD)A\neq B\cap\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D}), and otherwise δ(B,A)\delta(B,A) is the set of all s-elementary B𝖼𝗅(φD)B^{\prime}\subseteq\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) which satisfy the following condition: for each 𝖷ψ𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{X}\psi\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}), we have 𝖷ψB\mathsf{X}\psi\in B iff ψB\psi\in B^{\prime}.

In what follows we show that accepting runs of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} correspond to 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} models of φD\varphi_{D}, and so, satisfiability of φD\varphi_{D} is equivalent to nonemptiness of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} language. In the next lemma we show the first implication of this equivalence.

Lemma 8.

If φD\varphi_{D} is 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiable, then the language of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} is non-empty.

Proof sketch.

Assume that ,σ,0φD\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{D}, for some 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi. We let states B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots be such that each Bi={ψ𝖼𝗅(φD),σ,iψ}B_{i}=\{\psi\in\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D})\mid\mathcal{M},\sigma,i\models\psi\} and we let input word A0A1A_{0}A_{1}\dots be such that each Ai=Bi𝒫(φD)A_{i}=B_{i}\cap\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D}). As we will show, B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots is a run of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} on the word A0A1A_{0}A_{1}\dots, and this run is accepting. For the former statement, it suffices to observe that, by the definition, each BiB_{i} is s-elementary and Bi+1δ(Bi,Ai)B_{i+1}\in\delta(B_{i},A_{i}). To prove that the run B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots is accepting, we can show that for each accepting set FF\in\mathcal{F}, there are infinitely many ii with BiFB_{i}\in F. This follows from the standard argument used in the automaton construction for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [5, 15], since the accepting sets \mathcal{F} in our construction are defined in the same way as in the case of 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}. As B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots is an accepting run of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}}, the language of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} is non-empty. ∎

Next, we will show that the converse of Lemma 8 (forthcoming Lemma 10) holds true. This direction is more complex and requires establishing new properties for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}. Given an accepting run B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}}, we aim to construct an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model of φD\varphi_{D}. By standpoint-consistency of the BiB_{i}’s, there exists a sequence (0,π0),(1,π1),(\mathcal{M}_{0},\pi_{0}),(\mathcal{M}_{1},\pi_{1}),\ldots of pointed 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} models (i.e. pairs consisting of a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model and one of its precisifications) such that for all i0i\geq 0, we have i,πiψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\mathcal{M}_{i},\pi_{i}\models\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi. From such a sequence, we aim to construct an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σφD\mathcal{M},\sigma\models\varphi_{D}. The main challenge is to construct the set Π\Pi of traces in \mathcal{M} from the sets Π0,Π1,\Pi_{0},\Pi_{1},\ldots of precisifications in models 0,1,\mathcal{M}_{0},\mathcal{M}_{1},\dots. This task is reminiscent of known constructions of models from partial models, for instance, as developed in the mosaic method for temporal logics [25], see also [33]. However, in our case, the construction requires exploiting properties specific to 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}.

To address this challenge, we show a new model-theoretic result for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}, which is interesting on its own as, for example, it implies NP-membership of 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}-satisfiability. Our result states that the satisfiability of 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formulae can be witnessed by 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} models of a specific form and size, so it establishes a “normalised small model property” for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}. We show the result for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formulae which are relevant for our construction. In particular, for formulae of the form φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2} such that φ1\varphi_{1} is a conjunction of formulae 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} and φ2\varphi_{2} is a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formula in negation normal form with no occurrences of 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} (see the formula φD\varphi_{D} involved in Lemma 7). Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the universal standpoint * occurs in φ1\varphi_{1} (indeed, we can always add to φ1\varphi_{1} the formula *\preceq*, as it is equivalent to \top).

Our normalised small model property states that satisfiability of φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2} implies existence of some 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model of a specific form. This model has precisifications represented by pairs (S,j)(S,j) such that jj is a natural number and SS belongs to a set 𝕊\mathbb{S} defined as follows (based on the form of φ1\varphi_{1}). We let RR be the reflexive and transitive closure of the relation {(𝚜,𝚜)𝚜𝚜occurs inφ1}{(𝚜,)𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)}\{(\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\mid\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\ \mbox{occurs in}\ \varphi_{1}\}\cup\{(\mathtt{s},*)\mid\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2})\}. Hence, if (𝚜,𝚜)R(\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in R, then φ1\varphi_{1} entails 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}. We let R(𝚜)R(\mathtt{s}) be the set of all 𝚜\mathtt{s}^{\prime} such that (𝚜,𝚜)R(\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in R. Then we define the set 𝕊=def{R(𝚜)𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)}\mathbb{S}\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\{R(\mathtt{s})\mid\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2})\}. With these symbols in hand we are ready to formulate the small model property of 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}.

Theorem 9.

Let φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2} be a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}-formula of the form described above, which mentions N1N_{1} standpoint symbols and N2N_{2} occurrences of \Diamond. If φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2} is 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}-satisfiable, then for every natural number N>N1+N2N>N_{1}+N_{2} there is a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model =(Π,V)\mathcal{M}^{\star}=(\Pi^{\star},V^{\star}) such that:

  1. 1.

    Π=𝕊×{1,,N}\Pi^{\star}=\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\},

  2. 2.

    ,(S,1)φ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{\star},(S^{*},1)\models\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2} with S=R()S^{*}=R(*), and

  3. 3.

    for each (S,j)Π(S,j)\in\Pi^{\star}, it holds that S={𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)(S,j)V(𝚜)}S=\{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2})\mid(S,j)\in V^{\star}(\mathtt{s})\}.

Proof sketch.

The proof employs principles first used to show the small model property for 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5} [12, Chapter 6], for counting logics [26, Chapter 1], and for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} itself [21, Section 4.4].

Given a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model \mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}} and a precisification π\pi^{{\dagger}} such that ,πφ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, we perform four transformations to modify ,π\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}} into ,π\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star} satisfying Statements 1–3 from the theorem, where π=(S,1)\pi^{\star}=(S^{*},1). The steps are schematised below.

,π𝐄𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭,π𝐒𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐟,π𝐟𝐍𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐞𝐟𝐧,π𝐟𝐧𝐏𝐨𝐩𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞,π\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Elect\!\!}\mathcal{M},\pi\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Select\!\!}\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{f}\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Normalise\!\!}\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{fn}\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Populate\!\!}\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star}.

Let us describe briefly the objectives of each reduction.

(Elect)

The goal of transforming ,π\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}} into ,π\mathcal{M},\pi is to guarantee that the standpoint symbols labelling π\pi are exactly those in SS^{*}. At most one precisification is added to \mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}} to obtain \mathcal{M}.

(Select)

The construction of f,πf\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{f} from ,π\mathcal{M},\pi amounts to select a finite subset of precisifications from \mathcal{M} to witness the satisfaction of all the \Diamond-formulae. This step is analogous to the way the small model property is shown for the modal logic 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5}.

(Normalise)

The construction of fn,πfn\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{fn} from f,πf\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{f} guarantees that for any precisification π\pi in fn\mathcal{M}^{fn}, the set of standpoint symbols whose valuation contains π\pi, belongs to 𝕊\mathbb{S}. To do so, precisifications are “copied”, preserving the satisfaction of propositional variables but possibly updating the valuation of standpoints.

