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Age-Stratified COVID-19 Spread Analysis and Vaccination: A Multitype Random Network Approach

Xianhao Chen,  Guangyu Zhu,  Lan Zhang,  Yuguang Fang, , Linke Guo,  , and Xinguang Chen Xianhao Chen, Guangyu Zhu, and Yuguang Fang are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA. (e-mail: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]).Lan Zhang is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Michigan Technological University, Houghton, MI 49931, USA, (e-mail: [email protected]).Linke Guo is with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634, USA. (e-mail: [email protected]).Xinguang Chen is with the Department of Epidemiology, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32603, USA. ([email protected]). This work was supported in part by US National Science Foundation under grants IIS-1722791 and IIS-1722731.
Abstract

The risk for severe illness and mortality from COVID-19 significantly increases with age. As a result, age-stratified modeling for COVID-19 dynamics is the key to study how to reduce hospitalizations and mortality from COVID-19. By taking advantage of network theory, we develop an age-stratified epidemic model for COVID-19 in complex contact networks. Specifically, we present an extension of standard SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) compartmental model, called age-stratified SEAHIR (susceptible-exposed-asymptomatic-hospitalized-infectious-removed) model, to capture the spread of COVID-19 over multitype random networks with general degree distributions. We derive several key epidemiological metrics and then propose an age-stratified vaccination strategy to decrease the mortality and hospitalizations. Through extensive study, we discover that the outcome of vaccination prioritization depends on the reproduction number R0R_{0}. Specifically, the elderly should be prioritized only when R0R_{0} is relatively high. If ongoing intervention policies, such as universal masking, could suppress R0R_{0} at a relatively low level, prioritizing the high-transmission age group (i.e., adults aged 20-39) is most effective to reduce both mortality and hospitalizations. These conclusions provide useful recommendations for age-based vaccination prioritization for COVID-19.

Index Terms:
COVID-19, epidemic modeling, random network, vaccination.

I Introduction

Between January 2020 and November 30, 2020, about 1.47 million deaths from the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) are reported worldwide[1]. On the one hand, COVID-19 is much more deadly than most strains of flu. On the other hand, many people infected with the coronavirus do not develop symptoms, and hence they can transmit the virus to others without being aware of it[2], which makes the pandemic extremely difficult to contain.

To live with the COVID-19 pandemic, governments and healthcare systems are always struggling to save lives and “flatten the curve”, i.e., reducing the mortality and the peak of hospitalizations. Since severity and mortality rates of COVID-19 greatly vary across age-groups and increase dramatically for the elderly[3, 4], effective intervention policies to achieve these two goals must prevent elderly, who are at high-risk for severe clinical outcomes, from infections. For this reason, age-stratified modeling for COVID-19 dynamics indeed serves as the basis of accurately assessing the effectiveness of control policies in decreasing illness severity and mortality. In this respect, some age-stratified mathematical models have already been proposed to analyze the spread of COVID-19 for different purposes[5, 6, 7, 8]. However, these models are based on an oversimplified assumption that people are fully mixing, i.e., everyone contracting and spreading the virus to every other with equal probability, within each age group, which clearly fail to incorporate enough details in real-life contact networks. In reality, people in the same age group still differ greatly in the way of spreading the disease. As a consequence of this heterogeneity, it is found that epidemic outcomes in complex networks could deviate greatly from the results obtained from fully mixing epidemiological models[9, 10].

Motivated by the aforementioned observations, in this paper, we present a unified yet simple mathematical model for COVID-19 spread analysis by accounting for both the age-specific risk and the heterogeneity in contact patterns within and across age groups. We take advantage of random network theory to analyze the spread of COVID-19 in contact networks with general degree distributions. More specifically, we present an extension of standard SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) compartmental model, called age-stratified SEAHIR (susceptible-exposed-asymptomatic-hospitalized-infectious-removed) model to describe the disease progression for infected individuals, and study the epidemic spreading process in multitype random networks where each type of nodes is treated as an age group. Some key epidemiological metrics, such as time-dependent dynamics, steady-state epidemic size (which will be termed as epidemic size throughout this paper), epidemic probability, and reproduction number, are derived, allowing us to analyze the epidemics and the impact of control policies in a thorough and effective manner. Due to the consideration of stochasticity and network structure, the proposed model is capable of offering some useful epidemic results that the existing fully mixing age-stratified models are unable to provide, like assessing the impact of preferential isolation of nodes (e.g., immunizing essential workers first). Given that many contagious diseases, including influenza, also exhibit distinct characteristics for different groups of people[11], the proposed model can be easily generalized to modeling many other infectious diseases.

Refer to caption
Figure 1: Mortality (the ultimate death toll over the whole population) versus reproduction number R0R_{0} with 10%10\% vaccination coverage. Here, R0R_{0} denotes the reproduction number prior to vaccination, where we control the level of NPIs to vary R0R_{0} (the details are given in Section V-A). “20-39 prioritized” or “60+ prioritized” means that these vaccine doses (enough to vaccinate 10% population) are uniformly given to the adults aged 20-39 or aged 60+. The simulation is based on real-world age-stratified contact matrix for the United States[12].

While non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) policies, such as masking and social distancing, are effective in reducing the transmissions and mitigating the healthcare burden, it has become increasingly clear that vaccination is the only way to eliminate the pandemic worldwide. Unfortunately, vaccine availability will be highly constrained for general population during at least the first several months of the vaccine distribution campaign. Therefore, vaccination prioritization decision will play a pivotal role in reducing the effects of COVID-19 during such a period[13, 14]. Under our proposed framework, we present an age-stratified vaccination strategy for the considered multitype network. In simulations, we focus on answering the following question: with limited doses available, who should be vaccinated first to reduce mortality and hospitalizations as much as possible? Our simulation results show that the answer depends on the value of reproduction number R0R_{0}. The reason behind is that, the epidemic size (i.e., the fraction of population eventually getting infected) increases slowly in large R0R_{0} region, while increasing steeply in small R0R_{0} region. As a result, vaccinating the high-transmission group (adults aged 20-39) is highly effective in blocking COVID-19 transmissions in small R0R_{0} region, which thus protects the high-risk group (the elderly) indirectly. In contrast, in large R0R_{0} region, even if high-transmission group is prioritized, it will have little impact on epidemic size as long as the vaccine supply is limited. Consequently, directly vaccinating the high-risk group becomes the preferable strategy. We illustrate this phenomenon in Fig. 1, where prioritizing young people aged 20-39 is preferable when R0<1.36R_{0}<1.36, whereas prioritizing the elderly is the better choice only when R0>1.36R_{0}>1.36. Although most studies estimate that R0R_{0} for COVID-19 is between 2-3.5 under pre-intervention scenarios[15], it certainly can be pushed to a relatively low level, e.g., below 1.361.36, via NPI policies or even natural immunity (the latter only meaningful for highly infected places[16]). Thus, our finding indicates that vaccination prioritization should be customized for different places by considering the ongoing NPI policies and other effects that could suppress R0R_{0}. The key contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.

  • We employ multitype random network theory to develop an age-stratified epidemic model for COVID-19. We derive the time-dependent epidemic dynamics, where each individual could belong to one of six compartments, i.e., susceptible, exposed, asymptomatic, hospitalized, infectious and removed.

  • To analyze the stochastic property and final state of the epidemic, we derive other critical epidemiological metrics, such as epidemic size, epidemic probability, and reproduction number for the considered networks.

  • We present an age-stratified vaccination strategy based on the proposed model. The simulation results indicate that high-risk age group should be vaccinated first to diminish mortality and hospitalizations in large R0R_{0} region. Conversely, when R0R_{0} is suppressed at a low level, prioritizing the high-transmission age group becomes the most effective strategy.

The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the related work. In Section III, we introduce the network model, and derive the time-dependent epidemic dynamics and other key epidemiological metrics. In Section IV, we devise an vaccination strategy for the considered networks. In Section V, we conduct simulations to compare different age-specific vaccination prioritization strategies. In Section VI, we draw our conclusions.

