Computational Complexity of Standpoint LTL
Abstract
Standpoint linear temporal logic is a recent formalism able to model possibly conflicting commitments made by distinct agents, taking into account aspects of temporal reasoning. In this paper, we analyse the computational properties of . First, we establish logarithmic-space reductions between the satisfiability problems for the multi-dimensional modal logic and . This leads to the ExpSpace-completeness of the satisfiability problem in , which is a surprising result in view of previous investigations. Next, we present a method of restricting so that the obtained fragment is a strict extension of both the (non-temporal) standpoint logic and linear-time temporal logic , but the satisfiability problem is PSpace-complete in this fragment. Thus, we show how to combine standpoint logic with so that the worst-case complexity of the obtained combination is not higher than of pure .
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1 Introduction
Standpoint Logic.
Recently, a new framework based on modal logics was developed in order to interpret languages in the presence of vagueness [21]. The framework is called ‘standpoint logic’ where standpoints (a concept first introduced by Bennett [10] in a logical context, see also [11]) are used to interpret vague expressions. Logical reasoning about vagueness has a long tradition stemming from fuzzy logics [34, 35], to information logics based on rough sets [28, 27, 7]. In standpoint logic, each standpoint is associated with modalities and , and with a set of interpretations (a.k.a. precisifications) corresponding to . While reads as “according to , it is conceivable that ”, dually, reads as “according to , it is unequivocal that ”. The language of standpoint logic is equipped also with a binary operator between standpoints, such that is interpreted as “the standpoint is sharper than ” leading to the validity of the modal axiom . This is reminiscent to partially-ordered () modal operators [1], role hierarchies in description logics [4], and more generally to grammar logics [17], for which computational properties are well studied [6, 14]. Originally, standpoint logic framework was developed for propositional calculus [21], then also for predicate logic and description logics [23, 24], and most recently for the temporal logic [20]. This framework has a potential for further combinations with logical formalisms dedicated to knowledge representation and reasoning, allowing us to perform logical reasoning about vagueness [18, 9, 11].
Standpoint .
As evoked above, the recent paper [20] introduced a multi-perspective approach by combining standpoints and temporal reasoning expressed in the linear-time temporal logic [29], which is a very popular specification language, for instance used for model-checking [5], temporal planning [13, 2], and temporal reasoning with description logics [3]. This new formalism, called , handles both evolutions of systems and changes of standpoints. Gigante et al. [20] develop a tableau-based proof system to reason about , leading to a computational analysis for deciding the satisfiability status of formulae. Within , each standpoint is interpreted as a set of models (i.e. as a set of -sequences of propositional valuations, also known as traces) and the logical formalism has the ability to model possibly conflicting commitments made by distinct agents. Hence, significantly increases the modelling capabilities offered by , and so, can be seen as a non-trivial extension of . Our initial motivation in this work is to understand the computational properties of . We agree with Gigante et al. [20] that it is particularly desirable to be able to decide the satisfiability status of formulae in polynomial-space, which is the best we can hope for in view of PSpace-completeness of [31]. However, in contrast to the results of Gigante et al. [20], we show that the PSpace membership can be guaranteed only for strict fragments of (see Section 4) and ExpSpace is required for the full (see Section 3).
Our contributions.
We study the computational properties of the satisfiability problem for the standpoint linear temporal logic . We show that the problem is ExpSpace-complete (Theorem 5) by establishing logarithmic-space reductions between and the multi-dimensional modal logic whose satisfiability problem is known to be ExpSpace-complete [19]. The obtained ExpSpace-completeness of contrasts with PSpace-membership claimed by Gigante et al. [20]. In Section 4.1, we provide examples of formulae whose satisfiability is challenging to check as their models have an infinite set of traces and at every position, an exponential amount of valuations are witnessed on such traces (see Proposition 6). In Section 4.2, we identify a fragment of which contains both and propositional standpoint logic, but the satisfiability problem can be decided in polynomial-space. Since is known to be PSpace-complete [31], we obtain the same tight complexity result for the newly introduced fragment of (Theorem 11). To do so, we use the automata-based approach following the general principles for [32], but with non-trivial modifications.
2 Logical Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the standpoint linear temporal logic , the propositional standpoint logic , as well as the multi-dimensional modal logic , which we exploit in Section 3. For motivations and detailed presentation of these logics, we refer a reader to [22, 20] and [19, Chapter 5].
2.1 Standpoint linear temporal logic
The formulae are built over a countably infinite set of propositional variables and a countably infinite set of standpoint symbols including the universal standpoint symbol . The formulae are defined according to the grammar:
where and ; other Boolean connectives and temporal operators (e.g. , , , for “always in the future”, and for “sometime in the future”) are treated as standard abbreviations. In terms of expressivity, one modality among is sufficient. An model, , is a structure of the form where,
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is a set of models (traces) of the form ,
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is a map of the form such that .