(Populate)

This step to get ,π\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star} from fn,πfn\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{fn} consists in “copying” precisifications, so that the set of precisifications can be identified with 𝕊×[1,N]\mathbb{S}\times[1,N].

It can be shown that ,π\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star} constructed in this way is possible and satisfies all Statements 1–3 from the theorem. ∎

Interestingly, as a consequence of Theorem 9, we obtain the NP-membership for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL}-satisfiability. Indeed, given a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} formula φ\varphi, it suffices to non-deterministically guess a partition D=(I+,I)D=(I^{+},I^{-}) of formulae 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in φ\varphi, and to verify satisfiability of (𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)(𝚜𝚜)I(𝚜p𝚜,𝚜¬𝚜p𝚜,𝚜)φ[I+,I]\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\land\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\wedge\neg\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}})\wedge\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot]. The form of the obtained formula allows us to apply Theorem 9. Hence, to check satisfiability, it remains to guess a model with 𝕊(N1+N2+1){\mid\!{\mathbb{S}}\!\mid}(N_{1}+N_{2}+1) precisifications. The whole procedure is in NP. Above all, Theorem 9 is a key to show the converse of Lemma 8, stated below.

Lemma 10.

If the language of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} is not non-empty, then φD\varphi_{D} is 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}-satisfiable

Proof sketch.

Assume that B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots is an accepting run of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} on a word A0A1A_{0}A_{1}\dots. We construct an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0φD\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{D}. For each ii\in\mathbb{N}, by standpoint consistency of BiB_{i}, there exists a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model i=(Πi,Vi)\mathcal{M}_{i}=(\Pi_{i},V_{i}) and a precisification πiΠi\pi_{i}\in\Pi_{i} such that i,πiψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\mathcal{M}_{i},\pi_{i}\models\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi. Each formula ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi can be written in the form φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2} assumed in Theorem 9. Indeed, the only atomic formulae of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in 𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) are those from I+I^{+}, and due to χD\chi_{D}, each 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} can occur only positively in BiB_{i} (otherwise ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi is not satisfiable). For each ii\in\mathbb{N}, the formula ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi yields RR, N1N_{1}, and N2N_{2} used in Theorem 9. Importantly, all these RR are the same, all N1𝒮(φD)N_{1}\leq{\mid\!{\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D})}\!\mid}, and all N2φD2N_{2}\leq{\mid\!{\varphi_{D}}\!\mid}^{2}. Therefore we can apply Theorem 9 with N=𝒮(φD)+φD2+1N={\mid\!{\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D})}\!\mid}+{\mid\!{\varphi_{D}}\!\mid}^{2}+1 to obtain that there are 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} models i=(Πi,Vi)\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime}=(\Pi_{i}^{\prime},V_{i}^{\prime}) such that Πi=𝕊×{1,,N}\Pi_{i}^{\prime}=\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\}, i,(S,1)ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\models\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi (with S=R()S^{*}=R(*)), and for all (S,j)Πi(S,j)\in\Pi_{i}^{\prime}, we have {𝚜𝒮(φD)(S,j)Vi(𝚜)}=S\{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D})\mid(S,j)\in V_{i}^{\prime}(\mathtt{s})\}=S. We use these models to define an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi. We let Π\Pi be {σ(S,j)(S,j)𝕊×{1,,N}}\{\sigma_{(S,j)}\mid(S,j)\in\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\}\} and λ\lambda be such that

  • for all 𝚜𝒮(φD)\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D}), σ(S,j)λ(𝚜)\sigma_{(S,j)}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) iff 𝚜S\mathtt{s}\in S,

  • for all (S,j)𝕊×{1,,N}(S,j)\in\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\}, for all k0k\geq 0, we have σ(S,j)(k)=def{p𝒫(φD)(S,j)Vk(p)}\sigma_{(S,j)}(k)\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\{p\in\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D})\mid(S,j)\in V_{k}^{\prime}(p)\}.

Finally, we let σ\sigma be σ(S,1)\sigma_{(S^{*},1)}. The construction of \mathcal{M} is schematised in Figure 1. Observe that φDB0\varphi_{D}\in B_{0}. Hence, to prove that ,σ(S,1),0φD\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},0\models\varphi_{D}, it suffices to show by structural induction that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φD\varphi_{D} and all ii\in\mathbb{N} we have ψBi\psi\in B_{i} iff ,σ(S,1),iψ\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},i\models\psi. In the basis of the induction we let ψ\psi be any subformula which does not mention 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives. Note that for such ψ\psi, the equivalence follows from the construction of i\mathcal{M}^{\prime}_{i}. Regarding the inductive step, since φ\varphi does not mention 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives in the scope of standpoint operators, the cases in the inductive steps are for Boolean and 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives only. Thus, the proof is analogous as in the case of automaton construction for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [5, 15]. ∎

σ(S1,1)λ()λ(𝚜1)¯λ(𝚜2)¯\sigma_{(S_{1},1)}\in\lambda(*)\cap\overline{\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{1})}\cap\overline{\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{2})}σ(S1,2)λ()λ(𝚜1)¯λ(𝚜2)¯\sigma_{(S_{1},2)}\in\lambda(*)\cap\overline{\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{1})}\cap\overline{\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{2})}σ(S2,1)λ()λ(𝚜1)¯λ(𝚜2)\sigma_{(S_{2},1)}\in\lambda(*)\cap\overline{\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{1})}\cap\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{2})σ(S2,2)λ()λ(𝚜1)¯λ(𝚜2)\sigma_{(S_{2},2)}\in\lambda(*)\cap\overline{\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{1})}\cap\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{2})σ(S3,1)λ()λ(𝚜1)λ(𝚜2)\sigma_{(S_{3},1)}\in\lambda(*)\cap\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{1})\cap\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{2})σ(S3,2)λ()λ(𝚜1)λ(𝚜2)\sigma_{(S_{3},2)}\in\lambda(*)\cap\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{1})\cap\lambda(\mathtt{s}_{2})S1,1S_{1},1p,qp,qψ0\models\psi_{0}S1,2S_{1},2qqS2,1S_{2},1rrS2,2S_{2},2S3,1S_{3},1ppS3,2S_{3},2qqS1,1S_{1},1r,qr,qψ1\models\psi_{1}S1,2S_{1},2qqS2,1S_{2},1rrS2,2S_{2},2p,q,rp,q,rS3,1S_{3},1S3,2S_{3},2p,qp,qS1,1S_{1},1qqψ2\models\psi_{2}S1,2S_{1},2q,rq,rS2,1S_{2},1rrS2,2S_{2},2rrS3,1S_{3},1p,q,rp,q,rS3,2S_{3},2qqS1,1S_{1},1p,rp,rψ3\models\psi_{3}S1,2S_{1},2p,qp,qS2,1S_{2},1p,rp,rS2,2S_{2},2p,qp,qS3,1S_{3},1qqS3,2S_{3},2pp0\mathcal{M}_{0}^{\prime}1\mathcal{M}_{1}^{\prime}2\mathcal{M}_{2}^{\prime}3\mathcal{M}_{3}^{\prime}
Figure 1: Construction of \mathcal{M} from i\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime}’s with N=2N=2, S=S1={}S^{*}=S_{1}=\{*\}, S2={,𝚜2}S_{2}=\{*,\mathtt{s}_{2}\}, S3={,𝚜2,𝚜1}S_{3}=\{*,\mathtt{s}_{2},\mathtt{s}_{1}\}, and ψi=ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\psi_{i}=\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi

Lemmas 8 and 10 allow us to reduce the satisfiability of φD\varphi_{D} to checking the nonemptiness of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} language. This, as we show next, leads to tight PSpace complexity bound for satisfiability checking.