II Related Work

Some mathematical models for COVID-19 have been presented to account for the age-varying risks for mortality and severe illness. In [5], Singh et al. use an age-stratified SIR (susceptible-infective-removed) model to study the impact of social distancing measures, including workplace non-attendance, school closure, and lockdown, on the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. In [6], Balabdaoui et al. propose an age-stratified discrete compartmental model to describe the day-by-day progression of an infected individual in modern healthcare systems, e.g., in intensive care unit (ICU), with the objective of precisely projecting the occupancy of health care resources. In [7], Tuite et al. develop an age-stratified COVID-19 model to identify intervention strategies that keep the number of projected severe cases lower than the capacity of local health care systems. The aforementioned models make full-mixing assumption within each age group, which hence fail to capture enough details of population heterogeneity. In [17], Chang et al. propose an agent-based model to predict the infected number in Australia by considering the age-dependent effects. While agent-based models incorporate more realistic factors, they demand computationally intensive simulations, and generally offer limited insights into epidemic outcomes.

Random network theory allows us to model epidemics by taking heterogeneous contact network structure into account while bypassing computationally complicated simulations. Epidemic propagation in networks can be exactly interpreted as a bond percolation process, which hence can be analyzed by well-understood physics models, such as percolation[18]. Although several works have applied percolation theory to analyze the spread of COVID-19[10, 19, 20], they have not taken the age-varying effects into consideration. On the other hand, given that an age-stratified population can be characterized as a multitype random network in which each type of vertices correspond to an age group, one possible direction is to directly map the epidemic spread to bond percolation in multitype random graphs[21, 22]. Unfortunately, percolation theory is mostly limited to analysis of final state of networks, and cannot predict time-dependent transient dynamics. In [23], Miller et al. propose an edge-based SIR compartmental model to describe the time-dependent epidemic dynamics in complex networks. Inspired by their approach, we solve the time-dependent dynamics for COVID-19 in multitype random networks, and then derive the expressions for epidemic size, epidemic probability, and reproduction number by performing analysis on the final state of the considered networks.

The design of vaccination prioritization strategies for COVID-19 has also attracted some research attention. Nonetheless, most of works draw the conclusion that vaccinating the older groups first is the robust strategy to minimize mortality or hospitalizations during a vaccine shortage[24, 25, 26]. This perhaps is because they fail to identify the underlying relationship between the priority population and the reproduction number R0R_{0}. Our finding coincides with these works only when R0R_{0} is great. Recently, Jentsch et al. show that prioritizing the high-transmission group will reduce the death toll from COVID-19 most if vaccines become available late next year for Ontario, because high level of natural immunity may be already achieved in Ontario at that time[8]. Their conclusion essentially shares the same observation with ours as higher natural immunity leads to a lower R0R_{0}. Different from their work, by taking advantage of our epidemic model, we also study the impact of vaccination prioritization strategies on hospitalizations, and the effectiveness of immunizing people with high activity, i.e., the essential workers. Furthermore, our simulation results show that vaccinating high-transmission group is highly effective as long as R0R_{0} is small, which applies to areas that are either hit hard as in [8] or only have few infections but with relatively strict NPI policies, e.g., masking mandate.

III Epidemic analysis

III-A Network and compartmental model

Let us consider a multitype network which consists of MM types of nodes, each corresponding to an age group in a population. We use wiw_{i} to represent the fraction of the nodes of type i[1,M]i\in[1,M]. The contact from a type-ii node to others follows degree distribution pi(k1,k2,,kM)pi(𝒌)p_{i}(k_{1},k_{2},...,k_{M})\triangleq p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k}), describing the joint probability for type-ii node to be connected with k1k_{1} type-11 node, k2k_{2} type-22 node, …, and kMk_{M} type-MM node, where 𝒌=(k1,k2,,kM){\boldsymbol{k}}=(k_{1},k_{2},\ldots,k_{M}). The considered network can be generated by the following procedure: 1) generate stubs for every node following degree distribution pi(𝒌)p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k}), where each stub contains the information about which type of node it reaches. 2) randomly wire two matching stubs together to create an edge and repeat this process until no stubs left.

Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) and Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) compartmental models are widely used for epidemic modeling. In SEIR compartmental model, each individual can be in one of the four states, i.e., Susceptible, Exposed, Infected, or Removed. Here, to capture the salient features of COVID-19, we present a novel compartmental model, i.e., SEAHIR model, which adds two additional compartments, i.e., asymptomatic and hospitalized, to the classic SEIR model. In SEAHIR model, each individual can be in one of the six states: susceptible (S), exposed (E), symptomatic and infectious (I), asymptomatic and infectious (A), hospitalized (H), and removed (R). Both new compartments are paramount to describe the dynamics of COVID-19: the number of people in H state indicates the hospitalizations, which must be kept lower than health care capacity; patients in A state have different level of infectivity compared with symptomatic ones[27]. We assume that individuals in E state is not infectious because of low virus load, and individuals in H state are properly isolated. Individuals in I and A states are assumed to be infectious to others, where the infection rate from a type-ii source node to a type-jj node is λi,jI\lambda_{i,j}^{I} or λi,jA\lambda_{i,j}^{A} given the source node belongs to I or A state. For conciseness, we do not distinguish recovery and death in R state, but assume that an age-dependent fraction of infected people will die. Furthermore, given the fact that the cases of reinfection with COVID-19 are still extremely rare, we do not consider the transition from R state to S state. For type-ii nodes, the transitions among the compartments are illustrated in Fig. 2, where the symbols on the arrows denote the corresponding transition rates from one to another, which are all dependent on node type ii to account for the age-dependent effects.

III-B Time-dependent dynamics

Refer to caption
Figure 2: SEAHIR compartmental model for nodes of type ii.

Disease propagates from infectious nodes to its neighbors, leading to an epidemic if the epidemic size is comparable to the whole population. We employ the edge-based compartmental method to solve the equations of dynamics governing the epidemic spread over random graph[23]. The core idea of the edge-based method is to shift our attention from an individual node to the status of its neighbor reached by an edge. To study the impact of vaccination or natural immunity, we consider that a fraction of population may be already immune at the beginning of analysis: Si(𝒌,0)S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0) represents the fraction of type-ii nodes with degree 𝒌\boldsymbol{k} that are initially susceptible. Besides, we use θji(t)\theta_{ji}(t) to denote the probability that a type-jj neighbor has not transmitted the disease to a type-ii node by time tt given that the type-ii node is susceptible at time 0. θji(t)\theta_{ji}(t) can be interpreted as a state of a type-jj neighbor of an initially susceptible type-ii node. It is noted that θji(0)=1\theta_{ji}(0)=1 according to the definition. Based on Fig. 2, we can construct the following equations to characterize the time-dependent epidemic process.

Si(t)\displaystyle S_{i}(t) =𝒌Si(𝒌,0)pi(𝒌)l=1Mθlikl(t),\displaystyle=\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k})\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}}_{li}(t), (1)
A˙i(t)\displaystyle\dot{A}_{i}(t) =βiEi(t)γiAAi(t),\displaystyle=\beta_{i}E_{i}(t)-\gamma_{i}^{A}A_{i}(t), (2)
I˙i(t)\displaystyle\dot{I}_{i}(t) =δiEi(t)ηiIi(t)γiIIi(t),\displaystyle=\delta_{i}E_{i}(t)-\eta_{i}I_{i}(t)-\gamma_{i}^{I}I_{i}(t), (3)
H˙i(t)\displaystyle\dot{H}_{i}(t) =ηiIi(t)γiHHi(t),\displaystyle=\eta_{i}I_{i}(t)-\gamma_{i}^{H}H_{i}(t), (4)
R˙i(t)\displaystyle\dot{R}_{i}(t) =γiAAi(t)+γiIIi(t)+γiHHi(t),\displaystyle=\gamma_{i}^{A}A_{i}(t)+\gamma_{i}^{I}I_{i}(t)+\gamma_{i}^{H}H_{i}(t), (5)
Ei(t)\displaystyle E_{i}(t) =1Si(t)Ai(t)Ii(t)Hi(t)Ri(t),\displaystyle=1-S_{i}(t)-A_{i}(t)-I_{i}(t)-H_{i}(t)-R_{i}(t), (6)