For example, Figure 1 presents an model with six traces. The satisfaction relation, , for an model , , , and an formula is defined inductively as follows (we omit the standard clauses for Boolean connectives):
The satisfiability problem for takes as input an formula and asks whether there is a model and such that . By way of example, we provide an formula below taken from the medical devices example [20, Section 2.1] (more elaborated examples can be found in [21, 22, 20]):
The first conjunct states that all countries agree in their standpoints that if a medical device never malfunctions, then it is safe according to testing. The second one states that Italy deems a device safe if it is safe according to testing or it has been found safe by comparison.
Regarding our definition of , it is worth observing that, as far as we can judge, the satisfiability problem is not formally defined in [20, Section 2.2]. Only the validity problem is defined. In particular, non validity of the formula is defined as the existence of an model and such that . So, our definition of satisfiability is dual to the notion of validity used by Gigante et al. [20].
Besides, it is worth noting that the above presentation of differs slightly with the definition of Gigante et al. [20, Section 2.2], but it has no impact on our results, as described next. formulae, as defined in [20], are in negation normal form and allow for using the “release” operator. In our definition negation is unrestricted and we do not use the “release” operator, which makes no substantial difference. Gigante et al. [20] assumes also that the formulae cannot be combined with other formulae, so the way we define formulae is slightly more expressive. However, our ExpSpace-hardness proof (reduction in Lemma 1) does not use formulae of the form (actually only the modalities , , and are needed). The ExpSpace-membership (Corollary 4) for our, slightly richer language, clearly implies the same upper bound for the weaker language of Gigante et al. [20].
The change of standpoint performed with the modalities and is reminiscent to the change of observational power studied in [8] with the modalities . In both cases, a modality explicitly performs a change in the way the forthcoming formulae are evaluated.
2.2 Propositional standpoint logic
In the sequel, we also consider propositional standpoint logic [22] (herein, written ) understood as the fragment of without temporal connectives. The grammar of formulae is restricted to
and the models are of the form where is a finite non-empty set of precisifications, is a valuation such that for all , we have and . The satisfaction relation is defined as follows (where and we omit the obvious clauses for Boolean connectives):
The satisfiability problem, for an input formula , consists in checking whether there is some pair such that . This problem is NP-complete. To show NP-membership, Gómez Álvarez [21, Section 4.4.2] proved that if a satisfiable formula contains many standpoint symbols and many diamond modal operators, then is satisfied in a model such that . An alternative way to get the NP-membership is to translate into a formula of the modal logic [12], where turns standpoint operators into modal operators in the following manner: , , and . The correctness of such a reduction relies naturally on the Kripke-style semantics for . We will refine complexity analysis of in Section 4.2, which will be essential to establish complexity of fragments.
2.3 Multi-dimensional modal logic
Another logic that is useful herein is the multi-dimensional modal logic [19, Chapter 5] defined as the product of and . formulae are generated from the grammar
where is a propositional variable. As in , we use standard abbreviations for other Boolean connectives and operators (, , , , etc.). The models for are of the form where is an -frame (i.e. is an equivalence relation on ) and . The satisfaction relation for is defined as follows (again, we omit the standard clauses for Boolean connectives):
Therefore, the modalities and allow us to move within the dimension whereas the temporal connectives and allow us to move along the dimension. The satisfiability problem for takes as input a formula and asks whether there is a model and such that . It is known, that satisfaction of a formula can be always witnessed by a model with and by a pair (i.e. its first component is the origin position ). In the sequel we will use this assumption; in particular, we will assume that , and for simplicity of presentation we will drop the component from models.
It is worth noting that the above presentation of differs slightly from the definitions by Gabbay et al. [19, Section 2.1], but it has no impact on our results. Indeed, Gabbay et al. [19] use only the strict “until” operator, which we denote by (and no next-time operator ) and whose semantics is as follows:
It is easy to see that can be encoded by and therefore the ExpSpace-hardness for proved by Gabbay et al. [19, Theorem 5.43] applies also to our version of . As far as the ExpSpace-membership is concerned, the satisfiability problem for our version of is in ExpSpace using the approach of Gabbay et al. [19, Theorem 6.65] dedicated to with strict “until” and using a standard renaming technique [19, Proposition 2.10]. Note that a naive translation from our language to a formula with strict “until” exploiting , would cause an exponential blow-up. However, we can get a logarithmic-space reduction using the renaming technique, where any subformula is associated with a fresh propositional variable . For instance, to capture the meaning of we introduce an additional formula This additional formula (propagating an equivalence all over the model), if asserted in any world of the form , allows us to state that is equivalent with , in all elements in . The propagation is over the model because of the modality and we can always assume that a world satisfying our formula is of the form . As a conclusion, the version of involved in this paper admits also an ExpSpace-complete satisfiability problem (ExpSpace-hardness follows from the fact that can be encoded by ).