Theorem 11.

𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]}-satisfiability problem is PSpace-complete.

Proof.

The lower bound is from the fact that 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} is a syntactic fragment of 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} and is already PSpace-hard [31, Theorem 4.1]. For the upper bound, assume that we want to check if φ\varphi is satisfiable. Our procedure starts by guessing a partition DD of subformulae of φ\varphi of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} (in nondeterministic polynomial-time), and constructing the formula φD\varphi_{D}. By Lemma 7, it remains to check if φD\varphi_{D} is satisfiable. This, however, by Lemmas 8 and 10, reduces to checking if the language of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} is non-empty. The size (number of states) of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} is exponentially large, but similarly as in the automata construction for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}, we can use an “on the fly” approach to check in PSpace non-emptiness of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} language [5, 15]. The difference between our procedure and the standard one for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} is that we need to check if each constructed ‘on the fly’ state BiB_{i} of the automaton is standpoint-consistent. This, however, is feasible in NP due to NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} [22]. ∎

As a corollary of the proof, we obtain also the following result.

Corollary 12.

If an 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} formula φ\varphi is satisfiable, it is satisfied in an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model with polynomially many (in the size of φ\varphi) traces.

5 Concluding Remarks

We studied the computational properties of standpoint linear temporal logic 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL}. First, we proved that its satisfiability problem is ExpSpace-complete, contrary to the PSpace bound claimed recently in [20, Theorem 28]. To show this result, we designed reductions between 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and the multi-dimensional modal logic 𝖯𝖳𝖫𝗑𝖲𝟧\mathsf{PTLxS5}. Furthermore, we proposed a fragment of 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} which has PSpace-complete satisfiability problem, as 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [20]. This fragment disallows occurrences of temporal connectives in the scope of standpoint connectives; to show that the satisfiability problem for its formulae is in PSpace, we followed the automata-based approach [32] (similar to the well-known technique for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL}) but for which correctness requires to prove a new model-theoretic property about 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} (Theorem 9) that we find interesting for its own sake. In future it would be also interesting to implement practical decision procedures for 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} and for the PSpace fragment we have introduced, apart from studying its expressive power.

{ack}

We thank the referees for suggestions that help us to improve the quality of the document. Special thanks to the referee who pointed us to [8]. Przemysław A Wałęga was supported by the EPSRC projects OASIS (EP/S032347/1), ConCuR (EP/V050869/1) and UK FIRES (EP/S019111/1), as well as SIRIUS Centre for Scalable Data Access and Samsung Research UK.

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Technical Appendix

Due of lack of space, this technical appendix is dedicated to the proofs that could not included in the body of the paper.

Appendix A Proof details for Section 3

A.1 Proof details for Lemma 1

Proof.

In the main body of the paper, to show the first implication we defined a model \mathcal{M}^{\prime} and claimed that, by structural induction, we can show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi and for all (n,w)×W(n,w^{\prime})\in\mathbb{N}\times W, we have ,(n,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\psi iff ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi). We considered only one case of the induction, for a subformulae of the form ψ\Box\psi. Now, we will present all the remaining cases.

First, we observe that the basis of the induction, when ψ\psi is a propositional variable, follows directly from the definition of \mathcal{M}^{\prime}. The inductive steps for subformulae of the forms ¬ψ\neg\psi and ψ1ψ2\psi_{1}\land\psi_{2}, follow directly from the inductive assumption. Hence, it remains to consider the cases for subformulae of the forms ψ\Diamond\psi, 𝖷ψ\mathsf{X}\psi, and ψ1𝖴ψ2\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}. For ψ\Diamond\psi it suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:

  • ,(n,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\Diamond\psi

  • ,(n,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime\prime})\models\psi for some wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) for some wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) for some σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi (by definition of Π\Pi)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\Diamond_{*}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\Diamond\psi) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

For the case 𝖷ψ\mathsf{X}\psi, it suffices to observe that the statements below are equivalent:

  • ,(n,w)𝖷ψ\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\mathsf{X}\psi

  • ,(n+1,w)ψ\mathcal{M},(n+1,w^{\prime})\models\psi (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n+1𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n+1\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,σw,n𝖷𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathsf{X}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(𝖷ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\mathsf{X}\psi) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

Finally, for the case ψ1𝖴ψ2\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}, it suffices to observe that the statements below are equivalent:

  • ,(n,w)ψ1𝖴ψ2\mathcal{M},(n,w^{\prime})\models\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}

  • There is nnn^{\prime}\geq n such that ,(n,w)ψ2\mathcal{M},(n^{\prime},w^{\prime})\models\psi_{2} and for all nn<nn\leq n^{\prime\prime}<n^{\prime}, we have ,(n,w)ψ1\mathcal{M},(n^{\prime\prime},w^{\prime})\models\psi_{1} (by definition of \models)

  • There is nnn^{\prime}\geq n such that ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ2)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n^{\prime}\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{2}) and for all nn<nn\leq n^{\prime\prime}<n^{\prime}, we have ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ1)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n^{\prime\prime}\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{1}) (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ1)𝖴𝔱1(ψ2)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{1})\mathsf{U}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{2}) (by definition of \models)

  • ,σw,n𝔱1(ψ1𝖴ψ2)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

Therefore, we obtain that ,σw,0𝔱1(φ)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{w},0\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\varphi).

For the second implication in the lemma we claimed that we can show, by structural induction, that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi, all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi, and all nn\in\mathbb{N}, we have ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) iff ,(n,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime})\models\psi. However, we showed only how to handle the case with formulas ψ1𝖴ψ2\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2}. Now we will cover the remaining cases.

The basis of the induction, when ψ\psi is a propositional variable, follows directly from the definition of \mathcal{M}^{\prime} and the inductive steps for subformulae of the forms ¬ψ\neg\psi and ψ1ψ2\psi_{1}\land\psi_{2}, follow directly from the inductive assumption. Since the inductive step for ψ1𝖴ψ2\psi_{1}\mathsf{U}\psi_{2} is shown in the main body of the paper, it remains to consider the cases for subformulae of the forms ψ\Diamond\psi, ψ\Box\psi, and 𝖷ψ\mathsf{X}\psi. For ψ\Diamond\psi it suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\Diamond\psi)

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\Diamond_{*}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) for some σΠ\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi (by definition of \models)

  • ,(n,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\psi for some σW\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in W (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,(n,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime})\models\Diamond\psi (by definition of \models)

For ψ\Box\psi we observe that the following statements are equivalent:

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\Box\psi)

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\Box_{*}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) for all σΠ\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi (by definition of \models)

  • ,(n,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\psi for all σW\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in W (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,(n,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime})\models\Box\psi (by definition of \models)

Finally, for 𝖷ψ\mathsf{X}\psi the following are equivalent:

  • ,σ,n𝔱1(𝖷ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\mathsf{X}\psi)

  • ,σ,n𝖷𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n\models\mathsf{X}\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of 𝔱1\mathfrak{t}_{1})

  • ,σ,n+1𝔱1(ψ)\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},n+1\models\mathfrak{t}_{1}(\psi) (by definition of \models)

  • ,(n+1,σ)ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n+1,\sigma^{\prime})\models\psi (by induction hypothesis)

  • ,(n,σ)𝖷ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(n,\sigma^{\prime})\models\mathsf{X}\psi (by definition of \models)

Consequently, ,(0,σ)φ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,\sigma)\models\varphi. ∎

A.2 Proof details for Lemma 3

Proof.