where Si(t)S_{i}(t), Ai(t)A_{i}(t), Ii(t)I_{i}(t), Hi(t)H_{i}(t), Ri(t)R_{i}(t), and Ei(t)E_{i}(t) represent the proportions of type-ii nodes in the corresponding states at time tt, respectively. From Markov chain theory, when the network size is sufficiently large, the fraction of nodes in AiA_{i}, IiI_{i}, HiH_{i}, and RiR_{i} states can be described well by the differential equations (2)-(5) due to the flow diagram in Fig. 2. Moreover, (6)(\ref{d6}) is obtained from Si(t)+Ai(t)+Ii(t)+Hi(t)+Ri(t)+Ei(t)=1S_{i}(t)+A_{i}(t)+I_{i}(t)+H_{i}(t)+R_{i}(t)+E_{i}(t)=1. For the initial conditions, we assume Ai(0)=Ii(0)=Hi(0)=Ei(0)=0A_{i}(0)=I_{i}(0)=H_{i}(0)=E_{i}(0)=0 and Ri(0)=1Si(0)R_{i}(0)=1-S_{i}(0). Obviously, one can solve the above equations as long as the key probability, i.e., θji(t)\theta_{ji}(t), is derived. To calculate θji(t)\theta_{ji}(t), following the approach in [23], we break it into six parts, i.e., ξjiS(t)\xi_{ji}^{S}(t), ξjiE(t)\xi_{ji}^{E}(t), ξjiA(t)\xi_{ji}^{A}(t), ξjiI(t)\xi_{ji}^{I}(t), ξjiH(t)\xi_{ji}^{H}(t), and ξjiR(t)\xi_{ji}^{R}(t). Specifically, ξjiS(t)\xi_{ji}^{S}(t), ξjiE(t)\xi_{ji}^{E}(t), ξjiA(t)\xi_{ji}^{A}(t), ξjiI(t)\xi_{ji}^{I}(t), ξjiH(t)\xi_{ji}^{H}(t), or ξjiR(t)\xi_{ji}^{R}(t) represents the probability that the considered type-jj neighbor is in SS, EE, AA, II, HH, or RR state, respectively, and has not transmitted the disease to the initially susceptible type-ii node by time tt, satisfying

θji(t)=ξjiS(t)+ξjiE(t)+ξjiA(t)+ξjiH(t)+ξjiI(t)+ξjiR(t).\displaystyle\theta_{ji}(t)=\xi_{ji}^{S}(t)+\xi_{ji}^{E}(t)+\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)+\xi_{ji}^{H}(t)+\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)+\xi_{ji}^{R}(t). (7)

A type-jj neighbor in SS state cannot infect the type-ii node, and hence ξjiS(t)\xi_{ji}^{S}(t) is simply equal to the probability that the considered type-jj neighbor is susceptible. The degree distribution of the considered type-jj neighbor is given by kipj(𝒌)k¯ji\frac{k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}, where k¯ji=𝒌kipj(𝒌)\overline{k}_{ji}=\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k}) is the average degree leaving from type-jj node to type-ii node, which normalizes the probability distribution. This quantity is proportional to kipj(𝒌)k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k}) because type-jj nodes with more edges incident to type-ii nodes are more likely to become the neighbors of type-ii nodes[21]. We can obtain ξjiS(t)\xi_{ji}^{S}(t) by computing the probability that the type-jj neighbor is initially susceptible and has not been infected by any of its neighbors, except the considered type-ii node, by time tt, i.e.,

ξjiS(t)=𝒌kiSj(𝒌,0)pj(𝒌)k¯jil=1Mθljklδil(t),\displaystyle\xi_{ji}^{S}(t)=\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}\frac{k_{i}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{lj}(t), (8)

where δil\delta_{il} is the Kronecker delta operator, with δil=1\delta_{il}=1 only when i=li=l, and δil=0\delta_{il}=0 otherwise.

As mentioned before, two states in our compartmental model, i.e., II and AA states, are infectious. Thus, the decrease in θji\theta_{ji} comes from two joint events: 1) the type-jj neighbor is AA or II state, and 2) it transmits the disease to the type-ii node with infection rate λjiA\lambda_{ji}^{A} or λjiI\lambda_{ji}^{I}, i.e.,

θ˙ji(t)=(λjiAξjiA(t)+λjiIξjiI(t)).\displaystyle-\dot{\theta}_{ji}(t)=\big{(}\lambda_{ji}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)+\lambda_{ji}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)\big{)}. (9)

One can also interpret (9) in this way: there is a state 1θji(t)1-\theta_{ji}(t) (which corresponds to that the type-jj neighbor has transmitted the disease to the initially susceptible type-ii node by time tt) receiving the flows from both ξjiA(t)\xi_{ji}^{A}(t) and ξjiI(t)\xi_{ji}^{I}(t).

If staying in AA, II or HH state, the type-jj neighbor transits to R state with rate γiA\gamma_{i}^{A}, γiI\gamma_{i}^{I} or γiH\gamma_{i}^{H}, which means

ξ˙jiR(t)=γjAξjiA(t)+γjIξjiI(t)+γjHξjiH(t).\displaystyle\dot{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t)=\gamma_{j}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)+\gamma_{j}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)+\gamma_{j}^{H}\xi_{ji}^{H}(t). (10)

The type-jj neighbor progresses from I state to H state with rate ηj\eta_{j}, leading to

ξ˙jiH(t)=ηjξjiI(t)γjHξjiH(t).\displaystyle\dot{\xi}_{ji}^{H}(t)=\eta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)-\gamma_{j}^{H}\xi_{ji}^{H}(t). (11)

States ξjiA(t)\xi_{ji}^{A}(t) and ξjiI(t)\xi_{ji}^{I}(t) receive the flows from state ξjiE(t)\xi_{ji}^{E}(t). Besides, ξjiA(t)\xi_{ji}^{A}(t) progresses to state 1θji(t)1-\theta_{ji}(t) and ξjiR(t)\xi_{ji}^{R}(t), while ξjiI(t)\xi_{ji}^{I}(t) progresses to state 1θji(t)1-\theta_{ji}(t), ξjiR(t)\xi_{ji}^{R}(t), and ξjiH(t)\xi_{ji}^{H}(t), yielding

ξ˙jiA(t)\displaystyle\dot{\xi}_{ji}^{A}(t) =βjξjiE(t)γjAξjiA(t)λjiAξjiA(t),\displaystyle=\beta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{E}(t)-\gamma_{j}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)-\lambda_{ji}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t), (12)
ξ˙jiI(t)\displaystyle\dot{\xi}_{ji}^{I}(t) =δjξjiE(t)γjIξjiI(t)ηjξjiI(t)λjiIξjiI(t).\displaystyle=\delta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{E}(t)-\gamma_{j}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)-\eta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)-\lambda_{ji}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t). (13)

In summary, one can solve θji(t)\theta_{ji}(t) from the following equations.

ξjiS(t)=𝒌kiSj(𝒌,0)pj(𝒌)k¯jil=1Mθljklδil(t),θ˙ji(t)=(λjiAξjiA(t)+λjiIξjiI(t)),ξ˙jiA(t)=βjξjiE(t)γjAξjiA(t)λjiAξjiA(t),ξ˙jiI(t)=δjξjiE(t)γjIξjiI(t)ηjξjiI(t)λjiIξjiI(t),ξ˙jiH(t)=ηjξjiI(t)γjHξjiH(t),ξ˙jiR(t)=γjAξjiA(t)+γjIξjiI(t)+γjHξjiH(t),ξjiE(t)=θji(t)ξjiS(t)ξjiA(t)ξjiH(t)ξjiI(t)ξjiR(t),\displaystyle\begin{split}\xi_{ji}^{S}(t)&=\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}\frac{k_{i}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{lj}(t),\\ \dot{\theta}_{ji}(t)&=-\big{(}\lambda_{ji}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)+\lambda_{ji}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)\big{)},\\ \dot{\xi}_{ji}^{A}(t)&=\beta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{E}(t)-\gamma_{j}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)-\lambda_{ji}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t),\\ \dot{\xi}_{ji}^{I}(t)&=\delta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{E}(t)-\gamma_{j}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)-\eta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)-\lambda_{ji}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t),\\ \dot{\xi}_{ji}^{H}(t)&=\eta_{j}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)-\gamma_{j}^{H}\xi_{ji}^{H}(t),\\ \dot{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t)&=\gamma_{j}^{A}\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)+\gamma_{j}^{I}\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)+\gamma_{j}^{H}\xi_{ji}^{H}(t),\\ \xi_{ji}^{E}(t)&=\theta_{ji}(t)-\xi_{ji}^{S}(t)-\xi_{ji}^{A}(t)-\xi_{ji}^{H}(t)-\xi_{ji}^{I}(t)\\ &-\xi_{ji}^{R}(t),\end{split} (14)

where ξjiR(0)=1𝒌kiSj(𝒌,0)pj(𝒌)k¯ji\xi_{ji}^{R}(0)=1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}\frac{k_{i}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}, θji(0)=1\theta_{ji}(0)=1, and ξjiA(0)=ξjiI(0)=ξjiH(0)=0\xi_{ji}^{A}(0)=\xi_{ji}^{I}(0)=\xi_{ji}^{H}(0)=0. By plugging θji(t)\theta_{ji}(t) into (1), we can obtain the fraction of type-ii nodes in each compartment at given time from (1)-(6). As a result, the desired age-stratified epidemic dynamics can be obtained by solving 𝒪(M2)\mathcal{O}(M^{2}) equations, where MM is the number of age groups. One can see that (1)-(6) and (14) account for considerably more population structure than a fully mixing model by only introducing marginally more complexity.