Let us conclude this section by evoking the relationships between and the well-known modal logic [12]. The logic contains a modality where can be understood as the universal standpoint interpreted by the total set of traces and therefore behaves naturally as an modality, whence the component in . The presence of is not our finding as it has been already observed that quantification over precisifications leads to modalities, see e.g., the works of Bennett [9, Section 2.1] and Bennett [10, page 43], as well as the presence of modalities for modelling standpoints in [21, Section 3.5] and in [21, Chapter 4]. Furthermore, the relationship with multi-dimensional modal logics is already briefly evoked in [21, Section 7.3.3]. More importantly, an early introduction of some multi-dimensional modal logic is performed by Bennett [9, Section 2.1] where first-order logic and propositional modal logic are mixed. Hence, the fact that we use is not a total surprise, and the need for multi-dimensional modal logics was in the air for some time. Our contribution consists in establishing a formal result involving multi-dimensional modal logics and in designing simple logarithmic-space reductions between and , proving ExpSpace-hardness of , despite the complexity result claimed in [20, Theorem 28]. The design of a PSpace fragment completes our analysis and provides us with a fragment of which is a strict extension of both and standpoint logic, but its computational complexity is not higher than the complexity of pure .
3 Satisfiability for is ExpSpace-complete
In this section we design logarithmic-space translations from to formulae, and vice versa. As a result, we will obtain that the computational complexity of satisfiability for formulae is the same as for formulae, namely ExpSpace-complete. Both of our translations exploit similarities between and models. More specifically, we will consider an element in an model as a name for an trace from an model .
3.1 Translation from to
Let be a formula and be its translation obtained from by replacing every occurrence of by and every occurrence by (an alternative translation consists in using and and for some fixed ). We show that this simple translation preserves satisfiability.
Lemma 1.
is -satisfiable iff is -satisfiable.
Proof sketch.
Assume that there is a model and such that . Let us build an model and a trace such that . To this end, we let consist of all traces of the form
with ; note that we represent a trace as an -sequence . We let , for each (for the construction it is only important that as no other standpoint symbol occurs in ). We can prove by structural induction that, for all subformulae of and for all , we have iff . By way of example we handle below the case when the subformula is of the form . It suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:
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for all (by definition of )
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for all (by induction hypothesis)
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for all (by definition of )
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
Therefore, we can show that .
For the opposite implication, assume that there are an model and a trace such that . Let us build a model and such that . We let and , for all . We can show by structural induction that for all subformulae of , all , and all , we have iff . By way of example, we handle below the case when the subformula is of the form . To this end, we observe that the below statements are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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There is such that and for all , we have (by definition of )
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There is such that and for all , we have (by induction hypothesis)
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(by definition of )
This allows us to show that . ∎
As is computed in logarithmic-space, we get the following.
Corollary 2.
-satisfiability is ExpSpace-hard.
Note that this result contradicts the PSpace upper bound shown by Gigante et al. [20, Theorem 28], as PSpace and ExpSpace are known to be distinct complexity classes.
3.2 Translation from to
The translation from to is (slightly) more complex since models interpret standpoint symbols, which have no natural counterpart in models. As we will show, however, standpoints can be simulated in with fresh propositional variables. This, in particular, requires an additional formula (called below) simulating the requirements that each standpoint in an model has at least one associated trace and that if a trace is assigned to a standpoint, it is so throughout the entire timeline. As we show, such requirements can be easily expressed in .
Given an formula , we construct a formula , by applying the translation map such that is the identity map for propositional variables, it is homomorphic for Boolean and temporal connectives, and the following hold for all :
Assuming that the standpoint symbols in are , we let
As we show next, checking satisfiability of in reduces to checking satisfiability of in .
Lemma 3.
is -satisfiable iff is -satisfiable.
Proof sketch.
Assume that is -satifiable, so there are an model and a trace such that . Let us build a model such that and for all . We show that . First, we observe that . This follows from the definition of and the fact that for all and for all , we have iff . Second, by structural induction, we can show that for all subformulae of , all , and all , we get iff . Hence .
Now, assume that there is a model and such that . Let us build an model and a trace such that . As in the proof of Lemma 1, let consist of all traces
with . This time, the definition of exploits the assumption that . In particular, to define we let , for all and . By the definition of and the form of , for each we have . This guarantees that is an model. By structural induction, we can show that for all subformulae of and for all , we have iff . Hence, and so is satisfiable in . ∎
As the construction of is feasible in logarithmic-space, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.
-satisfiability is in ExpSpace.
Together with Corollary 2 we obtain tight complexity bounds for , which is the main result of this section:
Theorem 5.
-satisfiability is ExpSpace-complete.
Logarithmic-space reductions between and emphasize how close are these formalisms, a property that remained unnoticed so far. This allows us to establish the ExpSpace-completeness of -satisfiability in a transparent way. Therefore, the analysis of the properties of the tableau-style calculus for designed by Gigante et al. [20] needs, in the best case, lead to the ExpSpace upper bound.
4 PSpace Fragment of
Corollary 2 can be viewed as a negative result for the usability of (it is of course positive in terms of knowledge about properties), but as shown below, there is some room to find interesting fragments that include both and , but can be decided in polynomial-space. Before presenting a fragment of in which satisfiability is PSpace-complete, however, we provide more intuitions behind ExpSpace-hardness of full . This is helpful to discard syntactic features that lead to high complexity.