In the proof sketch, to show the first implication, we claim that by structural induction we can show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi, all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi, and all jj\in\mathbb{N}, we have ,σ,jψ\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},j\models\psi iff ,(j,σ)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi). Indeed, if ψ\psi is a propositional variable, then the equivalence holds by the definition of \mathcal{M}^{\prime}. If ψ\psi is of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}, then we observe that the following are equivalent:

  • ,σ,j𝚜𝚜\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},j\models\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}

  • λ(𝚜)λ(𝚜)\lambda(\mathtt{s})\subseteq\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) (by definition of \models)

  • σλ(𝚜)\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) implies σλ(𝚜)\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) for all σΠ\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi (by set-theoretical reasoning)

  • 𝚜L((j,σ))\mathtt{s}\in L((j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})) implies 𝚜L((j,σ))\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in L((j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})) for all σW\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \mathcal{M}^{\prime})

  • ,(j,σ)𝚜𝚜\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\mathtt{s}\to\mathtt{s}^{\prime} for all σW\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \models)

  • ,(j,σ)(𝚜𝚜)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) (by definition of 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2})

  • ,(j,σ)𝔱2(𝚜𝚜)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})

Hence, the basis of the induction holds.

The inductive steps for formulae ¬ψ\neg\psi and ψ1ψ2\psi_{1}\land\psi_{2}, hold directly by the inductive assumption. It remains to consider inductive steps for formulae of the forms ψ\Diamond_{*}\psi, ψ\Box{*}\psi, 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi, and 𝚜ψ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. For formulae of the form 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi the equivalence holds because the statements below are equivalent:

  • ,σ,j𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},j\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi

  • ,σ,jψ\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime\prime},j\models\psi for some σλ(𝚜)\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) (by definition of \models)

  • ,(j,σ)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) and ,(j,σ)𝚜\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\mathtt{s} for some σW\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in W  (by induction hypothesis and 𝚜L((n,σ))\mathtt{s}\in L((n,\sigma^{\prime\prime})), respectively)

  • ,(j,σ)(𝚜𝔱2(ψ))\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\Diamond(\mathtt{s}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi)) (by definition of \models)

  • ,(j,σ)𝔱2(𝚜(ψ))\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}(\psi)) (by definition of 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2})

For formulae of the form 𝚜ψ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi the equivalence holds since the following are equivalent:

  • ,σ,j𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime},j\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi

  • ,σ,jψ\mathcal{M},\sigma^{\prime\prime},j\models\psi for all σλ(𝚜)\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) (by definition of \models)

  • ,(j,σ)𝚜\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\mathtt{s} implies ,(j,σ)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) for all σW\sigma^{\prime\prime}\in W  (by induction hypothesis and 𝚜L((n,σ))\mathtt{s}\in L((n,\sigma^{\prime\prime})))

  • ,(j,σ)(𝚜𝔱2(ψ))\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi)) (by definition of \models)

  • ,(j,σ)𝔱2(𝚜(ψ))\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(j,\sigma^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Box_{\mathtt{s}}(\psi)) (by definition of 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2})

The cases for ψ\Diamond_{*}\psi and ψ\Box_{*}\psi are analogous (and even simpler) than the above showed cases for 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi and 𝚜ψ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi, respectively. Consequently, ,(0,σ)χn𝔱2(φ)\mathcal{M}^{\prime},(0,\sigma)\models\chi_{n}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\varphi).

For the second implication, we claimed in the proof sketch that, by structural induction, one can show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ\varphi and for all (j,w)×W(j,w^{\prime})\in\mathbb{N}\times W, we have ,(j,w)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) iff ,σw,jψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},j\models\psi. If ψ\psi is a propositional variable, then the equivalence holds by the definition of \mathcal{M}^{\prime}. If ψ\psi is of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}, then we observe that the statements below are equivalent:

  • ,(j,w)𝔱2(𝚜𝚜)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})

  • ,(j,w)(𝚜𝚜)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) (by definition of 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2})

  • ,(j,w)𝚜𝚜\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathtt{s}\to\mathtt{s}^{\prime} for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \models)

  • ,(0,w)𝖦𝚜𝖦𝚜\mathcal{M},(0,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathsf{G}\mathtt{s}\to\mathsf{G}\mathtt{s}^{\prime} for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by ,(0,w)χn\mathcal{M},(0,w)\models\chi_{n})

  • σwλ(𝚜)\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) implies σwλ(𝚜)\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of λ\lambda)

  • σλ(𝚜)\sigma^{\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) implies σλ(𝚜)\sigma^{\prime}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) for all σΠ\sigma^{\prime}\in\Pi (by definition of Π\Pi)

  • λ(𝚜)λ(𝚜)\lambda(\mathtt{s})\subseteq\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) (by set-theoretical reasoning)

  • ,σw,j𝚜𝚜\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},j\models\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} (by definition of \models)

Therefore, the basis of the induction holds.

The inductive steps for formulae ¬ψ\neg\psi and ψ1ψ2\psi_{1}\land\psi_{2}, hold directly by the inductive assumption. It remains to consider inductive steps for formulae of the forms ψ\Diamond_{*}\psi, ψ\Box{*}\psi, 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi, and 𝚜ψ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. For formulae of the form 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi the equivalence holds because the statements below are equivalent:

  • ,(j,w)𝔱2(𝚜ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi)

  • ,(j,w)(𝚜𝔱2(ψ))\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\Diamond(\mathtt{s}\wedge\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi)) (by definition of 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2})

  • ,(j,w)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) and ,(j,w)𝚜\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathtt{s} for some wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \models)

  • ,(j,w)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) and ,(0,w)𝖦𝚜\mathcal{M},(0,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathsf{G}\mathtt{s} for some wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by ,(0,w)χn\mathcal{M},(0,w)\models\chi_{n})

  • ,σw,jψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}},j\models\psi for some σwλ(𝚜)\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s})  (by induction hypothesis and definition of λ\lambda, respectively)

  • ,σw,j𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},j\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi (by definition of \models)

For formulae of the form 𝚜ψ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi the equivalence holds since the following are equivalent:

  • ,(j,w)𝔱2(𝚜ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi)

  • ,(j,w)(𝚜𝔱2(ψ))\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime})\models\Box(\mathtt{s}\to\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi)) (by definition of 𝔱2\mathfrak{t}_{2})

  • ,(j,w)𝚜\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathtt{s} implies ,(j,w)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by definition of \models)

  • ,(0,w)𝖦𝚜\mathcal{M},(0,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathsf{G}\mathtt{s} implies ,(j,w)𝔱2(ψ)\mathcal{M},(j,w^{\prime\prime})\models\mathfrak{t}_{2}(\psi) for all wWw^{\prime\prime}\in W (by ,(0,w)χn\mathcal{M},(0,w)\models\chi_{n})

  • ,σw,jψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}},j\models\psi for all σwλ(𝚜)\sigma_{w^{\prime\prime}}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s})  (by induction hypothesis and definition of λ\lambda, respectively)

  • ,σw,j𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{\prime},\sigma_{w^{\prime}},j\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi (by definition of \models)

The cases for ψ\Diamond_{*}\psi and ψ\Box_{*}\psi are analogous (and even simpler) than the above showed cases for 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi and 𝚜ψ\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi, respectively. ∎

Appendix B Proof details for Lemma 7

Proof.