III-C Epidemic size and epidemic probability

Epidemic size measures the fraction of people eventually getting infected, and epidemic probability is defined as the likelihood that the first infected patient sparks an epidemic[9]. SEAHIR model contains more compartments than traditional SIR or SEIR models, which complicates the derivations of these two key metrics. Fortunately, both metrics only depend on final state of networks. From Fig. 2, it is intuitive to see that the network progresses to an equilibrium when tt\rightarrow\infty, where Ei()=Ai()=Ii()=Hi()=0E_{i}(\infty)=A_{i}(\infty)=I_{i}(\infty)=H_{i}(\infty)=0. By using this fact, we use a single compartment 𝕀\mathbb{I} to replace all the infected states, i.e., E, A, I, H states in the original SEAHIR compartmental model. Here is our trick: although S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model cannot be used to capture the temporal dynamics of SEAHIR model, it can be calibrated appropriately to share the same final network state, i.e., Si()S_{i}(\infty) and Ri()R_{i}(\infty), with SEAHIR model. Let Tji[0,1]T_{ji}\in[0,1] denote the probability that an infected type-jj node ultimately transmits the disease to an initially susceptible adjacent type-ii node. We assume that the S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model is with infection rate λ^ji\hat{\lambda}_{ji} from type-jj node to type-ii node and transition rate γ^ji\hat{\gamma}_{ji} from 𝕀\mathbb{I} state to R state for a type-jj neighbor of a type-ii node. Since TjiT_{ji} for the S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model is λ^jiλ^ji+γ^ji\frac{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}+\hat{\gamma}_{ji}}, the S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model has exactly the same final network state as the SEAHIR model as long as λ^jiλ^ji+γ^ji\frac{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}+\hat{\gamma}_{ji}} is set to the TjiT_{ji} in the SEAHIR model.

Let us first calculate TjiT_{ji} in the SEAHIR model, and then derive the desired metrics based on the S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model. An infected type-jj node may enter one of two infectious states, i.e., II state or AA state, with probability δjβj+δj\frac{\delta_{j}}{\beta_{j}+\delta_{j}} or βjβj+δj\frac{\beta_{j}}{\beta_{j}+\delta_{j}}. Given that the type-jj node in I or A state, suppose that there are two stages that it will progress to, i.e., “infecting the adjacent type-ii node” and “leaving current state”, with rates λjiI\lambda_{ji}^{I} (or λjiA\lambda_{ji}^{A}) and ηj+γjI\eta_{j}+\gamma^{I}_{j} (or γjA\gamma^{A}_{j}), respectively. TjiT_{ji} is the probability that the considered node enters the first stage, which equals λjiIλjiI+(ηj+γjI)\frac{\lambda^{I}_{ji}}{\lambda^{I}_{ji}+(\eta_{j}+\gamma^{I}_{j})} if the type-jj node is in II state, and equals λjiAλjiA+γjA\frac{\lambda^{A}_{ji}}{\lambda^{A}_{ji}+\gamma^{A}_{j}} if it is in AA state, yielding

Tji=\displaystyle T_{ji}= δjβj+δjλjiIλjiI+(ηj+γjI)+βjβj+δjλjiAλjiA+γjA.\displaystyle\frac{\delta_{j}}{\beta_{j}+\delta_{j}}\frac{\lambda^{I}_{ji}}{\lambda^{I}_{ji}+(\eta_{j}+\gamma^{I}_{j})}+\frac{\beta_{j}}{\beta_{j}+\delta_{j}}\frac{\lambda^{A}_{ji}}{\lambda^{A}_{ji}+\gamma^{A}_{j}}. (15)

In S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model, we use ξ^jiS(t)\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{S}(t), ξ^ji𝕀(t)\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t), or ξ^jiR(t)\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t) to represent the probability that a type-jj neighbor of an initially susceptible type-ii node is in SS, 𝕀\mathbb{I}, or RR state and meanwhile has not infected this type-ii node by time tt, and use θ^ji(t)\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t) to denote the probability that the type-jj neighbor has not infected the initially susceptible type-ii node by time tt, satisfying θ^ji(t)=ξ^jiS(t)+ξ^ji𝕀(t)+ξ^jiR(t)\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t)=\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{S}(t)+\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)+\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t). Notice that θ^ji(t)=θji(t)\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t)=\theta_{ji}(t) only when t=t=\infty, because SEAHIR and S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model share the same final network state while having different temporal dynamics. By analogy with the preceding subsection, we can obtain

ξ^jiS(t)=\displaystyle\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{S}(t)= 𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)kipj(𝒌)k¯jil=1Mθ^ljklδil(t),\displaystyle\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\prod_{l=1}^{M}\hat{\theta}^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{lj}(t), (16)
ξ^jiR(t)=\displaystyle\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t)= (1θ^ji(t))γ^jiλ^ji+ξ^jiR(0),\displaystyle\frac{(1-\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t))\hat{\gamma}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}+\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(0), (17)
θ^˙ji(t)=\displaystyle\dot{\hat{\theta}}_{ji}(t)= λ^jiξ^ji𝕀(t),\displaystyle-\hat{\lambda}_{ji}\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t), (18)
ξ^ji𝕀(t)=\displaystyle\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)= θ^ji(t)ξ^jiS(t)ξ^jiR(t)\displaystyle\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t)-\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{S}(t)-\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t)
=\displaystyle= θ^ji(t)𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)kipj(𝒌)k¯jil=1Mθ^ljklδil(t)\displaystyle\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t)-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\prod_{l=1}^{M}\hat{\theta}^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{lj}(t)
(1θ^ji(t))γ^jiλ^jiξ^jiR(0),\displaystyle-\frac{(1-\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t))\hat{\gamma}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}-\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(0), (19)

where ξ^jiR(0)=1𝒌kiSj(𝒌,0)pj(𝒌)k¯ji\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(0)=1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}\frac{k_{i}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}} is the probability that the type-jj neighbor is initially removed (immune), and θ^ji(0)=1\hat{\theta}_{ji}(0)=1. The derivation of (16) and (18) is similar to that of (8) and (9). Analogous to the preceding subsection, probability 1θ^ji(t)1-\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t) corresponds to that the type-jj neighbor has transmitted the disease to the initially susceptible type-ii node by time tt. State ξ^ji𝕀(t)\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t) transits to state 1θ^ji(t)1-\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t) with rate λ^ji\hat{\lambda}_{ji} while transiting to state ξ^jiR(t)\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t) with rate γ^ji\hat{\gamma}_{ji}, leading to the relationship between ξ^jiR(t)\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(t) and 1θ^ji(t)1-\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t) in (17).