4.1 Computationally challenging behaviour of
To obtain a better understanding of the ExpSpace-hardness of full and of the mismatch between our result in Section 3.1 and the PSpace bound stated by Gigante et al. [20, Theorem 28], we present a specific formula whose satisfiability is particularly hard to decide. This will also prove useful for constructing PSpace fragments of , as they should disallow features expressing the computationally challenging behaviour of .
Our construction of exploits the following formula , encoding a binary counter from 0 to , where the propositional variables correspond to consecutive bits of the counter with being the most significant bit:
In every position of an trace , the propositional variables encode the bits (with being the most significant bit) such that iff . We write if the counter has value in the position , that is represents the number . It is easy to see that if , then the counter has value in the position and in every next position this value increases by 1 until the counter reaches the value . If this is the case, in the next position the value is and the process of counting (modulo ) repeats. Hence, and for any , we have where .
We use to define (of polynomial-size in ). As we show next, if for some model , then must contain infinitely many traces and for every position there are exponentially many (at least ) traces in which are pairwise different with respect to the valuation of at the position . The latter, in particular, seems to contradict the first paragraph of the proof of [20, Lemma 27] used to argue for PSpace satisfiability of .
Proposition 6.
The formula is satisfiable. Moreover, for each model and such that , the following hold: (1) is infinite, (2) for each and , there is such that , and (3) for all positions , there are , …, in such that
Proof.
Assume that . Firstly, let us show that is necessarily infinite. Since , for each , there is a witness trace such that . Hence, for all , we have and , and so, is distinct from . Consequently, is an infinite set of distinct traces, all belonging to .
To show the second item in the proposition, let and let be witness traces as defined above. So, for all , we have . Assuming that for some , for all we have with . Since are pairwise distinct, we obtain also that , and so, the third item from the proposition holds.
Let us conclude by showing that is satisfiable, as stated in the proposition. For this we can construct a model with infinitely many traces and with . Each trace is such that . Note that such needs to exist and has a uniquely determined valuation of in all positions not smaller than , whereas their valuation in positions smaller than is irrelevant for our construction. Then, by the form of , we get . ∎
4.2 Limiting the interplay between connectives
In this section we show that a PSpace upper bound for the satisfiability problem in can be obtained by limiting the interplay between standpoint and temporal operators. To this end, we focus on formulae which do not allow for connectives occurring in the scope of standpoint modal operators; in the sequel we call this fragment . By way of example, the formula from Section 2.1 does not belong to . However the following is already an formula: , which states that if always in future all countries agree that a medical device does not malfunction, then all these countries agree that this device is safe according to testing. It is worth observing that the formula from Section 4.1, illustrating computationally challenging behaviour, does not belong to (because of in the scope of ). In contrast, any formula of the form where are formulae (see Section 2.2) are in .
As we show in the remaining part of this section, we can check satisfiability of formulae in PSpace by adapting the Büchi automaton construction developed for [5, 15] and by performing model-theoretical constructions based on a refinement of the finite model property for (see Theorem 9).
Let us fix an formula and let be the set of propositional variables occurring in it. Let (for ‘inequality’) be the set of subformulae of of the form . To check satisfiability of , our procedure considers all possible partitions of into sets and ; intuitively such a partition states that formulae in are true and those in are false. Since is a global statement (either it is satisfied in all traces and all positions of a model, or it is not satisfied in any of them), its truth value can be non-deterministically guessed from the very beginning. Moreover, such a guess is feasible in PSpace since NPSpace = PSpace [30]. Given , we encode the above intuition with the formula
where each is a fresh propositional variable. This can be done as is countably infinite. Note that encodes that each in holds true always in future and that each in is always false. We also define , where is the formula obtained from by replacing each with and each with . Note that is an formula.
The purpose of the construction of , leading to Lemma 7, is to nondeterministically choose which inequalities hold, and in particular to enforce the non-satisfaction of some by the existence of two traces, see the formula . Notice that occurs only positively in . In forthcoming Theorem 9, we show how to construct models based on , defined as a conjunction of inequalities of the form . This step is therefore instrumental to handle the inequalities .
Lemma 7.
Satisfiability of reduces to checking if there exists a partition of such that is satisfiable.
Therefore, in what follows we will consider an arbitrary partition of , and focus on checking satisfiability of .
We write to denote the closure set of defined as the smallest set containing all the subformulae of as well as and , which is closed under taking negations (as usually, we do not allow for double negations by identifying with ) and such that implies . We can observe that and the number of formulae in the set , whose outermost connective is a modality of the form or , is bounded by .
As in the standard automaton construction for [5, 15, 16], we call a set maximally consistent if it satisfies the properties:
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and ; iff , for all ,
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iff and , for all ,
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iff or , for all .
Moreover, we introduce an additional property specific to ; we say that is standpoint-consistent if the formula (we treat here as the set of all well-formed formulae) is satisfiable in standpoint logic . It is worth noting that checking standpoint-consistency is decidable and, in particular, NP-complete [22, Corollary 3] as we have discussed in Section 2.1 (see also the forthcoming Theorem 9).