Let us fix an 𝖫𝖳𝖫[𝖯𝖲𝖫]\mathsf{LTL[PSL]} formula φ\varphi and let II be the set of all subformulae of φ\varphi of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}. To prove the lemma it suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:

  • φ\varphi is satisfiable

  • ,σ,0φ\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi for some =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi (by definition of satisfiability)

  • ,σ,0φ[I+,I]((𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)(𝚜𝚜)I(¬𝚜𝚜))\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot]\wedge\left(\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\land\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\neg\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\right) for some =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda), σΠ\sigma\in\Pi, and partition (I+,I)(I^{+},I^{-}) of II (since each 𝚜𝚜I\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in I holds in some σ,i\sigma^{\prime},i iff it holds in all σ,i\sigma^{\prime},i)

  • ,σ,0φ[I+,I]χD\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot]\wedge\chi_{D} for some =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda), σΠ\sigma\in\Pi, and partition DD of II (by definition of χD\chi_{D} and definition of an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model)

  • ,σ,0φD\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{D} for some =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda), σΠ\sigma\in\Pi, and partition DD of II (by definition of φD\varphi_{D})

  • φD\varphi_{D} is satisfiable for some partition DD of II (by definition of satisfiability)

Appendix C Proof details for Theorem 9

In Section 2, a model for 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} is defined as a pair =(Π,V)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,V) where Π\Pi is a finite non-empty set of precisifications and V:𝒮𝒫2ΠV:\mathcal{S}\cup\mathcal{P}\to 2^{\Pi} (understood as a valuation). Below, we adopt an alternative formulation (known to be equivalent when passing from valuations to labellings) that is more practical to write a few expressions below. We use models of the form (Π,L)(\Pi,L) where L:Π2𝒮𝒫L:\Pi\longrightarrow 2^{\mathcal{S}\cup\mathcal{P}} is a labelling such that for all 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}, we have 𝚜πΠL(π)\mathtt{s}\in\bigcup_{\pi\in\Pi}L(\pi) and {πΠL(π)}=Π\{\pi\in\Pi\mid*\in L(\pi)\}=\Pi (counterpart of V(𝚜)V(\mathtt{s})\neq\emptyset for all 𝚜\mathtt{s} and V()=ΠV(*)=\Pi).

Proof.

Suppose that φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2} is satisfiable. Consequently, there is a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model =(Π,L)\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}}=(\Pi^{{\dagger}},L^{{\dagger}}) and πΠ\pi^{{\dagger}}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}} such that

,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2.\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}.

The satisfaction of ,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)} is due to the fact that for all 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}, there is π𝚜Π\pi_{\mathtt{s}}\in\Pi such that 𝚜L(π𝚜)\mathtt{s}\in L^{{\dagger}}(\pi_{\mathtt{s}}).

We perform four transformations to modify ,π\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}} into ,π\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star} satisfying Statements 1–3 from the theorem, where π=(S,1)\pi^{\star}=(S^{*},1). The steps are schematised below.

,π𝐄𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭,π𝐒𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐟,π𝐟𝐍𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐬𝐞𝐟𝐧,π𝐟𝐧𝐏𝐨𝐩𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐞,π\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Elect\!\!}\mathcal{M},\pi\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Select\!\!}\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{f}\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Normalise\!\!}\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{fn}\xrightarrow{\!\!\bf Populate\!\!}\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star}.

Let us describe briefly the objectives of each reduction.

(Elect)

The goal of transforming ,π\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}} into ,π\mathcal{M},\pi is to guarantee that the standpoint symbols labelling π\pi are exactly those in SS^{*}. At most one precisification is added to \mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}} to obtain \mathcal{M}.

(Select)

The construction of f,πf\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{f} from ,π\mathcal{M},\pi amounts to select a finite subset of precisifications from \mathcal{M} to witness the satisfaction of all the \Diamond-formulae. This step is analogous to the way the small model property is shown for the modal logic 𝖲𝟧\mathsf{S5}.

(Normalise)

The construction of fn,πfn\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{fn} from f,πf\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{f} guarantees that for any precisification π\pi in fn\mathcal{M}^{fn}, the set of standpoint symbols whose valuation contains π\pi, belongs to 𝕊\mathbb{S}. To do so, precisifications are “copied”, preserving the satisfaction of propositional variables but possibly updating the valuation of standpoints.

(Populate)

This step to get ,π\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star} from fn,πfn\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{fn} consists in “copying” precisifications, so that the set of precisifications can be identified with 𝕊×[1,N]\mathbb{S}\times[1,N].

Here are the details of the transformations as well as the formal justifications.

(Elect) We perform a preliminary step related to SS^{*} so that the standpoint symbols holding at the witness precisification are precisely those in SS^{*} (in the process of transforming the model, π\pi^{{\dagger}} becomes π\pi). In the case L(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)SL^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{{\dagger}})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})\neq S^{*} (necessarily SL(π)S^{*}\subseteq L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{{\dagger}}) because ,πφ1\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\varphi_{1}), we build a new model =(Π,L)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,L) from \mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}} with a new precisification π\pi (i.e. Π=defΠ{π}\Pi\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\Pi^{{\dagger}}\uplus\{\pi\}) such that L(π)=defSL(π)𝒫(π)L(\pi)\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}S^{*}\cup L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{{\dagger}})\cap\mathcal{P}(\pi^{{\dagger}}) (π\pi and π\pi^{{\dagger}} agree on the propositional variables) and LL and LL^{{\dagger}} agree on Π\Pi^{{\dagger}}. If L(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)=SL^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{{\dagger}})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})=S^{*}, then \mathcal{M} is equal to \mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}}, and π\pi to π\pi^{{\dagger}}. For all subformulae ψ\psi of (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, for all πΠ\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}}, we have ,πψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi implies ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi, and ,πψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\psi implies ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi\models\psi. Consequently, ,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M},\pi\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}. Indeed, let us check carefully each conjunct.

  • ,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)\mathcal{M},\pi\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)} because for all 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}, there is π𝚜ΠΠ\pi_{\mathtt{s}}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}}\subseteq\Pi such that 𝚜L(π𝚜)=L(π𝚜)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi_{\mathtt{s}})=L^{{\dagger}}(\pi_{\mathtt{s}}).

  • For all 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in φ1\varphi_{1}, for all πΠ\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}}, we have 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi^{\prime}) implies 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{\prime}) (L(π)=L(π)L(\pi^{\prime})=L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{\prime})), 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{\prime}) (by ,πφ1\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\varphi_{1}), 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in L(\pi^{\prime}) (L(π)=L(π)L(\pi^{\prime})=L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{\prime})). Similarly, for all 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in φ1\varphi_{1}, 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi) (for the unique πΠΠ\pi\in\Pi\setminus\Pi^{{\dagger}} if any) implies 𝚜S\mathtt{s}\in S^{*} by definition of L(π)L(\pi). Consequently, there is a sequence of relations 𝚜1,,𝚜n1𝚜n*\preceq\mathtt{s}_{1},\ldots,\mathtt{s}_{n-1}\preceq\mathtt{s}_{n} in φ1\varphi_{1} with 𝚜n=𝚜\mathtt{s}_{n}=\mathtt{s}. Hence, 𝚜S\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in S^{*} too and therefore by definition of L(π)L(\pi), we also get 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in L(\pi). Hence, ,πφ1\mathcal{M},\pi\models\varphi_{1}.