Clearly, the epidemic dynamics can be governed by (18) and (19). By taking (19) into (18), we have

θ^˙ji(t)=\displaystyle\dot{\hat{\theta}}_{ji}(t)= λ^jiξ^jiR(0)+λ^ji𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)kipj(𝒌)k¯jil=1Mθ^ljklδil(t)\displaystyle\hat{\lambda}_{ji}\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{R}(0)+\hat{\lambda}_{ji}\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\prod_{l=1}^{M}\hat{\theta}^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{lj}(t)
+(1θ^ji(t))γ^jiλ^jiθ^ji(t).\displaystyle+(1-\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t))\hat{\gamma}_{ji}-\hat{\lambda}_{ji}\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t). (20)

Now the advantage of using S𝕀\mathbb{I}R compartmental model becomes clearer: we arrive at (20) which is only related to θ^ji(t)\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t). Since the population is closed, the epidemic will eventually go extinct, implying ξ^ji𝕀()=0\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(\infty)=0. Given that θ^˙ji()=λ^jiξ^ji𝕀()=0\dot{\hat{\theta}}_{ji}(\infty)=-\hat{\lambda}_{ji}\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(\infty)=0 and θji()=θ^ji()\theta_{ji}(\infty)=\hat{\theta}_{ji}(\infty), and recall that λ^jiλ^ji+γ^ji=Tji\frac{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}+\hat{\gamma}_{ji}}=T_{ji}, we can go back to the original SEAHIR model and obtain

θji()=\displaystyle\theta_{ji}(\infty)= Tji(1𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)kipj(𝒌)k¯ji(1l=1Mθljklδil()))\displaystyle T_{ji}\Big{(}1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\big{(}1-\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{lj}(\infty)\big{)}\Big{)}
+1Tji,\displaystyle+1-T_{ji}, (21)

where TjiT_{ji} can be calculated from (15). One can solve θji()\theta_{ji}(\infty) from the above equation. In fact, (21) can be explained in an intuitive way: a type-ii node has not been infected by a type-jj neighbor since t=0t=0 either because it cannot be reached from its neighbor with probability 1Tji1-T_{ji}, or it can be reached from its neighbor with probability TjiT_{ji} but the neighbor has not been infected since t=0t=0. Thus, as tt\rightarrow\infty, the fraction of type-ii nodes that have been infected since t=0t=0 is given by Ri()Ri(0)R_{i}(\infty)-R_{i}(0), i.e.,

Ri()Ri(0)=(1𝒌Si(𝒌,0)pi(𝒌)l=1Mθlikl())\displaystyle R_{i}(\infty)-R_{i}(0)=\big{(}1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k})\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}}_{li}(\infty)\big{)}-
(1𝒌Si(𝒌,0)pi(𝒌))=𝒌Si(𝒌,0)pi(𝒌)(1l=1Mθlikl()).\displaystyle\big{(}1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k})\big{)}=\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k})\big{(}1-\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}}_{li}(\infty)\big{)}. (22)

The epidemic size is therefore expressed as

=\displaystyle\mathcal{R}= i=1Mwi(𝒌Si(𝒌,0)pi(𝒌)(1l=1Mθlikl())).\displaystyle\sum_{i=1}^{M}w_{i}\Big{(}\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k})\big{(}1-\prod_{l=1}^{M}\theta^{k_{l}}_{li}(\infty)\big{)}\Big{)}. (23)

It is noted that when the population is fully susceptible, i.e., Si(𝒌,0)=1S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)=1 for all jj and 𝒌\boldsymbol{k}, \mathcal{R} solved from (21) and (23) is the size of giant component in multitype networks obtained by percolation theory[21, 22]. We can compute epidemic probability in a similar way. Let μij()\mu_{ij}(\infty) denote the probability that a type-ii node (which is assumed to be infected) does not spark an epidemic via a type-jj neighbor. Analogous to (21), the following argument is true: a type-ii node does not ignite an epidemic via a type-jj node either because it cannot infect its type-jj neighbor, or it can infect its type-jj neighbor but the latter cannot spark an epidemic, which means

μij()=\displaystyle\mu_{ij}(\infty)= Tij(1𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)kipj(𝒌)k¯ji(1l=1Mμjlklδil()))\displaystyle T_{ij}\Big{(}1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}\big{(}1-\prod_{l=1}^{M}\mu^{k_{l}-\delta_{il}}_{jl}(\infty)\big{)}\Big{)}
+1Tij.\displaystyle+1-T_{ij}. (24)

As a result, the probability that an infected type-ii node ignites an epidemic is given by

𝒫i=1𝒌pi(𝒌)l=1Mμilkl().\displaystyle\mathcal{P}_{i}=1-\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}p_{i}(\boldsymbol{k})\prod_{l=1}^{M}\mu^{k_{l}}_{il}(\infty). (25)

By randomly choosing a susceptible node to infect, we define the likelihood that it starts an epidemic as the epidemic probability:

𝒫=\displaystyle\mathcal{P}= i=1Mw¯i𝒫i,\displaystyle\sum_{i=1}^{M}\overline{w}_{i}\mathcal{P}_{i}, (26)

where w¯i=𝒌wiSi(𝒌,0)i𝒌wiSi(𝒌,0)\overline{w}_{i}=\frac{\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}w_{i}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)}{\sum_{i}\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}w_{i}S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0)} is the probability that the randomly chosen susceptible node is of type ii, which reduces to wiw_{i} in a fully susceptible population.

III-D Reproduction number

One of the fundamental parameters for an epidemic is its reproduction number, i.e., the average number of secondary cases caused by an infected individual. Again, since this metric is unrelated to temporal dynamics, we can derive it from S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model to simplify our calculation. According to the seminal work [28], the reproduction number is equivalent to the spectral radius of the next generation matrix FV1FV^{-1}, where the (m,n)(m,n) element of matrix FF is the rate of new infections entering infected state mm caused by infected state nn, and (m,n)(m,n) element of matrix VV is the rate at which infected state mm transfers to infected state nn, assuming that the population remains near the disease-free equilibrium. In our edge-based S𝕀\mathbb{I}R model (18) and (19), ξ^ji𝕀\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}} can be treated as the infected state. Therefore, we have M2M^{2} infected states in total. Recall that there should be λ^jiλ^ji+γ^ji=Tji\frac{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}+\hat{\gamma}_{ji}}=T_{ji}, where TjiT_{ji} is calculated from (15). To simplify the derivations below, we further assume that λ^ji+γ^ji=1\hat{\lambda}_{ji}+\hat{\gamma}_{ji}=1 (one can derive the same R0R_{0} in (30) without this assumption, because R0R_{0} is only related to λ^jiλ^ji+γ^ji\frac{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}}{\hat{\lambda}_{ji}+\hat{\gamma}_{ji}}). By differentiating (19) and taking (18) into it, we have

ξ^˙ji𝕀(t)=ξ^ji𝕀(t)+\displaystyle\dot{\hat{\xi}}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)=-\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)+
l=1M𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)ki(klδil)pj(𝒌)k¯jiTljξ^lj𝕀(t)x[1,M]θ^xjkxδixδxl(t).\displaystyle\sum_{l=1}^{M}\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}(k_{l}-\delta_{il})p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}T_{lj}\hat{\xi}_{lj}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)\prod_{x\in[1,M]}\hat{\theta}^{k_{x}-\delta_{ix}-\delta_{xl}}_{xj}(t). (27)

Then, to obtain the linearized subsystem for infected states about the disease-free equilibrium, we linearize (27) at the origin (ξ^ji𝕀(t)=0\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)=0 and θ^ji(t)=1\hat{\theta}_{ji}(t)=1):

ξ^˙ji𝕀(t)=ξ^ji𝕀(t)+l=1M𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)ki(klδil)pj(𝒌)k¯jiTljξ^lj𝕀(t).\displaystyle\dot{\hat{\xi}}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)=-\hat{\xi}_{ji}^{\mathbb{I}}(t)+\sum_{l=1}^{M}\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}(k_{l}-\delta_{il})p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}T_{lj}\hat{\xi}_{lj}^{\mathbb{I}}(t). (28)

Then, we can construct FF as an M2×M2M^{2}\times M^{2} matrix, with ((i1)M+j,(j1)M+l)\big{(}(i-1)M+j,(j-1)M+l\big{)} element equal to

𝒌Sj(𝒌,0)ki(klδil)pj(𝒌)k¯jiTlj,i,j,l[1,M],\displaystyle\sum_{\boldsymbol{k}}S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)\frac{k_{i}(k_{l}-\delta_{il})p_{j}(\boldsymbol{k})}{\overline{k}_{ji}}T_{lj},\quad\forall i,j,l\in[1,M], (29)

and construct VV as an M2×M2M^{2}\times M^{2} identity matrix. Reproduction number R0R_{0} is therefore given by

R0=ρ(FV1)=ρ(F),\displaystyle R_{0}=\rho(FV^{-1})=\rho(F), (30)

where ρ()\rho(\cdot) represents spectral radius. From Theorem 2 in [28], R0=1R_{0}=1 marks the epidemic threshold in the sense that the disease-free equilibrium is asymptotically stable if R0<1R_{0}<1, and is unstable if R0>1R_{0}>1. In particular, in the case of Sj(𝒌,0)=1S_{j}(\boldsymbol{k},0)=1 for all jj and 𝒌\boldsymbol{k}, R0R_{0} becomes the basic reproduction number, i.e., the average number of secondary cases caused by an infected individual in a completely susceptible population. In this special case, the epidemic threshold R0=1R_{0}=1 is also in agreement with the threshold for multitype random network obtained by percolation theory[21, 22].