We call s-elementary if it is maximally consistent and standpoint-consistent. We will use s-elementary sets as states of an automaton.
We are ready now to define an automaton which we use for checking satisfiability of . We let be a generalised nondeterministic Büchi automaton whose components are as follows:
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the set of states, , consists of all s-elementary sets ,
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the automaton alphabet is the powerset ,
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the set of initial states is ,
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the set of accepting sets, , is the family containing for each the set
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the transition relation is such that if , and otherwise is the set of all s-elementary which satisfy the following condition: for each , we have iff .
In what follows we show that accepting runs of correspond to models of , and so, satisfiability of is equivalent to nonemptiness of language. In the next lemma we show the first implication of this equivalence.
Lemma 8.
If is -satisfiable, then the language of is non-empty.
Proof sketch.
Assume that , for some model and . We let states be such that each and we let input word be such that each . As we will show, is a run of on the word , and this run is accepting. For the former statement, it suffices to observe that, by the definition, each is s-elementary and . To prove that the run is accepting, we can show that for each accepting set , there are infinitely many with . This follows from the standard argument used in the automaton construction for [5, 15], since the accepting sets in our construction are defined in the same way as in the case of . As is an accepting run of , the language of is non-empty. ∎
Next, we will show that the converse of Lemma 8 (forthcoming Lemma 10) holds true. This direction is more complex and requires establishing new properties for . Given an accepting run of , we aim to construct an model of . By standpoint-consistency of the ’s, there exists a sequence of pointed models (i.e. pairs consisting of a model and one of its precisifications) such that for all , we have . From such a sequence, we aim to construct an model and a trace such that . The main challenge is to construct the set of traces in from the sets of precisifications in models . This task is reminiscent of known constructions of models from partial models, for instance, as developed in the mosaic method for temporal logics [25], see also [33]. However, in our case, the construction requires exploiting properties specific to .
To address this challenge, we show a new model-theoretic result for , which is interesting on its own as, for example, it implies NP-membership of -satisfiability. Our result states that the satisfiability of formulae can be witnessed by models of a specific form and size, so it establishes a “normalised small model property” for . We show the result for formulae which are relevant for our construction. In particular, for formulae of the form such that is a conjunction of formulae and is a formula in negation normal form with no occurrences of (see the formula involved in Lemma 7). Without any loss of generality, we can assume that the universal standpoint occurs in (indeed, we can always add to the formula , as it is equivalent to ).
Our normalised small model property states that satisfiability of implies existence of some model of a specific form. This model has precisifications represented by pairs such that is a natural number and belongs to a set defined as follows (based on the form of ). We let be the reflexive and transitive closure of the relation . Hence, if , then entails . We let be the set of all such that . Then we define the set . With these symbols in hand we are ready to formulate the small model property of .
Theorem 9.
Let be a -formula of the form described above, which mentions standpoint symbols and occurrences of . If is -satisfiable, then for every natural number there is a model such that:
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,
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with , and
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for each , it holds that .
Proof sketch.
The proof employs principles first used to show the small model property for [12, Chapter 6], for counting logics [26, Chapter 1], and for itself [21, Section 4.4].
Given a model and a precisification such that , we perform four transformations to modify into satisfying Statements 1–3 from the theorem, where . The steps are schematised below.
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Let us describe briefly the objectives of each reduction.
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The goal of transforming into is to guarantee that the standpoint symbols labelling are exactly those in . At most one precisification is added to to obtain .
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The construction of from amounts to select a finite subset of precisifications from to witness the satisfaction of all the -formulae. This step is analogous to the way the small model property is shown for the modal logic .
- (Normalise)
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The construction of from guarantees that for any precisification in , the set of standpoint symbols whose valuation contains , belongs to . To do so, precisifications are “copied”, preserving the satisfaction of propositional variables but possibly updating the valuation of standpoints.
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This step to get from consists in “copying” precisifications, so that the set of precisifications can be identified with .
It can be shown that constructed in this way is possible and satisfies all Statements 1–3 from the theorem. ∎
Interestingly, as a consequence of Theorem 9, we obtain the NP-membership for -satisfiability. Indeed, given a formula , it suffices to non-deterministically guess a partition of formulae in , and to verify satisfiability of . The form of the obtained formula allows us to apply Theorem 9. Hence, to check satisfiability, it remains to guess a model with precisifications. The whole procedure is in NP. Above all, Theorem 9 is a key to show the converse of Lemma 8, stated below.
Lemma 10.
If the language of is not non-empty, then is -satisfiable
Proof sketch.
Assume that is an accepting run of on a word . We construct an model and a trace such that . For each , by standpoint consistency of , there exists a model and a precisification such that . Each formula can be written in the form assumed in Theorem 9. Indeed, the only atomic formulae of the form in are those from , and due to , each can occur only positively in (otherwise is not satisfiable). For each , the formula yields , , and used in Theorem 9. Importantly, all these are the same, all , and all . Therefore we can apply Theorem 9 with to obtain that there are models such that , (with ), and for all , we have . We use these models to define an model and . We let be and be such that
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for all , iff ,
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for all , for all , we have .