  • In order to show ,πφ2\mathcal{M},\pi\models\varphi_{2}, we need to show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ2\varphi_{2}, for all πΠ\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}}, we have ,πψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi implies ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi, and ,πψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\models\psi implies ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi\models\psi. This can be done by structural induction. The base case with literals is easy as well as the cases in the induction step with the Boolean connectives \vee and \wedge. By way of example, here are a few more cases.

    • Suppose that ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. There is πΠ\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}} such that 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{\prime\prime}) and ,πψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. By definition of LL and by the induction hypothesis, we get 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi^{\prime\prime}) and ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. Consequently, ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi.

    • Suppose that ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime}\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. For all πΠ\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}} such that 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{\prime\prime}), we have ,πψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. Hence, by the induction hypothesis and by definition of LL, for all πΠ\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi^{{\dagger}} such that 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi^{\prime\prime}), we have ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. Ad absurdum, suppose that 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi) and ,π⊧̸ψ\mathcal{M},\pi\not\models\psi. By the induction hypothesis, ,π⊧̸ψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\not\models\psi. Since S=L(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)L(π)S^{*}=L(\pi)\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})\subseteq L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{{\dagger}}), we get ,π⊧̸ψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{{\dagger}}\not\models\psi and 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{{\dagger}}(\pi^{{\dagger}}), which leads to a contradiction with ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{{\dagger}},\pi^{\prime}\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. Hence, for all πΠ\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi such that 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi^{\prime\prime}), we have ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi.

(Select) Now, we build a finite model f=(Πf,Lf)\mathcal{M}^{f}=(\Pi^{f},L^{f}) from \mathcal{M} such that ΠfN1+N2+1{\mid\!{\Pi^{f}}\!\mid}\leq N_{1}+N_{2}+1 (and therefore Πf\Pi^{f} is finite, that is why we use the superscript ‘ff’) and ΠfΠ\Pi^{f}\subseteq\Pi, πΠf\pi\in\Pi^{f} and f,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}. In a way, in order to define Πf\Pi^{f}, we identify a relevant set of witness precisifications from Π\Pi. Before providing the construction, note that for any subformula 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi in (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, the propositions below are equivalent:

  • for some πΠ\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi, we have ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi,

  • for all πΠ\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi, we have ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi.

Indeed, 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi can be understood as a global statement about \mathcal{M} and does not depend on the precisification π\pi^{\prime} where it is evaluated. A similar property holds holds true for the subformulae of the form 𝚜\Box_{\mathtt{s}}. Let XX the set of subformulae of (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2} of the form 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi such that ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\pi\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. Remember that φ2\varphi_{2} is in negation normal form. Furthermore, the conjunct (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)} makes explicit the fact that each standpoint symbol 𝚜\mathtt{s} has at least one precisification. For each formula 𝚜ψ\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi in XX, we pick a precisification in \mathcal{M}, say π𝚜ψΠ\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}\in\Pi such that 𝚜L(π𝚜ψ)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}) and ,π𝚜ψψ\mathcal{M},\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}\models\psi. The set Πf\Pi^{f} is defined as the set below:

{π}{π𝚜ψ𝚜ψX}.\{\pi\}\cup\{\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}\mid\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi\in X\}.

Note that ΠfN1+N2+1{\mid\!{\Pi^{f}}\!\mid}\leq N_{1}+N_{2}+1. We write LfL^{f} to denote the restriction of LL to the set Πf\Pi^{f}. One can show by structural induction that for all πΠf\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{f}, for all subformulae ψ\psi of (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, we have ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi implies f,πψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi. Consequently, f,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}. Indeed, let us check carefully each conjunct.

  • f,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)} because for all 𝚜𝒮\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}, there is π𝚜ΠfΠ\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top}\in\Pi^{f}\subseteq\Pi such that 𝚜Lf(π𝚜)=L(π𝚜)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top})=L(\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top}).

  • For all 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in φ1\varphi_{1}, for all πΠf\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{f}, we have 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\prime}) implies 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi^{\prime}) (Lf(π)=L(π)L^{f}(\pi^{\prime})=L(\pi^{\prime})), 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in L(\pi^{\prime}) (by ,πφ1\mathcal{M},\pi\models\varphi_{1}), 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\prime}) (Lf(π)=L(π)L^{f}(\pi^{\prime})=L(\pi^{\prime})).

  • In order to show f,πφ2\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi\models\varphi_{2}, we need to show that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ2\varphi_{2}, for all πΠf\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{f}, we have ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi implies f,πψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi. This can be done by structural induction. The base case with literals is easy as well as the cases in the induction step with the Boolean connectives \vee and \wedge. By way of example, here are a few more cases.

    • Suppose that ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. There is π𝚜ψΠ\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}\in\Pi such that 𝚜L(π𝚜ψ)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}) and ,π𝚜ψψ\mathcal{M},\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}\models\psi. By definition of LfL^{f} and by the induction hypothesis, we get 𝚜Lf(π𝚜ψ)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}) and f,π𝚜ψψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi_{\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi}\models\psi. Consequently, f,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi.

    • Suppose that ,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime}\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. For all πΠ\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi such that 𝚜L(π)\mathtt{s}\in L(\pi^{\prime\prime}), we have ,πψ\mathcal{M},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. By the induction hypothesis and since ΠfΠ\Pi^{f}\subseteq\Pi, for all πΠf\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi^{f} such that 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime}), we have f,πψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. Consequently, f,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi.

(Normalise) From f\mathcal{M}^{f}, we build a larger model fn=(Πfn,Lfn)\mathcal{M}^{fn}=(\Pi^{fn},L^{fn}) towards the satisfaction of the condition (3.) (the superscript ‘fnfn’ is intended to mean ‘finite and normalised’). Given πΠf\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{f}, there is S𝕊S\in\mathbb{S} such that SLf(π)S\subseteq L^{f}(\pi^{\prime}) (by satisfaction of φ1\varphi_{1} in f\mathcal{M}^{f}). Indeed, we recall that 𝕊={R(𝚜)𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)}\mathbb{S}=\{R(\mathtt{s})\mid\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2})\} and for all πΠf\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{f}, Lf(π)L^{f}(\pi^{\prime})\neq\emptyset. Since f,πφ1\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi\models\varphi_{1}, if 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\prime}), then 𝕊R(𝚜)Lf(π)\mathbb{S}\ni R(\mathtt{s})\subseteq L^{f}(\pi^{\prime}). If S=Lf(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)S=L^{f}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}), then we keep π\pi^{\prime} in Πfn\Pi^{fn} (and π\pi^{\prime} is understood of the first copy of itself in fn\mathcal{M}^{fn}). Otherwise, let S1,,SS_{1},\ldots,S_{\ell} be the set of all strict subsets of Lf(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)L^{f}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}) in 𝕊\mathbb{S}. Note that N1\ell\leq N_{1}. From f\mathcal{M}^{f} to fn\mathcal{M}^{fn}, we replace π\pi^{\prime} by \ell new copies π1,,π\pi^{\prime}_{1},\ldots,\pi^{\prime}_{\ell} such that all i{1,,}i\in\{1,\dots,\ell\}, Lfn(πi)=defSiLf(π)𝒫(φ1φ2)L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime}_{i})\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}S_{i}\cup L^{f}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}). Two distinct copies πi\pi^{\prime}_{i} and πj\pi^{\prime}_{j} agree on the interpretation of the propositional variables from 𝒫(φ2)\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{2}) but may differ on the interpretation of the standpoint symbols. One can show by structural induction that for all πΠf\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{f}, for all copies πi\pi^{\prime}_{i}, for all subformulae ψ\psi of (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, we have f,πψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi implies fn,πiψ\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{\prime}_{i}\models\psi. This can be done by structural induction. The base case with literals is easy as well as the cases in the induction step with the Boolean connectives \vee and \wedge. By way of example, here are a few more cases.