IV Age-Stratified Vaccination

Under our proposed analytical framework, in this section, we present an age-stratified vaccination scheme and study its impact on epidemic outcomes. Considering a network with NN nodes of type ii, we use the following function to characterize the immunization strategy for type-ii nodes[29, 30]:

Φi(k~n)=k~nαn=1Nk~nα,<α<+,\displaystyle\Phi_{i}(\tilde{k}_{n})=\frac{\tilde{k}_{n}^{\alpha}}{\sum_{n=1}^{N}\tilde{k}_{n}^{\alpha}},-\infty<\alpha<+\infty, (31)

where Φi(k~n)\Phi_{i}(\tilde{k}_{n}) is the probability that a susceptible node nn of type ii with k~n\tilde{k}_{n}-degree is chosen to be immunized, and α\alpha is an exponent quantifying the immunization preference towards nodes with high degree. We use the tilde operator on kk to represent the total degree of a node. A greater α\alpha indicates that nodes with higher degree (e.g., essential workers) are more likely to be immunized. In particular, α=\alpha=\infty represents a node immunization process in an entire descending order, i.e., from the highest degree to the lowest degree. In contrast, when α=0\alpha=0, we have Φi(k~n)=1N\Phi_{i}(\tilde{k}_{n})=\frac{1}{N}, implying a uniform immunization strategy for nodes of type ii. Notice that since the full knowledge of a contact network is generally unavailable, immunizing nodes in a descending order is rather unrealistic. The value of α\alpha depends on the strategy and knowledge of a vaccine distributor.

Recall that Si(𝒌,0)S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0) denotes the fraction of type-ii nodes with degree 𝒌\boldsymbol{k} that are initially susceptible. In our model, studying the impact of the immunization strategy in (31) only requires solving new initial conditions Sif(𝒌,0)S_{i}^{f}(\boldsymbol{k},0), i.e., the fraction of type-ii nodes with degree 𝒌\boldsymbol{k} that are still susceptible when only ff fraction of type-ii nodes remain susceptible after implementing the immunization strategy, where f=Si(0)vf=S_{i}(0)-v, with vv being the fraction of type-ii nodes immunized by vaccination. Let Pi(k~)P_{i}(\tilde{k}) be the probability that a type-ii node is with degree k~\tilde{k}, Sif(k~,0)S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0) and Aif(k~)A^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k}) be the fraction and the number of type-ii nodes with k~\tilde{k} degree that are still susceptible when only ff fraction of type-ii nodes remain susceptible, respectively. Due to the fact that (31) only depends on total node degree k~\tilde{k}, the subsequent development is only related to k~\tilde{k} instead of the vector of node degree 𝒌\boldsymbol{k}. According to the definitions, we have the relationship

Pi(k~)Sif(k~,0)=Aif(k~)N.\displaystyle P_{i}(\tilde{k})S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)=\frac{A^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k})}{N}. (32)

After one susceptible node is immunized according to (31), Aif(k~)A^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k}) becomes

Aif1N(k~)=Aif(k~)Pi(k~)Sif(k~,0)k~αk~α¯(f),\displaystyle A^{f-\frac{1}{N}}_{i}(\tilde{k})=A^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k})-\frac{P_{i}(\tilde{k})S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}{\overline{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}(f)}, (33)

where

k~α¯(f)k~Pi(k~)Sif(k~,0)k~α.\displaystyle\overline{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}(f)\equiv\sum_{\tilde{k}}P_{i}(\tilde{k})S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)\tilde{k}^{\alpha}. (34)

In the limit of NN\rightarrow\infty, (33) can be expressed as

dAif(k~)df=NPi(k~)Sif(k~,0)k~αk~α¯(f).\displaystyle\frac{dA^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k})}{df}=N\frac{P_{i}(\tilde{k})S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}{\overline{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}(f)}. (35)

Differentiating (32) in terms of ff and plugging it into (35), we obtain

dSif(k~,0)df=Sif(k~,0)k~αk~α¯(f).\displaystyle\frac{dS^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)}{df}=\frac{S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}{\overline{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}(f)}. (36)

In the spirit of [29], we define a new function Gα(x)=k~Pi(k~)Si(k~,0)xk~αG_{\alpha}(x)=\sum_{\tilde{k}}P_{i}(\tilde{k})S_{i}(\tilde{k},0)x^{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}} and introduce a new variable tGα1(f)t\equiv G^{-1}_{\alpha}(f) in order to solve (36), where Si(k~,0)S_{i}(\tilde{k},0) in Gα(x)G_{\alpha}(x) is the fraction of type-ii nodes with degree k~\tilde{k} that are susceptible before implementing the immunization strategy. One can find that

Sif(k~,0)=tk~αSi(k~,0),\displaystyle S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{k},0)=t^{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}S_{i}(\tilde{k},0), (37)

exactly satisfies (36), which hence is the solution to (36). Equivalently, considering the vector of node degree 𝒌~\tilde{\boldsymbol{k}} with k~\tilde{k} as the total degree, we have

Sif(𝒌~,0)=tk~αSi(𝒌~,0),\displaystyle S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{k}},0)=t^{\tilde{k}^{\alpha}}S_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{k}},0), (38)

By simply replacing Si(𝒌~,0)S_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{k}},0) with the new initial conditions Sif(𝒌~,0)S^{f}_{i}(\tilde{\boldsymbol{k}},0), we can obtain the various epidemic outcomes in the preceding section by taking the age-stratified immunization into account.

V Simulations

V-A Parameter settings

We now study the impact of control policies, particularly age-specific vaccination strategies, for the COVID-19 pandemic. We use the estimated social contact data by age groups for the United States to conduct our simulations, where C=[cij]C=[c_{ij}] represents the contact matrix by age, with cijc_{ij} being the average number of contacts that a node of type ii has with nodes of type jj[12]. Notice, however, that the conclusions drawn from our simulations are also generalizable to many other countries, because age-stratified contact exhibits similar patterns in most countries[31, 12]. The population is partitioned into M=6M=6 age groups, i.e., populations of [0,4][0,4], [5,19][5,19], [20,39][20,39], [40,49][40,49], [50,59][50,59] and 60+60+ years old.

Following [32], we assume that the susceptibility to infection for adults over 20 years is identical, and the susceptibility to infection for individuals under 20 years old is half of that for adults over 20 years old. Specifically, we set transmission rate λijI=λ\lambda^{I}_{ij}=\lambda for all i[1,6]i\in[1,6] and j[3,6]j\in[3,6], and λijI=12λ\lambda^{I}_{ij}=\frac{1}{2}\lambda for all i[1,6]i\in[1,6] and j[1,2]j\in[1,2]. We set λijA=23λijI\lambda^{A}_{ij}=\frac{2}{3}\lambda^{I}_{ij} to account for the fact that asymptomatic people are less infectious than symptomatic ones111It is commonly recognized that symptomatic patients are more infectious than asymptomatic ones because cough and sneeze could help spread the virus.. The course of an epidemic is primarily governed by the basic reproduction number. Being consistent with [15], we assume that the basic reproduction number is R0=2.5R_{0}=2.5, and derive the transmission rate λ\lambda from (30) accordingly. Given that young people develop milder symptoms or no symptoms more frequently than the elderly, the symptomatic probabilities are set to 20%20\%, 20%20\%, 30%30\%, 40%40\%, 50%50\%, and 60%60\%, and the probabilities of needing to be hospitalized for symptomatic cases are set to 0.10%0.10\%, 0.23%0.23\%, 2.19%2.19\%, 4.90%4.90\%, 10.20%10.20\%, and 20.82%20.82\% from young age groups to old age groups[3]. Furthermore, the infection fatality ratios are set to 0.003%0.003\%, 0.01%0.01\%, 0.06%0.06\%, 0.16%0.16\%, 0.60%0.60\%, and 3.64%3.64\% from the young to the elderly, respectively[3]. We set the average time from the exposure to the onset of being infected (i.e., A or I states) to 5 days, the average infection period to 77 days if not admitted to hospital, and the average time stay in hospitals to 1010 days[33]. To compare the effectiveness of vaccination prioritization strategies, we consider a completely susceptible population before vaccination. Later, this assumption is relaxed in Fig. 8 to demonstrate the consistency of our conclusion by considering a population with a high level of natural immunity.