Finally, we let be . The construction of is schematised in Figure 1. Observe that . Hence, to prove that , it suffices to show by structural induction that for all subformulae of and all we have iff . In the basis of the induction we let be any subformula which does not mention connectives. Note that for such , the equivalence follows from the construction of . Regarding the inductive step, since does not mention connectives in the scope of standpoint operators, the cases in the inductive steps are for Boolean and connectives only. Thus, the proof is analogous as in the case of automaton construction for [5, 15]. ∎
Lemmas 8 and 10 allow us to reduce the satisfiability of to checking the nonemptiness of language. This, as we show next, leads to tight PSpace complexity bound for satisfiability checking.
Theorem 11.
-satisfiability problem is PSpace-complete.
Proof.
The lower bound is from the fact that is a syntactic fragment of and is already PSpace-hard [31, Theorem 4.1]. For the upper bound, assume that we want to check if is satisfiable. Our procedure starts by guessing a partition of subformulae of of the form (in nondeterministic polynomial-time), and constructing the formula . By Lemma 7, it remains to check if is satisfiable. This, however, by Lemmas 8 and 10, reduces to checking if the language of is non-empty. The size (number of states) of is exponentially large, but similarly as in the automata construction for , we can use an “on the fly” approach to check in PSpace non-emptiness of language [5, 15]. The difference between our procedure and the standard one for is that we need to check if each constructed ‘on the fly’ state of the automaton is standpoint-consistent. This, however, is feasible in NP due to NP-completeness of the satisfiability problem for [22]. ∎
As a corollary of the proof, we obtain also the following result.
Corollary 12.
If an formula is satisfiable, it is satisfied in an model with polynomially many (in the size of ) traces.
5 Concluding Remarks
We studied the computational properties of standpoint linear temporal logic . First, we proved that its satisfiability problem is ExpSpace-complete, contrary to the PSpace bound claimed recently in [20, Theorem 28]. To show this result, we designed reductions between and the multi-dimensional modal logic . Furthermore, we proposed a fragment of which has PSpace-complete satisfiability problem, as [20]. This fragment disallows occurrences of temporal connectives in the scope of standpoint connectives; to show that the satisfiability problem for its formulae is in PSpace, we followed the automata-based approach [32] (similar to the well-known technique for ) but for which correctness requires to prove a new model-theoretic property about (Theorem 9) that we find interesting for its own sake. In future it would be also interesting to implement practical decision procedures for and for the PSpace fragment we have introduced, apart from studying its expressive power.
We thank the referees for suggestions that help us to improve the quality of the document. Special thanks to the referee who pointed us to [8]. Przemysław A Wałęga was supported by the EPSRC projects OASIS (EP/S032347/1), ConCuR (EP/V050869/1) and UK FIRES (EP/S019111/1), as well as SIRIUS Centre for Scalable Data Access and Samsung Research UK.
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Technical Appendix
Due of lack of space, this technical appendix is dedicated to the proofs that could not included in the body of the paper.
Appendix A Proof details for Section 3
A.1 Proof details for Lemma 1
Proof.
In the main body of the paper, to show the first implication we defined a model and claimed that, by structural induction, we can show that for all subformulae of and for all , we have iff . We considered only one case of the induction, for a subformulae of the form . Now, we will present all the remaining cases.
First, we observe that the basis of the induction, when is a propositional variable, follows directly from the definition of . The inductive steps for subformulae of the forms and , follow directly from the inductive assumption. Hence, it remains to consider the cases for subformulae of the forms , , and . For it suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:
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for some (by definition of )
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for some (by induction hypothesis)
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for some (by definition of )
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
For the case , it suffices to observe that the statements below are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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(by induction hypothesis)
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
Finally, for the case , it suffices to observe that the statements below are equivalent:
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There is such that and for all , we have (by definition of )
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There is such that and for all , we have (by induction hypothesis)
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
Therefore, we obtain that .
For the second implication in the lemma we claimed that we can show, by structural induction, that for all subformulae of , all , and all , we have iff . However, we showed only how to handle the case with formulas . Now we will cover the remaining cases.
The basis of the induction, when is a propositional variable, follows directly from the definition of and the inductive steps for subformulae of the forms and , follow directly from the inductive assumption. Since the inductive step for is shown in the main body of the paper, it remains to consider the cases for subformulae of the forms , , and . For it suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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for some (by definition of )
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for some (by induction hypothesis)
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(by definition of )
For we observe that the following statements are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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for all (by definition of )
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for all (by induction hypothesis)
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(by definition of )
Finally, for the following are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
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(by induction hypothesis)
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(by definition of )
Consequently, . ∎
A.2 Proof details for Lemma 3
Proof.