  • Suppose that f,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. There is πΠf\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi^{f} such that 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime}) and f,πψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. If Lf(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)𝕊L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})\in\mathbb{S}, then by the induction hypothesis fn,π1ψ\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{\prime\prime}_{1}\models\psi and Lf(π)=Lfn(π)L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime})=L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime\prime}). Otherwise, let S1,,SS_{1},\ldots,S_{\ell} be the set of all strict subsets of Lf(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}) in 𝕊\mathbb{S}. We have S1S=Lf(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)S_{1}\cup\cdots\cup S_{\ell}=L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}). Let ii be such that 𝚜Si\mathtt{s}\in S_{i}. Consequently, by the induction hypothesis, fn,πiψ\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{\prime\prime}_{i}\models\psi and 𝚜Lfn(πi)\mathtt{s}\in L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime\prime}_{i}). Hence, in all cases, fn,πj𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{\prime}_{j}\models\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\psi for any jj (jj depending on π\pi^{\prime}).

  • Suppose that f,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi. For all πΠf\pi^{\prime\prime}\in\Pi^{f} such that 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\prime\prime}), we have f,πψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime\prime}\models\psi. Ad absurdum, suppose that not fn,πjψ\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{\circ}_{j}\models\psi for some πjΠfn\pi^{\circ}_{j}\in\Pi^{fn}, πΠf\pi^{\circ}\in\Pi^{f} and 𝚜Lfn(πj)Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{fn}(\pi^{\circ}_{j})\cap L^{f}(\pi^{\circ}). By the induction hypothesis, f,π⊧̸ψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\circ}\not\models\psi. Since 𝚜Lf(π)\mathtt{s}\in L^{f}(\pi^{\circ}), this leads to a contradiction with f,π𝚜ψ\mathcal{M}^{f},\pi^{\prime}\models\Box_{\mathtt{s}}\psi.

Observe for all πΠfn\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{fn}, we have Lfn(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)𝕊L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})\in\mathbb{S}. Moreover, for all S𝕊S\in\mathbb{S},

1{πΠfn:Lfn(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)=S}N1+N2+1.1\leq{\mid\!{\{\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{fn}:L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})=S\}}\!\mid}\leq N_{1}+N_{2}+1.

(Populate) Finally, we may need to add extra copies of precisifications from fn\mathcal{M}^{fn} to get the desired final model =(Π,L)\mathcal{M}^{\star}=(\Pi^{\star},L^{\star}). Assuming π1\pi_{1} is the first copy of the initial precisification π\pi satisfying ,π(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M},\pi\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, we have fn,π1(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi_{1}\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2} and Lfn(π1)𝒮(φ1φ2)=SL^{fn}(\pi_{1})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})=S^{*}

We recall that NN from the statement of Theorem 9 is a natural number strictly greater than N1+N2N_{1}+N_{2}. For all S𝕊S\in\mathbb{S}, if

N{πΠfn:Lfn(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)=S}=K>0,N-{\mid\!{\{\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{fn}:L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})=S\}}\!\mid}=K>0,

we pick one element π\pi^{\prime} in the above-mentioned set, and we copy it KK times leading to the additional precisifications π1,,πK\pi^{\star}_{1},\ldots,\pi^{\star}_{K} such that for all i{1,,K}i\in\{1,\dots,K\}, L(πi)=defSLfn(π)𝒫(φ1φ2)L^{\star}(\pi^{\star}_{i})\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}S\cup L^{fn}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}). The set Π\Pi^{\star} is made of the elements of Πfn\Pi^{fn} plus the additional precisifications. One can check that for all S𝕊S\in\mathbb{S}, there are exactly NN precisifications in {πΠ:L(π)𝒮(φ1φ2)=S}\{\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{\star}:L^{\star}(\pi^{\prime})\cap\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})=S\} and ,π1(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi_{1}\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}. Indeed, as shown above, we can show that for all πΠfn\pi^{\prime}\in\Pi^{fn}, for all copies πi\pi^{\star}_{i}, for all subformulae ψ\psi of (𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}, we have fn,πψ\mathcal{M}^{fn},\pi^{\prime}\models\psi implies ,πiψ\mathcal{M}^{\star},\pi^{\star}_{i}\models\psi. The cases for 𝚜\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}} and 𝚜\Box_{\mathtt{s}} are handled exactly as for the previous transformation.

Consequently, we can assume that Π=𝕊×{1,,N}\Pi^{\star}=\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\} and ,(S,1)(𝚜𝒮(φ1φ2)𝚜)φ1φ2\mathcal{M}^{\star},(S^{*},1)\models\big{(}\bigwedge_{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2})}\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\top\big{)}\wedge\varphi_{1}\wedge\varphi_{2}. Obviously, this is sufficient to satisfy the conditions (1.) and (2.) from Theorem 9. As far as condition (3.) is concerned, it is satisfied first by construction of fn\mathcal{M}^{fn} and then by the way copies are made in \mathcal{M}^{\star}. ∎

Appendix D Proof details of Lemma 10

Proof.

Assume that B0,B1,B_{0},B_{1},\dots is an accepting run of 𝒜φD\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}} on a word A0A1A_{0}A_{1}\dots. We recall that 𝒜φD=(𝒬,2𝒫(φD),δ,𝒬0,)\mathcal{A}_{\varphi_{D}}=(\mathcal{Q},2^{\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D})},\delta,\mathcal{Q}_{0},\mathcal{F}). Consequently, for all ii, we have Bi+1δ(Bi,Ai)B_{i+1}\in\delta(B_{i},A_{i}).

From such a run, we construct an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and a trace σΠ\sigma\in\Pi such that ,σ,0φD\mathcal{M},\sigma,0\models\varphi_{D}. For each ii\in\mathbb{N}, by standpoint consistency of BiB_{i}, there exists a 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} model i=(Πi,Vi)\mathcal{M}_{i}=(\Pi_{i},V_{i}) and a precisification πiΠi\pi_{i}\in\Pi_{i} such that i,πiψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\mathcal{M}_{i},\pi_{i}\models\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi. Each formula ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi can be written in the form φ1φ2\varphi_{1}\land\varphi_{2} assumed in Theorem 9. Indeed, the only atomic formulae of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in 𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) are those from I+I^{+}, and due to χD\chi_{D}, each 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} can occur only positively in BiB_{i}. Otherwise ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi is not satisfiable. Indeed, ad absurdum, suppose that some 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} in 𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}) occurs negatively in BiB_{i}, i.e. ¬(𝚜𝚜)Bi\neg(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in B_{i}. By construction of 𝖼𝗅(φD)\mathsf{cl}(\varphi_{D}), 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} belongs to I+I^{+}. However, using the definition of the temporal connective 𝖦\mathsf{G}, maximal consistency of the BjB_{j}’s implies that 𝖦ψBj\mathsf{G}\psi\in B_{j} iff ψBj\psi\in B_{j} and 𝖷𝖦ψBj\mathsf{X}\mathsf{G}\psi\in B_{j}. Since χDB0\chi_{D}\in B_{0} and by maximal consistency, we can conclude that for all jj\in\mathbb{N}, 𝚜𝚜Bj\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in B_{j}, which leads to a contradiction.