Refer to caption
Figure 3: Epidemic size versus reproduction number R0R_{0}.

V-A1 Modeling of Universal Masking

At the early stage of vaccine distribution campaign, masking and/or social distancing measures are still needed. Thus, assessing the effectiveness of an vaccination prioritization strategy requires the considerations of ongoing NPI policies. We denote the population contact matrix as C=Ch+Cw+Cs+CoC=C^{h}+C^{w}+C^{s}+C^{o}, where ChC^{h}, CwC^{w}, CsC^{s} and CoC^{o} are the age-stratified contact matrices for home, workplace, school, and other locations, respectively[12]. For instance, the (i,j)(i,j)-th element in ChC^{h}, denoted by cijhc^{h}_{ij}, is the average degree from a node of type ii to nodes of type jj at home. By considering the NPIs, we modify the population contact matrix CC as follows.

C=Ch+g(Cw+Cs+Co),C=C^{h}+g\big{(}C^{w}+C^{s}+C^{o}\big{)}, (39)

where g[0,1]g\in[0,1] is the scaling factor accounting for the change in transmission rate per contact due to the presence of NPIs. We assume that widespread face masking in public (i.e., workplace, school, and other locations) are recommended. Since reducing the transmission rate for an edge (contact) by 1g1-g is equivalent to removing this edge with probability 1g1-g for the spread of epidemic[9], we directly scale the contact matrices CwC^{w}, CsC^{s}, and CoC^{o} to reflect the reduction in transmission rates in these places. The value of gg can be estimated from mask coverage (the fraction of population wearing masks) and mask efficacy (the fraction of effective transmissions blocked by masking)[34]. In what follows, we assume g=0.3g=0.3 for illustrative purpose. By this scaling, reproduction number R0R_{0} is pushed from 2.52.5 to 1.161.16. We will compare different vaccination prioritization strategies under no-masking scenario with g=1g=1 and masking scenario with g=0.3g=0.3. We remark that weaker mask use in conjunction with other NPIs in public places (i.e., social distancing measures) may have a similar effect on gg. This is because social distancing also reduces the transmission opportunity between two individuals, which has no difference with masking in terms of mathematical modeling.

To demonstrate that our parameter g=0.3g=0.3 is realistic, we refer the readers to the reference [34]. According to Ref. [34], when the product of mask coverage and mask efficacy is 0.60.6, e.g., mask coverage is 0.750.75 and mask efficacy is 0.80.8, the relative transmission rate of COVID-19 reduces to 0.30.3 compared with the no-masking case. In the real world, the efficacy of surgical masks is estimated to be about 0.80.8[34]. Therefore, three quarters of population wearing surgical masks in the public places (i.e., workplace, school, and other locations) may lead to g=0.3g=0.3.

V-A2 Impact of Population Structure Heterogeneity

Even with the same R0R_{0} and contact matrix CC (containing average contact number cijc_{ij} across age groups), the epidemic may still spread differently in networks because of the assumption on degree distributions. Fig. 3 sheds light on the effects of structural heterogeneity on epidemic outcome. Based on the same contact matrix, we examine two types of degree distributions: Poisson distribution and power law distribution with the law’s exponent equal to 2.52.5[9]. From the estimates in [12], the contact numbers cijc_{ij} are assumed to follow Poisson distributions. Compared with Poisson distributions, power law distributions have a quite “heterogeneous” structure: it contains not only many nodes with few contacts, but also a handful of “superspreaders” with very high degree. As illustrated in Fig. 3, power law network shrinks the epidemic size compared with Poisson network, which clearly reveals that the same R0R_{0} and matrix of average contact number are still not enough to accurately forecast epidemic dynamics. In fact, the assumption that contact networks follow Poisson distributions is rather ideal, as it fails to capture the superspreader events that may greatly drive the transmissions of COVID-19[16]. An estimate of degree distributions of real-world contact networks is still needed in the future research to improve the precision of projected epidemic results. However, noting that our mission in this section is to seek the effective vaccination prioritization policies rather than providing the exact or even best estimate of epidemic dynamics, we assume that the contact network follows Poisson distributions without loss of generality.

V-B Effectiveness of Vaccination Prioritization Strategies

Refer to caption
(a) No-masking scenario (g=1g=1).
Refer to caption
(b) Masking scenario (g=0.3g=0.3).
Figure 4: Epidemic size versus different immunization prioritization strategies.
Refer to caption
(a) No-masking scenario (g=1g=1).
Refer to caption
(b) Masking scenario (g=0.3g=0.3).
Figure 5: Mortality versus different immunization prioritization strategies.

We intend to compare the effectiveness of age-specfic vaccination prioritization strategies under two scenarios: no-masking scenario and masking scenario. Unless specified otherwise, we consider uniform vaccination within the same age group by setting α=0\alpha=0 in (38). Although we conduct simulations by assuming the basic reproduction number R0=2.5R_{0}=2.5, our conclusions below also hold for other reasonable estimated R0R_{0} values for COVID-19, such as from 22 to 3.53.5. We assume that the vaccine efficacy for individuals below 6565 years old is 95.6%95.6\%, and for individuals over 6565 years old is 86.4%86.4\% according to the Moderna’s clinical trial data[35]. In fact, our findings below also hold for Pfizer’s vaccine efficacy, which is about 95%95\% for all age groups[36]. Since the elderly aged 60+ has the lowest average contact number but the highest mortality and illness severity, while the adults aged 203920-39 have a high average contact rate and low mortality and illness severity, we call the adults aged 203920-39 as the high-transmission group, and the elderly aged 60+ as the high-risk group. We remark that, even though the children aged 5-19 have the highest average contact number among the population[12], they are assumed to be less susceptible to the infection as mentioned before, thus contributing less to the COVID-19 transmissions than the adults aged 203920-39.

In Fig. 4, we compare the epidemic size under different vaccination prioritization strategies by varying the fraction of the whole population being vaccinated. In the figure, we use “20-39 prioritized” (or other age ranges) to represent that the vaccine doses are all given to the population aged 20-39. In particular, since the children aged 040-4 only constitute about 6%6\% of the whole population, the remaining vaccines, if all the children aged 040-4 get vaccinated (i.e., in the case where 8%8\% or 10%10\% population is vaccinated in the figure), are uniformly allocated to other age groups. As shown in the figure, prioritization of the adults aged 20-39 is most effective in blocking the transmissions and reducing the infections under both no-masking and masking scenarios. However, we should notice the difference: the reduction in epidemic size achieved by prioritization of the high-transmission group under masking scenario is much more significant than that of no-masking scenario. As illustrated in Fig. 3, when around R0=2.5R_{0}=2.5, i.e., under no-masking scenario, epidemic size decreases slowly with R0R_{0}. As a result, no matter which vaccination strategy is implemented, it will not affect the epidemic size much, as observed from Fig. 4(a). In contrast, under masking scenario with R0=1.16R_{0}=1.16, epidemic size shrinks fast as R0R_{0} reduces. For this reason, prioritizing the high-transmission group reduces the epidemic size significantly as shown in Fig. 4(b).