In the proof sketch, to show the first implication, we claim that by structural induction we can show that for all subformulae of , all , and all , we have iff . Indeed, if is a propositional variable, then the equivalence holds by the definition of . If is of the form , then we observe that the following are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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implies for all (by set-theoretical reasoning)
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implies for all (by definition of )
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for all (by definition of )
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(by definition of )
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Hence, the basis of the induction holds.
The inductive steps for formulae and , hold directly by the inductive assumption. It remains to consider inductive steps for formulae of the forms , , , and . For formulae of the form the equivalence holds because the statements below are equivalent:
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for some (by definition of )
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and for some (by induction hypothesis and , respectively)
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
For formulae of the form the equivalence holds since the following are equivalent:
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for all (by definition of )
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implies for all (by induction hypothesis and )
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(by definition of )
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(by definition of )
The cases for and are analogous (and even simpler) than the above showed cases for and , respectively. Consequently, .
For the second implication, we claimed in the proof sketch that, by structural induction, one can show that for all subformulae of and for all , we have iff . If is a propositional variable, then the equivalence holds by the definition of . If is of the form , then we observe that the statements below are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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for all (by definition of )
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for all (by )
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implies for all (by definition of )
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implies for all (by definition of )
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(by set-theoretical reasoning)
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(by definition of )
Therefore, the basis of the induction holds.
The inductive steps for formulae and , hold directly by the inductive assumption. It remains to consider inductive steps for formulae of the forms , , , and . For formulae of the form the equivalence holds because the statements below are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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and for some (by definition of )
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and for some (by )
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for some (by induction hypothesis and definition of , respectively)
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(by definition of )
For formulae of the form the equivalence holds since the following are equivalent:
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(by definition of )
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implies for all (by definition of )
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implies for all (by )
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for all (by induction hypothesis and definition of , respectively)
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(by definition of )
The cases for and are analogous (and even simpler) than the above showed cases for and , respectively. ∎
Appendix B Proof details for Lemma 7
Proof.
Let us fix an formula and let be the set of all subformulae of of the form . To prove the lemma it suffices to observe that the following statements are equivalent:
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is satisfiable
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for some and (by definition of satisfiability)
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for some , , and partition of (since each holds in some iff it holds in all )
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for some , , and partition of (by definition of and definition of an model)
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for some , , and partition of (by definition of )
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is satisfiable for some partition of (by definition of satisfiability)
∎
Appendix C Proof details for Theorem 9
In Section 2, a model for is defined as a pair where is a finite non-empty set of precisifications and (understood as a valuation). Below, we adopt an alternative formulation (known to be equivalent when passing from valuations to labellings) that is more practical to write a few expressions below. We use models of the form where is a labelling such that for all , we have and (counterpart of for all and ).
Proof.
Suppose that is satisfiable. Consequently, there is a model and such that
The satisfaction of is due to the fact that for all , there is such that .
We perform four transformations to modify into satisfying Statements 1–3 from the theorem, where . The steps are schematised below.
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Let us describe briefly the objectives of each reduction.
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The goal of transforming into is to guarantee that the standpoint symbols labelling are exactly those in . At most one precisification is added to to obtain .
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The construction of from amounts to select a finite subset of precisifications from to witness the satisfaction of all the -formulae. This step is analogous to the way the small model property is shown for the modal logic .
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The construction of from guarantees that for any precisification in , the set of standpoint symbols whose valuation contains , belongs to . To do so, precisifications are “copied”, preserving the satisfaction of propositional variables but possibly updating the valuation of standpoints.
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This step to get from consists in “copying” precisifications, so that the set of precisifications can be identified with .
Here are the details of the transformations as well as the formal justifications.
(Elect) We perform a preliminary step related to so that the standpoint symbols holding at the witness precisification are precisely those in (in the process of transforming the model, becomes ). In the case (necessarily because ), we build a new model from with a new precisification (i.e. ) such that ( and agree on the propositional variables) and and agree on . If , then is equal to , and to . For all subformulae of , for all , we have implies , and implies . Consequently, . Indeed, let us check carefully each conjunct.
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because for all , there is such that .
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For all in , for all , we have implies (), (by ), (). Similarly, for all in , (for the unique if any) implies by definition of . Consequently, there is a sequence of relations in with . Hence, too and therefore by definition of , we also get . Hence, .
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In order to show , we need to show that for all subformulae of , for all , we have implies , and implies . This can be done by structural induction. The base case with literals is easy as well as the cases in the induction step with the Boolean connectives and . By way of example, here are a few more cases.
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Suppose that . There is such that and . By definition of and by the induction hypothesis, we get and . Consequently, .
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Suppose that . For all such that , we have . Hence, by the induction hypothesis and by definition of , for all such that , we have . Ad absurdum, suppose that and . By the induction hypothesis, . Since , we get and , which leads to a contradiction with . Hence, for all such that , we have .
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(Select) Now, we build a finite model from such that (and therefore is finite, that is why we use the superscript ‘’) and , and . In a way, in order to define , we identify a relevant set of witness precisifications from . Before providing the construction, note that for any subformula in , the propositions below are equivalent:
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for some , we have ,
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for all , we have .