For each ii\in\mathbb{N}, the formula ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi yields RR, N1N_{1}, and N2N_{2} used in Theorem 9. Importantly, all these RR are the same, all N1𝒮(φD)N_{1}\leq{\mid\!{\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D})}\!\mid}, and all N2φD2N_{2}\leq{\mid\!{\varphi_{D}}\!\mid}^{2}. Therefore we can apply Theorem 9 with N=𝒮(φD)+φD2+1N={\mid\!{\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D})}\!\mid}+{\mid\!{\varphi_{D}}\!\mid}^{2}+1 to obtain that there are 𝖯𝖲𝖫\mathsf{PSL} models i=(Πi,Vi)\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime}=(\Pi_{i}^{\prime},V_{i}^{\prime}) such that Πi=𝕊×{1,,N}\Pi_{i}^{\prime}=\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\}, i,(S,1)ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\models\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi (with S=R()S^{*}=R(*)), and for all (S,j)Πi(S,j)\in\Pi_{i}^{\prime}, we have {𝚜𝒮(φD)(S,j)Vi(𝚜)}=S\{\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D})\mid(S,j)\in V_{i}^{\prime}(\mathtt{s})\}=S. We use these models to define an 𝖲𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{SLTL} model =(Π,λ)\mathcal{M}=(\Pi,\lambda) and σΠ\sigma\in\Pi.

We let Π\Pi be {σ(S,j)(S,j)𝕊×{1,,N}}\{\sigma_{(S,j)}\mid(S,j)\in\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\}\} and λ\lambda be such that

  • for all 𝚜𝒮(φD)\mathtt{s}\in\mathcal{S}(\varphi_{D}), σ(S,j)λ(𝚜)\sigma_{(S,j)}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}) iff 𝚜S\mathtt{s}\in S,

  • for all (S,j)𝕊×{1,,N}(S,j)\in\mathbb{S}\times\{1,\dots,N\}, for all k0k\geq 0, we have σ(S,j)(k)=def{p𝒫(φD)(S,j)Vk(p)}\sigma_{(S,j)}(k)\stackrel{{\scriptstyle\mbox{\tiny def}}}{{=}}\{p\in\mathcal{P}(\varphi_{D})\mid(S,j)\in V_{k}^{\prime}(p)\}.

Finally, we let σ\sigma be σ(S,1)\sigma_{(S^{*},1)}. The construction of \mathcal{M} is schematised in Figure 1.

A few interesting properties about \mathcal{M} can be noticed: Π=𝕊×N{\mid\!{\Pi}\!\mid}={\mid\!{\mathbb{S}}\!\mid}\times N and each σ(S,j)\sigma_{(S,j)} is built from the propositional restriction of the valuations V0,V1,V_{0},V_{1},\ldots.

Observe that φDB0\varphi_{D}\in B_{0}. Hence, to prove that ,σ(S,1),0φD(=φ[I+,I]χD)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},0\models\varphi_{D}(=\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot]\wedge\chi_{D}), we need to show by structural induction that for all subformulae ψ\psi of φ[I+,I]\varphi[I^{+}\mapsto\top,I^{-}\mapsto\bot] and all ii\in\mathbb{N} we have ψBi\psi\in B_{i} iff ,σ(S,1),iψ\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},i\models\psi.

In the basis of the induction we let ψ\psi^{\prime} be any subformula which does not mention 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives. Note that for such a formula ψ\psi^{\prime}, the equivalence follows from the construction of i\mathcal{M}^{\prime}_{i}. Indeed, ψBi\psi^{\prime}\in B_{i} implies i,(S,1)ψ\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\models\psi^{\prime} by Theorem 9, condition (2.). Conversely, suppose that i,(S,1)ψ\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\models\psi^{\prime}. Ad absurdum, suppose that ψBi\psi^{\prime}\not\in B_{i}, i.e. ¬ψBi\neg\psi^{\prime}\in B_{i} by maximal consistency. Consequently, ψ\psi^{\prime} occurs negatively in ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi, and by construction of i\mathcal{M}^{\prime}_{i}, we get i,(S,1)⊧̸ψ\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\not\models\psi^{\prime}, which leads to a contradiction.

Regarding the inductive step, since φ\varphi does not mention 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives in the scope of standpoint operators, the cases in the inductive steps are for Boolean and 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} connectives only. Thus, the proof is analogous as in the case of automaton construction for 𝖫𝖳𝖫\mathsf{LTL} [5, 15].

In order to verify that ,σ(S,1),0χD\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},0\models\chi_{D}, first note that since ((𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)(𝚜𝚜)I(𝚜p𝚜,𝚜¬𝚜p𝚜,𝚜))Bi\left(\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\land\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\wedge\neg\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}})\right)\in B_{i} for all ii, we have that such a conjunct belongs to each ψBi𝖯𝖲𝖫ψ\bigwedge_{\psi\in B_{i}\cap\mathsf{PSL}}\psi. Consequently, for all ii, we have

i,(S,1)(𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)(𝚜𝚜)I¬(𝚜𝚜).\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\models\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\wedge\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}\neg(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}).

Let 𝚜𝚜I+\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in I^{+} and suppose that σ(S,j)λ(𝚜)\sigma_{(S,j)}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}). By definition of λ\lambda, we have 𝚜S\mathtt{s}\in S. Since 𝚜𝚜I+\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in I^{+}, 𝚜R(𝚜)\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in R(\mathtt{s}) and therefore 𝚜S\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in S too. By definition of λ\lambda, we get 𝚜S\mathtt{s}^{\prime}\in S and therefore σ(S,j)λ(𝚜)\sigma_{(S,j)}\in\lambda(\mathtt{s}^{\prime}). Consequently, ,σ(S,1),0(𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},0\models\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) and therefore ,σ(S,1),0𝖦(𝚜𝚜)I+(𝚜𝚜)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},0\models\mathsf{G}\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{+}}(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime}) (because the expressions of the form 𝚜𝚜\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime} state global properties about \mathcal{M}). In order to verify that ,σ(S,1),0𝖦(𝚜𝚜)I(𝚜p𝚜,𝚜¬𝚜p𝚜,𝚜)\mathcal{M},\sigma_{(S^{*},1)},0\models\mathsf{G}\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\wedge\neg\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}), it is sufficient to observe that for all ii, (𝚜𝚜)I(𝚜p𝚜,𝚜¬𝚜p𝚜,𝚜)Bi\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\wedge\neg\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}})\in B_{i} and i,(S,1)(𝚜𝚜)I(𝚜p𝚜,𝚜¬𝚜p𝚜,𝚜)\mathcal{M}_{i}^{\prime},(S^{*},1)\models\bigwedge_{(\mathtt{s}\preceq\mathtt{s}^{\prime})\in I^{-}}(\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\wedge\neg\Diamond_{\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}\ p_{\mathtt{s},\mathtt{s}^{\prime}}) by Theorem 9, condition (2.). ∎