In Fig. 5, we investigate which age-specific vaccination prioritization strategy reduces the mortality (the death toll over the whole population) most. This metric is calculated from the epidemic size and the age-dependent mortality ratios. As shown in Fig. 5(a), prioritizing the elderly achieves the lowest mortality under no-masking scenario. This is due to two facts: 1) no matter which prioritization strategy is implemented, limited vaccine doses will not decrease the epidemic size much when R0R_{0} is great. 2) The elderly people have remarkably higher mortality risk than the remaining population. Consequently, protecting the elderly directly is a wise method in such a case. Nonetheless, under masking scenario, inoculating the adults aged 203920-39 becomes the most effective strategy to reduce the mortality as illustrated in Fig. 5(b). This is because prioritization of high-transmission groups substantially blocks COVID-19 transmissions in small R0R_{0} region as aforementioned, thereby in turn protecting the elderly even though they have not been vaccinated. There exist some related simulation studies in the literature. It is shown in [8] that vaccinating high-transmission group is the best strategy to minimize the death from COVID-19 when the NPIs (for Ontario) is combined with high level of natural immunity. Our results further illustrate that relatively strong NPI strategies, even without natural immunity, could lead to the same conclusion. In [24], the researchers show that high-transmission group should be prioritized to minimize death only when the vaccination covers a large proportion of the population (e.g., over 40%40\% coverage when the vaccine efficacy is 100%100\%). This finding may be due to that they have not combined vaccination with NPIs. As a consequence of this difference, our results instead indicate that the high-transmission group should be prioritized under the presence of relatively strong NPIs, even if the vaccine coverage is very limited, say, 2%2\%, as shown in Fig. 5(b).

Refer to caption
(a) 5% population vaccinated under no-masking scenario (g=1g=1).
Refer to caption
(b) 5% population vaccinated under masking scenario (g=0.3g=0.3).
Figure 6: Hospitalizations versus different immunization prioritization strategies.

In Fig. 6, we evaluate how different vaccination prioritization strategies affect hospitalizations. Similar to the results for mortality, vaccinating high-transmission group first is still more effective under masking scenario, as shown in Fig. 6(b). On the other hand, while both severity and mortality risks increase with age, the disparity in severity ratio between the elderly and younger groups is not as significant as the disparity in the mortality ratio. As a result, under no-masking scenario, vaccinating the adults aged 203920-39 or 505950-59 first even slightly outperforms vaccinating the elderly first in terms of reducing hospitalizations from COVID-19 as depicted in Fig. 6(a), because the former age groups have much higher average contact rates than the elderly people.

Refer to caption
(a) No-masking scenario (g=1g=1).
Refer to caption
(b) Masking scenario (g=0.3g=0.3).
Figure 7: Mortality versus different immunization prioritization strategies with different α\alpha.

Fig. 7 evaluates the performance of different age-specific vaccination strategies versus α\alpha. (38) with α>0\alpha>0 corresponds to a vaccine plan targeting at people with high activity level (e.g., essential workers) in that age group. Thus, it is not surprising to see that the vaccination strategies with α=5\alpha=5 outperform the corresponding vaccination strategies with α=0\alpha=0 in both no-masking and masking scenarios. The effect of changing α\alpha is more significant in Fig. 7(b) than Fig. 7(a), as the epidemic results in small R0R_{0} region are more sensitive to the limited vaccination. In real world, α\alpha reflects the vaccine allocation plan and the knowledge of the vaccine distributor towards the population structure, which must be taken into account to forecast the effectiveness of certain immunization strategies. This preferential immunization for human networks with general degree distributions, however, cannot be evaluated based on traditional age-stratified homogeneous-mixing models.

Fig. 8 examines the consistency of our conclusions under a hard-hitting scenario with 20%20\% population naturally immune before vaccination. To obtain the initial conditions Si(𝒌,0)S_{i}(\boldsymbol{k},0) for this case, we simulate the disease spread according to the time-dependent dynamics in (1)-(6) until when around 20%20\% people get infected. Due to the natural immunity, R0R_{0} reduces from 2.52.5 to 1.781.78 under the no-masking scenario. To sustain R0R_{0} above 11, we set g=0.5g=0.5, which corresponds to a looser masking measure, resulting in R0=1.1R_{0}=1.1 under the masking scenario. As can be observed from Fig. 8, vaccinating the elderly still reduces the mortality from COVID-19 most in the no-masking case, and vaccinating adults aged 203920-39 still decreases the mortality most in the masking scenario. This phenomenon demonstrates that our conclusion still holds when a high level of natural immunity has already been achieved.

Refer to caption
(a) No-masking scenario (g=1g=1)
Refer to caption
(b) Masking scenario (g=0.5g=0.5).
Figure 8: Mortality versus different immunization prioritization strategies with 20%20\% population naturally immune before vaccination.

V-C Epidemic Probability

Refer to caption
Figure 9: Epidemic probability versus transmission rate λ\lambda under either no-masking or masking case. The vertical line marks the value of λ\lambda corresponding to R0=2.5R_{0}=2.5 under no-masking scenario.

The proposed epidemic model is capable of capturing the stochastic property of epidemics. For countries or areas that have no active cases inside, it is useful to estimate the probability that a new import case, if not quarantined properly, sparks an epidemic. In Fig. 9, we study how universal masking could suppress the epidemic probability under both no-masking and masking scenarios. Recall that the epidemic probability is the likelihood that a zero patient randomly chosen from the population starts an epidemic. Under the no-masking scenario, it is shown that the epidemic probability is about 0.80.8 when R0=2.5R_{0}=2.5, implying that most new cases, if not isolated, will give rise to an epidemic. Conversely, face mask wearing effectively suppresses the epidemic probability to about 0.250.25. As reported in China, import cold-chain food contamination is even a source for COVID-19 resurgence, and therefore it is nearly impossible to isolate all new (or import) case properly. Consequently, taking some low-cost control policies, such as universal masking, is still important for disease-free areas to reduce or eliminate the risk of COVID-19 outbreak or resurgence.

VI Conclusion

To combat the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most important research tasks is to find out how to effectively decrease mortality and severe illness from COVID-19. To achieve this goal, we present a unified analytical framework for COVID-19 by considering both age-dependent risks and heterogeneity in contact networks within and across age groups. Under this framework, we use a novel age-stratified SEAHIR compartmental model to account for the distinct dynamics in a micro-state level, and employ the multitype random network approach to characterize the spread of epidemics. Several critical epidemiological metrics, including time-dependent dynamics, epidemic size, epidemic probability, and reproduction number are rigorously derived to capture essential features to be used to manage the pandemic.

Based on our proposed epidemic model, we have also studied the vaccination problem. It turns out that what is the best vaccination prioritization strategy to decrease mortality and hospitalizations depends on the reproduction number R0R_{0}. In other words, the effective strategies may vary across different areas, and heavily depends on the level of local NPI policies, such as masking, that suppress COVID-19 transmissions. We conclude that vaccinating the high-risk group is only effective in reducing mortality when R0R_{0} is relatively high, e.g., under the no-masking scenario, whereas vaccinating the high-transmission group turns out to be the wise strategy if intervention policies have already suppressed R0R_{0} at a low level. Although there are many social and ethical considerations in vaccination allocation, our results provide the rationale for vaccination prioritization at early stage of vaccination campaign.

There are several promising directions for future research. First, the COVID-19 reinfection can be incorporated into the epidemic model. In this paper, we assume that once a person becomes immune (either via getting infected or vaccinated), the person will never contract the disease. In a relatively short term (e.g., several months), this assumption may be reasonable given the rare reports of reinfection and the current understanding of the vaccination. However, how long the protective antibodies last remains an open problem. To take the possible reinfection into account, we need to break the state RR into recovery, vaccinated and death states, and consider the transition from the recovery and vaccinated states to state SS. Under this case, we can still obtain the time-dependent epidemic dynamics by using the proposed approach in Section III-B. Nevertheless, since the final state of the network may not be disease-free due to the existence of reinfection, other fundamental epidemic metrics, such as epidemic size and reproduction number, cannot be calculated via the proposed approach, which is worth studying in the future. Second, it is useful to evaluate many other NPIs based on our proposed model. For instance, what is the impact of limiting some gatherings or events, such as mass gatherings in bars, gyms, and churches, on the epidemic spread? To answer these kinds of questions, one can simulate a realistic contact network (e.g., with households, schools, bars, gyms, and churches), as in [9], to discover the impact of different gatherings or events on the network structure, and then perform the epidemic analysis using our mathematical framework by removing the edges contributed by these gatherings.

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