Indeed, can be understood as a global statement about and does not depend on the precisification where it is evaluated. A similar property holds holds true for the subformulae of the form . Let the set of subformulae of of the form such that . Remember that is in negation normal form. Furthermore, the conjunct makes explicit the fact that each standpoint symbol has at least one precisification. For each formula in , we pick a precisification in , say such that and . The set is defined as the set below:
Note that . We write to denote the restriction of to the set . One can show by structural induction that for all , for all subformulae of , we have implies . Consequently, . Indeed, let us check carefully each conjunct.
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because for all , there is such that .
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For all in , for all , we have implies (), (by ), ().
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In order to show , we need to show that for all subformulae of , for all , we have implies . This can be done by structural induction. The base case with literals is easy as well as the cases in the induction step with the Boolean connectives and . By way of example, here are a few more cases.
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Suppose that . There is such that and . By definition of and by the induction hypothesis, we get and . Consequently, .
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Suppose that . For all such that , we have . By the induction hypothesis and since , for all such that , we have . Consequently, .
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(Normalise) From , we build a larger model towards the satisfaction of the condition (3.) (the superscript ‘’ is intended to mean ‘finite and normalised’). Given , there is such that (by satisfaction of in ). Indeed, we recall that and for all , . Since , if , then . If , then we keep in (and is understood of the first copy of itself in ). Otherwise, let be the set of all strict subsets of in . Note that . From to , we replace by new copies such that all , . Two distinct copies and agree on the interpretation of the propositional variables from but may differ on the interpretation of the standpoint symbols. One can show by structural induction that for all , for all copies , for all subformulae of , we have implies . This can be done by structural induction. The base case with literals is easy as well as the cases in the induction step with the Boolean connectives and . By way of example, here are a few more cases.
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Suppose that . There is such that and . If , then by the induction hypothesis and . Otherwise, let be the set of all strict subsets of in . We have . Let be such that . Consequently, by the induction hypothesis, and . Hence, in all cases, for any ( depending on ).
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Suppose that . For all such that , we have . Ad absurdum, suppose that not for some , and . By the induction hypothesis, . Since , this leads to a contradiction with .
Observe for all , we have . Moreover, for all ,
(Populate) Finally, we may need to add extra copies of precisifications from to get the desired final model . Assuming is the first copy of the initial precisification satisfying , we have and
We recall that from the statement of Theorem 9 is a natural number strictly greater than . For all , if
we pick one element in the above-mentioned set, and we copy it times leading to the additional precisifications such that for all , . The set is made of the elements of plus the additional precisifications. One can check that for all , there are exactly precisifications in and . Indeed, as shown above, we can show that for all , for all copies , for all subformulae of , we have implies . The cases for and are handled exactly as for the previous transformation.
Consequently, we can assume that and . Obviously, this is sufficient to satisfy the conditions (1.) and (2.) from Theorem 9. As far as condition (3.) is concerned, it is satisfied first by construction of and then by the way copies are made in . ∎
Appendix D Proof details of Lemma 10
Proof.
Assume that is an accepting run of on a word . We recall that . Consequently, for all , we have .
From such a run, we construct an model and a trace such that . For each , by standpoint consistency of , there exists a model and a precisification such that . Each formula can be written in the form assumed in Theorem 9. Indeed, the only atomic formulae of the form in are those from , and due to , each can occur only positively in . Otherwise is not satisfiable. Indeed, ad absurdum, suppose that some in occurs negatively in , i.e. . By construction of , belongs to . However, using the definition of the temporal connective , maximal consistency of the ’s implies that iff and . Since and by maximal consistency, we can conclude that for all , , which leads to a contradiction.
For each , the formula yields , , and used in Theorem 9. Importantly, all these are the same, all , and all . Therefore we can apply Theorem 9 with to obtain that there are models such that , (with ), and for all , we have . We use these models to define an model and .
We let be and be such that
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for all , iff ,
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for all , for all , we have .
Finally, we let be . The construction of is schematised in Figure 1.
A few interesting properties about can be noticed: and each is built from the propositional restriction of the valuations .
Observe that . Hence, to prove that , we need to show by structural induction that for all subformulae of and all we have iff .
In the basis of the induction we let be any subformula which does not mention connectives. Note that for such a formula , the equivalence follows from the construction of . Indeed, implies by Theorem 9, condition (2.). Conversely, suppose that . Ad absurdum, suppose that , i.e. by maximal consistency. Consequently, occurs negatively in , and by construction of , we get , which leads to a contradiction.
Regarding the inductive step, since does not mention connectives in the scope of standpoint operators, the cases in the inductive steps are for Boolean and connectives only. Thus, the proof is analogous as in the case of automaton construction for [5, 15].
In order to verify that , first note that since for all , we have that such a conjunct belongs to each . Consequently, for all , we have
Let and suppose that . By definition of , we have . Since , and therefore too. By definition of , we get and therefore . Consequently, and therefore (because the expressions of the form state global properties about ). In order to verify that , it is sufficient to observe that for all , and by Theorem 9, condition (2.). ∎